Re: Fwd: Re: [PEIRCE-L] [biosemiotics:6231] Re: biosemiotics is the basis for

[John Collier]

Response to Claudio (nice post in my opinion) and Gary R.
At 05:52 PM 2014-08-10, Gary Richmond wrote:
Forwarded at the request of
Claudio Guerri. GR

-- Forwarded message --
From: Claudio Guerri
<
claudiogue...@fibertel.com.ar>
Date: Sun, Aug 10, 2014 at 9:25 AM
Subject: Fwd: Re: [PEIRCE-L] [biosemiotics:6231] Re: biosemiotics is the
basis for
To: Gary Richmond

 Mensaje original  
Asunto: Re: [PEIRCE-L] [biosemiotics:6231] Re: biosemiotics is the basis
for 
Fecha: Wed, 06 Aug 2014 15:17:22 -0300 
De: Claudio Guerri

 
A: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu


Gary, John, List, 
Firstness is really a complex aspect of the sign... but the more
important and difficult aspect for knowledge...
"Symbols grow" and so, First is last... but not least...
and Firstness is essential to all Design disciplines, because related to
Form: conception of form (Math, Geometry...), concrete representation of
form (graphic languages...), aesthetic strategy of form (Renaissance,
Cubism...).
I think that some good should come out of considering a concrete sign
instead of an abstract approach to what can be considered First (examples
are not easy to give, Peirce not excluded from that difficulty).
Everything can be considered a sign, and all signs have to be considered
in its triadic aspects: Firstness, Secondness and Thirdness.
But, Firstness can not be considered in its own, but related to the other
two aspects. Considering a very abstract sign, Firstness can be a feeling
and a Qualisign: redness...
But 'redness' needs a word, so it involves Thirdness, and it can not
exist without the experienced "brute force" of lots of red
objects, so Secondness is also present.
Verbal language is tricky... 'is' and 'are' should not be used for
subsigns or aspects of a sign. The Gioconda IS not an Icon, but a
complete SIGN, from which I can legally emphasize the iconic aspect in a
sentence without naming specifically the other two logically necessary
aspects. In this sense, Louis Althusser is very helpful by stating: some
aspect can be "dominant".
The sign Architecture is an 'easy' example... Somewhere in the old
e-mails in the List there should be a complete Semiotic Nonagon of the
'sign Architecture'. Resuming:
The three aspects of Architecture are: Design (1ness), Construction
(2ness) and Habitability (3ness).
At his time, Vitruvius considered also three aspects, but naming the
three values or 3ness's of the three aspects (in his own order): 
Firmitas (Dicisign), Utilitas (Argument) and Venustas (Rhema).
In the case of architecture, I would not say that Design is a
'feeling'... it should be (normally) something very concrete, even if
only the 'possibility' of being constructed and inhabited.
By deepening in the 3 aspects of Design (always simplifying), we have:
Geometry, Graphic Languages and Gestalt Theory (for the Qualisign);
plans/drawings, models and texts (for the Iconic aspect); and an
aesthetic value of that proposal (for Rhema). And I would not dare to say
that even Geometry can be considered a 'feeling', except in a very
metaphoric way...
In this example, Geometry is not considered as a sign in itself, but as a
1ness of 1ness of 1ness of Architecture, and, since it is considered in
the context of Architecture it is also related unavoidably to Projective
Geometry (2ness, the different graphic languages: Perspective, Monge
System and TSD) and to Gestalt Theory (3ness). Though, Geometry IS not
something concrete and stable but is an aspect of itself, depending on
the context in which it appears.
So, given any sign or aspect of a sign all three Categories will be there
necessarily, in a way or an other, explicitly or not, by cognitive
consciousness or not...
The troglodyte that killed the neighbor to get his 'better' cave (the
equivalent to a better building today) had no IDEA, was not conscious
about DESIGN to decide to kill his neighbor, but, according to Peirce's
proposal, he had to have SOME idea about 'forms' of caves (design,
1ness), some idea of the of materiality of caves (construction, 2ness)
and some idea of the usability (3ness) of that space, called
'cave'.
It seems to me that it is not completely correct, or say, misleading, to
say "that those direct 'feels' are not thoughts, that they
are unanalyzed experiences of qualities" or are
"ineffable", because to say so, we have to imply all knowledge
of concrete materialized experiences and use all our symbolic knowledge
of speech to say that, in THIS case, "this is ineffable"... but
actually meaning: after having reviewed all what I know, I can not
recognize the immediate object nor its symbolic meaning. As far as I can
think, there can not be a pure 1ness, nor a pure 2ness nor a pure 3ness,
but there is always SOME presence of the three categories... perhaps with
an emphasis on one aspect.
This is my understanding. I think it is very difficult, If not
impossible, to concentrate on firstness alone (see below, response to
Gary R.)

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: [biosemiotics:6061] Re: "Unreasonable

[U Pascal]

Sung,

The relationship between the sign vehicle/representamen and the object may
be motivated or unmotivated. If the relationship is one of similarity or
spatio-temporal contiguity, the sign is said to be motivated. If the
relationship between the sign vehicle and the object only exists though
convention the sign is said to be arbitrary. If the graphical
representation of the formula share similarities with the representations
of the data distributions, the sign is motivated, which is to say *NOT
ARBITRARY*

Another way to think about is that a graph is a one-to-many function where
one graph type represents many (but not any) graph objects. An arbitrary
sign function is an any-to-one function where any sign vehicle could be
selected to represent one object. Out of phonetic space many arrangements
of sounds could be selected at random to refer to the same object. Just in
the english language alone, "dog", "hound", "puppy", "canine" etc. have all
been selected to refer to the same object despite being unrelated sounds,
because the object does not constrain the form of phonetic space we use to
represent it. In science however, the object does constrain the form of
possible representations (which is to say in science we aim to make sure
our representations are motivated). I hope this clarifies the
"arbitrariness of the sign".

---
Ulysses


On Sun, Aug 10, 2014 at 1:09 PM, Benjamin Udell  wrote:

>  Frank, list,
>
> Thanks for your response. I've been quite busy myself. I've tried to make
> some Arisbe pages friendlier to people who have trouble using a mouse -
> using tab to move from link to link, shift tab to move likewise but
> backward, etc.
> http://www.cspeirce.com/menu/library/aboutcsp/aboutcsp.htm ,
> http://www.cspeirce.com/menu/library/bycsp/bycsp.htm ,
> http://www.cspeirce.com/newbooks.htm , and
> http://www.cspeirce.com/pastbooks.htm .
> Those should work for such people better now than before in recent
> versions of Internet Explorer and Firefox. I doubt that I can make
> everything work with all browsers, since they're up to differing speeds on
> 'accessibility' issues. Of course I should do it with the home page too!
> But I wanted to get the most complex pages done before I did the home
> page.  Once I get this modicum of accessibility accomplished, I'll get back
> to adding books to the book pages.
>
> You wrote,
>
> [Quote]
> When I was coming up with a response, I realized I had been thinking of
> the nature of the dynamical object, in which the Third in that trichotomy
> is a collective, and that's what made me think the charcar example
> appropriate. But after considering it further, I recall that the symbol
> would not only be a sign that is a collective but also a type, so I suppose
> you must be right. I had been thinking that a common purpose was enough,
> but now I see a common type is required too for a symbol.
> [End quote]
>
>  That's an adjunct to the ten trichotomies of signs in the letter to Lady
> Welby, the trichotomy of objects. I thought that it was kind of odd that he
> dubbed it 'collective', maybe he thought that the object as such needs to
> be 'secundan' in some way. But it's been a while since I read it. Then I
> remembered a passage from a letter to William James (in EP 2:492, and in CP
> 8.177 including editorial end note 4) 
> http://www.commens.org/dictionary/entry/quote-letters-william-james-6
>
>
> A Sign is a Cognizable that, on the one hand, is so determined (i.e.,
> specialized, '_*bestimmt*_') by something _*other than itself_*, called
> its Object (or, in some cases, as if the Sign be the sentence "Cain killled
> Abel," in which Cain and Abel are equally Partial Objects, it may be more
> convenient to say that that which determines the Sign is the Complexus, or
> Totality, of Partial Objects. And in every case the Object is accurately
> the Universe of which the Special Object is member, or part), while, on the
> other hand, it so determines some actual or potential Mind, the
> determination whereof I term the Interpretant created by the Sign, that
> that Interpreting Mind is therein determined mediately by the Object.
>
> It is hard to avoid thinking of a Universe of Discourse as a collective.
> It consists of the things that can bear relative or polyadic predicates.
> Even a propositional or a monadic logic involves 2nd-order objects with
> 2nd-order relative predicates such as conjunction and disjunction. Some
> polyadic conditionals express the kinds of things that Peirce regarded as
> would-be's, such as rules or laws. Well, I could ramble, I'm not sure quite
> what to make of all this.
>
> Regarding 'term' and 'word', the distinction is one to which Peirce
> appeals but which, as far as I know, did not originate with him. I was
> taught it in high school, if I remember correctly. _*Term*_ is to _*word*_
> as _*proposition*_ is to _*sentence*_. Now, Quine and others rejected the
> idea of the _*proposition*_ as a thought or idea or meaning,
> linguis