Aw: [PEIRCE-L] Graphical Representations of the Sign by Peirce
Supplement: All in all, I have the feeling, that by trying to distinguish the representamen from the object, and the immediate from the dynamical object, and including memory, then you look at more and more subsigns, the closer you try to analyse. But maybe that doesn´t matter, because with the mind it is the same, you cannot analyse mind by closer and closer looking at it? So, is semiotics rather a matter of somehow hovering over the situation, a matter of "Gestalt" (overall figure)? Another problem I see, is, that the sign determines the interpretant, that would be an upward determination in categoriality- I know that not everybody agrees, that sign-object-interpretant are categorically 1-2-3. This would mean, that the categories do not only apply to modes of being (classification), but also to generalization of triadic composition. I think so, because, well, categories should apply to everything, or at least to triadicity, whether this triadicity is a relation of classification, composition, or determination. Anyway, from this point of view on, an upward determination (from 1ns to 3ns) is odd. So I guess, that what determines the interpretant is not only the sign, but the sign and the interpreter´s mind. Mind, of course, includes 3ns. Gesendet: Montag, 08. Januar 2024 um 19:44 Uhr Von: "Helmut Raulien" An: "Edwina Taborsky" Cc: "Peirce-L" , "Edwina Taborsky" Betreff: Aw: [PEIRCE-L] Graphical Representations of the Sign by Peirce Edwina, list, ok, I too think, that the DO does not exist without the sign, so the "sleeping" memory, in this case the knowledge, that snow can be shoveled away, is just a memory then. But in the next sign, when the person is aware of a new white, fluffy layer on the lawn and the pathway, the knowledge of new snow is part of the immediate object, because this information is transported by the sign/representamen (while the real snow is not transported, it keeps lying there, so it is the material part of the DO). And the knowledge, that snow may be handled by using a shovel, is not part of the sign, but comes from the memory. Now what is this remembered memory? Is it part of the dynamical object of "snow, actual and general", or is this memorization another representamen, that merges with the other representamen to a blended one? But anyway I am confused now, because the knowledge, that the white, fluffy layer is snow, comes from the memory too. So what is what? Or is it not one sign, but a cascade or cluster of signs with different objects, some from the memory, and others from the real snow? Best, Helmut Gesendet: Montag, 08. Januar 2024 um 17:47 Uhr Von: "Edwina Taborsky" An: "Helmut Raulien" Cc: "Peirce-L" , "Edwina Taborsky" Betreff: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Graphical Representations of the Sign by Peirce Helmut, list I’m not quite sure if I understand your post - I don’t think that ‘habits’ [sleeping in memory?] are equivalent to Dynamicl Objects - and the Dynamical Object is always a part of the sign; ie, the DO doesn’t exist on its own outside of the semiosic interaction. With reference to the Interpretant changing the nature of the Object, I’d agree -within the understanding of the reality of evolution. That is, - a disease, formerly reduced in its effects by an antibiotic, ….understood as O->reduction in effect, becomes, over time changed by those results [ reduction in effect] to become immune to the antibiotic. - a tree, attacked by insects [ Objects]….which reduces its capacity to live [Interpretant: by the reduction of the leaves]….develops internal chemicals in the leaves to thwart the insects [O]. But then, the insects develop new immunities to those chemicals! - a word [Object] — such as the word ‘virus’…. Changes its meaning over time… The point is - such changes in the nature of the functioning of the Object in the world [ disease, insects, words] can only take place if the sign vehicle [ the disease, the tree, the word] are functioning in a mode of Thirdness. And Thirdness is vital to the nature of the universe. Again, I stress the importance of the categories in the functioning of semiosis. Edwina On Jan 8, 2024, at 10:19 AM, Helmut Raulien wrote: Edwina, yes, I agree. Only the model I used is different: While you say, that the representamen grows, I talk about old and new sign. Like the snow situation is a continuous thing in reality, in the mind of the interpreter it serves as a new sign again and again. If you say, the snow situation is the representamen, ok, then it grows, but for me the appearance of the snow situation in the interpreter´s mind is the representamen in either case of noticing it. What grows in the interpreter´s mind, is the object of snow. Whether that is the immediate or the dynamical object, is hard to decide for me: At times of no sign, it still is in the interpreter´s memory: How to handle the snow. But while this knowledge is sleeping in the memory, it is not a p
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Graphical Representations of the Sign by Peirce
Helmut - I think you have a lot of misunderstandings of Peirce - and can only suggest: Read Peirce. And think: How can an entity organized within Firstness [ pure vague feeling] produce an entity organized within the much more restrictive mode of Secondness [an actual single form]? Think of this situation in terms of ‘information -content. Can an entity with a low information content [ ie, just a feeling]..produce an entity with a higher information content [ a singular thing]? How? Where does it get that increased information to form something that is so much more organized? How does pure indeterminacy [Firstness] produce something determined [ Secondness]. You are moving into magical assumptions! Tha’s why the outline by Peirce in “EP:272 “A Sign , or Representamen, is a First which stands iin such a genuine triadic relation to a Second, called its Object, as to be capable of determining a Third, called its Interpretant”…. ….Has to be understood as referring to ordinal numbers rather than the modal categories. Peirce warned of this error [p 271 note] “The conception of a First, improperly called an ‘object’ and of aSecond, should be carefully distinguished from those of Firstness or Secondness’. I am aware of a number of people on this list who insist that these words First, Second, Third, refer to he modal categories - but I’ve never understood how they can come to such a conc Again - if you read what he wrote - Peirce was referring to the RELATIONS between the ’nodes’ [Representamen, Object, Interpretant] and to these relations as determinants. He was not referring to their mode-of-being, or the categories. And - just a wee bit of thought - would lead you to realize that something in a. Mode of Firstness [pure indeterminacy] doesn’t have the informational capacity to produce something in a mode of either Secondness or Thirdness with their much more restrictive natures! Edwina > On Jan 9, 2024, at 11:08 AM, Helmut Raulien wrote: > > > Supplement: All in all, I have the feeling, that by trying to distinguish the > representamen from the object, and the immediate from the dynamical object, > and including memory, then you look at more and more subsigns, the closer you > try to analyse. But maybe that doesn´t matter, because with the mind it is > the same, you cannot analyse mind by closer and closer looking at it? So, is > semiotics rather a matter of somehow hovering over the situation, a matter of > "Gestalt" (overall figure)? > > Another problem I see, is, that the sign determines the interpretant, that > would be an upward determination in categoriality- I know that not everybody > agrees, that sign-object-interpretant are categorically 1-2-3. This would > mean, that the categories do not only apply to modes of being > (classification), but also to generalization of triadic composition. I think > so, because, well, categories should apply to everything, or at least to > triadicity, whether this triadicity is a relation of classification, > composition, or determination. Anyway, from this point of view on, an upward > determination (from 1ns to 3ns) is odd. So I guess, that what determines the > interpretant is not only the sign, but the sign and the interpreter´s mind. > Mind, of course, includes 3ns. > > Gesendet: Montag, 08. Januar 2024 um 19:44 Uhr > Von: "Helmut Raulien" > An: "Edwina Taborsky" > Cc: "Peirce-L" , "Edwina Taborsky" > > Betreff: Aw: [PEIRCE-L] Graphical Representations of the Sign by Peirce > Edwina, list, > > ok, I too think, that the DO does not exist without the sign, so the > "sleeping" memory, in this case the knowledge, that snow can be shoveled > away, is just a memory then. But in the next sign, when the person is aware > of a new white, fluffy layer on the lawn and the pathway, the knowledge of > new snow is part of the immediate object, because this information is > transported by the sign/representamen (while the real snow is not > transported, it keeps lying there, so it is the material part of the DO). And > the knowledge, that snow may be handled by using a shovel, is not part of the > sign, but comes from the memory. Now what is this remembered memory? Is it > part of the dynamical object of "snow, actual and general", or is this > memorization another representamen, that merges with the other representamen > to a blended one? But anyway I am confused now, because the knowledge, that > the white, fluffy layer is snow, comes from the memory too. So what is what? > Or is it not one sign, but a cascade or cluster of signs with different > objects, some from the memory, and others from the real snow? > > Best, Helmut > > > Gesendet: Montag, 08. Januar 2024 um 17:47 Uhr > Von: "Edwina Taborsky" > An: "Helmut Raulien" > Cc: "Peirce-L" , "Edwina Taborsky" > > Betreff: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Graphical Representations of the Sign by Peirce > Helmut, list > I’m not quite sure if I understan
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Categorizations of triadic Relationships (Was Re: Graphical Representations of the Sign by Peirce)
Jerry, List: I am honestly not sure exactly what all you are asking me to address here and how my engineering background is relevant. What do you mean by "the origins of the 'triadic relations'"? From what are we seeking to distinguish Peirce's semeiotic? What do you have in mind as *semantic* aspects of the triadic relations? My understanding is that the immediate object and immediate interpretant are *internal *to the sign, while the dynamical object, dynamical interpretant, and final interpretant are *external *to the sign. Presumably, that is why Peirce's late taxonomies for sign classification include separate trichotomies for the sign's dyadic relations with the latter three correlates, but not the former two. Regarding where syntax originates and resides, this passage seems relevant. CSP: A single Assertion has but a single Predicate; but the simplest Assertion has more than one Subject, unless it be such a statement as "It rains," where one of the Subjects is expressed otherwise than in words. But I must explain myself more fully, and in the way which alone will be truly expressive, namely, by examples. I will, however, first remark that the Proposition that embodies an Assertion has the same Subjects and Predicate as the Assertion itself. Take the Proposition "Cain killed Abel." This is identically the same Proposition as "Abel was killed by Cain": It is only the grammatical dress that is different. Other things being equal, everybody will prefer the former. Why? Because it is simpler; but why is it simpler? Because in putting the cause before the effect, it in that respect diagrammatizes the truth. What are the Subjects of this Proposition[?] Cain, first: that is not only a Subject of the Proposition, but is the principal Subject of the Assertion which a historian would naturally make. But in the Proposition Cain and Abel are, as Subjects, on one footing precisely (or almost precisely, for Cain is preponderant in causality). But besides these, "killed" = committed *murder* upon, is a third Subject, since no study of the words alone, without extraneous experience, would enable the Ad[d]ressee to understand it. What, then, is left to serve as Predicate? Nothing but the *flow of causation*. It is true that we are more acquainted even with that in Experience. When we see a babe in its cradle bending its arms this way and that, while a smile of exultation plays upon its features, it is making acquaintance with the flow of causation. So acquaintance with the flow of causation so early as to make it familiar before speech is so far acquired that an assertion can be syntactically framed, and it is embodied in the syntax of every tongue. (R 664, 1910) The proposition "Cain killed Abel" has three subjects denoted by its three words--the dyadic relation of killing and its two correlates, Cain and Abel, all of which require collateral experience/observation to understand--and exactly one predicate, a *pure *or *continuous *predicate that "is signified as the logical connexion between the Subjects" (R 611, 1908) only by its *syntax*. As Peirce explains elsewhere, "A proposition can be separated into a predicate and subjects in more ways than one," but this approach is "the proper way in logic" (NEM 3:885, 1908) because "when we have carried analysis so far as to leave only a continuous predicate, we have carried it to its ultimate elements" (SS 72, 1908). For more on this, I highly recommend Francesco Bellucci's 2013 paper about it ( https://www.academia.edu/11685812/Peirces_Continuous_Predicates). In the Beta part of Existential Graphs (EG), there are two ways of indexically denoting subjects--lines of identity for indefinite individuals, and names for general concepts--while the pure/continuous predicate is again iconically signified by the syntax, in this case the arrangement of the lines and names (as well as any shaded areas for negation) on the sheet of assertion that represents the universe of discourse. Attributing concepts to individuals by attaching names to lines increases the information being conveyed by making those individuals more definite (increasing logical depth) and those concepts more determinate (increasing logical breadth). As a *dyadic *relation, the EG for killing has two lines and three names, while as genuine *triadic *relations, the EGs for representing/mediating and giving have three lines and four names each (as I have noted previously). When it comes to ordinal numbers, phaneroscopic analysis of the genuine triadic relation of representing/mediating establishes that the sign is the first (simplest) correlate, the object is the second (of middling complexity), and the interpretant is the third (most complex). The upshot is that there is only the genuine correlate for the sign itself, there are genuine (dynamical) and degenerate (immediate) correlates for the object, and there are genuine (final), degenerate (dynamical), and doubly degenerate (immediate) correlates for the
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Categorizations of triadic Relationships (Was Re: Graphical Representations of the Sign by Peirce)
List With regard to the use of the terms of ‘genuine, degenerate and doubly degenerate’ - my understanding of these terms is that they refer only to the categories. Not to the ’nodes’ and relations, ie, not to the two Objects or the three Interpretants. . For example, Peirce writes: “The Sign may be said pose as a representative of its object, that is, suggests an idea of the Object which is distinguishable from the Object in its own Being. The former I term the Dynamoid Object [for I want the word “genuine” to express something different]; the latter the Immediate Object …Each off these many have either off the three Modalities of Being, the former in itself, the latter in representation. 1908 Letters to Lady Welby lMS[R] L463.15. That is, Peirce specifically rejects in the above quote, the use of the term ‘genuine’ to refer to the Dynamoid Object. With regard to the terms of ‘genuine’, degenerate and doubly degenerate’, as I’ve said - my readings of Peirce are that these terms refer strictly to the categories, with there being genuine and degenerate forms of Secondness [ 2-2 and 2-1]; See 1903 1.535. and three forms of Thirdness, from genuine, to a first degree of degeneracy [3-2] to ’the most degenerate [3-1]. See 5.70-71; and 1903; 1.536-37. and 8.331-32 I don’t consider that the ordinal numbers of First, Second and Third refer to the complexity of the Relations and ’nodes’, but to the order of processing [ this is not the same as ‘determination’].. That is - the Representamen, which functions within the sign-vehicle, begins. [is First] the semiosic process when it receives input data from the Dynamical Object. [Second]…and mediates this input to arrive at, Third, the Interpretant[s]. The determinative process, as outlined clearly by Robert Marty, moves from O-R-I - by which is meant, the nature of and content of the information being semiotically processed. The point of ‘determination, as Robert Marty points out is that it ‘renders definitely to be such as it will be [8.361 1908[…by which I understand that the informational content [as Interpreted] is determined by the nature of and content of the data input from the Object…as mediated by the semiosic nature of the Representamen… I am presuming that this ‘grounds’ the semeiotic process in an objective rather than subjective world. Edwina > On Jan 9, 2024, at 6:08 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt wrote: > > Jerry, List: > > I am honestly not sure exactly what all you are asking me to address here and > how my engineering background is relevant. What do you mean by "the origins > of the 'triadic relations'"? From what are we seeking to distinguish Peirce's > semeiotic? What do you have in mind as semantic aspects of the triadic > relations? > > My understanding is that the immediate object and immediate interpretant are > internal to the sign, while the dynamical object, dynamical interpretant, and > final interpretant are external to the sign. Presumably, that is why Peirce's > late taxonomies for sign classification include separate trichotomies for the > sign's dyadic relations with the latter three correlates, but not the former > two. > > Regarding where syntax originates and resides, this passage seems relevant. > > CSP: A single Assertion has but a single Predicate; but the simplest > Assertion has more than one Subject, unless it be such a statement as "It > rains," where one of the Subjects is expressed otherwise than in words. But I > must explain myself more fully, and in the way which alone will be truly > expressive, namely, by examples. I will, however, first remark that the > Proposition that embodies an Assertion has the same Subjects and Predicate as > the Assertion itself. Take the Proposition "Cain killed Abel." This is > identically the same Proposition as "Abel was killed by Cain": It is only the > grammatical dress that is different. Other things being equal, everybody will > prefer the former. Why? Because it is simpler; but why is it simpler? Because > in putting the cause before the effect, it in that respect diagrammatizes the > truth. What are the Subjects of this Proposition[?] Cain, first: that is not > only a Subject of the Proposition, but is the principal Subject of the > Assertion which a historian would naturally make. But in the Proposition Cain > and Abel are, as Subjects, on one footing precisely (or almost precisely, for > Cain is preponderant in causality). But besides these, "killed" = committed > murder upon, is a third Subject, since no study of the words alone, without > extraneous experience, would enable the Ad[d]ressee to understand it. What, > then, is left to serve as Predicate? Nothing but the flow of causation. It is > true that we are more acquainted even with that in Experience. When we see a > babe in its cradle bending its arms this way and that, while a smile of > exultation plays upon its features, it is making acquaintance with t
