RE: [PEIRCE-L] Nominalism vs. Realism - “The union of units unifies the unity”

[John Collier]

Jerry, I think we are using ‘empiricism’ differently. I was using it in the 
classic form, not just to refer to anyone who uses the natural world as a 
touchstone for clarifying meaning and discovering the truth. I am an empiricist 
in this latter sense, but not the former.

John Collier
Emeritus Professor and Senior Research Associate
Philosophy, University of KwaZulu-Natal
http://web.ncf.ca/collier

From: Jerry LR Chandler [mailto:jerry_lr_chand...@mac.com]
Sent: Friday, 03 February 2017 3:20 AM
To: John Collier 
Cc: Peirce List ; Eric Charles 
; Helmut Raulien 
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Nominalism vs. Realism - “The union of units unifies 
the unity”

John, List:

On Jan 31, 2017, at 1:05 AM, John Collier 
> wrote:

5. The assertion "Empiricists typically claim that we don't need anything more 
to do science.” appears rather problematic to me.

I don’t see this, Jerry. A typical example of a contemporary empiricist who 
argues specifically this is Bas van Fraassen, who specifically takes this view 
in his work, such as The Scientific Image. Classic empiricists like Locke, 
Berkeley and Hume also take this view. I would hasten to add that I distinguish 
between empiricism as a reductive sceptical constructivist movement and 
empiricism as the view that our interactions with the world are our only 
reliable touchstone for clarifying meaning and discovering the truth. I agree 
with the latter, and I don’t think it implies nominalism. But it also goes 
beyond classic empiricism, being more open to methods than reliance on 
observation and combining and projecting observations inductively. I would 
agree with Edwina and John Sowa that classic empiricism has been tied together 
with certain sociological views, but I don’t think that these are implied by 
the logic of empiricism. Stan Salthe is one who, it seems to me, ties the 
sociological aspects into a common “discourse” that he takes to define 
empiricism (but I think his alternative discourse makes the same errors). I am 
not keen on discourses as unanalysable wholes. I think they can be examined 
both internally and externally in a critical way. I think the external 
criticism is often opened up by internal criticism (e.g., Feyerabend’ s 
“Problems with empiricism” and Hanson’s work, as well as Kuhn’s, of course, and 
Quine’s “Two dogmas of empiricism”).

John

You touch many bases in this paragraph, often rather adroitly.  I agree with 
several points. But, more importantly, it is what I find missing from this 
paragraph is the essential need to expand the scope of view from the science of 
physics to the science of biology and medicine.  Belief in raw empiricism does 
not negate the need for deep abstractions. Internality and externality are 
essential to systems as well. This requires a grammar of speciation that is 
remote from predicate logic and your oft-cited set theoretical deductions.

It (empiricism) requires new symbolic competencies to integrate the meanings of 
the  symbol systems in the perplex or organic sciences.

It also requires elaboration on the roles of electrical symbols as parts of 
wholes and as attractors and repellers that contribute to the spontaneity of 
life.

Quine?  H…  From my perspective, I long ago discarded any role for Quine’s 
scientific illiteracy in the perplex number system or organic mathematics.

Why? Because his well known quote, ‘To be is to be a variable’ contradicts the 
logic of the table of elements and the derivation of the genetic code from it.

Let me suggest an alternative that can be derived from the table of physical 
elements:
"To be alive is to be a species.”

The logic of “The union of units unifies the unity”  under natural physical 
constraints (Newton’s and Coulomb’s laws) can be used to derive the graphic 
pathways.

Or, have I missed your point completely?

Cheers

Jerry





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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Nominalism vs. Realism - “The union of units unifies the unity”

[Jerry LR Chandler]

John, List:

> On Jan 31, 2017, at 1:05 AM, John Collier  wrote:
> 
> 5. The assertion "Empiricists typically claim that we don't need anything 
> more to do science.” appears rather problematic to me. 
>  
> I don’t see this, Jerry. A typical example of a contemporary empiricist who 
> argues specifically this is Bas van Fraassen, who specifically takes this 
> view in his work, such as The Scientific Image. Classic empiricists like 
> Locke, Berkeley and Hume also take this view. I would hasten to add that I 
> distinguish between empiricism as a reductive sceptical constructivist 
> movement and empiricism as the view that our interactions with the world are 
> our only reliable touchstone for clarifying meaning and discovering the 
> truth. I agree with the latter, and I don’t think it implies nominalism. But 
> it also goes beyond classic empiricism, being more open to methods than 
> reliance on observation and combining and projecting observations 
> inductively. I would agree with Edwina and John Sowa that classic empiricism 
> has been tied together with certain sociological views, but I don’t think 
> that these are implied by the logic of empiricism. Stan Salthe is one who, it 
> seems to me, ties the sociological aspects into a common “discourse” that he 
> takes to define empiricism (but I think his alternative discourse makes the 
> same errors). I am not keen on discourses as unanalysable wholes. I think 
> they can be examined both internally and externally in a critical way. I 
> think the external criticism is often opened up by internal criticism (e.g., 
> Feyerabend’ s “Problems with empiricism” and Hanson’s work, as well as 
> Kuhn’s, of course, and Quine’s “Two dogmas of empiricism”).
>  
> John

You touch many bases in this paragraph, often rather adroitly.  I agree with 
several points. But, more importantly, it is what I find missing from this 
paragraph is the essential need to expand the scope of view from the science of 
physics to the science of biology and medicine.  Belief in raw empiricism does 
not negate the need for deep abstractions. Internality and externality are 
essential to systems as well. This requires a grammar of speciation that is 
remote from predicate logic and your oft-cited set theoretical deductions.  

It (empiricism) requires new symbolic competencies to integrate the meanings of 
the  symbol systems in the perplex or organic sciences. 

It also requires elaboration on the roles of electrical symbols as parts of 
wholes and as attractors and repellers that contribute to the spontaneity of 
life. 

Quine?  H…  From my perspective, I long ago discarded any role for Quine’s 
scientific illiteracy in the perplex number system or organic mathematics.

Why? Because his well known quote, ‘To be is to be a variable’ contradicts the 
logic of the table of elements and the derivation of the genetic code from it.

Let me suggest an alternative that can be derived from the table of physical 
elements:
"To be alive is to be a species.”

The logic of “The union of units unifies the unity”  under natural physical 
constraints (Newton’s and Coulomb’s laws) can be used to derive the graphic 
pathways.

Or, have I missed your point completely?

Cheers

Jerry





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