Re: [PEIRCE-L] Dyadic relations within the triadic

[Gary Richmond]

Gary F, List,

Correction: off-list Gary F suggested that where I'd written

But dicisigns *are* (along with Qualisigns and Sinsigns) *most
certainly* signs,
i.e., Representamen.


that I probably meant, not Dicisign, but Qualisign. Yes, that* is* what I
meant. Maybe I ought to start speaking of Signs (as such) as Marks, Tokens,
and Types (as John Sowa suggested) in the interest of not making that sort
of mistake in the future!

Gary F also wrote off-list, and I responded:


GF: I just don’t buy your ontological argument[. . .] I prefer to take
Peirce as speaking with his usual exactitude when he says “An Icon is a
sign”, “An Index is a sign”, “A Symbol is a sign” and so on. He doesn’t
need to add “i.e. a representamen” because he has already *defined* a sign
as a representamen.


Well, we will have to continue to disagree on this. There are several signs
which are iconic, and *in this sense*, an icon is a sign. There are several
signs which are indexical; 3 are symbolic.


If you say, for example, "An Icon is a sign," then what you are saying is
that there are exactly three sign classes where *in relation to the object* the
sign is icon*ic*. If you say "An Index is a sign," well that refers to 4
sign classes. I think that sort of talk (an Index is a Sign) out of context
leads to some very loose thinking, and there is a LOT of loose thinking to
this day surrounding icons/indices/symbols. Too many commentators stop at
the consideration of these relations to the Object, ignoring the 2
additional trichotomies.


So, the "exactitude" with which Peirce speaks, as you put it, is in a
specific context in which he is emphasizing that relationship to the
Object, prescinding it from other discussions. I personally think that more
prescision is needed in discussing Peirce's classification of signs.


Best,


Gary R




[image: Gary Richmond]

*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
*C 745*
*718 482-5690*

On Mon, Apr 17, 2017 at 7:06 PM, Gary Richmond 
wrote:

> Gary F,
>
> I guess I'll have to continue to at least partially disagree with you on
> one of the points you singled out. You quoted me then wrote:
>
> GR: “It is my understanding the 9 are NOT as GF wrote "classifications of
> Signs," rather, they are *parametric* [and]together (given certain
> constraints) lead to the Classification of Signs into 10 classes.”
>
>
>
> GF: Of course the three trichotomies into which Peirce divides signs are
> parametric, but so are the resulting ten classes.
>
>
> If the 10 sign classes are parametric then they are certainly not so in
> anything like the same sense that the three trichotomies are parametric.
> One can, for example, give examples of exactly the kind of sign each of the
> 10 classes represents, and Peirce does exactly that. On the other hand, the
> 9 elements of the three trichotomies are given precisely to establish the
> 10 classes as Peirce clearly says ("These three trichotomies, taken
> together. etc.")_
>
>
> It seems to me that to distinguish the two (the elements of the
> trichotomies as logically substantially different from those of the
> classification) we should call the 9 "parameters" (since *3 trichotomies*
> doesn't get at the specific parametric character of each of the 9) and the
> 10 members of the Classification of Signs,  "classes." What good could
> possibly come from using the same term, "parameter," to describe them both?
>
>
> GF: I can’t bring myself to use a terminology in which Qualisigns and
> Sinsigns are signs but Dicisigns, Symbols and Arguments are *not *signs.
> Translating Peirce’s text into that terminology is just too much work.
>
>
> But dicisigns *are* (along with Qualisigns and Sinsigns) *most certainly*
> signs, i.e., Representamen.
>
>
> I have pointed to the way in which, for example, it is more correct to
> speak of the *symbolic* character of a sign (for it is  a symbol in
> consideration of its Object only), but that when one considers that there
> are *three* classes of signs which are symbolic in relation to their
> objects, to speak of a symbol can only be a kind of shorthand, useful
> enough in a context in which it is clear exactly what one is talking about.
>
>
> This is a fortiori the case with Argument, which one surely need never
> "spell out" as, say, *argumentative symbolic legisign. *The three
> symbolic classes may safely be shortened to, respectively, Rheme, Dicisign
> (or Proposition), and Argument (Jon S has suggested the possibility of
> providing all three terms for the 10 classes, and while this may be helpful
> with some of the sign classes, I agree with GF that it is
> unnecessary--"just too much work"-- in the case of all 3 classes of signs
> that are symbolic in relaiton to their objects; this is also so for the
> first class, the Qualisign).
>
>
>
> GF: Peirce actually uses the “mode” language quite often, for instance in
> MS 318 (EP2:410):
>
> [[ I will

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Dyadic relations within the triadic

[Gary Richmond]

Gary F,

I guess I'll have to continue to at least partially disagree with you on
one of the points you singled out. You quoted me then wrote:

GR: “It is my understanding the 9 are NOT as GF wrote "classifications of
Signs," rather, they are *parametric* [and]together (given certain
constraints) lead to the Classification of Signs into 10 classes.”



GF: Of course the three trichotomies into which Peirce divides signs are
parametric, but so are the resulting ten classes.


If the 10 sign classes are parametric then they are certainly not so in
anything like the same sense that the three trichotomies are parametric.
One can, for example, give examples of exactly the kind of sign each of the
10 classes represents, and Peirce does exactly that. On the other hand, the
9 elements of the three trichotomies are given precisely to establish the
10 classes as Peirce clearly says ("These three trichotomies, taken
together. etc.")_


It seems to me that to distinguish the two (the elements of the
trichotomies as logically substantially different from those of the
classification) we should call the 9 "parameters" (since *3 trichotomies*
doesn't get at the specific parametric character of each of the 9) and the
10 members of the Classification of Signs,  "classes." What good could
possibly come from using the same term, "parameter," to describe them both?


GF: I can’t bring myself to use a terminology in which Qualisigns and
Sinsigns are signs but Dicisigns, Symbols and Arguments are *not *signs.
Translating Peirce’s text into that terminology is just too much work.


But dicisigns *are* (along with Qualisigns and Sinsigns) *most certainly*
signs, i.e., Representamen.


I have pointed to the way in which, for example, it is more correct to
speak of the *symbolic* character of a sign (for it is  a symbol in
consideration of its Object only), but that when one considers that there
are *three* classes of signs which are symbolic in relation to their
objects, to speak of a symbol can only be a kind of shorthand, useful
enough in a context in which it is clear exactly what one is talking about.


This is a fortiori the case with Argument, which one surely need never
"spell out" as, say, *argumentative symbolic legisign. *The three symbolic
classes may safely be shortened to, respectively, Rheme, Dicisign (or
Proposition), and Argument (Jon S has suggested the possibility of
providing all three terms for the 10 classes, and while this may be helpful
with some of the sign classes, I agree with GF that it is
unnecessary--"just too much work"-- in the case of all 3 classes of signs
that are symbolic in relaiton to their objects; this is also so for the
first class, the Qualisign).



GF: Peirce actually uses the “mode” language quite often, for instance in
MS 318 (EP2:410):

[[ I will say that a sign is anything, of whatsoever mode of being, which
mediates between an object and an interpretant; since it is both determined
by the object*relatively to the interpretant*, and determines the
interpretant *in reference to the object*, in such wise as to cause the
interpretant to be determined by the object through the mediation of this
“sign.” ]]

This quote should also clarify the order of determination as it applies to
signs. But if you search Peirce’s texts for “mode of being,” you’ll find
dozens more.



And yes, I goofed in my remark about legisigns


OK. If you goofed in your remark about legisigns, I goofed on mine
regarding "mode."


Best,


Gary R



[image: Gary Richmond]

*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
*C 745*
*718 482-5690 <(718)%20482-5690>*


>
>

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RE: [PEIRCE-L] Dyadic relations within the triadic

[John Collier]

I do mean as you say by “formally”. I am pretty well trained in traditional 
formal logic (Boolos, Kaplan, Church, Kalish). I don’t know if Peirce made a 
diagram or algebraic form that I can understand. I find natural language words 
comparatively slippery, and I often don’t understand what they mean in, say, 
physics or biology, until I can construct a diagram or something of the sort. 
But I have not read nearly as much Peirce as other people on this list.

John

From: g...@gnusystems.ca [mailto:g...@gnusystems.ca]
Sent: Monday, 17 April 2017 5:01 AM
To: 'Peirce-L' 
Subject: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Dyadic relations within the triadic

John C,

By “represent it formally,” do you mean translate the verbal expression into an 
algebraic notation? Or perhaps an entirely nonverbal diagram?
Since you say you have no idea how to represent it formally, and you’ve read 
some Peirce, are you also saying that Peirce never represented it formally, or 
tried to?

Gary f.

From: John Collier [mailto:colli...@ukzn.ac.za]
Sent: 16-Apr-17 21:11
To: g...@gnusystems.ca; 'Peirce-L' 
mailto:peirce-l@list.iupui.edu>>
Subject: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Dyadic relations within the triadic

What you say may well be true, Gary, but I have no idea how to represent it 
formally (or iconically, for that matter), so it doesn’t do much more for me 
than gibberish, except to indicate there is probably something I don’t 
understand.

I’ve already expressed my problems with formalizing how interpretants can be 
signs in a cascade of interpretation if signs are limited to representamens. 
This seems to me to be a similar problem.

John

From: g...@gnusystems.ca [mailto:g...@gnusystems.ca]
Sent: Sunday, 16 April 2017 5:22 PM
To: 'Peirce-L' mailto:peirce-l@list.iupui.edu>>
Subject: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Dyadic relations within the triadic

John C,

You say that you are assuming that by “sign” I mean “representamen.” I am 
consistently using the word “sign” as Peirce defined it in 1903, as “a 
Representamen with a mental Interpretant.” But since Peirce never says anything 
specific about representamens which are not signs (though he admits the 
possibility, EP2:273), the two terms are pretty much interchangeable in 
Peircean semiotic practice.

But I think your assumption about my usage is not based on that practice, but 
on the habit of using “representamen” as one correlate of the triadic sign 
relation as opposed to the “sign” which supposedly refers to all three 
correlates taken together. As I explained at the end of my previous post, I 
regard this as a bad habit because it causes endless confusion for those trying 
to understand what Peirce actually said about signs.

I also don’t think it’s consistent with Peircean terminology to say that “the 
object and the representamen and the interpretant are the same thing as each 
other,” for the icon or any other kind of sign. You could say that all three 
share the same quality, or perhaps “form,” in the case of the icon, but they 
cannot be identical, as the correlates of a triadic relation must be distinct.

Gary f.

From: John Collier [mailto:colli...@ukzn.ac.za]
Sent: 16-Apr-17 16:37
To: g...@gnusystems.ca; 'Peirce-L' 
mailto:peirce-l@list.iupui.edu>>
Subject: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Dyadic relations within the triadic

This is my understanding too, Gary F., though I have found the passage you 
quoted from Peirce especially hard to parse formally.

The only time thee sign (I am assuming you mean representamen) might determine 
the objects is when it is purely iconic. I take it that this is a trivial case.

Cheers,
John


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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Dyadic relations within the triadic

[Jeffrey Brian Downard]

Gary F, Jon S, Gary R, List,


Jon S. has pointed to a potential problem with the standard reading of the 
character of the three correlates of a genuine triadic relation and the account 
in NDTR of what determines what in the semiotic process. What is more, he 
suggests a way out of the potential problem, although it involves having the 
interpretant determine the sign--which seems to be at odds with what Peirce 
says in many places.


Before we draw a interpretative conclusion that Peirce tried out a different 
account in NDTR and then later changed his mind, or that he made a mistake, I'm 
wondering if there are other options for interpreting the text that are 
consistent with what he says. It will help, I think, to keep in mind that the 
triadic relations between sign, object and interpretant can be arranged such 
that all three have the same modal character or such there is a mixed kind of 
relation between correlates having different modal characters.


In NDDR, Peirce points out that, in most of his earlier writings on logic, he 
focused on logical systems in which the dyadic relations are all existential in 
character. Having said that, he also considered dyadic relations between 
possibles and between necessitants as well as those that have a mixed modal 
character in an appendix to NDDR. These modal relations are front and center, 
for instance, in the development of the lines of potentiality in the gamma 
graphs, but we'll leave these kinds of points to the side for now.


In order to keep the relations between the correlates of a genuine triadic 
relationship clearer, I'd like to follow his suggestion that we think of the 
modal character of the three correlates as being arranged in strata--such that 
there is a level of possibles, a level of existents and a level of necessitants.


Here is a diagram of the three levels, where the dotted arrows are the 
relations of determination between the correlates and the dyadic relations 
between the two correlates--interpreted in light of and in a manner that is 
consistent with the later writings on semiotics. The colored boxes mark the 
points that are central in the 10-fold classification of signs.


[cid:5805e0c0-0e68-40f6-8cd0-d776412fe780]


Keeping this in mind, we need to sort out the different classes of signs that 
are based on the different kinds of genuine triadic relations--and these may be 
different from the classes that are based on the dyadic relations between the 
three correlates. As we have seen, there appears to be two ways of making the 
classifications:


1. Triadic relations are in three ways divisible by trichotomy, according as 
the First, the Second, or the Third Correlate, respectively, is a mere 
possibility, an actual existent, or a law. These three trichotomies, taken 
together, divide all triadic relations into ten classes. These ten classes will 
have certain subdivisions according as the existent correlates are individual 
subjects or individual  facts, and according as the correlates that are laws 
are general subjects, general modes of fact, or general modes of law. (CP 2.238)


2. There will be besides a second similar division of triadic relations into 
ten classes, according as the dyadic relations which they constitute between 
either the First and Second Correlates, or the First and Third, or the Second 
and Third are of the nature of possibilities, facts, or laws; and these ten 
classes will be subdivided in different ways. (CP 2.239)


On its face, the distinction between the qualisign, sinsign and legisign would 
appear to be based on the considerations are highlighted in (1) (and the same 
holds for the later division between signs that are abstractives, occurrences 
and collectives, and the division between signs that are emotional, energetic 
and normal), which ask us to focus our attention on the modal character of the 
correlates themselves. The distinctions between icons, indices and symbols and 
between rhemes, dicisigns and arguments would appear to be based on the 
considerations that are highlighted in (2), which ask us to focus on the dyadic 
relation between two correlates (and this holds as well for the later division 
between signs that are suggestives, imperatives and indicatives).


Based on a reading of "The Logic of Mathematics, an attempt to develop my 
categories from within," I think it is reasonable to suppose that thoroughly 
genuine triadic relations have a special sort of iterative pattern. This 
pattern is highlighted in his many definitions of the sign--both early and 
late. In NDTR, he puts the point in these terms:


A Representamen is the First Correlate of a triadic relation, the Second 
Correlate being termed its Object, and the possible Third Correlate being 
termed its Interpretant, by which triadic relation the possible Interpretant is 
determined to be the First Correlate of the same triadic relation to the same 
Object, and for some possible Interpretant. (CP 2.242)


Let me

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Laws of Nature as Signs

[Thomas903]

Group ~

Going back to the original question, I believe a "law of nature" is
characterized differently, in terms of Sign relationships, depending upon
one of three ('ness) perspectives from which the "law of nature" is being
considered:

1 - To Peirce-Emerson-The Sphinx:  Existence consists solely of: (a)
objects which (b) behave logically. To Peirce, behaving logically is the
ONLY law of nature.  It is the unifying element of all of existence, and
represents ultimate Truth.

>From this perspective (of ultimate Truth), phenomena labeled by Man as
"laws of nature" (such as the law of gravity) are physical potentials of
existence (firstness), which do not necessarily occur everywhere, or in all
times.


2 - To an object, like Man, affected by but unable to affect a "law of
nature," the law is a physical regularity in its environment that can be
counted on without fail.  It enters the Man's logic-decision calculus as an
object or brute force (secondness).

3 - Finally, the objects comprising the environment (i.e., the environment
responsible for the "law of nature" that Man perceives) are themselves
engaged in habitual-optimizing behaviors (thirdness).


These alternating perspectives for perceiving-assigning Signs carry over to
other objects, apart from "laws of nature."

For example, subatomic particles that obey Pragmatic Logic will in certain
environmental settings evolve into a uranium atom. In other environments,
those particles would have evolved into something else.  From this
perspective, a "uranium atom" is a potential (firstness Sign) of a universe
of logical particles.

To Man, the uranium atom has specific-fixed physical qualities, including
decaying at a certain fixed/predictable rate. Here, the uranium atom is an
object, with a secondness Sign.

>From the perspective of the particles comprising the uranium atom,
presently they are experiencing the optimizing relationship that earlier
evolved between them (thirdness).  However, having landed on earth, the
particles comprising the uranium atom find themselves in an inhospitable
environment (relative to that of the u-atom's "birth").  Therefore, the
original habits of the particles are no longer optimal.  The decay of the
uranium atom represents a transition phase (secondness activities), where
the particles seek new optimizing actives appropriate for their earth
environment (thirdness).


Regards,
Tom Wyrick


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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Dyadic relations within the triadic

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

Gary F., List:

Right, Peirce's tenfold classification of Signs in NDTR is *not *based in
any way on CP 2.235-238.  The three trichotomies that he used in CP 2.243ff
were not Sign, Object, and Interpretant *as correlates*; this was precisely
the mistake that Hartshorne and Weiss made when they wrongly suggested in a
footnote to CP 2.238 that he reversed "First" and "Third" in CP 2.235-236.
Rather, the three trichotomies were Sign as correlate (per CP 2.238),
Sign-Object as relation (per CP 2.239), and how Sign determines
Interpretant in respect to Object (per CP 2.241).  Peirce never applied CP
2.238 to *all three* correlates--Sign, Object, and Interpretant--in NDTR.
Had he done so, perhaps he would have detected and corrected what I have
come to believe was an error on his part, especially since I now see that
CP 2.241 specifically states that the First Correlate *determines *the
Third Correlate.

Maybe Peirce had not yet fully worked out in his own mind that X
determining Y means that if X is a mere possibility, then Y must also be a
mere possibility; and that if Y is a law, then X must also be a law.  In
other words, contrary to CP 2.235-236, the correlate that is more complex *in
itself* (Interpretant) does not necessarily determine the correlate that is
simpler *in itself* (Sign); rather, complexity vs. simplicity applies to
how the *Category *of one correlate constrains the *Category *of another
(3ns>2ns>1ns).  When I talk about "the order of determination" as applied
to trichotomies, I am referring to which correlate does the constraining
and which one is constrained--which is evidently based on something *other
than* complexity.

Thanks,

Jon

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Mon, Apr 17, 2017 at 10:28 AM,  wrote:

> Jon S, Gary R, Jeff,
>
>
>
> Hold the phone … perhaps the scales have suddenly fallen from my eyes, but
> I now see the problem with CP 2.235-6 if it’s applied to signs: the order
> of complexity as stated there is NOT consistent with the order of
> determination object > sign > interpretant. My point 3 below, following the
> order of determination, says that if the sign is a law, then the
> Interpretant could be possibility, fact or law. But 235 says that the First
> Correlate is “not a law unless all three are of that nature.” (Why did I
> think those two statements were compatible?!)
>
>
>
> CP 2.236-6 now does appear to me as a red herring with respect to the
> classification of signs. So I guess I’d better shut up now. Apologies for
> the queasiness I’ve caused.
>
>
>
> Gary f.
>

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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Dyadic relations within the triadic

[Clark Goble]

> On Apr 15, 2017, at 12:14 PM, g...@gnusystems.ca wrote:
> 
> Clark, yes, that’s why I was careful to qualify my comments by saying “In 
> NDTR.” But when you say that “what happens actually affects what is 
> possible,” what you mean is that what happens now affects what can possibly 
> happen in the future. Possibility as Firstness is timeless, in Peirce’s 
> usage, so your usage of the term in your statement diverges from Peirce’s 
> usage in a categorial context.

That’s an interesting question. My assumption is simply that possibles are 
abstract. So what we’re really saying is that there is some possibility given a 
particular state where the state can be of varying levels of generality or 
vagueness. That is when we talk about how an event changes the possibilities 
we’re talking about what possibilities as first apply. The reasoning of 
possibilities is always this applying abstractions.



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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Dyadic relations within the triadic

[gnox]

Jon S, Gary R, Jeff,

 

Hold the phone . perhaps the scales have suddenly fallen from my eyes, but I
now see the problem with CP 2.235-6 if it's applied to signs: the order of
complexity as stated there is NOT consistent with the order of determination
object > sign > interpretant. My point 3 below, following the order of
determination, says that if the sign is a law, then the Interpretant could
be possibility, fact or law. But 235 says that the First Correlate is "not a
law unless all three are of that nature." (Why did I think those two
statements were compatible?!)

 

CP 2.236-6 now does appear to me as a red herring with respect to the
classification of signs. So I guess I'd better shut up now. Apologies for
the queasiness I've caused.

 

Gary f.

 

From: g...@gnusystems.ca [mailto:g...@gnusystems.ca] 

Sent: 17-Apr-17 09:36

 

Jon S.,

 

OK, what I'll do here is take CP 2.235-6 and apply it to signs on the
assumption that the Sign is First Correlate and determines the Interpretant
which is Third Correlate, and list ALL the possibilities, and see whether
your "entailment" is among them. 

 

1. Sign is a mere possibility (qualisign). Then the Interpretant is
a mere possibility.

2. Sign is an actual fact (sinsign). Then the Interpretant is either
an actual fact or a possibility.

3. Sign is a law. Then the Interpretant could be possibility, fact
or law.

4. Interpretant is a mere possibility. Then it could have been
determined by any of the three kinds of sign.

5. Interpretant is an actual fact. Then it could have been
determined by a fact or a law.

6. Interpretant is a law. Then it could only have been determined by
a law.

 

Or, as Peirce put it in terms of correlates: the First Correlate is "a mere
possibility if any one of the three is of that nature, and not a law unless
all three are of that nature." And the Third Correlate is "a law if any one
of the three is a law, and not a mere possibility unless all three are of
that nature." That's what 2.235-6 says.


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RE: [PEIRCE-L] Dyadic relations within the triadic

[gnox]

Jon S,

Hold the phone … perhaps the scales have suddenly fallen from my eyes, but I
now see the problem with CP 2.235-6 if it’s applied to signs: the order of
complexity as stated there is NOT consistent with the order of determination
object > sign > interpretant.

From: g...@gnusystems.ca [mailto:g...@gnusystems.ca]
Sent: 17-Apr-17 09:36
To: 'Peirce-L' 
Subject: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Dyadic relations within the triadic

Jon S.,

OK, what I’ll do here is take CP 2.235-6 and apply it to signs on the
assumption that the Sign is First Correlate and determines the Interpretant
which is Third Correlate, and list ALL the possibilities, and see whether
your “entailment” is among them.

1.        Sign is a mere possibility (qualisign). Then the  
Interpretant is a mere

possibility.
2.        Sign is an actual fact (sinsign). Then the Interpretant is either an
actual fact or a possibility.
3.        Sign is a law. Then the Interpretant could be possibility,  
fact or law.
4.        Interpretant is a mere possibility. Then it could have been  
determined by

any of the three kinds of sign.
5.        Interpretant is an actual fact. Then it could have been  
determined by a

fact or a law.
6.        Interpretant is a law. Then it could only have been  
determined by a law.


Or, as Peirce put it in terms of correlates: the First Correlate is “a mere
possibility if any one of the three is of that nature, and not a law unless
all three are of that nature.” And the Third Correlate is “a law if any one
of the three is a law, and not a mere possibility unless all three are of
that nature.” That’s what 2.235-6 says.

I still don’t see how you get this passage to “entail that the Third
Correlate determines the Second Correlate, which determines the First
Correlate.” Hence my bafflement.

Gary f.

From: Jon Alan Schmidt [ 
mailto:jonalanschm...@gmail.com][1]
Sent: 16-Apr-17 20:17
To: Gary Fuhrman <  g...@gnusystems.ca>
Cc: Peirce-L <  peirce-l@list.iupui.edu>
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Dyadic relations within the triadic

Gary F., List:

Consider these two passages.

CSP:  The First Correlate is that one of the three which is regarded as of
the simplest nature, being a mere possibility if any one of the three is of
that nature, and not being a law unless all three are of that nature. The
Third Correlate is that one of the three which is regarded as of the most
complex nature, being a law if any one of the three is a law, and not being
a mere possibility unless all three are of that nature ...  (CP 2.235-236;
1903)

CSP:  It is evident that a Possible can determine nothing but a Possible; it
is equally so that a Necessitant can be determined by nothing but a
Necessitant. Hence it follows from the definition of a Sign that since the
Dynamoid Object determines the Immediate Object, which determines the Sign
itself, which determines the Destinate Interpretant, which determins the
Effective Interpretant, which determines the Explicit Interpretant, the six
trichotomies, instead of determining 729 classes of signs, as they would if
they were independent, only yield 28 classes ... (EP 2:481; 1908)

If we equate "mere possibility" with "Possible" and "law" with
"Necessitant," and define "determines" in accordance with the second
passage, then the first passage entails that the Third Correlate determines
the Second Correlate, which determines the First Correlate.  This is the
only way that the same procedure that yields 28 classes from six correlate
trichotomies will yield ten classes from three correlate trichotomies such
that the First Correlate is a law only if all three are laws, and the Third
Correlate is a mere possibility only if all three are mere possibilities.
Please note, I am well aware that these are not the ten Sign classes that
Peirce spells out later in NDTR.

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA


Links:
--
[1] mailto:jonalanschm...@gmail.com%5D

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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Dyadic relations within the triadic

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

Gary F.:

Your #3 directly contradicts CP 2.235--the First Correlate (Sign) is a law,
but the Third Correlate (Interpretant) need not be.
Your #4 directly contradicts CP 2.236--the Third Correlate (Interpretant)
is a mere possibility, but the First Correlate (Sign) need not be.

Now, if we reverse the order--such that the Interpretant determines the
Sign--then we get these combinations instead.

   1. Interpretant is a mere possibility.  Then the Sign is a mere
   possibility.
   2. Interpretant is an actual fact.  Then the Sign is an actual fact or a
   possibility.
   3. Interpretant is a law.  Then the Sign could be possibility, fact or
   law.
   4. Sign is a mere possibility.  Then it could have been determined by
   any of the three kinds of Interpretant.
   5. Sign is an actual fact.  Then it could have been determined by a fact
   or a law.
   6. Sign is a law.  Then it could only have been determined by a law.

These are all perfectly consistent with CP 2.235-236; in particular, the
First Correlate (Sign) is "not a law unless all three are of that nature"
(my #6), and the Third Correlate (Interpretant) is "not a mere possibility
unless all three are of that nature" (my #1).

CP 2.235-238 is based on the assumption that in a genuine triadic relation,
the more complex correlate always determines the simpler one.  If--as we
all agree--the Object (Second Correlate) determines the Sign (First
Correlate), which determines the Interpretant (Third Correlate), then
Peirce was simply wrong about this in NDTR.  He obviously corrected himself
in later writings, including EP 2:481.

Thanks,

Jon S.

On Mon, Apr 17, 2017 at 8:36 AM,  wrote:

> Jon S.,
>
>
>
> OK, what I’ll do here is take CP 2.235-6 and apply it to signs on the
> assumption that the Sign is First Correlate and determines the Interpretant
> which is Third Correlate, and list ALL the possibilities, and see whether
> your “entailment” is among them.
>
>
>
>1. Sign is a mere possibility (qualisign). Then the Interpretant is a
>mere possibility.
>2. Sign is an actual fact (sinsign). Then the Interpretant is either
>an actual fact or a possibility.
>3. Sign is a law. Then the Interpretant could be possibility, fact or
>law.
>4. Interpretant is a mere possibility. Then it could have been
>determined by any of the three kinds of sign.
>5. Interpretant is an actual fact. Then it could have been determined
>by a fact or a law.
>6. Interpretant is a law. Then it could only have been determined by a
>law.
>
> Or, as Peirce put it in terms of correlates: the First Correlate is “a
> mere possibility if any one of the three is of that nature, and not a law
> unless all three are of that nature.” And the Third Correlate is “a law if
> any one of the three is a law, and not a mere possibility unless all three
> are of that nature.” That’s what 2.235-6 says.
>
>
>
> I still don’t see how you get this passage to “entail that the Third
> Correlate determines the Second Correlate, which determines the First
> Correlate.” Hence my bafflement.
>
>
>
> Gary f.
>

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[PEIRCE-L] Re: Laws of Nature as Signs

[Jon Awbrey]

Helmut, List ...

The difference between the two definitions is sometimes
described as “decontextualized” versus “contextualized”
or, in computerese, “weak typing” versus “strong typing”.
The second definition is typically expressed by means of
a peculiar mathematical idiom that starts out as follows:

“A k-place relation is a k+1-tuple (X_1, …, X_k, L) …”

That way of defining relations is a natural generalization
of the way functions are defined in the mathematical subject
of category theory, where the “domain” X and the “codomain” Y
share in defining the “type” X → Y of the function f : X → Y.

The threshold between “arbitrary”, “artificial”, “random” kinds of
relations and those selected for due consideration as “reasonable”,
“proper”, “natural” kinds tends to shift from context to context.
We usually have in mind some property or quality that marks the
latter class as “proper” objects of contemplation relative to
the end in view, and so this relates to the intensional view
of subject matters.

Regards,

Jon

On 4/15/2017 2:49 PM, Helmut Raulien wrote:
> Jon, List,
> Thank you, Jon! Your point No. 2 is new to me, that some
> define relation not only as the subset of the domains'
> cartesian product, but as that plus a list of the domains.
>
> In case the subset is not a random one, but a consequence
> of some reasonable classification, eg. in a dyadic relation:
> "x_1 < x_2", what is this term "x_1 < x_2" called then?
> I am asking, because I think, that in common language this
> is what people might understand as relation.  I had called
> it "relation reason" before.
> Best,
> Helmut
>
> 15 April 2017 um 16:30 Uhr
>> "Jon Awbrey"  wrote:
>> Helmut, List,
>>
>> Looking over those articles with fresh eyes this morning
>> I see they are rather thick with abstract generalities at
>> the beginning and it would be better to skip down to the
>> concrete examples on a first run-through. I promise to
>> keep that in mind the next time I rewrite them. At any
>> rate, we can always go through the material in a more
>> leisurely fashion on the List.
>>
>> Looking back over many previous discussions, I think one
>> of the main things keeping people from being on the same
>> page, or even being able to understand what others write
>> on their individual pages, is the question of what makes
>> a relation.
>>
>> There's a big difference between a single ordered tuple, say,
>> (x_1, x_2, ..., x_k), and a whole set of ordered tuples that
>> it takes to make up a k-place relation. The language we use
>> to get a handle on the structure of relations goes like this:
>>
>> Say the variable x_1 ranges over the set X_1,
>> and the variable x_2 ranges over the set X_2,
>> ...
>> and the variable x_k ranges over the set X_k.
>>
>> Then the set of all possible k-tuples (x_1, x_2, ..., x_k)
>> ranges over a set that is notated as X_1 × X_2 × ... × X_k,
>> called the “cartesian product” of the “domains” X_1 to X_k.
>>
>> There are two different ways of defining
>> a k-place relation that are in common use:
>>
>> 1. Some define a relation L on the domains X_1 to X_k
>> as a subset of the cartesian product X_1 × ... × X_k,
>> in symbols, L ⊆ X_1 × ... × X_k.
>>
>> 2. Others like to make the domains of the relation
>> an explicit part of the definition, saying that
>> a relation L is a list of domains plus a subset
>> of their cartesian product.
>>
>> Sounds like a mess but it's usually pretty easy to
>> translate between the two conventions, so long as
>> one remains aware of difference.
>>
>> By way of a geometric image, we can picture the
>> cartesian product X_1 × ... × X_k as a space in
>> which many different relations reside, each one
>> cutting a different figure in that space.
>>
>> To be continued ...
>>
>> Jon
>>
>> On 4/15/2017 12:00 AM, Jon Awbrey wrote:
>>> Helmut, List,
>>>
>>> I think it would be a good idea to continue reviewing basic concepts
>>> and get better acquainted with the relational context that is needed
>>> to ground all the higher order functions, properties, and structures
>>> we might wish to think about. Once we understand what relations are
>>> then we can narrow down to triadic relations and then sign relations
>>> will fall more easily within our grasp.
>>>
>>> I've written up intros to these topics many times before, and you
>>> can find my latest editions, if still very much works in progress,
>>> on the InterSciWiki site, though in this case it may be preferable
>>> to take them up in order from special to general:
>>>
>>> Sign Relations
>>> http://intersci.ss.uci.edu/wiki/index.php/Sign_relation
>>>
>>> Triadic Relations
>>> http://intersci.ss.uci.edu/wiki/index.php/Triadic_relation
>>>
>>> Relation Theory
>>> http://intersci.ss.uci.edu/wiki/index.php/Relation_theory
>>>
>>> I think most of the material you mentioned on Relational Reducibility,
>>> Compositional and Projective, is summarized in the following article:
>>>
>>> Relation Reduction
>>> http://intersci.ss.uci.edu/wiki/index.php/Rel

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Dyadic relations within the triadic

[gnox]

Jon S.,

 

OK, what I’ll do here is take CP 2.235-6 and apply it to signs on the 
assumption that the Sign is First Correlate and determines the Interpretant 
which is Third Correlate, and list ALL the possibilities, and see whether your 
“entailment” is among them.

 

1.  Sign is a mere possibility (qualisign). Then the Interpretant is a mere 
possibility.
2.  Sign is an actual fact (sinsign). Then the Interpretant is either an 
actual fact or a possibility.
3.  Sign is a law. Then the Interpretant could be possibility, fact or law.
4.  Interpretant is a mere possibility. Then it could have been determined 
by any of the three kinds of sign.
5.  Interpretant is an actual fact. Then it could have been determined by a 
fact or a law.
6.  Interpretant is a law. Then it could only have been determined by a law.

 

Or, as Peirce put it in terms of correlates: the First Correlate is “a mere 
possibility if any one of the three is of that nature, and not a law unless all 
three are of that nature.” And the Third Correlate is “a law if any one of the 
three is a law, and not a mere possibility unless all three are of that 
nature.” That’s what 2.235-6 says.

 

I still don’t see how you get this passage to “entail that the Third Correlate 
determines the Second Correlate, which determines the First Correlate.” Hence 
my bafflement.

 

Gary f.

 

From: Jon Alan Schmidt [mailto:jonalanschm...@gmail.com] 
Sent: 16-Apr-17 20:17
To: Gary Fuhrman 
Cc: Peirce-L 
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Dyadic relations within the triadic

 

Gary F., List:

 

Consider these two passages.

 

CSP:  The First Correlate is that one of the three which is regarded as of the 
simplest nature, being a mere possibility if any one of the three is of that 
nature, and not being a law unless all three are of that nature. The Third 
Correlate is that one of the three which is regarded as of the most complex 
nature, being a law if any one of the three is a law, and not being a mere 
possibility unless all three are of that nature ...  (CP 2.235-236; 1903)

 

CSP:  It is evident that a Possible can determine nothing but a Possible; it is 
equally so that a Necessitant can be determined by nothing but a Necessitant. 
Hence it follows from the definition of a Sign that since the Dynamoid Object 
determines the Immediate Object, which determines the Sign itself, which 
determines the Destinate Interpretant, which determins the Effective 
Interpretant, which determines the Explicit Interpretant, the six trichotomies, 
instead of determining 729 classes of signs, as they would if they were 
independent, only yield 28 classes ... (EP 2:481; 1908)

 

If we equate "mere possibility" with "Possible" and "law" with "Necessitant," 
and define "determines" in accordance with the second passage, then the first 
passage entails that the Third Correlate determines the Second Correlate, which 
determines the First Correlate.  This is the only way that the same procedure 
that yields 28 classes from six correlate trichotomies will yield ten classes 
from three correlate trichotomies such that the First Correlate is a law only 
if all three are laws, and the Third Correlate is a mere possibility only if 
all three are mere possibilities.  Please note, I am well aware that these are 
not the ten Sign classes that Peirce spells out later in NDTR. 

 

Regards,




Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA


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RE: [PEIRCE-L] Dyadic relations within the triadic

[gnox]

Gary R,

 

I don’t have time today to respond to all of your points, so I’ll start with 
this one:

Gr: “It is my understanding the 9 are NOT as GF wrote "classifications of 
Signs," rather, they are parametric in the sense that Ben Udell and I 
introduced in my first paper on the topic over a decade ago and, as Peirce 
said, together (given certain constraints) lead to the Classification of Signs 
into 10 classes.”

 

Gf: Of course the three trichotomies into which Peirce divides signs are 
parametric, but so are the resulting ten classes. I’m afraid I can’t bring 
myself to use a terminology in which Qualisigns and Sinsigns are signs but 
Dicisigns, Symbols and Arguments are not signs. Translating Peirce’s text into 
that terminology is just too much work.

 

Peirce actually uses the “mode” language quite often, for instance in MS 318 
(EP2:410): 

[[ I will say that a sign is anything, of whatsoever mode of being, which 
mediates between an object and an interpretant; since it is both determined by 
the object relatively to the interpretant, and determines the interpretant in 
reference to the object, in such wise as to cause the interpretant to be 
determined by the object through the mediation of this “sign.” ]]

This quote should also clarify the order of determination as it applies to 
signs. But if you search Peirce’s texts for “mode of being,” you’ll find dozens 
more.

 

And yes, I goofed in my remark about legisigns.

 

Gary f.

 

From: Gary Richmond [mailto:gary.richm...@gmail.com] 
Sent: 16-Apr-17 20:12
To: Peirce-L 
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Dyadic relations within the triadic

 

Gary F, Jon S, List,

 

I'm afraid your post did *not* make me feel any less queasy. My comments are 
interleaved below preceeded by GR:

 

When I say that one aspect of semeiosis "determines" another, what I 
mean--because it is what I take Peirce to mean--is that the mode of the first 
constrains the mode of the second.

[GF: ] By “mode,” are you referring to the ‘mode of being’ (Firstness, 
Secondness, Thirdness?)

 

GR: Where is the language of 'mode' coming from? I don't find it helpful. Why 
call 1ns/2ns/3ns modes? Did Peirce?

 

Translating the second part of that into the terms of NDTR, if the Sign-Object 
relation is a law, the Sign is a Symbol. But it does not follow from this that 
the Sign in itself must be a Legisign. It could also be a symbolic Dicisign 
(proposition) or a Rheme (term).

 

GR: Huh? Dicisigns and Rhemes are both Legisigns.

 

The same is true for the Sign-Object relation with respect to how the 
Interpretant represents the Sign in respect to the Object.

[GF: ] Hmmm, now I’m getting queasy …

 

GR: But doesn't the Interpretant stand in the same (or similar, that is, 
slightly more developed) relation to the Object to which the Representamen 
stands?

 

That is why three trichotomies result in ten Sign classes, rather than 27.  
That is why a Qualisign must also be an Icon and a Rheme, and why an Argument 
must also be a Symbol and a Legisign.

[GF: ] I thought we already agreed that it’s the order of determination that 
accounts for that (more phenomenologically complex can determine simpler, but 
not the reverse).

 

GR: Queasiness again. . .

 

GF:  And that goes double for your claim that “the Sign-Object relation 
determines how the Interpretant represents the Sign.” In my view, that is 
determined by whether the Sign is an Argument, a Dicisign or a Rheme.

 

Maybe this is where the disconnect is happening.  You seem to be saying that 
whether the Sign is an Argument, Dicent, or Rheme determines how the 
Intepretant represents the Sign in respect to the Object.  By contrast, my 
understanding has always been that how the Interpretant represents the Sign in 
respect to the Object determines whether the Sign is classified as an Argument, 
Dicent, or Rheme.

[GF: ] Ah. Well, I have been speaking as if a Sign is classified that way 
because it really is that kind of Sign, i.e. Peirce’s definition of that Sign 
type in NDTR really does apply to that particular Sign. In other words, I’m 
speaking from a pragmatistically realist point of view. g\

 

GR: Signs are qualisigns/sinsigns/or legisigns (marks/tokens/or types). They 
are argumentative, dicentic, rhematic iconic, indexical, symbolic, etc.

 

The Sign in itself is always and only a Qualisign, Sinsign, or Legisign.  No 
Sign is a Rheme, a Dicent, or an Argument in itself; it is only classified as 
such by virtue of how its Interpretant represents it in respect to the Object.  
Likewise, no Sign is an Icon, an Index, or a Symbol in itself; it is only 
classified as such by virtue of its relation to its Object.

[GF: ] OK, that’s true. As long as we agree that all nine of these Sign types 
are classifications of Signs, i.e. of First Correlates in the various triadic 
relations that make up this universe of semiotic discourse. Sometimes I think 
that the kind of confusion we’ve been experiencing is sown by the habit of 

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Dyadic relations within the triadic

[gnox]

John C,

 

By “represent it formally,” do you mean translate the verbal expression into an 
algebraic notation? Or perhaps an entirely nonverbal diagram?

Since you say you have no idea how to represent it formally, and you’ve read 
some Peirce, are you also saying that Peirce never represented it formally, or 
tried to?

 

Gary f.

 

From: John Collier [mailto:colli...@ukzn.ac.za] 
Sent: 16-Apr-17 21:11
To: g...@gnusystems.ca; 'Peirce-L' 
Subject: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Dyadic relations within the triadic

 

What you say may well be true, Gary, but I have no idea how to represent it 
formally (or iconically, for that matter), so it doesn’t do much more for me 
than gibberish, except to indicate there is probably something I don’t 
understand.

 

I’ve already expressed my problems with formalizing how interpretants can be 
signs in a cascade of interpretation if signs are limited to representamens. 
This seems to me to be a similar problem.

 

John

 

From: g...@gnusystems.ca   
[mailto:g...@gnusystems.ca] 
Sent: Sunday, 16 April 2017 5:22 PM
To: 'Peirce-L' mailto:peirce-l@list.iupui.edu> >
Subject: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Dyadic relations within the triadic

 

John C,

 

You say that you are assuming that by “sign” I mean “representamen.” I am 
consistently using the word “sign” as Peirce defined it in 1903, as “a 
Representamen with a mental Interpretant.” But since Peirce never says anything 
specific about representamens which are not signs (though he admits the 
possibility, EP2:273), the two terms are pretty much interchangeable in 
Peircean semiotic practice. 

 

But I think your assumption about my usage is not based on that practice, but 
on the habit of using “representamen” as one correlate of the triadic sign 
relation as opposed to the “sign” which supposedly refers to all three 
correlates taken together. As I explained at the end of my previous post, I 
regard this as a bad habit because it causes endless confusion for those trying 
to understand what Peirce actually said about signs.

 

I also don’t think it’s consistent with Peircean terminology to say that “the 
object and the representamen and the interpretant are the same thing as each 
other,” for the icon or any other kind of sign. You could say that all three 
share the same quality, or perhaps “form,” in the case of the icon, but they 
cannot be identical, as the correlates of a triadic relation must be distinct.

 

Gary f.

 

From: John Collier [mailto:colli...@ukzn.ac.za] 
Sent: 16-Apr-17 16:37
To: g...@gnusystems.ca  ; 'Peirce-L' 
mailto:peirce-l@list.iupui.edu> >
Subject: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Dyadic relations within the triadic

 

This is my understanding too, Gary F., though I have found the passage you 
quoted from Peirce especially hard to parse formally. 

 

The only time thee sign (I am assuming you mean representamen) might determine 
the objects is when it is purely iconic. I take it that this is a trivial case.

 

Cheers,

John

 


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