Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 3.11

[Jerry Rhee]

Helmut, list,



In response to “.. failed to consider the possibility that all philosophers
form a class by themselves, or that what unites all genuine philosophers is
more important than what unites a given philosopher with a particular group
of non-philosophers”,



you said:
I also think, that philosophers are not a class. Everybody is a philosopher
somehow..



I am sure you are right.

I am also sure there can never ever have been a genuine philosopher in all
of human history..  so why *even* bother with talk about genuine philosophy?



Best,
Jerry R

On Mon, Jan 8, 2018 at 4:14 PM, Helmut Raulien  wrote:

>
> Jerry, List,
> I think there are essential distinctions between the experience that is
> written in the genes (instincts), epigenetic dispositions, and that which
> is written in in the memory of the brain, like cultural experience. I also
> think, that philosophers are not a class. Everybody is a philosopher
> somehow, and every philosopher is a non-philosopher somehow too, especially
> Nietzsche.
> Best,
> Helmut
>  08. Januar 2018 um 01:31 Uhr
> *Von:* "Jerry Rhee" 
>
>
> Btw,
>
>
>
> “cask of memory”, Nietzsche
>
> “This is man”, Peirce
>
> “glassy essence, like an angry ape”, Shakespeare
>
>
>
> “.. failed to consider the possibility that all philosophers form a class
> by themselves, or that what unites all genuine philosophers is more
> important than what unites a given philosopher with a particular group of
> non-philosophers”, Strauss
>
>
>
> Best wishes,
> Jerry Rhee
>
> On Sun, Jan 7, 2018 at 5:49 PM, Jerry Rhee  wrote:
>>
>> Dear list,
>>
>>
>>
>> Is my experience but of yesterday?
>>
>> It is long ago that I experienced the reasons for mine opinions.
>>
>>
>>
>> This is man,
>>
>> ". . . proud man,
>> Most ignorant of what he's most assured,
>> His glassy essence, like an angry ape.."
>>
>>
>>
>> Best,
>> Jerry R
>>
>> On Sat, Jan 6, 2018 at 6:49 PM, Gary Richmond 
>> wrote:
>>>
>>> Gene, Gary f, list,
>>>
>>> Gene wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>> It seems to me that one can also say that some elements of our
>>> experience are primate experience, and also even mammal experience, rather
>>> than specifically human experience. And perhaps these prejudices need to be
>>> bracketed out in scientific experience as well.
>>>
>>>
>>> But aren't such primate, mammalian and material 'elements' immediately
>>> *filtered*, so to speak, through our* human being* in order to count as *our
>>> experience, *experience in Peirce's sense in the material under
>>> discussion?
>>>
>>> So, while it's true that my pain in stubbing my toe is surely mammalian
>>> pain, I immediately, quasi-necessarily turn it into *human* *experience*.
>>> I say to myself "ouch!" (the pain is symbolized), "my right big toe" (the
>>> pain is immediately localized in human terms), etc. Such human
>>> symbolization allows us to not only experience, but also importantly to
>>> reflect on our experience in order to, come to better understandings of the
>>> nature of physical pain, to, for example, discover means to control it
>>> medically for not only humans, but for primates, other mammals, etc.
>>>
>>> Best,
>>>
>>> Gary R
>>>
>>>
>>> [image: Gary Richmond]
>>>
>>> *Gary Richmond*
>>> *Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
>>> *Communication Studies*
>>> *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
>>> *718 482-5690*
>>>
>>> On Sat, Jan 6, 2018 at 3:28 PM,  wrote:
>>>
 Gene,



 Yes — for me it goes without saying that humans are mammals and
 primates, but now that you’ve said it, I agree.



 The Nietszche quote does seem timely in some respects … likewise this
 bit from the *Avatamsaka Sutra* that I quoted on my blog the other
 day: “There is not a single sentient being who is not fully endowed with
 the knowledge of the enlightened; it is just that because of deluded
 notions, erroneous thinking, and attachments, they are unable to realize
 it.”



 Gary f.



 } The lord whose oracle is at Delphi neither speaks nor conceals, but
 gives signs. [Heraclitus] {

 http://gnusystems.ca/wp/ }{ *Turning Signs* gateway







 *From:* Eugene Halton [mailto:eugene.w.halto...@nd.edu]
 *Sent:* 6-Jan-18 14:13
 *To:* Peirce List 
 *Subject:* RE: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 3.11



 Dear Gary F,

  Your comment concludes:

  "That last sentence takes us to the crux of the challenge of
 Peircean semiotics and Peircean phenomenology: *Experience is our only
 teacher* in science, as he says elsewhere, and all of our experience
 is *human* experience — yet we are tasked to “take away the
 psychological or accidental human element” from our comprehension of the
 elements of the phenomenon, and specifically of 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 3.11

[Jeffrey Brian Downard]

Gary F, List,


In the "Logic of Mathematics," Peirce makes a distinction between the general 
class of genuinely triadic relations, and the species that are thoroughly 
genuine in their triadic character. Here is a way of characterizing the 
difference between the two.


In all genuinely triadic relations, a general rule is the third correlate, and 
that rule governs the relations between the first and second correlates. 
Consequently, there are three kinds of genuinely triadic relations--and they 
can be distinguished on the basis of the character of the first and second 
correlates that are governed by the rule:


1. The laws of quality are general rules that governs the relations between 
qualities;

2. The laws of fact are general rules that governs the relations between facts, 
where each fact involves existing objects having various qualities;

3. Representations involve general rules that govern the relations between a 
thought playing the role of a first and a thought playing the role of a second.


As such, I am working on the assumption that, when it comes to thoroughly 
genuine triadic relations, all three correlates have the character of thoughts. 
What is more, these thoroughly genuine triadic relations  can be distinguished 
from triadic relations that are not thoroughly genuine on the grounds that the 
latter take qualities, objects and/or facts as the first and second 
correlates--and not thoughts of those things.




--Jeff



Jeffrey Downard
Associate Professor
Department of Philosophy
Northern Arizona University
(o) 928 523-8354

From: g...@gnusystems.ca 
Sent: Monday, January 8, 2018 3:13:25 PM
To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
Subject: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 3.11

One more comment on Lowell 3.11 before we move on:

When we analyze a Genuine Thirdness, or the operation of a Sign, we find 
Thought playing three different roles, which we might call the Firstness of 
Thought (“which is such as it is positively and regardless of anything else”), 
its Secondness (“which is as it is in a second something's being as it is”), 
and its Thirdness (“whose being consists in its bringing about a secondness”) — 
those definitions are from the Syllabus (EP2:267). Experience and Information 
are two names for the Secondness of Thought, i.e. Thought as Event, as 
something that happens when two subjects enter into dyadic relations with one 
another. An experiencing “subject” and an experienced “object,” for example, 
are each what they are in that moment because the other is what it is at that 
time.

“Information” here, as usual in Peirce, is not something that can be quantified 
in numbers of bits or megabytes, but an event that leaves some quasi-mind more 
informed about the Other than it was before the informing event. The event is a 
change in a “state of information,” as Peirce often puts it. But the “subject” 
or “mind” who is informed by this event must continue to be the same system or 
entity in order to be changed or informed by it; and if there is any regularity 
governing the information process, it must also continue in its generality, its 
ability to continue bringing about such events in the future. That is its 
Thirdness — which necessarily involves its Secondness and Firstness, as Peirce 
has already explained. Likewise a triadic relation can always be seen as a 
single relation involving three “subjects,” which in Peircean semiotics are 
called Sign, Object and Interpretant.

The analysis can be continued: the sign in itself can have three modes of 
being; the sign-object relation likewise be predominantly monadic, dyadic or 
triadic; and the interpretant can represent that relation in three different 
ways. Peirce gives much more of this further analysis in the Syllabus, both in 
the “speculative Grammar” section and the “Nomenclature and Divisions of 
Triadic Relations,” which culminates in the famous tenfold classification of 
sign types. But all this analysis depends on an understanding of Genuine 
Thirdness. So here again is the paragraph on this that I’ve been paraphrasing 
from Lowell 3:

[CP 1.537] Now in Genuine Thirdness, the First, the Second, and the Third are 
all three of the nature of thirds, or Thought, while in respect to one another 
they are First, Second, and Third. The First is Thought in its capacity as mere 
Possibility; that is, mere Mind capable of thinking, or a mere vague idea. The 
Second is Thought playing the rôle of a Secondness, or Event. That is, it is of 
the general nature of Experience or Information. The Third is Thought in its 
rôle as governing Secondness. It brings the Information into the Mind, or 
determines the Idea and gives it body. It is informing thought, or Cognition. 
But take away the psychological or accidental human element, and in this 
genuine Thirdness we see the operation of a Sign.

http://gnusystems.ca/Lowell3.htm }{ Peirce’s Lowell Lectures of 1903

Aw: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 3.11

[Helmut Raulien]

 

Jerry, List,

I think there are essential distinctions between the experience that is written in the genes (instincts), epigenetic dispositions, and that which is written in in the memory of the brain, like cultural experience. I also think, that philosophers are not a class. Everybody is a philosopher somehow, and every philosopher is a non-philosopher somehow too, especially Nietzsche.

Best,

Helmut


 08. Januar 2018 um 01:31 Uhr
Von: "Jerry Rhee" 
 



Btw, 

 

“cask of memory”, Nietzsche

“This is man”, Peirce

“glassy essence, like an angry ape”, Shakespeare

 

“.. failed to consider the possibility that all philosophers form a class by themselves, or that what unites all genuine philosophers is more important than what unites a given philosopher with a particular group of non-philosophers”, Strauss

 

Best wishes, 
Jerry Rhee


 
On Sun, Jan 7, 2018 at 5:49 PM, Jerry Rhee  wrote:



Dear list,

 

Is my experience but of yesterday? 

It is long ago that I experienced the reasons for mine opinions.

 

This is man,

". . . proud man,
Most ignorant of what he's most assured,
His glassy essence, like an angry ape.."

 

Best,
Jerry R




 
On Sat, Jan 6, 2018 at 6:49 PM, Gary Richmond  wrote:



Gene, Gary f, list, 

 

Gene wrote: 

 


It seems to me that one can also say that some elements of our experience are primate experience, and also even mammal experience, rather than specifically human experience. And perhaps these prejudices need to be bracketed out in scientific experience as well.


 

But aren't such primate, mammalian and material 'elements' immediately filtered, so to speak, through our human being in order to count as our experience, experience in Peirce's sense in the material under discussion? 

 

So, while it's true that my pain in stubbing my toe is surely mammalian pain, I immediately, quasi-necessarily turn it into human experience. I say to myself "ouch!" (the pain is symbolized), "my right big toe" (the pain is immediately localized in human terms), etc. Such human symbolization allows us to not only experience, but also importantly to reflect on our experience in order to, come to better understandings of the nature of physical pain, to, for example, discover means to control it medically for not only humans, but for primates, other mammals, etc.

 

Best,

 

Gary R

 


 








 

Gary Richmond

Philosophy and Critical Thinking

Communication Studies

LaGuardia College of the City University of New York

718 482-5690






 



On Sat, Jan 6, 2018 at 3:28 PM,  wrote:







Gene,

 

Yes — for me it goes without saying that humans are mammals and primates, but now that you’ve said it, I agree.

 

The Nietszche quote does seem timely in some respects … likewise this bit from the Avatamsaka Sutra that I quoted on my blog the other day: “There is not a single sentient being who is not fully endowed with the knowledge of the enlightened; it is just that because of deluded notions, erroneous thinking, and attachments, they are unable to realize it.” 

 

Gary f.

 

} The lord whose oracle is at Delphi neither speaks nor conceals, but gives signs. [Heraclitus] {

http://gnusystems.ca/wp/ }{ Turning Signs gateway

 

 

 

From: Eugene Halton [mailto:eugene.w.halto...@nd.edu]
Sent: 6-Jan-18 14:13
To: Peirce List 
Subject: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 3.11

 


Dear Gary F, 


     Your comment concludes:



     "That last sentence takes us to the crux of the challenge of Peircean semiotics and Peircean phenomenology: Experience is our only teacher in science, as he says elsewhere, and all of our experience is human experience — yet we are tasked to “take away the psychological or accidental human element” from our comprehension of the elements of the phenomenon, and specifically of semiosic phenomena. Nominalists and others will say it can’t be done; Peirce says “Why not?”



 



   As a quibble, it seems to me that one can also say that some elements of our experience are primate experience, and also even mammal experience, rather than specifically human experience. And perhaps these prejudices need to be bracketed out in scientific experience as well.



     Nietszche said something that may speak to Peirce’s words, though perhaps not completely parallel:



     "Your true educators and formative teachers reveal to you what the real raw material of your being is, something quite ineducable, yet in any case accessible only with difficulty, bound, paralyzed: your educators can be only your liberators." (Untimely Meditations III)



     Gene Halton



 




 




 

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RE: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 3.11

[gnox]

One more comment on Lowell 3.11 before we move on:

 

When we analyze a Genuine Thirdness, or the operation of a Sign, we find
Thought playing three different roles, which we might call the Firstness of
Thought (“which is such as it is positively and regardless of anything
else”), its Secondness (“which is as it is in a second something's being as
it is”), and its Thirdness (“whose being consists in its bringing about a
secondness”) — those definitions are from the Syllabus (EP2:267). Experience
and Information are two names for the Secondness of Thought, i.e. Thought as
Event, as something that happens when two subjects enter into dyadic
relations with one another. An experiencing “subject” and an experienced
“object,” for example, are each what they are in that moment because the
other is what it is at that time.

 

“Information” here, as usual in Peirce, is not something that can be
quantified in numbers of bits or megabytes, but an event that leaves some
quasi-mind more informed about the Other than it was before the informing
event. The event is a change in a “state of information,” as Peirce often
puts it. But the “subject” or “mind” who is informed by this event must
continue to be the same system or entity in order to be changed or informed
by it; and if there is any regularity governing the information process, it
must also continue in its generality, its ability to continue bringing about
such events in the future. That is its Thirdness — which necessarily
involves its Secondness and Firstness, as Peirce has already explained.
Likewise a triadic relation can always be seen as a single relation
involving three “subjects,” which in Peircean semiotics are called Sign,
Object and Interpretant. 

 

The analysis can be continued: the sign in itself can have three modes of
being; the sign-object relation likewise be predominantly monadic, dyadic or
triadic; and the interpretant can represent that relation in three different
ways. Peirce gives much more of this further analysis in the Syllabus, both
in the “speculative Grammar” section and the “Nomenclature and Divisions of
Triadic Relations,” which culminates in the famous tenfold classification of
sign types. But all this analysis depends on an understanding of Genuine
Thirdness. So here again is the paragraph on this that I’ve been
paraphrasing from Lowell 3: 

 

[CP 1.537] Now in Genuine Thirdness, the First, the Second, and the Third
are all three of the nature of thirds, or Thought, while in respect to one
another they are First, Second, and Third. The First is Thought in its
capacity as mere Possibility; that is, mere Mind capable of thinking, or a
mere vague idea. The Second is Thought playing the rôle of a Secondness, or
Event. That is, it is of the general nature of Experience or Information.
The Third is Thought in its rôle as governing Secondness. It brings the
Information into the Mind, or determines the Idea and gives it body. It is
informing thought, or Cognition. But take away the psychological or
accidental human element, and in this genuine Thirdness we see the operation
of a Sign. 

 

http://gnusystems.ca/Lowell3.htm }{ Peirce’s Lowell Lectures of 1903

 


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PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L 
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http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .

[PEIRCE-L] Peirce's search for a more iconic notation

[John F Sowa]

I was rereading Peirce's 1885 article "On the Algebra of Logic",
in which he presented the algebraic notation that was adopted
by Schröder, Peano, Russell, Whitehead, and the rest of the world.

In the final paragraph of that article (csp85p202.jpg), he wrote

It is plain that by a more iconical and less logically analytical
notation this procedure might be much abridged...


That comment shows that he was already thinking about a graphical
notation as more iconic that the algebra -- and he expected its proofs
to be "much abridged" in comparison to proofs with the algebra.

In later writings, he wrote that EG proofs tended to be longer than
other methods.  But he was comparing them to the more traditional
syllogisms, not to the algebraic notation (which few of his readers
at that time had seen).

John

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