[PEIRCE-L] The final interpretant
Auke- I have a different view of the Final Interpretant - I see it as a means of 'changing habits'. My view of the Final Interpretant is that it is a continuous and infinite process of generalization, vital to the formation of habits. That is, the Logical or Final or Destinate Interpretant [the name isn't relevant] is an integral component of the universe's growth and increasing complexity. ["Everywhere the main fact is growth and increasing complexity" 6.58and "I, for my part, think that the diversification, the specification, has been continually taking place" 6.57. And "there is probably in nature some agency by which the complexity and diversity of things can be increased" 6.58. What is this 'agency'? It's both 'pure spontaneity' or Firstness [6.59] AND - how does this spontaneity move into the actualities of Secondness? By means of habit formation. By means of Thirdness. "I make use of chance chiefly to make room for a principle of generalization, or tendency to form habits, which I hold has produced all regularities'. 6.63. See also 6.64 and 6.65...the 'phenomen of growth and developing complexity which appears to be universal'. That is, the semiosic process is one that is constantly enabling and increasing both the diversity and complexity of life. Mind enables Matter to become more diverse and complex. To enable this - semiosis does not just focus on the particular individual act of experience of an external object and the interpretation of that external object. Such a confinement of the world to Secondness would deny the realities of Types, of continuity and common adaptation and growth Semiosis also focuses on enhancing and expanding the depth and breadth, the complexity, of the development of habits, the knowledge base/Thirdness that is used within the process of the triadic semiosis. It achieves this enhancement/expansion of habits, of generalization - by means of the Final Interpretant, which is a process of constant generalization of the informational results of the previous Interpretants [the II and DI]. And this information comes from many sites. I think it's important that the 'input' to the FI comes from many sites. - "the logical interpretant should in all cases be a conditional future" . The Interpretants are, after all 'a modification of consciousness' 5.485. What is the nature of a conditional future? - 'those signs that have a logical interpretant are either generals or closely connected with generals" 5.488. See also 5.482 for this focus on the Logical/Final Interpretant as a general and in the 'conditional mood' of 'would be. - "the interpretant is a modifier of consciousness" 5.485 -"the whole function of thought is to produce habits of action' 5.400; 6.262 - this 'logical interpretant' has the function of a 'habit-change' [see 5.476 The works of Peirce are filled with these analyses - too many to quote here. That is - my understanding of the Final Interpretant is that its role is to develop and change habits, relevant to the actual world [of Secondness] and yet capable of the obvious expansion of diversity and complexity in life. In the biological realm, what we see is that the Final Interpretant accepts information/data from many individual agents; it generalizes this data; and then, this generalization becomes dominant and acts to change the species habits stored within Thirdness such that, a bird develops a new beak; a moth develops different coloured wings..and so on. The Final Interpretant is not 'often' used; most of life operates within Firstness/Secondness - and a stable Thirdness. But, the Final Interpretant is, I feel, the key to how we change habits. The Final Interpretant is a means of enabling the infinite evolution of the world's diversity and complexity. It collects data from multiple sites - generalizes them, and this new 'habit' becomes dominant and changes the habits-of-formation of a species. With regard to your example of the changes in style in the life of an artist - I'd say the process is similar, where the artist develops a 'normative style of his art'..and then, by means of interaction with others, with experience etc...comes to a Final Interpretant phase, where he changes his 'normative style of art'. Notice that my view of the Final Interpretant is an evolutionary one; there is no notion of a final Perfection, but instead, a concept of infinite capacity, via input data from multiple sites, plus the action of generalization.. to change the habits of a Type. Edwina - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message.
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Categories at work within the signs
Auke, List: I am a structural engineer, not an architect, so I specialize in bones rather than meat. :-) More seriously, I have long recognized that I am much more adept at formulating abstract theories than at coming up with concrete examples. AvB: In that, i.e. 'they may nevertheless only invoke a feeling in some interpreters', art does not differ from science. I agree, since scientific signs are typically intended to provoke thought (i.e., further signs). By contrast, Robert's ordering of the hexad would entail that such signs *always* produce further signs as their dynamical interpretants. AvB: Does the later work determine the earlier or is it a development from principles laid down in combination with reflection on the intermediate products? The latter, which is consistent with what I have been saying; again, it is a matter of *logical *order, not *temporal* order. Principles are the ideals at which someone is aiming, the standards against which he/she compares those intermediate products. This is *final* causation, the sense in which the *perfect* embodiment of the principles--which is never *actually* achieved--determines *all *the products, even the earliest attempts that fall well short. Regards, Jon S. On Wed, Apr 15, 2020 at 3:03 AM wrote: > Jan Alan, > > It seems that we differ in opinion about meat and bones. I just see more > bones, no meat. Not very informative. > > A side issue: > > You wrote: > > Of course, there are other kinds of art that are intended to provoke > thought and/or action, and my ordering (unlike Robert's) recognizes that > they may nevertheless only evoke a feeling in some interpreters. > > -- > > In that, i.e. 'they may nevertheless only invoke a feeling in some > interpreters', art does not differ from science. Trump is living proof. > > By art I was not thinking about individual pieces of artwork, but about > the development in the work of an individual artist, like Mondriaan and his > development from figurism towards abstraction, or a group of like minded > artists with a program, like Bauhaus. Does the later work determine the > earlier or is it a development from principles laid down in combination > with reflection on the intermediate products? > > Best, > > Auke > > Op 15 april 2020 om 3:14 schreef Jon Alan Schmidt < > jonalanschm...@gmail.com>: > > Auke, List: > > I have been specifically addressing sign classification using a linear > order of trichotomies, which (again) I personally no longer believe is the > most fruitful approach for speculative grammar. Nevertheless, here are > some examples of a necessitant determining a possible. > >- 1903 taxonomy - any ordinary term as a rhematic symbol. >- Hexadic taxonomy per my ordering - a sign that ideally would produce >a further sign (temperative), but whose actual effect is merely a feeling >(sympathetic). >- Hexadic taxonomy per Robert's ordering - a sign that ideally would >produce only a feeling (gratific), but whose actual effect is a further >sign (usual), which I find implausible. > > As for the application to art, I am inclined to agree with T. L. Short's > assessment that "pure" art is properly classified as a possible according > to all the interpretants; i.e., it is intended only to evoke a feeling, and > it never does anything more than evoke a feeling. Of course, there are > other kinds of art that are intended to provoke thought and/or action, and > my ordering (unlike Robert's) recognizes that they may nevertheless only > evoke a feeling in some interpreters. > > Regards, > > Jon S. > > On Tue, Apr 14, 2020 at 10:50 AM < a.bree...@chello.nl> wrote: > > Jon S., > > How do you apply this scheme to art? it is by the fruit that one knows the > tree. I don't see constraints that limit in semiotics, I see possibilies > that evolve. You wrote "a neccesitant can determine ... a possible." > > Under what circumstances can we say that 'the' or 'a' necessitant actually > determines a possible? I need some meat on the terminological bones. > > Auke > > Op 14 april 2020 om 15:10 schreef Jon Alan Schmidt < > jonalanschm...@gmail.com>: > > Auke, List: > > It implies that a necessitant can determine a necessitant, an existent, or > a possible; an existent can determine an existent or a possible; and a > possible can only determine a possible. That is why, in the 1903 taxonomy, > a symbol can be an argument, a dicent, or a rheme; an index can be a dicent > or a rheme; and an icon can only be a rheme. > > In the hexad, signs are classified according to the purpose of the final > interpretant, the mode of being of the dynamic interpretant, and the mode > of presentation of the immediate interpretant; and I believe that the *logical > *order of determination for these three trichotomies is If-->Id-->Ii. > For If and Id, a temperative can be a usual, a percussive, or a > sympathetic; an actuous can be a percussive or a sympathetic; and a > gratific can only be a
[PEIRCE-L] Re: Essay about categories and logical presuppositions
Robert, All ...
At this point I have mostly questions, which would take further
research to answer, not to mention unpacking many books still
in boxes from our move a year and a half ago, none of which
I'm at liberty to do right now. So, just off the cuff ...
"Presupposition" is one of those words I tend to avoid, as it
has too many uses at odds with one another. There are at least
the architectonic, causal, and logical meanings. It it were only
a matter of logic, I would say "P presupposes Q" means "P => Q".
But usually people have something more pragmatic or rhetorical
in mind than pure logic would require, something like enthymeme.
It's also common for people to confound the implication order
"P => Q" with the causal order "P causes Q", whereas it's more
like the reverse of that. In more complex settings we usually
have the architectonic sense in mind, and that is what I sensed
in the case of the normative sciences. Viewed with regard to
their bases, logic is a special case of ethics and ethics is
a special case of aesthetics, but with regard to their levels
of oversight, aesthetics must submit to ethical control and
ethics must submit to logical control.
Early on, Peirce used "involution" with the meaning it has
in arithmetic or number theory, namely, exponentiation, where
x^y means taking x to the power y. See the following passage:
Peirce's 1870 Logic Of Relatives : The Sign of Involution
https://oeis.org/wiki/Peirce%27s_1870_Logic_Of_Relatives_%E2%80%A2_Part_2#The_Sign_of_Involution
As far as the purely boolean or propositional analogue goes,
x^y for x, y in {0, 1} means the same a "x <= y", as you can
tell from the cases: 0^0 = 1, 1^0 = 1, 0^1 = 0, 1^1 = 1.
Whether Peirce is using "involution" that way in the sources
you are using, I do not know at this point.
Regards,
Jon
On 4/15/2020 1:00 PM, Robert Marty wrote:
I like ... what do you think of the presuppositions
between the levels? Do they make sense to you ?
Le mer. 15 avr. 2020 à 18:41, Jon Awbrey a écrit :
Robert,
With a few choice exceptions I have always found Peirce's earlier
writings on categories, relations, and semiotics to be more clear,
exact, and fruitful in practice than his last attempts to explain
himself without the requisite logical and mathematical formalisms.
Still, I do like that podium picture, comprehend it all or not,
and I found myself once using a similar picture to explain the
relationships among the big 3 normative sciences of aesthetics,
ethics, and logic. I called this "The Pragmatic Cosmos" using
"cosmos" in the sense of a global order. It seems most of this
stuff has fallen off the live web. Here's a few links I found:
The Pragmatic Cosmos (Oct 2003)
http://web.archive.org/web/20061014010215/http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2003-October/000879.html
Inquiry Oriented Systems (Feb 2004)
0.
http://web.archive.org/web/20070222005725/http://suo.ieee.org/ontology/thrd4.html#05337
1.
http://web.archive.org/web/20070302154925/http://suo.ieee.org/ontology/msg05337.html
8.
http://web.archive.org/web/20070302155036/http://suo.ieee.org/ontology/msg05344.html
The Pragmatic Cosmos (Mar 2012)
https://www.mail-archive.com/peirce-l@listserv.iupui.edu/msg00924.html
Regards,
Jon
On 4/10/2020 6:39 PM, robert marty wrote:
Dear colleagues hello,
I submit for your review this preprint which is awaiting publication :
https://academia.edu/resource/work/41574474
Here is his abstract :
"This article organizes Peirce's universal categories
and their degenerate forms from their presupposition
relationships. These relationships are formally clarified
on the basis of Frege's definition of presupposition.
They are visualized in a "podium" diagram. With these
forms, we then follow step by step the well-known and
very often cited third Peirce Lowell Conference of 1903
(third draft) in which he sets out his entire method of
analysis based on these categories. The very strong
congruence that is established between the podium and
the text validates the importance, even the necessity,
of taking into account these presuppositions in order
to correctly understand Peirce's phenomenology"
I would be very happy to read your comments.
Best regards
Robert Marty
-
PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L
to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To
UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the
line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at
http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Essay about categories and logical presuppositions
I like ... what do you think of the presuppositions between the levels? Do they make sense to you ? Le mer. 15 avr. 2020 à 18:41, Jon Awbrey a écrit : > Robert, > > With a few choice exceptions I have always found Peirce's earlier > writings on categories, relations, and semiotics to be more clear, > exact, and fruitful in practice than his last attempts to explain > himself without the requisite logical and mathematical formalisms. > > Still, I do like that podium picture, comprehend it all or not, > and I found myself once using a similar picture to explain the > relationships among the big 3 normative sciences of aesthetics, > ethics, and logic. I called this "The Pragmatic Cosmos" using > "cosmos" in the sense of a global order. It seems most of this > stuff has fallen off the live web. Here's a few links I found: > > The Pragmatic Cosmos (Oct 2003) > > http://web.archive.org/web/20061014010215/http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2003-October/000879.html > > Inquiry Oriented Systems (Feb 2004) > 0. > http://web.archive.org/web/20070222005725/http://suo.ieee.org/ontology/thrd4.html#05337 > 1. > http://web.archive.org/web/20070302154925/http://suo.ieee.org/ontology/msg05337.html > 8. > http://web.archive.org/web/20070302155036/http://suo.ieee.org/ontology/msg05344.html > > The Pragmatic Cosmos (Mar 2012) > https://www.mail-archive.com/peirce-l@listserv.iupui.edu/msg00924.html > > Regards, > > Jon > > On 4/10/2020 6:39 PM, robert marty wrote: > > Dear colleagues hello, > > > > I submit for your review this preprint which is awaiting publication : > > > > https://academia.edu/resource/work/41574474 > > > > Here is his abstract : > > > > "This article organizes Peirce's universal categories > > and their degenerate forms from their presupposition > > relationships. These relationships are formally clarified > > on the basis of Frege's definition of presupposition. > > They are visualized in a "podium" diagram. With these > > forms, we then follow step by step the well-known and > > very often cited third Peirce Lowell Conference of 1903 > > (third draft) in which he sets out his entire method of > > analysis based on these categories. The very strong > > congruence that is established between the podium and > > the text validates the importance, even the necessity, > > of taking into account these presuppositions in order > > to correctly understand Peirce's phenomenology" > > > > > > I would be very happy to read your comments. > > > > Best regards > > > > Robert Marty > > > - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
[PEIRCE-L] Re: Essay about categories and logical presuppositions
Robert, With a few choice exceptions I have always found Peirce's earlier writings on categories, relations, and semiotics to be more clear, exact, and fruitful in practice than his last attempts to explain himself without the requisite logical and mathematical formalisms. Still, I do like that podium picture, comprehend it all or not, and I found myself once using a similar picture to explain the relationships among the big 3 normative sciences of aesthetics, ethics, and logic. I called this "The Pragmatic Cosmos" using "cosmos" in the sense of a global order. It seems most of this stuff has fallen off the live web. Here's a few links I found: The Pragmatic Cosmos (Oct 2003) http://web.archive.org/web/20061014010215/http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2003-October/000879.html Inquiry Oriented Systems (Feb 2004) 0. http://web.archive.org/web/20070222005725/http://suo.ieee.org/ontology/thrd4.html#05337 1. http://web.archive.org/web/20070302154925/http://suo.ieee.org/ontology/msg05337.html 8. http://web.archive.org/web/20070302155036/http://suo.ieee.org/ontology/msg05344.html The Pragmatic Cosmos (Mar 2012) https://www.mail-archive.com/peirce-l@listserv.iupui.edu/msg00924.html Regards, Jon On 4/10/2020 6:39 PM, robert marty wrote: > Dear colleagues hello, > > I submit for your review this preprint which is awaiting publication : > > https://academia.edu/resource/work/41574474 > > Here is his abstract : > > "This article organizes Peirce's universal categories > and their degenerate forms from their presupposition > relationships. These relationships are formally clarified > on the basis of Frege's definition of presupposition. > They are visualized in a "podium" diagram. With these > forms, we then follow step by step the well-known and > very often cited third Peirce Lowell Conference of 1903 > (third draft) in which he sets out his entire method of > analysis based on these categories. The very strong > congruence that is established between the podium and > the text validates the importance, even the necessity, > of taking into account these presuppositions in order > to correctly understand Peirce's phenomenology" > > > I would be very happy to read your comments. > > Best regards > > Robert Marty > - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Categories at work within the signs
Jan Alan, It seems that we differ in opinion about meat and bones. I just see more bones, no meat. Not very informative. A side issue: You wrote: Of course, there are other kinds of art that are intended to provoke thought and/or action, and my ordering (unlike Robert's) recognizes that they may nevertheless only evoke a feeling in some interpreters. -- In that, i.e. 'they may nevertheless only invoke a feeling in some interpreters', art does not differ from science. Trump is living proof. By art I was not thinking about individual pieces of artwork, but about the development in the work of an individual artist, like Mondriaan and his development from figurism towards abstraction, or a group of like minded artists with a program, like Bauhaus. Does the later work determine the earlier or is it a development from principles laid down in combination with reflection on the intermediate products? Best, Auke > Op 15 april 2020 om 3:14 schreef Jon Alan Schmidt : > > Auke, List: > > I have been specifically addressing sign classification using a linear > order of trichotomies, which (again) I personally no longer believe is the > most fruitful approach for speculative grammar. Nevertheless, here are some > examples of a necessitant determining a possible. > * 1903 taxonomy - any ordinary term as a rhematic symbol. > * Hexadic taxonomy per my ordering - a sign that ideally would > produce a further sign (temperative), but whose actual effect is merely a > feeling (sympathetic). > * Hexadic taxonomy per Robert's ordering - a sign that ideally would > produce only a feeling (gratific), but whose actual effect is a further sign > (usual), which I find implausible. > As for the application to art, I am inclined to agree with T. L. Short's > assessment that "pure" art is properly classified as a possible according to > all the interpretants; i.e., it is intended only to evoke a feeling, and it > never does anything more than evoke a feeling. Of course, there are other > kinds of art that are intended to provoke thought and/or action, and my > ordering (unlike Robert's) recognizes that they may nevertheless only evoke a > feeling in some interpreters. > > Regards, > > Jon S. > > On Tue, Apr 14, 2020 at 10:50 AM < a.bree...@chello.nl > mailto:a.bree...@chello.nl > wrote: > > > > > > Jon S., > > > > How do you apply this scheme to art? it is by the fruit that one > > knows the tree. I don't see constraints that limit in semiotics, I see > > possibilies that evolve. You wrote "a neccesitant can determine ... a > > possible." > > > > Under what circumstances can we say that 'the' or 'a' necessitant > > actually determines a possible? I need some meat on the terminological > > bones. > > > > Auke > > > > > > > Op 14 april 2020 om 15:10 schreef Jon Alan Schmidt < > > jonalanschm...@gmail.com mailto:jonalanschm...@gmail.com >: > > > > > > Auke, List: > > > > > > It implies that a necessitant can determine a necessitant, an > > > existent, or a possible; an existent can determine an existent or a > > > possible; and a possible can only determine a possible. That is why, in > > > the 1903 taxonomy, a symbol can be an argument, a dicent, or a rheme; an > > > index can be a dicent or a rheme; and an icon can only be a rheme. > > > > > > In the hexad, signs are classified according to the purpose > > > of the final interpretant, the mode of being of the dynamic interpretant, > > > and the mode of presentation of the immediate interpretant; and I believe > > > that the logical order of determination for these three trichotomies is > > > If-->Id-->Ii. For If and Id, a temperative can be a usual, a percussive, > > > or a sympathetic; an actuous can be a percussive or a sympathetic; and a > > > gratific can only be a sympathetic. Likewise, for Id and Ii, a usual can > > > be a relative, a categorical, or a hypothetic; a percussive can be a > > > categorical or a hypothetic; and a sympathetic can only be a hypothetic. > > > > > > Regards, > > > > > > Jon S. > > > > > > On Tue, Apr 14, 2020 at 6:27 AM < a.bree...@chello.nl > > > mailto:a.bree...@chello.nl > wrote: > > > > > > > > > > > > > > Sorry, nasty typo : But, does this imply that a > > > > Neccesitant determines a Possible? > > > > > > > > Op 14 april 2020 om 11:55 schreef a.bree...@chello.nl > > > > mailto:a.bree...@chello.nl : > > > > > > > > Jon Alan, > > > > > > > > You wrote: > > > > > > > > "Constrains" refers to the rule of determination-- -"It > > > > is evident that a Possible can determine nothing but a Possible; it is > > > > equally so that a Necessitant can be determined by nothing but a > > > > Necessitant" (EP
