Dear John, lists - A very central comment. Issues of classification are fundamental. And abduction is the first step in establishing classifications.
One of the things I argue in Natural Propositions is that Peirce's alternative conception of propositions offers a radical reclassification of the whole field of logic-epistemology-cognition-perception which I think has certain virtues. This is easily misunderstood because readers frown on one immediate consequence which runs counter to their received view (e.g. that propositions may include pictures or need not involve consciousness or may befound in animals, etc.) and then quickly refuse to try go grasp the whole edifice. Best F Den 24/04/2015 kl. 01.13 skrev John Collier <colli...@ukzn.ac.za<mailto:colli...@ukzn.ac.za>>: Bob, The problem I see with that is it assumes that the classes on which the induction works are given already. This is also a problem with Bayesian methods. One of the problems in science is that the classes are often not obvious, and scientific work often involves reclassifications. In the case of people working with different paradigms (say, for example, of information), the problem can be intractable until some overarching view is found or constructed. Everyday concepts like emeralds and green may not seem to cause any trouble, but then there is Nelson Goodman’s (in)famous grue paradox. Abduction comes first because it gives the conditions for belonging to a class (one that is to be hoped to be scientifically useful). Best, John
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