Dear Peircers -

Indeed a deep question.
In Peirce, it is connected to his complicated theory of what constitutes the 
unity of propositions ("Dicisigns" - . I addressed this in "Natural 
propositions" (2014)).

To Peirce, this question is independent of the issue of the components of 
propositions (subjects and predicate) taken individually and seems to have two 
aspects, one being the basic, relational structure underlying predicates, the 
other being a (most often disguised) self-reference of propositions connected 
to 1) their truth-claims and 2) the issue of the "immediate object" as the 
sign's claimed connection to its object.

Best,
Frederik

Fra: John Collier <colli...@ukzn.ac.za<mailto:colli...@ukzn.ac.za>>
Svar til: John Collier <colli...@ukzn.ac.za<mailto:colli...@ukzn.ac.za>>
Dato: onsdag den 20. januar 2016 06.40
Til: Robert Eckert <recke...@mail.naz.edu<mailto:recke...@mail.naz.edu>>, 
"peirce-l@list.iupui.edu<mailto:peirce-l@list.iupui.edu>" 
<peirce-l@list.iupui.edu<mailto:peirce-l@list.iupui.edu>>
Emne: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Thirdness, coupling and merging

Interesting questions, Robert. They certainly deserve further investigation.

One difference I see is that Chomsky’s merge is a syntactic operation, whereas, 
If I understand him correctly, Peircean coupling has a semantic aspect as well. 
Chomsky consistently separates syntax and semantics, but he perhaps has a more 
narrow view of semantics than Peirce did. This latter issue is especially worth 
exploring, I think.

I believe that Chomsky’s merge (and many if not all of his earlier syntactic 
operations) is nonreducible to component parts (especially linguistic 
behaviours), and in this respect seems to be a Peircean third. Likewise for 
Peircean coupling. So in this respect they are species of a common genus. But I 
don’t think this directly implies they are of the same species of this genus 
for the reasons I gave before.

I have considerably more I could say, but I will leave it at that for now. I 
was exposed to Chomsky (as a professor of mine) and to Peirce (by independent 
study) more or less at the same time as an undergraduate, and I am probably 
more inclined than many to see connections between the two. This has only been 
reinforced by my subsequent studies, though the differences have also become 
more apparent.

John Collier
Professor Emeritus and Senior Research Associate
University of KwaZulu-Natal
http://web.ncf.ca/collier

From: Robert Eckert [mailto:recke...@mail.naz.edu]
Sent: Wednesday, 20 January 2016 1:49 AM
To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu<mailto:peirce-l@list.iupui.edu>
Subject: [PEIRCE-L] Thirdness, coupling and merging

Dear list,

Is it possible that Peirce's thirdness, Percy's coupling and Chomsky's merging 
are the same?

Could this bringing together, symbolization, merging, of two other things, 
explain our language ability?

If so, this basic exemplification in diagrammatic form defines humans.
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