Dear list:


Here is the original pragmatic maxim that often gets treated as

*the* pragmatic maxim:

*It appears, then, that the rule for attaining the third grade of clearness
of apprehension is as follows: Consider what effects, that might
conceivably have practical bearings, we conceive the object of our
conception to have. Then, our conception of these effects is the whole of
our conception of the object.*



Is it plausible that we, critical thinkers, have not given the idea of a
*best* pragmatic maxim enough of a critical working over?



For instance:



*If*

the *goal* of a pragmatic maxim is:



*It will be seen that pragmatism is not a *Weltanschauung* but is a method
of reflexion having for its purpose to render ideas clear.*



*Pragmaticism makes thinking to consist in the living inferential metaboly
of symbols whose purport lies in the conditional general resolution to act
(5.403 n.3)…*



*I have long ago come to be guided by this maxim: that as long as it is
practically certain that we cannot directly, nor with much accuracy even
indirectly, observe what passes in the consciousness of any other person,
while it is far from certain that we can do so (and accurately record what
[we] can even glimpse at best but very glibberly) even in the case of what
shoots through our own minds, it is much safer to define all mental
characters as far as possible in terms of their outward manifestations.*



*“The point of the pragmatic maxim is to relate our concepts and judgments
to human conduct.  The maxim is intended to single out from “the myriads of
forms into which a proposition may be translated… that form in which the
proposition becomes applicable to human conduct” (5.427).”* ~Richard
Bernstein





*then *

is it not self-evident that the original maxim is not sufficient to
discriminate between pragmatism and pragmaticism?  It says nothing about
any proposition at all, particular or general, except to refer to the
conception and the process.



Therefore, it merely starts the process of aiding two disputants resolve
their disagreeement through clarification of meaning that improves
collaboration.  There is nothing there that helps prevent the walking
away.  If the utterer and interpreter were to seek further help in Peirce,
they will need to read books and manuscripts, which require more time and
energy, never mind the investment required to learn new technologies, which
promote semiotic application.



The use of the original maxim mainly appears to be to indicate that *all of*
pragmaticism is expressible as a short statement.  But that statement can
be modified.  Movement to a better form is possible.  So, where is this
statement currently?  What is the strongest argument?

Which is the *best* pragmatic maxim?



That is, why is the original considered *the* pragmatic maxim over CP
5.189, which is, in actuality, stated as a “*normative form* of *abduction*,
the *form to which abduction ought* to conform”?



Which is the best maxim by which to enter pragmaticistic inquiry?



“Now the partisan, when he is engaged in a dispute, cares nothing about the
rights of the question, but is anxious only to convince his hearers of his
own assertions. And the difference between him and me at the present moment
is merely this — that whereas he seeks to convince his hearers that what he
says is true, I am rather seeking to convince myself; to convince my
hearers is a secondary matter with me. “

~ *Phaedo*



Best,

Jerry Rhee
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