Aw: Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Pragmatics and Peirce

2019-04-05 Thread Helmut Raulien 
 
 

supp.: Quote from Jon Awbrey´s Inquiry to inquiry:


"As mathematical traps go, this one is hydra-headed.

I don’t know if it’s possible to put a prior restraint on the varieties of relational reduction that might be considered, but usually we are talking about either one of two types of reducibility.

Compositional Reducibility. All triadic relations are irreducible under relational composition, since the composition of two dyadic relations is a dyadic relation, by the definition of relational composition.

Projective Reducibility. Consider the projections of a triadic relation  on the coordinate planes  and ask whether these dyadic relations uniquely determine  If so, we say  is projectively reducible, otherwise it is projectively irreducible."





Jon, list,

 

I also try to stick with Peirce. Contradictions I dont see:

 

1.: I dont think that social is not logical, and subjectivity versus objectivity I see not as modes of being, but of chosen point of view.

 

2.: With triad I have meant triadic relation, and did not claim any identity.

 

3.: With projectional reducibility (Jon Awbrey) I have meant this involvement, the Peircean irreducibility is about compositional reducibility, which all triadic relations dont have.

 

4.: I agree

 

5.: But how then are objects changed?

 

Best,

Helmut

 

 05. April 2019 um 23:38 Uhr
 "Jon Alan Schmidt" 
 





Helmut, List:
 

Again, I prefer to stick with Peirce on all of this.



	A logical relation is not subjective, like social relationships are; it is simply "a fact about a number of things" (CP 3.416; 1892).
	There is no "SOI triad," but a triadic relation between the Sign, Object, and Interpretant, none of which are identical (cf. CP 2.242, EP 2:290; 1903).
	That triadic relation involves dyadic relations between its external correlates as I indicated previously, but it is not reducible to them (cf. CP 2.274; 1903).
	There is no distinct Object-Interpretant relation because the Interpretant has the same relation to the Object that the Sign has (ibid).
	The Object is not changed by either the Sign or the Interpretant; their triadic relation is asymmetric (cf. EP 2:544n22; 1906).







Regards,

 





Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA

Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman

www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt







 


On Fri, Apr 5, 2019 at 3:22 PM Helmut Raulien  wrote:




Jon, list,

 

thank you for explaining, e.g. of the ten divisions of signs!

They contain correlates with single names, and relations too. About "relation" I think, that to observe a relation it takes objectivity. But objectivity is sometimes hard to achieve. For example, there is a man who decides to become a stalker, and his intended-for victim, the stalker says that they have a relation, and the intended-for victim says they dont. Do they have one or not?

 

A normal triad ABC (like in "A gives B to C") is compositionally irreducible, and projectively (or projectionally, I forgot) reducible to the dyads AB, BC, AC. The SOI- triad is noncompositionally, maybe also called projectively, reducible to the dyads SS, SO, SI. So it is very special kind of triadic relation. There is no relation OI, and in all dyads S appears. So S plays a central, focal role.

 

To avoid objectivity problems, I thought it is ok to look at the whole thing from the sign´s point of view, that is to ask, which functions do S, O, I and the further divisions have for S. Because the self-relation SS is included, I think, that there is nothing more the (function of the) sign consists of than these functions for it. That is why I called it (functional) composition.

 

But maybe there is a logical fault in this argument, because a function of the sign might be that the object is changed. This might be a function of the sign, but not a function for it. But maybe too, the object is changed rather by the interpretant, and there is an act of determination from the changed object to the new sign that the interpretant becomes. In the actual sign, the not-yet-changed object determines the sign, and the sign the interpretant. The possibility or necessity of object change is in the interpretant that is determined by the sign, so maybe this determining function of the sign is also a function for it.

 

Best,

Helmut







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Aw: Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Pragmatics and Peirce

2019-04-05 Thread Helmut Raulien 

Jon, list,

 

I also try to stick with Peirce. Contradictions I dont see:

 

1.: I dont think that social is not logical, and subjectivity versus objectivity I see not as modes of being, but of chosen point of view.

 

2.: With triad I have meant triadic relation, and did not claim any identity.

 

3.: With projectional reducibility (Jon Awbrey) I have meant this involvement, the Peircean irreducibility is about compositional reducibility, which all triadic relations dont have.

 

4.: I agree

 

5.: But how then are objects changed?

 

Best,

Helmut

 

 05. April 2019 um 23:38 Uhr
 "Jon Alan Schmidt" 
 





Helmut, List:
 

Again, I prefer to stick with Peirce on all of this.



	A logical relation is not subjective, like social relationships are; it is simply "a fact about a number of things" (CP 3.416; 1892).
	There is no "SOI triad," but a triadic relation between the Sign, Object, and Interpretant, none of which are identical (cf. CP 2.242, EP 2:290; 1903).
	That triadic relation involves dyadic relations between its external correlates as I indicated previously, but it is not reducible to them (cf. CP 2.274; 1903).
	There is no distinct Object-Interpretant relation because the Interpretant has the same relation to the Object that the Sign has (ibid).
	The Object is not changed by either the Sign or the Interpretant; their triadic relation is asymmetric (cf. EP 2:544n22; 1906).







Regards,

 





Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA

Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman

www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt







 


On Fri, Apr 5, 2019 at 3:22 PM Helmut Raulien  wrote:




Jon, list,

 

thank you for explaining, e.g. of the ten divisions of signs!

They contain correlates with single names, and relations too. About "relation" I think, that to observe a relation it takes objectivity. But objectivity is sometimes hard to achieve. For example, there is a man who decides to become a stalker, and his intended-for victim, the stalker says that they have a relation, and the intended-for victim says they dont. Do they have one or not?

 

A normal triad ABC (like in "A gives B to C") is compositionally irreducible, and projectively (or projectionally, I forgot) reducible to the dyads AB, BC, AC. The SOI- triad is noncompositionally, maybe also called projectively, reducible to the dyads SS, SO, SI. So it is very special kind of triadic relation. There is no relation OI, and in all dyads S appears. So S plays a central, focal role.

 

To avoid objectivity problems, I thought it is ok to look at the whole thing from the sign´s point of view, that is to ask, which functions do S, O, I and the further divisions have for S. Because the self-relation SS is included, I think, that there is nothing more the (function of the) sign consists of than these functions for it. That is why I called it (functional) composition.

 

But maybe there is a logical fault in this argument, because a function of the sign might be that the object is changed. This might be a function of the sign, but not a function for it. But maybe too, the object is changed rather by the interpretant, and there is an act of determination from the changed object to the new sign that the interpretant becomes. In the actual sign, the not-yet-changed object determines the sign, and the sign the interpretant. The possibility or necessity of object change is in the interpretant that is determined by the sign, so maybe this determining function of the sign is also a function for it.

 

Best,

Helmut







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