[PEIRCE-L] Peirce's discovery of 2 June 1911 (was Philosophy of EGs

2020-08-21 Thread John F. Sowa



Jon AS, List 
This thread began with my note of  August 2nd,
which I include below in the file 2aug20.txt.  All the points in that note
are based on the citations included in it.  But I changed the subject line
of this note to emphasize Peirce's fundamental insight of 2 June 1911
shortly after 7:40 pm. 
That was when Peirce finished writing two of
his three "Illative Permissions" in R669.  He then wrote a short
paragraph with a few lines at the top of a new page.  And he stopped.

He did not write the third permission (about double negations), he
left most of the sheet blank, and he never resumed R669.  Three
questions:  Why did he stop when he had enough paper to write the third
permission?  Why did he begin a completely new version of EGs  in R670
with different notation and terminology?  And what did he do in the time
between June 2 and June 7?
My guess:  He reviewed his earlier
writings on EGs, especially the ones from 1903 and 1906.   The content of
R670 and L231 shows what he rejected.  His comments in L378  and L376 show
that he considered the presentation in 1906 "as bad as it could
be".   But his comments in R670 show that he considered some
combination of shading with tinctured areas as possible.  That would be an
option for Delta graphs, as I mentioned in an earlier note. 
JAS>
understanding the entire system of EGs requires familiarity with all
his different writings about them.
Familiarity does not imply
agreement.  The writings prior to June 1911 have some useful insights
mixed with some obsolete material.  It's necessary to evaluate them in
terms of L231.
JFS>   There is no need to derive negation from
anything else.
JAS>  Peirce repeatedly says otherwise, as I have
repeatedly demonstrated..
All those quotations are prior to June
1911.  They're irrelevant and obsolete.
JAS> In R 669 (May 1911),
he notes--just three weeks before composing RL 231--that necessary
reasoning is possible without the concept of falsity
No, for several
reasons:  (1) That is not an exact quotation, since Peirce knew that
affirmation and negation are fundamental to every version of logic from
Aristotle onward. (2) Peirce had forgotten his 1884 point that all
reasoning can be done with just insertions and deletions (W 5:107).   And
Peirce's discovery of 2 June 1911 makes the earlier quotations
irrelevant.
JAS> This (R 466:18-19, 1903) comes from one of
Peirce's notebooks for the Lowell Lectures, which in RL 376 (December
1911) he calls "the better exposition" of EGs than
"Prolegomena to an Apology for Pragmaticism" (1906).  The three
primitives are thus consequence (scroll), coexistence (blank), and
identity (line)
Although Peirce said that the version of 1903 was
better than the version of 1906, it still has obsolete passages, such as
the comments about the scroll.
In R670, he writes "There are
but three peculiar signs that the Syntax of Existential Graphs absolutely
requires."  The first is the line of identity.  The, the second is
the spot, which may be a medad or it may have one or more pegs.  "The
third is one that shall deny a Graph instance, or scribed
assertion."  With that explanation and further confirmation in L231,
every previous comment about scrolls is obsolete and irrelevant.
At
this point, I rest my case.  I stand by the attached 2aug20.txt and the
additional comments above.  Any relevant evidence to the contrary would
have to come from documents later than June 1911.
John


To: ahti-veikko.pietari...@ttu.ee, francesco.belluc...@unibo.it,
jonalanschm...@gmail.com> ``

cc: "De Waal, Cornelis" , Martin Irvine


Dear Ahti, Francesco, and Jon,

I have long maintained that Peirce's best and final version of the
syntax, semantics (endoporeutic), rules of inference, and terminology
for EGs is in L231 and NEM 3.162-169.  But Jon quoted some comments by
Ahti that seem to contradict that claim.  Instead of debating them on
Peirce-L, I'd like to discuss the issues with this smaller group.

First, I'll summarize my reasons for claiming that the copy in
http://jfsowa.com/peirce/eg1911.pdf should be considered the most
definitive:

1. By 1911, Peirce had abandoned hope of publishing a final version, but
he knew that Lady Welby and her correspondents circulated letters among
a group of well-respected philosophers and logicians.  He considered the
letter L231 to be as significant as a formal publication.

2. EG1911 is the clearest, shortest, and most elegant summary of Alpha +
Beta.  The shaded areas can be generalized to 3-D regions or to 4-D for
stereoscopic moving images.  Aspects of Gamma or Delta graphs could be
added without changing the Alpha + Beta foundation.  And eg1911 has a
short, but complete selection of technical terms that could be adapted
to a wide range of notations in any number of dimensions.

3. In L231, Peirce replaced the term 'illative transformation' with the
term 'permission'.  Perhaps he realized that the words 'illative' and
'illation' had become archaic.  More

[PEIRCE-L] Re: Animated Logical Graphs

2020-08-21 Thread Jon Awbrey

Cf: Animated Logical Graphs ??? 36
http://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2020/08/21/animated-logical-graphs-36/

Re: Richard J. Lipton
https://rjlipton.wordpress.com/about-me/
::: Logical Complexity Of Proofs
https://rjlipton.wordpress.com/2020/08/19/logical-complexity-of-proofs/

Dear Dick,

You asked, "Is this measure, the logical flow of a proof, of any interest?"

I wasn't quite clear how you define the measure of flow in a proof --
it seemed to have something to do with the number of implication arrows
in the argument structure?

But this does bring up interesting issues of "proof style" ...

Propositional calculus as a formal language and boolean functions
as an object domain form an instructive microcosm for many issues
of logic writ large.  The relation between proof theory and model
theory is one of those issues, despite, or maybe in virtue of,
propositional logic's status as a special case.

Folks who pursue the CSP-GSB line of development
in graphical syntax for propositional calculus are
especially likely to notice the following dimensions
of proof style.

Formal Duality
==
This goes back to Peirce's discovery of the "amphecks"
( https://oeis.org/wiki/Ampheck )  and the duality between
Not Both (nand ( https://oeis.org/wiki/Logical_NAND ) ) and
Both Not (nnor ( https://oeis.org/wiki/Logical_NNOR ) ).
The same duality is present in Peirce's graphical systems
for propositional calculus.  It is analogous to the duality
in projective geometry and it means we are always proving
two theorems for the price of one.  That's a reduction in
complexity -- it raises the question of how many such
group-theoretic reductions we can find.

To be continued ...

Resources
=

* Cactus Language
https://oeis.org/wiki/Cactus_Language_%E2%80%A2_Overview

Applications


* Applications of a Propositional Calculator ??? Constraint Satisfaction 
Problems
https://www.academia.edu/4727842/Applications_of_a_Propositional_Calculator_Constraint_Satisfaction_Problems

* Exploratory Qualitative Analysis of Sequential Observation Data
http://web.archive.org/web/20180828161616/http://intersci.ss.uci.edu/wiki/index.php/Exploratory_Qualitative_Analysis_of_Sequential_Observation_Data 



Regards,

Jon
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