Re: Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Talking about Peirce's theory of research

[Edwina Taborsky]

 

 BODY { font-family:Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;font-size:12px;
}JAS, list

I continue to disagree. I consider that a critique of an argument
does not require a 'better argument' to justify the criticism. The
criticism should stand on its own - critiquing both the content of
the premises, the logical connection between them and the conclusion
-  without also providing another argument. The focus is strictly on
the ONE argument: its premises, its conclusion; its logical
connections. Nothing else.

The proposition vs argument concept makes no difference - a full
syllogism is subject to a critique of each of its premises and its
conclusion without also providing a 'better argument'.

An If-Then mode does not mean that the antecedent is 'strictly
hypothetical' but instead, functions as a connector; it sets up a
logical connection between two situations. The full modus of 
If-Then- So/Therefore actually affirms the antecedent.  "If it rains,
my car will be wet'. The focus is not on the hypothetical nature of
the antecedent but on the connection. 

Edwina
 On Mon 24/06/19  6:28 PM , Jon Alan Schmidt jonalanschm...@gmail.com
sent:
 Edwina, List:
 My point is that if someone disagrees with X, and wants to convince
others that X is false, then that person needs to offer an argument
for not-X that is better (i.e., more persuasive) than any arguments
presented for X.  If you fail to demonstrate that my argument is
somehow fallacious, then you provide no reason for anyone else to
join you in evaluating it as such.
 "All human actions are determined by prior events beyond our
control" is a proposition, not an argument.  Merely asserting it does
not  rationally support its truth, and merely denying it does not
rationally support its falsehood.  Why do some people hold it to be
true?  Why do others hold it to be false?  Who has the better
argument for their position?
 In the example from Plato, the argument is formally valid, and you
agree with its conclusion; so what is your objection?  The first
premiss is a conditional proposition, which means that the antecedent
is strictly hypothetical ; there is no assertion that knowledge is
sensation.  Perhaps you consider the second premiss, "Pigs don't have
knowledge," to be false; but then you would need to offer an argument
to support your contention that pigs do have knowledge.
 Regards,
 Jon S.
 On Mon, Jun 24, 2019 at 4:35 PM Edwina Taborsky < tabor...@primus.ca
[1]> wrote:
JAS, list

I disagree. An argument that is, it itself, fallacious, as I suggest
yours was, cannot be 'supported by a better argument' - since, as I
keep saying and you don't seem to understand, - what if the argument
itself is fallacious? How can a false argument be critiqued by a
'better argument'?

That is - if my argument is, for another example, that I believe
that 'all human actions are determined by prior events beyond our
control' - then, how can this argument/conclusion, which is in itself
fallacious, be critiqued by a 'better argument' for that same
conclusion? 

If an argument is in itself false - then, the premises which support
that argument ought to be critiqued for themselves and thus, the final
conclusion would be shown as unsustainable by any argumentative
premises.

How about ..from Plato:

"If knowledge is sensation, then pigs have knowledge. Pigs don't
have knowledge; therefore, knowledge isn't sensation".

Here, the basic argument of 'knowledge is sensation' is false. How
can it be supported by a 'better argument, when the belief is itself
fallacious? 

Edwina

On Mon 24/06/19  5:17 PM , Jon Alan Schmidt jonalanschm...@gmail.com
[2] sent:
 Edwina, List:
 Thank you for perfectly illustrating my point.  Merely stating
disagreement should never be sufficient, by itself, to convince
anyone.  A critique can only "logically and factually stand on its
own merits" if it is supported by a better argument than the position
being criticized.
 Regards,
 Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USAProfessional Engineer, Amateur
Philosopher, Lutheran Laymanwww.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt [3] -
twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt [4]
 On Mon, Jun 24, 2019 at 3:44 PM Edwina Taborsky  wrote:
JAS, list

I disagree with your comment:

"If someone disagrees with what I post on the List--whether a
particular reading of Peirce's words, or my own suggestion "inspired
by" them--then the proper response is to offer a better argument,
instead of just complaining about mine."

I don't think that critique of arguments should require offering a
'better argument'; I think that a critique ought to stand on its own.
For example, I disagree with your [JAS's] argument for the semeiosic
reality of God [where you move from 'the Universe is a 'perfusion of
signs'---to 'all signs are connected and thus can be understood as A
sign [one sign] '---to 'a sign must have an external object ---

Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Talking about Peirce's theory of research

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

Edwina, List:

My point is that if someone disagrees with X, and wants to convince others
that X is false, then that person needs to offer an *argument *for not-X
that is *better *(i.e., more persuasive) than any arguments presented for
X.  If you fail to *demonstrate *that my argument is somehow fallacious,
then you provide no *reason *for anyone else to join you in evaluating it
as such.

"All human actions are determined by prior events beyond our control" is a
proposition, not an argument.  Merely asserting it does not *rationally*
support its truth, and merely denying it does not *rationally *support its
falsehood.  Why do some people hold it to be true?  Why do others hold it
to be false?  Who has the *better *argument for their position?

In the example from Plato, the argument is formally valid, and you agree
with its conclusion; so what is your objection?  The first premiss is a
*conditional* proposition, which means that the antecedent is strictly
*hypothetical*; there is no *assertion *that knowledge is sensation.
Perhaps you consider the second premiss, "Pigs don't have knowledge," to be
false; but then you would need to offer an argument to *support *your
contention that pigs *do *have knowledge.

Regards,

Jon S.

On Mon, Jun 24, 2019 at 4:35 PM Edwina Taborsky  wrote:

> JAS, list
>
> I disagree. An argument that is, it itself, fallacious, as I suggest yours
> was, cannot be 'supported by a better argument' - since, as I keep saying
> and you don't seem to understand, - what if the argument itself is
> fallacious? How can a false argument be critiqued by a 'better argument'?
>
> That is - if my argument is, for another example, that I believe that 'all
> human actions are determined by prior events beyond our control' -
> then, how can this argument/conclusion, which is in itself fallacious,
> be critiqued by a 'better argument' for that same conclusion?
>
> If an argument is in itself false - then, the premises which support that
> argument ought to be critiqued for themselves and thus, the final
> conclusion would be shown as unsustainable by any argumentative premises.
>
> How about ..from Plato:
>
> "If knowledge is sensation, then pigs have knowledge. Pigs don't have
> knowledge; therefore, knowledge isn't sensation".
>
> Here, the basic argument of 'knowledge is sensation' is false. How can it
> be supported by a 'better argument, when the belief is itself fallacious?
>
> Edwina
>
> On Mon 24/06/19 5:17 PM , Jon Alan Schmidt jonalanschm...@gmail.com sent:
>
> Edwina, List:
>
> Thank you for perfectly illustrating my point.  Merely stating
> disagreement should never be sufficient, by itself, to convince anyone.  A
> critique can only "logically and factually stand on its own merits" if it
> is supported by a better argument than the position being criticized.
>
> Regards,
>
> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
> Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
>
> On Mon, Jun 24, 2019 at 3:44 PM Edwina Taborsky < tabor...@primus.ca>
> wrote:
>
>> JAS, list
>>
>> I disagree with your comment:
>>
>> "If someone disagrees with what I post on the List--whether a particular
>> reading of Peirce's words, or my own suggestion "inspired by" them--then
>> the proper response is to offer a better argument, instead of just
>> complaining about mine."
>>
>> I don't think that critique of arguments should require offering a
>> 'better argument'; I think that a critique ought to stand on its own. For
>> example, I disagree with your [JAS's] argument for the semeiosic reality of
>> God [where you move from 'the Universe is a 'perfusion of signs'---to 'all
>> signs are connected and thus can be understood as A sign [one sign] '---to
>> 'a sign must have an external object  to 'JAS calls this external
>> Object 'God'.
>>
>> I don't see that I should offer a 'better argument' for this hypothesis,
>> since I disagree with and thus, critique each of the steps that you take. I
>> think a critique should logically and factually stand on its own merits and
>> not require a 'better argument' to validate it.
>>
>> Edwina
>>
>

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Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Talking about Peirce's theory of research

[Edwina Taborsky]

 

 BODY { font-family:Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;font-size:12px;
}JAS, list

I disagree. An argument that is, it itself, fallacious, as I suggest
yours was, cannot be 'supported by a better argument' - since, as I
keep saying and you don't seem to understand, - what if the argument
itself is fallacious? How can a false argument be critiqued by a
'better argument'?

That is - if my argument is, for another example, that I believe
that 'all human actions are determined by prior events beyond our
control' - then, how can this argument/conclusion, which is in itself
fallacious, be critiqued by a 'better argument' for that same
conclusion?

If an argument is in itself false - then, the premises which support
that argument ought to be critiqued for themselves and thus, the final
conclusion would be shown as unsustainable by any argumentative
premises.

How about ..from Plato:

"If knowledge is sensation, then pigs have knowledge. Pigs don't
have knowledge; therefore, knowledge isn't sensation".

Here, the basic argument of 'knowledge is sensation' is false. How
can it be supported by a 'better argument, when the belief is itself
fallacious?

Edwina
 On Mon 24/06/19  5:17 PM , Jon Alan Schmidt jonalanschm...@gmail.com
sent:
 Edwina, List:
 Thank you for perfectly illustrating my point.  Merely stating
disagreement should never be sufficient, by itself, to convince
anyone.  A critique can only "logically and factually stand on its
own merits" if it is supported by a better argument than the position
being criticized.
 Regards,
 Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USAProfessional Engineer, Amateur
Philosopher, Lutheran Laymanwww.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt [1] -
twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt [2]
 On Mon, Jun 24, 2019 at 3:44 PM Edwina Taborsky < tabor...@primus.ca
[3]> wrote:
JAS, list

I disagree with your comment:

"If someone disagrees with what I post on the List--whether a
particular reading of Peirce's words, or my own suggestion "inspired
by" them--then the proper response is to offer a better argument,
instead of just complaining about mine."

I don't think that critique of arguments should require offering a
'better argument'; I think that a critique ought to stand on its own.
For example, I disagree with your [JAS's] argument for the semeiosic
reality of God [where you move from 'the Universe is a 'perfusion of
signs'---to 'all signs are connected and thus can be understood as A
sign [one sign] '---to 'a sign must have an external object  to
'JAS calls this external Object 'God'.  

I don't see that I should offer a 'better argument' for this
hypothesis, since I disagree with and thus, critique each of the
steps that you take. I think a critique should logically and
factually stand on its own merits and not require a 'better argument'
to validate it.

Edwina 


Links:
--
[1] http://www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt
[2] http://twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
[3]
http://webmail.primus.ca/javascript:top.opencompose(\'tabor...@primus.ca\',\'\',\'\',\'\')

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Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Talking about Peirce's theory of research

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

Edwina, List:

Thank you for perfectly illustrating my point.  Merely *stating*
disagreement should never be sufficient, by itself, to convince anyone.  A
critique can only "logically and factually stand on its own merits" if it
is supported by a *better* argument than the position being criticized.

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Mon, Jun 24, 2019 at 3:44 PM Edwina Taborsky  wrote:

> JAS, list
>
> I disagree with your comment:
>
> "If someone disagrees with what I post on the List--whether a particular
> reading of Peirce's words, or my own suggestion "inspired by" them--then
> the proper response is to offer a better argument, instead of just
> complaining about mine."
>
> I don't think that critique of arguments should require offering a 'better
> argument'; I think that a critique ought to stand on its own. For example,
> I disagree with your [JAS's] argument for the semeiosic reality of God
> [where you move from 'the Universe is a 'perfusion of signs'---to 'all
> signs are connected and thus can be understood as A sign [one sign] '---to
> 'a sign must have an external object  to 'JAS calls this external
> Object 'God'.
>
> I don't see that I should offer a 'better argument' for this hypothesis,
> since I disagree with and thus, critique each of the steps that you take. I
> think a critique should logically and factually stand on its own merits and
> not require a 'better argument' to validate it.
>
> Edwina
>

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Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Unexplained phenomena (was Talking about...

[Edwina Taborsky]

 

 BODY { font-family:Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;font-size:12px;
}John, list

Perhaps I'm more cynical or sceptical or...but I have my doubts
about our daily opinions having been verified and tested.

After all - the belief that 'evil spirits' cause illness has been a
mainstay in many societies and ethnic groups for hundreds of years.
How can it be tested/  verified - and yet, it is maintained for
centuries. But they aren't true.

And we continue to believe in 'beliefs'  - whether it be about our
environment, our nature as humans, the difference between 'nature'
and 'nurture' and so on. We hold to them with
tenacity/authority/emotion. That is, I don't see that our capacity to
think rationally and scientifically has increased; the majority of a
population do not do so but follow the non-scientific, non-rational
methods of Fixation of Belief. These other methods are easier to use.
So- we may, in large part, no longer believe in witches-on-the-hill,
but we do have other unverified, non-scientific and irrational
beliefs.

Edwina
 On Mon 24/06/19 10:41 AM , John F Sowa s...@bestweb.net sent:
 Edwina, 
 That's a good question: 
 > But how do we get around the fact that most of our beliefs are  
 > 'firmly held opinions' without any ability to be factually
verified. 
 But actually, the overwhelming number of opinions that guide our 
 daily lives have been tested and verified by constant repetition. 
 That's also true of the opinions of cows, chickens, cats, and dogs. 
 All of them learn that humans feed them and take care of them. 
 But one fateful day, some of them discover that their beliefs were 
 tragically mistaken. 
 > That is - as a species - are we doomed to live primarily within 
 > a fictional realm - with only the briefest diversions into the 
 > factual and truthful? 
 Peirce had a lot to say about those issues.  His general conclusion 
 is that the overwhelming number of beliefs that guide our daily
lives 
 are true to the extent that they have been tested.  But it's
important 
 to test the limits. 
 That's why he developed his methodeutic. 
 John 

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Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Talking about Peirce's theory of research

[Edwina Taborsky]

 

 BODY { font-family:Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;font-size:12px;
}JAS, list

I disagree with your comment:

"  If someone disagrees with what I post on the List--whether a
particular reading of Peirce's words, or my own suggestion "inspired
by" them--then the proper response is to offer a better argument,
instead of just complaining about mine."

I don't think that critique of arguments should require offering a
'better argument'; I think that a critique ought to stand on its own.
For example, I disagree with your [JAS's] argument for the semeiosic
reality of God [where you move from 'the Universe is a 'perfusion of
signs'---to 'all signs are connected and thus can be understood as A
sign [one sign] '---to 'a sign must have an external object  to
'JAS calls this external Object 'God'. 

I don't see that I should offer a 'better argument' for this
hypothesis, since I disagree with and thus, critique each of the
steps that you take. I think a critique should logically and
factually stand on its own merits and not require a 'better argument'
to validate it.

Edwina
 On Mon 24/06/19  3:19 PM , Jon Alan Schmidt jonalanschm...@gmail.com
sent:
 John, List:
 JFS:  I searched CP for all occurrences of 'harmonize' to see what
Peirce had to say, favorable or unfavorable.
 That is fine, but not really relevant, since I have never claimed
that what I have in mind by "harmonize" matches Peirce's usage of
that particular word.  Coincidentally, a new  issue [1] of
Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society came out last week; and
it includes T. L. Short's generally favorable review of Robert Lane's
recent book, Peirce on Realism and Idealism, which I read more than a
year ago and now plan to revisit.  The following methodological
remarks by Short caught my eye for reasons that I trust are obvious.
  TLS:  ... Lane’s readings apply the famous ‘principle of
charity’: if something Peirce said, read literally, contradicts
something else he said in the same writing or in closely related
writings, or if it entails some obvious absurdity, then Lane
concludes that that literal reading is not what Peirce meant, because
it clearly could not have been what he thought. As changes in
Peirce’s thought over time are thereby exposed, Lane’s method,
thirdly, is to attempt to account for those  changes--as much as
possible on the basis of what Peirce himself said about them, but in
any case on grounds of sound arguments employing ideas found in his
writings.
 This more or less describes my approach to "harmonizing,"
"synthesizing," and "systematizing" Peirce's thought.  It is an
interpretative practice that (1) attempts to discern his intended
meaning in any given passage, assuming as much as possible that it is
consistent with what he wrote elsewhere; and then (2) develops new
hypotheses accordingly, recognizing that they are always fallible and
thus subject to good-faith criticism.  Ideally, what Short's
immediately subsequent paragraph says about Lane and his book would
likewise be descriptive of me and my List posts. 
 TLS:  In consequence of the care and thoroughness with which Lane
goes about his work, this book not only is a useful guide to the
study of Peirce but will serve as a touchstone of defensible
interpretation. By that I mean this. No doubt there are many points
on which one may reasonably disagree with Lane, as I am sure he
himself would admit; but his readings are so well-grounded that no
one can hope to establish a contrary view without coming to grips
with the evidence and argument Lane has provided. His book cannot be
ignored. 
 This, rather than "a definitive version of Peirce's philosophy," is
the most that I could ever dare to aspire to achieve.  If someone
disagrees with what I post on the List--whether a particular reading
of Peirce's words, or my own suggestion "inspired by" them--then the
proper response is to offer a better argument, instead of just
complaining about mine.
 Regards,
 Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USAProfessional Engineer, Amateur
Philosopher, Lutheran Laymanwww.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt [2] -
twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt [3] 
 On Fri, Jun 21, 2019 at 4:17 PM John F Sowa  wrote:
 Jon, Edwina, Jerry, and Helmut,
 This discussion gets into issues that are fundamental to
methodeutic.
 > JFS:  All my objections would vanish if Jon would make one simple
 > change:  replace every occurrence of 'harmony' with 'hypothesis'.
 >  
 > JAS:  As an alternative, I respectfully request that you accept my
 > explanations and not try to dictate how I express myself.
 > 
 > ET:  Jon - I don't think you realize what you are doing.  There is
 > no need to be so defensive about what others write to you with
 > regard to your comments/interpretations!
 I'm trying to be as constructive as I can.  And I hope that other
 people would apply the same criteria to what I write.  I would
 welcome any criticism anyone may have about what I write.  I may
 agree 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Talking about Peirce's theory of research

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

John, List:

JFS:  I searched CP for all occurrences of 'harmonize' to see what Peirce
had to say, favorable or unfavorable.


That is fine, but not really relevant, since I have never claimed that what
I have in mind by "harmonize" matches *Peirce's *usage of that particular
word.  Coincidentally, a new issue
 of
*Transactions
of the Charles S. Peirce Society *came out last week; and it includes T. L.
Short's generally favorable review of Robert Lane's recent book, *Peirce on
Realism and Idealism*, which I read more than a year ago and now plan to
revisit.  The following *methodological *remarks by Short caught my eye for
reasons that I trust are obvious.

TLS:  ... Lane’s readings apply the famous ‘principle of charity’: if
something Peirce said, read literally, contradicts something else he said
in the same writing or in closely related writings, or if it entails some
obvious absurdity, then Lane concludes that that literal reading is not
what Peirce meant, because it clearly could not have been what he thought.
As changes in Peirce’s thought over time are thereby exposed, Lane’s
method, thirdly, is to attempt to account for those
changes--as much as possible on the basis of what Peirce himself said about
them, but in any case on grounds of sound arguments employing ideas found
in his writings.


This more or less describes my approach to "harmonizing," "synthesizing,"
and "systematizing" Peirce's thought.  It is an interpretative practice
that (1) attempts to discern his intended meaning in any given passage,
assuming as much as possible that it is consistent with what he wrote
elsewhere; and then (2) develops new hypotheses accordingly, recognizing
that they are always fallible and thus subject to good-faith criticism.
Ideally, what Short's immediately subsequent paragraph says about Lane and
his book would likewise be descriptive of me and my List posts.

TLS:  In consequence of the care and thoroughness with which Lane goes
about his work, this book not only is a useful guide to the study of Peirce
but will serve as a touchstone of defensible interpretation. By that I mean
this. No doubt there are many points on which one may reasonably disagree
with Lane, as I am sure he himself would admit; but his readings are so
well-grounded that no one can hope to establish a contrary view without
coming to grips with the evidence and argument Lane has provided. His book
cannot be ignored.


This, rather than "a definitive version of Peirce's philosophy," is the
most that I could ever dare to aspire to achieve.  If someone disagrees
with what I post on the List--whether a particular reading of Peirce's
words, or my own suggestion "inspired by" them--then the proper response is
to offer a *better* argument, instead of just complaining about *mine*.

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Fri, Jun 21, 2019 at 4:17 PM John F Sowa  wrote:

> Jon, Edwina, Jerry, and Helmut,
>
> This discussion gets into issues that are fundamental to methodeutic.
>
> > JFS:  All my objections would vanish if Jon would make one simple
> > change:  replace every occurrence of 'harmony' with 'hypothesis'.
> >
> > JAS:  As an alternative, I respectfully request that you accept my
> > explanations and not try to dictate how I express myself.
> >
> > ET:  Jon - I don't think you realize what you are doing.  There is
> > no need to be so defensive about what others write to you with
> > regard to your comments/interpretations!
>
> I'm trying to be as constructive as I can.  And I hope that other
> people would apply the same criteria to what I write.  I would
> welcome any criticism anyone may have about what I write.  I may
> agree or not.  But that's what I would expect.
>
> Re harmonizing:  I searched CP for all occurrences of 'harmonize'
> to see what Peirce had to say, favorable or unfavorable.
>
> > CP 1.6.  The works of Duns Scotus have strongly influenced me.
> > ... I am convinced that it will go far toward supplying the
> > philosophy which is best to harmonize with physical science.
>
> But note what he wrote in the next paragraph:
> > CP 1.7.  The demonstrations of the metaphysicians are all moonshine.
> > The best that can be done is to supply a hypothesis, not devoid of
> > all likelihood, in the general line of growth of scientific ideas,
> > and capable of being verified or refuted by future observers.
>
> In short, this favorable example of harmonizing is a source for
> *hypotheses* that must then be tested by scientific methodeutic.
>
> For a more critical comment about harmonizing, see below for an
> extended excerpt from CP 5.406 to 5.408.  In 5.406, Peirce praises
> "The real spirit of Socrates, who I hope would have been delighted
> to have been 'overcome in argument,' because he would have learned
> something by it."

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Unexplained phenomena (was Talking about...

[John F Sowa]

Edwina,

That's a good question:

But how do we get around the fact that most of our beliefs are 
'firmly held opinions' without any ability to be factually verified.


But actually, the overwhelming number of opinions that guide our
daily lives have been tested and verified by constant repetition.

That's also true of the opinions of cows, chickens, cats, and dogs.
All of them learn that humans feed them and take care of them.
But one fateful day, some of them discover that their beliefs were
tragically mistaken.


That is - as a species - are we doomed to live primarily within
a fictional realm - with only the briefest diversions into the
factual and truthful?


Peirce had a lot to say about those issues.  His general conclusion
is that the overwhelming number of beliefs that guide our daily lives
are true to the extent that they have been tested.  But it's important
to test the limits.

That's why he developed his methodeutic.

John

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Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Unexplained phenomena (was Talking about...

[Edwina Taborsky]

 

 BODY { font-family:Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;font-size:12px;
}John, list

But how do we get around the fact that most of our beliefs are
'firmly held opinions' without any ability to be factually verified.

That is - we live in, not merely a cultural and historical 'fog'
where our facts about the past and the present are instead opinions
detached from existential reality, but our metaphysical beliefs are
purely intellectual constructs and equally outside of verification.

That is - as a species - are we doomed to live primarily within a
fictional realm - with only the briefest diversions into the factual
and truthful?

Edwina
 On Sun 23/06/19 11:18 PM , John F Sowa s...@bestweb.net sent:
 Jerry and Joe, 
 Jerry 
 > What... makes a phenomenon valuable for science if there are 
 > numerous unexplained facts that can be subject to exact analysis 
 > but not enough time to examine them all? 
 Peirce's definition of truth depends on what would be discovered 
 if inquiry is pursued indefinitely.  He even said that the time 
 to complete all the analysis might take longer than the survival 
 of the human race.  Then perhaps some future beings or even 
 some aliens in a distant galaxy might be able to continue 
 the inquiry. 
 JR 
 > That is, how do you go from a strange, isolated and unexplained 
 > fact useful to science to “a very serious problem requiring 
 > respectful treatment”, which renders it useful? 
 Peirce's criterion for evaluating the truth of any assumption 
 is its ability to make testable predictions.  A single observation, 
 such as some message obtained through telepathy, doesn't provide 
 sufficient information for predicting how and when other messages 
 might come through telepathy. 
 For the word 'telepathy', I found 42 examples by searching CP. 
 In some examples, he talks about cases where somebody dies, and 
 a close friend or relative instantly get a feeling that the 
 person had died. 
 That is very hard to test.  Even if someone gets a strong feeling 
 that seems to be telepathic, it's quite possible that the
information 
 was an "educated guess" based on knowledge about somebody's health. 
 Joe 
 > Interesting case, however it is not clear what motion detection 
 > technology was deployed...  Depending on type, infrared motion 
 > detectors can be triggered by temperature change, and/or light 
 > wave pattern disturbance. 
 I agree that there may be some physical explanation for the 
 phenomena.  The people from the Percy Grainger Society asked the 
 experts at the company that made the camera and motion detector 
 about possible causes.  But no one could suggest any likely cause. 
 But given that we are now reaching the end of June, I started to 
 think about the Fourth of July.  And I noticed that the date might 
 be significant:  Saturday, 2 July 2016 at 8:32 pm and 9:23 pm. 
 Kids often get fireworks for the Fourth, and I have sometimes 
 seen and heard some them practicing on the weekend before. The 
 time of 8:32 pm EDT is just after sunset, and 9:23 pm is long 
 enough after twilight for more complete darkness.  Just behind the 
 Grainger house is a parking lot for a business on the next street, 
 and the Grainger property includes a side lot next to the house. 
 Either one might be a place sufficiently removed from watchful 
 parents. 
 It's possible that a loud noise might have set off the motion 
 detector, and it's possible that the light might have affected 
 the camera. 
 Now that would be a testable hypothesis.  In New York, fireworks 
 are illegal without a permit.  But some scientists (or kids) who 
 have the time, funding, and inclination to perform repeated 
 experiments might be able to determine what kind of fireworks 
 from what positions could trigger the motion detector and be 
 recorded by the camera. 
 On the other hand, the fireworks might have awakened Percy's ghost. 
 John 

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