Aw: Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Logical Depth and Signification

[Helmut Raulien]

 
 

Supp: And what does "normative" mean? I guess that for people who tell us that humans have evolved from transparent lemurs, or that the earth is on a turtle shell of a turtle standing on a pile of more turtles, their view is regarded as normative for them too. And the theory of evolution, grounded on scientific hard facts, is not normative for quite many people, who choose to rather believe, that God has dug in the dinosaur bones as a mislead to test our faith, to exclude the non-believers. Or does the ISO (international standardising organisation) say which science is normative?

 




Jon, List,

I dont understand what is the separating difference between "relation to ends" and "reality", so I dont understand the difference between normative science and metaphysics. And if logic has the relation to representational ends, this is an ends too, so a subset of normative science. Though I cannot see which ends might be non-representational.

I thought, reality is the effects of anything, so also if something is or seems true, right, beautiful, or is related to any other ends. "Ends" to me sounds like thirdness, and a secondness-science would be a merely observing and describing science (of which I cannot find an example, maybe the first biologist, before she/he drew the first conclusion).

I remember having read somewhere that semiotics would be the new metaphysics. I intuitively had agreed, but obviously this is wrong, according to Peirce.

To me it still (in my lamentably persisting state of noncomprehension) seems, that logic is the science/metaphysics of true representation, or true ends, which would be deduction and complete induction.

Best, Helmut

 

 26. Juli 2018 um 23:21 Uhr
 "Jon Alan Schmidt" 
wrote:


Helmut, List:

 

In Peirce's architectonic of the sciences, logic (i.e., semeiotic) is definitely not "a part of metaphysics"; it is instead one of the Normative Sciences.

 


CSP:  Philosophy has three grand divisions. The first is Phenomenology, which simply contemplates the Universal Phenomenon, and discerns its ubiquitous elements, Firstness, Secondness, and Thirdness, together perhaps with other series of categories. The second grand division is Normative Science, which investigates the universal and necessary laws of the relation of Phenomena to Ends, that is, perhaps, to Truth, Right, and Beauty. The third grand division is Metaphysics, which endeavors to comprehend the Reality of Phenomena ... 

For Phenomenology treats of the universal Qualities of Phenomena in their immediate phenomenal character, in themselves as phenomena. It, thus, treats of Phenomena in their Firstness.

Normative Science treats of the laws of the relation of phenomena to ends, that is, it treats of Phenomena in their Secondness.

Metaphysics, as I have just remarked, treats of Phenomena in their Thirdness ...


For normative science in general being the science of the laws of conformity of things to ends, esthetics considers those things whose ends are to embody qualities of feeling, ethics those things whose ends lie in action, and logic those things whose end is to represent something. (CP 5.121-124&129, EP 2:196-197&200; 1903)



 



Logic does not, or at least should not, presuppose a particular metaphysics; i.e., it takes no position on the Reality of any phenomena.  When metaphysical language is used to express logical concepts, it is a kind of hypostatic abstraction.

 

 



CSP:  The logician is not concerned with any metaphysical theory; still less, if possible, is the mathematician. But it is highly convenient to express ourselves in terms of a metaphysical theory; and we no more bind ourselves to an acceptance of it than we do when we use substantives such as "humanity," "variety," etc., and speak of them as if they were substances, in the metaphysical sense. (EP 2:304; 1904)



 
However, logic can and should furnish principles that are subsequently applied to metaphysics.

 




CSP:  Metaphysics consists in the results of the absolute acceptance of logical principles not merely as regulatively valid, but as truths of being. (CP 1.487; c. 1896)



 

Retroduction, deduction, and induction all fall within the purview of logic as a Normative Science; metaphysics and the special sciences employ them in investigating the Reality of phenomena.

 

Regards,


 





Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA

Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman

www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt





 

On Thu, Jul 26, 2018 at 4:09 PM, Helmut Raulien  wrote:






Supp: I think, metaphysics are all assumed principles, and Kant has attempted (and succeded?) to pull some into the realm of logic, secure it, esp. by bridging the gap between individual and society (generality, universality) by showing that there are things an individual logically cannot want to be general. So according to Kant, some metaphysics is logical, and other not. But I guess, the 

Aw: Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Logical Depth and Signification

[Helmut Raulien]

Jon, List,

I dont understand what is the separating difference between "relation to ends" and "reality", so I dont understand the difference between normative science and metaphysics. And if logic has the relation to representational ends, this is an ends too, so a subset of normative science. Though I cannot see which ends might be non-representational.

I thought, reality is the effects of anything, so also if something is or seems true, right, beautiful, or is related to any other ends. "Ends" to me sounds like thirdness, and a secondness-science would be a merely observing and describing science (of which I cannot find an example, maybe the first biologist, before she/he drew the first conclusion).

I remember having read somewhere that semiotics would be the new metaphysics. I intuitively had agreed, but obviously this is wrong, according to Peirce.

To me it still (in my lamentably persisting state of noncomprehension) seems, that logic is the science/metaphysics of true representation, or true ends, which would be deduction and complete induction.

Best, Helmut

 

 26. Juli 2018 um 23:21 Uhr
 "Jon Alan Schmidt" 
wrote:


Helmut, List:

 

In Peirce's architectonic of the sciences, logic (i.e., semeiotic) is definitely not "a part of metaphysics"; it is instead one of the Normative Sciences.

 


CSP:  Philosophy has three grand divisions. The first is Phenomenology, which simply contemplates the Universal Phenomenon, and discerns its ubiquitous elements, Firstness, Secondness, and Thirdness, together perhaps with other series of categories. The second grand division is Normative Science, which investigates the universal and necessary laws of the relation of Phenomena to Ends, that is, perhaps, to Truth, Right, and Beauty. The third grand division is Metaphysics, which endeavors to comprehend the Reality of Phenomena ... 

For Phenomenology treats of the universal Qualities of Phenomena in their immediate phenomenal character, in themselves as phenomena. It, thus, treats of Phenomena in their Firstness.

Normative Science treats of the laws of the relation of phenomena to ends, that is, it treats of Phenomena in their Secondness.

Metaphysics, as I have just remarked, treats of Phenomena in their Thirdness ...


For normative science in general being the science of the laws of conformity of things to ends, esthetics considers those things whose ends are to embody qualities of feeling, ethics those things whose ends lie in action, and logic those things whose end is to represent something. (CP 5.121-124&129, EP 2:196-197&200; 1903)



 



Logic does not, or at least should not, presuppose a particular metaphysics; i.e., it takes no position on the Reality of any phenomena.  When metaphysical language is used to express logical concepts, it is a kind of hypostatic abstraction.

 

 



CSP:  The logician is not concerned with any metaphysical theory; still less, if possible, is the mathematician. But it is highly convenient to express ourselves in terms of a metaphysical theory; and we no more bind ourselves to an acceptance of it than we do when we use substantives such as "humanity," "variety," etc., and speak of them as if they were substances, in the metaphysical sense. (EP 2:304; 1904)



 
However, logic can and should furnish principles that are subsequently applied to metaphysics.

 




CSP:  Metaphysics consists in the results of the absolute acceptance of logical principles not merely as regulatively valid, but as truths of being. (CP 1.487; c. 1896)



 

Retroduction, deduction, and induction all fall within the purview of logic as a Normative Science; metaphysics and the special sciences employ them in investigating the Reality of phenomena.

 

Regards,


 





Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA

Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman

www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt





 

On Thu, Jul 26, 2018 at 4:09 PM, Helmut Raulien  wrote:






Supp: I think, metaphysics are all assumed principles, and Kant has attempted (and succeded?) to pull some into the realm of logic, secure it, esp. by bridging the gap between individual and society (generality, universality) by showing that there are things an individual logically cannot want to be general. So according to Kant, some metaphysics is logical, and other not. But I guess, the common meaning of metaphysics means only the illogical, not deductively secured part?






List,

Gary, I don´t get the difference between metaphysics and logic: In´t logic a part of metaphysics? If "metaphysics" means "behind nature", I mean, logic is so. Wasn´ it so for Kant too: "Pure reason" (synonymous with "logic"?) is "transcendental" (synonymous with "metaphysical"?)

Or is logic the deductive part, and metaphysics the inductive and abductive part of assumed principles of nature? Or is logic the part of belief in nature´s principles gathered by the scientific method, while