Re: Fwd: Re: [PEIRCE-L] [biosemiotics:6231] Re: biosemiotics is the basis for

[Gary Richmond]

Gary, all,

Gary F. wrote:

But phaneroscopy is looking for the elements of the phaneron, not the
elements of experience, and certainly not the elements of *human* experience
only. I can well believe that the only way to do this scientifically (i.e.
communally) is by way of iconoscopy, or objectifying the phenomenon as an
icon. Is there any way to formulate this that avoids the limitations and
ambiguities of language?


One might ask the same of phaneroscopy: is there any way to 'do' this
science which avoids the limitations and ambiguities of language? My answer
is, probably not, at least not if one is doing *science* and not, say,
merely meditating or some such thing (this holds for the 3rd
phenomenological science I'd posit as well, that is, category theory, what
Peirce called trichotomic, and which considers genuine trichotomic
relations wherever they occur, and, just as with iconoscopy, not
necessarily as merely "elements of experience" or just "elements of human
experience").

So what exactly are "the elements of the phaneron" once one's stated the
obvious, that is, the three universal categories? (And even that statement
requires language, as is clear from Peirce's own phenomenological studies.)
This was Joe Ransdell's problem with phaneroscopy as I recall--he didn't
think it had much work to do, and that which it did have to do had been
pretty much done by Peirce already. I didn't agree with him on this, but I
don't think one can make much progress in Peircean phenomenology as a
science until one considers not only phaneroscopy, but also iconoscopy and,
I'd hold, trichotomic category theory. And, again, for all three putative
phenomenological sciences, there seems to be no way to avoid language.

But, I'd agree with you that Andre sounding in on this would be most
helpful.

Best,

Gary

*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
*C 745*
*718 482-5690*


On Wed, Aug 13, 2014 at 8:21 AM, Gary Fuhrman  wrote:

> Gary,
>
>
>
> GR: I would maintain that, and apart from analysis, in our *phenomenological
> experience* those several qualities are felt as distinct.
>
>
>
> GF: I would agree with that. They are *felt* as distinct when the
> analysis is not under conscious control, as the percept itself is not.
> Phaneroscopically, though, the distinctness of each quality is its
> Secondness to the others; and at the same time, the distinctive quality of 
> *our
> experience* (which is surely due to the biological nature of our
> embodiment) is determined both by the Secondness of our various senses to
> one another, and by the Secondness of the sensed object (the apple in this
> case) to the nervous system. Our recognition of the apple as such, *and*
> our recognition of any of its qualities as such, constitute the Thirdness
> of the phenomenon. So, like every conceivable phenomenon, it involves all
> three elements.
>
>
>
> Defining a "first" is even harder than defining Firstness. When we give
> examples, such as redness, we are inclined to draw them from *sensory*
> experience. But phaneroscopy is looking for the elements of the phaneron,
> not the elements of experience, and certainly not the elements of *human*
> experience only. I can well believe that the only way to do this
> scientifically (i.e. communally) is by way of iconoscopy, or objectifying
> the phenomenon as an icon. Is there any way to formulate this that avoids
> the limitations and ambiguities of language?
>
>
>
> I'd like to hear what André has to say about this, but I imagine he's
> pretty busy now with more urgent matters!
>
>
>
> gary f.
>
>
>
> } End here. Us then. Finn, again! Take. Bussoftlhee, mememormee! Till
> thousendsthee. Lps. The keys to. Given! [Finnegans Wake, final page] {
>
> www.gnusystems.ca/gnoxic.htm }{ gnoxics
>
>
>
>
>
> *From:* Gary Richmond [mailto:gary.richm...@gmail.com]
> *Sent:* 12-Aug-14 11:01 PM
>
>
>
> Gary F, list,
>
>
>
> I'm not at all convinced of the following.
>
>
>
> GF: Speaking both for my own phaneroscopy and for my understanding of
> Peirce's, I would say that the redness, the roundness, the coolness and the
> solidity of the apple are all constituents of the single feeling which is
> the experience of that moment of the phaneron. The quality of that single
> feeling is the Firstness of that moment, and the various constituents are
> the products of the "destructive distillation" which follows upon
> reflection as the phenomenon is 'objectified', and not until then do they
> appear separately [. . . ] the phaneroscopist, who is trying to figure out
> how anything can *appear* to any kind of mind, considers experience more
> holistically. Or at least I do, and I think Peirce did. [You then quoted a
> snippet at EP2:368].
>
>
>
> However, it seems to me that one ought to be careful not to conflate what
> is admittedly the firstness that is "the single feeling . . . of that
> moment of the phaneron" with the fi

RE: Fwd: Re: [PEIRCE-L] [biosemiotics:6231] Re: biosemiotics is the basis for

[Gary Fuhrman]

Gary, 

 

GR: I would maintain that, and apart from analysis, in our phenomenological
experience those several qualities are felt as distinct.

 

GF: I would agree with that. They are felt as distinct when the analysis is
not under conscious control, as the percept itself is not.
Phaneroscopically, though, the distinctness of each quality is its
Secondness to the others; and at the same time, the distinctive quality of
our experience (which is surely due to the biological nature of our
embodiment) is determined both by the Secondness of our various senses to
one another, and by the Secondness of the sensed object (the apple in this
case) to the nervous system. Our recognition of the apple as such, and our
recognition of any of its qualities as such, constitute the Thirdness of the
phenomenon. So, like every conceivable phenomenon, it involves all three
elements.

 

Defining a “first” is even harder than defining Firstness. When we give
examples, such as redness, we are inclined to draw them from sensory
experience. But phaneroscopy is looking for the elements of the phaneron,
not the elements of experience, and certainly not the elements of human
experience only. I can well believe that the only way to do this
scientifically (i.e. communally) is by way of iconoscopy, or objectifying
the phenomenon as an icon. Is there any way to formulate this that avoids
the limitations and ambiguities of language?

 

I’d like to hear what André has to say about this, but I imagine he’s pretty
busy now with more urgent matters!

 

gary f.

 

} End here. Us then. Finn, again! Take. Bussoftlhee, mememormee! Till
thousendsthee. Lps. The keys to. Given! [Finnegans Wake, final page] {

  www.gnusystems.ca/gnoxic.htm }{
gnoxics

 

 

From: Gary Richmond [mailto:gary.richm...@gmail.com] 
Sent: 12-Aug-14 11:01 PM



 

Gary F, list,

 

I'm not at all convinced of the following.

 

GF: Speaking both for my own phaneroscopy and for my understanding of
Peirce’s, I would say that the redness, the roundness, the coolness and the
solidity of the apple are all constituents of the single feeling which is
the experience of that moment of the phaneron. The quality of that single
feeling is the Firstness of that moment, and the various constituents are
the products of the “destructive distillation” which follows upon reflection
as the phenomenon is ‘objectified’, and not until then do they appear
separately [. . . ] the phaneroscopist, who is trying to figure out how
anything can appear to any kind of mind, considers experience more
holistically. Or at least I do, and I think Peirce did. [You then quoted a
snippet at EP2:368].

 

However, it seems to me that one ought to be careful not to conflate what is
admittedly the firstness that is "the single feeling . . . of that moment of
the phaneron" with the firstnesses of the individual qualities within the
phaneron--certainly the quality 'red' is in no way like the qualities
'round' or 'solid' or 'cool'. They are sui generis and exactly what each is
in the phaneron. 

 

And I think it may be in consideration of this distinction that Andre de
Tienne has argued that phenomenology consists not only of 'phaneroscopy' but
also of 'iconoscopy' (in my--and, in truth, his--opinion, the second being a
wholly inadequate term for the study of those individual qualities and
characters appearing within the phaneron). 

 

So, earlier in the passage from which you quoted, Peirce writes:

 

[T]hough we cannot prescind redness from superficial extension, we can
easily distinguish it from superficial extension, owing (for one thing) to
our being able to prescind the latter from the former. Sealing wax red, then
is a Priman (EP2. 267).

 

Peirce immediately continues: 

 

[Sealing wax red, then is a Priman.] // So is any other quality of feeling.
Now the whole content of consciousness is made up of qualities of feeling
(EP2.267) [Note the plural: "qualities of feeling"].

 

So, again, I think that something like de Tienne's 2nd phenomenological
science is required since, at the moment of our phenomenological experience,
we experience (feel) not only the phaneron in its integrity, but also 'red'
as a quality altogether different from the quality 'round', etc.  The the
attempt to sublate these different qualities into the phaneron seems to me
extremely problematic. Perhaps this is why you concluded your post:

 

GF: On the other hand, the question of whether there are many firsts or only
one per moment is like the semiotic question of whether a sign such as a
proposition has a number of objects or just one complex object. It all
depends on the context and the purpose of your analysis.

 

Still, I would maintain that, and apart from analysis, in our
phenomenological experience those several qualities are felt as distinct.

 

Best,

 

Gary R.

 


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PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L 
to 

Re: Fwd: Re: [PEIRCE-L] [biosemiotics:6231] Re: biosemiotics is the basis for

[Sungchul Ji]

Gary R, Gary F, list,

>From my cherry-picking readings in the orchard of Peirce, I gathered the
impression that

"Every phenomenon has three aspects he called   (081314-1)
Firstness, Secondness and Thirdness."

If this impression of mine is true, why can't "phaneron" itself have these
three aspects, so that there may be

(i) phaneron AS IS (i.e., quality),

(ii) phaneron AS ENCOUNTERED/EXPERIENCED (i.e., actuality), and

(iii) phaneron AS CONCEPTUALIZED/ABSTRACTED/THEORIZED (i.e. lawfulness) ?

With all the best.

Sung
_
Sungchul Ji, Ph.D.
Associate Professor of Pharmacology and Toxicology
Department of Pharmacology and Toxicology
Ernest Mario School of Pharmacy
Rutgers University
Piscataway, N.J. 08855
732-445-4701

www.conformon.net


> Gary F, list,
>
> I'm not at all convinced of the following.
>
> GF: Speaking both for my own phaneroscopy and for my understanding of
> Peirce's, I would say that the redness, the roundness, the coolness and
> the
> solidity of the apple are all constituents of the single feeling which is
> the experience of that moment of the phaneron. The quality of that single
> feeling is the Firstness of that moment, and the various constituents are
> the products of the "destructive distillation" which follows upon
> reflection as the phenomenon is 'objectified', and not until then do they
> appear separately [. . . ] the phaneroscopist, who is trying to figure out
> how anything can *appear* to any kind of mind, considers experience more
> holistically. Or at least I do, and I think Peirce did. [You then quoted a
> snippet at EP2:368].
>
>
> However, it seems to me that one ought to be careful not to conflate what
> is admittedly the firstness that is "the single feeling . . . of that
> moment of the phaneron" with the firstnesses of the individual qualities
> within the phaneron--certainly the quality 'red' is in no way like the
> qualities 'round' or 'solid' or 'cool'. They are sui generis and exactly
> *what
> each is *in the phaneron.
>
> And I think it may be in consideration of this distinction that Andre de
> Tienne has argued that phenomenology consists not only of 'phaneroscopy'
> but also of 'iconoscopy' (in my--and, in truth, his--opinion, the second
> being a wholly inadequate term for the study of those individual qualities
> and characters appearing within the phaneron).
>
>
> So, earlier in the passage from which you quoted, Peirce writes:
>
>
> [T]hough we cannot prescind redness from superficial extension, we can
> easily distinguish it from superficial extension, owing (for one thing) to
> our being able to prescind the latter from the former. Sealing wax red,
> then is a Priman (EP2. 267).
>
>
> Peirce immediately continues:
>
>
> [Sealing wax red, then is a Priman.] // So is any other quality of
> feeling.
> Now the whole content of consciousness is made up of qualities of feeling
> (EP2.267) [Note the plural: "*qualities* of feeling"].
>
>
> So, again, I think that something like de Tienne's 2nd phenomenological
> science is required since, at the moment of our phenomenological
> experience, we experience (feel) not only the phaneron in its integrity,
> but also 'red' as a quality altogether different from the quality 'round',
> etc.  The the attempt to sublate these different qualities into the
> phaneron seems to me extremely problematic. Perhaps this is why you
> concluded your post:
>
>
> GF: On the other hand, the question of whether there are many firsts or
> only one per moment is like the semiotic question of whether a sign such
> as
> a proposition has a number of objects or just one complex object. It all
> depends on the context and the purpose of your analysis.
>
>
> Still, I would maintain that, and apart from analysis, in our
> *phenomenological
> experience* those several qualities are felt as distinct.
>
> Best,
>
> Gary R.
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> *Gary Richmond*
> *Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
> *Communication Studies*
> *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
> *C 745*
> *718 482-5690*
>
>
> On Tue, Aug 12, 2014 at 8:29 PM, Gary Fuhrman  wrote:
>
>> Gary, John, list,
>>
>>
>>
>> GR: Although I agree that "Firstness" (rather, any given First as
>> quality
>> or character) does not admit of discreteness or plurality," I'm not so
>> certain that "we can't really speak of 'firsts' in the plural." Doesn't
>> it
>> happen that within a moment of a single experience that several Firsts
>> can
>> appear, so that I may be simultaneously aware of, say, the redness, the
>> roundness,  the coolness, and the solidity of the apple which I hold in
>> my
>> hand--and without putting a 'word' to any--and surely not in that moment
>> to
>> all--of them?
>>
>>
>>
>> GF: Speaking both for my own phaneroscopy and for my understanding of
>> Peirce's, I would say that the redness, the roundness, the coolness and
>> the
>> solidity of the apple are all constituents of the single feeling

Re: Fwd: Re: [PEIRCE-L] [biosemiotics:6231] Re: biosemiotics is the basis for

[Gary Richmond]

Gary F, list,

I'm not at all convinced of the following.

GF: Speaking both for my own phaneroscopy and for my understanding of
Peirce's, I would say that the redness, the roundness, the coolness and the
solidity of the apple are all constituents of the single feeling which is
the experience of that moment of the phaneron. The quality of that single
feeling is the Firstness of that moment, and the various constituents are
the products of the "destructive distillation" which follows upon
reflection as the phenomenon is 'objectified', and not until then do they
appear separately [. . . ] the phaneroscopist, who is trying to figure out
how anything can *appear* to any kind of mind, considers experience more
holistically. Or at least I do, and I think Peirce did. [You then quoted a
snippet at EP2:368].


However, it seems to me that one ought to be careful not to conflate what
is admittedly the firstness that is "the single feeling . . . of that
moment of the phaneron" with the firstnesses of the individual qualities
within the phaneron--certainly the quality 'red' is in no way like the
qualities 'round' or 'solid' or 'cool'. They are sui generis and exactly *what
each is *in the phaneron.

And I think it may be in consideration of this distinction that Andre de
Tienne has argued that phenomenology consists not only of 'phaneroscopy'
but also of 'iconoscopy' (in my--and, in truth, his--opinion, the second
being a wholly inadequate term for the study of those individual qualities
and characters appearing within the phaneron).


So, earlier in the passage from which you quoted, Peirce writes:


[T]hough we cannot prescind redness from superficial extension, we can
easily distinguish it from superficial extension, owing (for one thing) to
our being able to prescind the latter from the former. Sealing wax red,
then is a Priman (EP2. 267).


Peirce immediately continues:


[Sealing wax red, then is a Priman.] // So is any other quality of feeling.
Now the whole content of consciousness is made up of qualities of feeling
(EP2.267) [Note the plural: "*qualities* of feeling"].


So, again, I think that something like de Tienne's 2nd phenomenological
science is required since, at the moment of our phenomenological
experience, we experience (feel) not only the phaneron in its integrity,
but also 'red' as a quality altogether different from the quality 'round',
etc.  The the attempt to sublate these different qualities into the
phaneron seems to me extremely problematic. Perhaps this is why you
concluded your post:


GF: On the other hand, the question of whether there are many firsts or
only one per moment is like the semiotic question of whether a sign such as
a proposition has a number of objects or just one complex object. It all
depends on the context and the purpose of your analysis.


Still, I would maintain that, and apart from analysis, in our *phenomenological
experience* those several qualities are felt as distinct.

Best,

Gary R.











*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
*C 745*
*718 482-5690*


On Tue, Aug 12, 2014 at 8:29 PM, Gary Fuhrman  wrote:

> Gary, John, list,
>
>
>
> GR: Although I agree that "Firstness" (rather, any given First as quality
> or character) does not admit of discreteness or plurality," I'm not so
> certain that "we can't really speak of 'firsts' in the plural." Doesn't it
> happen that within a moment of a single experience that several Firsts can
> appear, so that I may be simultaneously aware of, say, the redness, the
> roundness,  the coolness, and the solidity of the apple which I hold in my
> hand--and without putting a 'word' to any--and surely not in that moment to
> all--of them?
>
>
>
> GF: Speaking both for my own phaneroscopy and for my understanding of
> Peirce's, I would say that the redness, the roundness, the coolness and the
> solidity of the apple are all constituents of the single feeling which is
> the experience of that moment of the phaneron. The quality of that single
> feeling is the Firstness of that moment, and the various constituents are
> the products of the "destructive distillation" which follows upon
> reflection as the phenomenon is 'objectified', and not until then do they
> appear separately. Empiricists generally look at such a "simultaneous"
> experience as consisting of sensations bundled together by the mind into a
> Gestalt, but I think Peirce saw it the other way round, as a whole
> phenomenon, which strictly speaking has no parts, although it can be
> analyzed afterwards into separate sensations. I suppose the psychologist,
> if he's trying to figure out how the brain does perception, has to take the
> multitude of sensations as primary; but the phaneroscopist, who is trying
> to figure out how anything can *appear* to any kind of mind, considers
> experience more holistically. Or at least I do, and I think Peirce did.
>
>
>
> EP2:368: [[ Contem

RE: Fwd: Re: [PEIRCE-L] [biosemiotics:6231] Re: biosemiotics is the basis for

[Gary Fuhrman]

Gary, John, list,

 

GR: Although I agree that "Firstness" (rather, any given First as quality or
character) does not admit of discreteness or plurality," I'm not so certain
that "we can't really speak of 'firsts' in the plural." Doesn't it happen
that within a moment of a single experience that several Firsts can appear,
so that I may be simultaneously aware of, say, the redness, the roundness,
the coolness, and the solidity of the apple which I hold in my hand--and
without putting a 'word' to any--and surely not in that moment to all--of
them?

 

GF: Speaking both for my own phaneroscopy and for my understanding of
Peirce's, I would say that the redness, the roundness, the coolness and the
solidity of the apple are all constituents of the single feeling which is
the experience of that moment of the phaneron. The quality of that single
feeling is the Firstness of that moment, and the various constituents are
the products of the "destructive distillation" which follows upon reflection
as the phenomenon is 'objectified', and not until then do they appear
separately. Empiricists generally look at such a "simultaneous" experience
as consisting of sensations bundled together by the mind into a Gestalt, but
I think Peirce saw it the other way round, as a whole phenomenon, which
strictly speaking has no parts, although it can be analyzed afterwards into
separate sensations. I suppose the psychologist, if he's trying to figure
out how the brain does perception, has to take the multitude of sensations
as primary; but the phaneroscopist, who is trying to figure out how anything
can appear to any kind of mind, considers experience more holistically. Or
at least I do, and I think Peirce did.

 

EP2:368: [[ Contemplate anything by itself,-anything whatever that can be so
contemplated. Attend to the whole and drop the parts out of attention
altogether. One can approximate nearly enough to the accomplishment of that
to see that the result of its perfect accomplishment would be that one would
have in his consciousness at the moment nothing but a quality of feeling.
This quality of feeling would in itself, as so contemplated, have no parts.
It would be unlike any other such quality of feeling. In itself, it would
not even resemble any other; for resemblance has its being only in
comparison. It would be a pure priman. Since this is true of whatever we
contemplate, however complex may be the object, it follows that there is
nothing else in immediate consciousness. ]]

 

On the other hand, the question of whether there are many firsts or only one
per moment is like the semiotic question of whether a sign such as a
proposition has a number of objects or just one complex object. It all
depends on the context and the purpose of your analysis.

 

gary f.

 


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Re: Fwd: Re: [PEIRCE-L] [biosemiotics:6231] Re: biosemiotics is the basis for

[Gary Richmond]

Gary, John, list,

Responding John's remark that:


I think you would have to agree that experiencing firsts is at least very
difficult and something that we do not usually do. In particular, because
of this, they cannot be the ground of other experiences. If so, then this
is the point I have been trying to make.


Gary F. wrote:


I would say that there is no "experience of firsts", but Firstness is an
element of every phenomenon, i.e. anything that can be experienced.


I agree, but might restate this slightly to emphasize that since Firstness
is an element of every phenomenon, and that the phenomenal is what we can
experience, then *all *our actual experiences involve firstnesses. Gary F.
continued:


It can be more prominent in some experiences than in others, but even then
is not a "ground" of that experience, let alone of others.


Agreed. Firstness is not a ground, but is 'present' in all our experience.
Gary F. concluded:


Also, one can't really speak of "firsts" in the plural because Firstness
does not admit of discreteness or plurality. The ground of otherness is
Secondness.


Although I agree that "Firstness" (rather, any given First as quality or
character) does not admit of discreteness or plurality," I'm not so certain
that "we can't really speak of 'firsts' in the plural." Doesn't it happen
that within a moment of a single experience that several Firsts can appear,
so that I may be simultaneously aware of, say, the redness, the roundness,
 the coolness, and the solidity of the apple which I hold in my hand--and
without putting a 'word' to any--and surely not in that moment to all--of
them?

Best,

Gary R.


*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
*C 745*
*718 482-5690*


On Tue, Aug 12, 2014 at 9:07 AM, Gary Fuhrman  wrote:

> John, you wrote,
>
>
>
>
> I think you would have to agree that experiencing firsts is at least very
> difficult and something that we do not usually do. In particular, because
> of this, they cannot be the ground of other experiences. If so, then this
> is the point I have been trying to make.
>
>
>
> I think your statement here is close to meaningless (as opposed to false).
> I would say that there is no "experience of firsts", but Firstness is an
> element of every phenomenon, i.e. anything that can be experienced. It can
> be more prominent in some experiences than in others, but even then is not
> a "ground" of that experience, let alone of others. Also, one can't really
> speak of "firsts" in the plural because Firstness does not admit of
> discreteness or plurality. The ground of otherness is Secondness.
>
>
>
> gary f.
>
>
> -
> PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON
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> .
>
>
>
>
>
>

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Re: Fwd: Re: [PEIRCE-L] [biosemiotics:6231] Re: biosemiotics is the basis for

[Stephen C. Rose]

To the extent that I understand Firsts as originating in feelings (derived
I infer from some effort to sense what is "coming up" in one's
consciousness, having willed to seek to plumb it, it seems to me that a
First begins with that feeling and that it is then named with one or more
terms. For example, Loose Ends or Unfinished Business. Naming (using words
to describe signs or feelings) is our editing of reality. We determine what
a first is by such a process of feeling and naming. I am referring to the
actual experience I have when I engage in intentional, conscious thinking.
I wonder if John thinks what I am describing is the "experience of a
first". To continue the exercise i have mentioned, the "experience" might
more generally be called "the past" or "what is not now". It is exactly
what I went through yesterday on returning home from a weekend filled with
things that left me quite overloaded (loose ends, the past, etc. Or so I
felt. The result of my cogitations was a few actions and expressions I
doubt I would have had the "presence of mind" to do if I had not allowed
the process to move through an ethical index and culminate as they did.

*@stephencrose *


On Tue, Aug 12, 2014 at 9:07 AM, Gary Fuhrman  wrote:

> John, you wrote,
>
>
>
>
> I think you would have to agree that experiencing firsts is at least very
> difficult and something that we do not usually do. In particular, because
> of this, they cannot be the ground of other experiences. If so, then this
> is the point I have been trying to make.
>
>
>
> I think your statement here is close to meaningless (as opposed to false).
> I would say that there is no "experience of firsts", but Firstness is an
> element of every phenomenon, i.e. anything that can be experienced. It can
> be more prominent in some experiences than in others, but even then is not
> a "ground" of that experience, let alone of others. Also, one can't really
> speak of "firsts" in the plural because Firstness does not admit of
> discreteness or plurality. The ground of otherness is Secondness.
>
>
>
> gary f.
>
>
> -
> PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON
> PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to
> peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L
> but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the
> BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm
> .
>
>
>
>
>
>

-
PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L 
to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To 
UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the 
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RE: Fwd: Re: [PEIRCE-L] [biosemiotics:6231] Re: biosemiotics is the basis for

[Gary Fuhrman]

John, you wrote,

 


I think you would have to agree that experiencing firsts is at least very
difficult and something that we do not usually do. In particular, because of
this, they cannot be the ground of other experiences. If so, then this is
the point I have been trying to make.

 

I think your statement here is close to meaningless (as opposed to false). I
would say that there is no "experience of firsts", but Firstness is an
element of every phenomenon, i.e. anything that can be experienced. It can
be more prominent in some experiences than in others, but even then is not a
"ground" of that experience, let alone of others. Also, one can't really
speak of "firsts" in the plural because Firstness does not admit of
discreteness or plurality. The ground of otherness is Secondness.

 

gary f. 


-
PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L 
to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To 
UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the 
line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at 
http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .

Re: Fwd: Re: [PEIRCE-L] [biosemiotics:6231] Re: biosemiotics is the basis for

[John Collier]

Response to Claudio (nice post in my opinion) and Gary R.
At 05:52 PM 2014-08-10, Gary Richmond wrote:
Forwarded at the request of
Claudio Guerri. GR

-- Forwarded message --
From: Claudio Guerri
<
claudiogue...@fibertel.com.ar>
Date: Sun, Aug 10, 2014 at 9:25 AM
Subject: Fwd: Re: [PEIRCE-L] [biosemiotics:6231] Re: biosemiotics is the
basis for
To: Gary Richmond
<gary.richm...@gmail.com
>
 Mensaje original  
Asunto: Re: [PEIRCE-L] [biosemiotics:6231] Re: biosemiotics is the basis
for 
Fecha: Wed, 06 Aug 2014 15:17:22 -0300 
De: Claudio Guerri

 
A: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu


Gary, John, List, 
Firstness is really a complex aspect of the sign... but the more
important and difficult aspect for knowledge...
"Symbols grow" and so, First is last... but not least...
and Firstness is essential to all Design disciplines, because related to
Form: conception of form (Math, Geometry...), concrete representation of
form (graphic languages...), aesthetic strategy of form (Renaissance,
Cubism...).
I think that some good should come out of considering a concrete sign
instead of an abstract approach to what can be considered First (examples
are not easy to give, Peirce not excluded from that difficulty).
Everything can be considered a sign, and all signs have to be considered
in its triadic aspects: Firstness, Secondness and Thirdness.
But, Firstness can not be considered in its own, but related to the other
two aspects. Considering a very abstract sign, Firstness can be a feeling
and a Qualisign: redness...
But 'redness' needs a word, so it involves Thirdness, and it can not
exist without the experienced "brute force" of lots of red
objects, so Secondness is also present.
Verbal language is tricky... 'is' and 'are' should not be used for
subsigns or aspects of a sign. The Gioconda IS not an Icon, but a
complete SIGN, from which I can legally emphasize the iconic aspect in a
sentence without naming specifically the other two logically necessary
aspects. In this sense, Louis Althusser is very helpful by stating: some
aspect can be "dominant".
The sign Architecture is an 'easy' example... Somewhere in the old
e-mails in the List there should be a complete Semiotic Nonagon of the
'sign Architecture'. Resuming:
The three aspects of Architecture are: Design (1ness), Construction
(2ness) and Habitability (3ness).
At his time, Vitruvius considered also three aspects, but naming the
three values or 3ness's of the three aspects (in his own order): 
Firmitas (Dicisign), Utilitas (Argument) and Venustas (Rhema).
In the case of architecture, I would not say that Design is a
'feeling'... it should be (normally) something very concrete, even if
only the 'possibility' of being constructed and inhabited.
By deepening in the 3 aspects of Design (always simplifying), we have:
Geometry, Graphic Languages and Gestalt Theory (for the Qualisign);
plans/drawings, models and texts (for the Iconic aspect); and an
aesthetic value of that proposal (for Rhema). And I would not dare to say
that even Geometry can be considered a 'feeling', except in a very
metaphoric way...
In this example, Geometry is not considered as a sign in itself, but as a
1ness of 1ness of 1ness of Architecture, and, since it is considered in
the context of Architecture it is also related unavoidably to Projective
Geometry (2ness, the different graphic languages: Perspective, Monge
System and TSD) and to Gestalt Theory (3ness). Though, Geometry IS not
something concrete and stable but is an aspect of itself, depending on
the context in which it appears.
So, given any sign or aspect of a sign all three Categories will be there
necessarily, in a way or an other, explicitly or not, by cognitive
consciousness or not...
The troglodyte that killed the neighbor to get his 'better' cave (the
equivalent to a better building today) had no IDEA, was not conscious
about DESIGN to decide to kill his neighbor, but, according to Peirce's
proposal, he had to have SOME idea about 'forms' of caves (design,
1ness), some idea of the of materiality of caves (construction, 2ness)
and some idea of the usability (3ness) of that space, called
'cave'.
It seems to me that it is not completely correct, or say, misleading, to
say "that those direct 'feels' are not thoughts, that they
are unanalyzed experiences of qualities" or are
"ineffable", because to say so, we have to imply all knowledge
of concrete materialized experiences and use all our symbolic knowledge
of speech to say that, in THIS case, "this is ineffable"... but
actually meaning: after having reviewed all what I know, I can not
recognize the immediate object nor its symbolic meaning. As far as I can
think, there can not be a pure 1ness, nor a pure 2ness nor a pure 3ness,
but there is always SOME presence of t

Fwd: Re: [PEIRCE-L] [biosemiotics:6231] Re: biosemiotics is the basis for

[Gary Richmond]

Forwarded at the request of Claudio Guerri. GR


-- Forwarded message --
From: Claudio Guerri 
Date: Sun, Aug 10, 2014 at 9:25 AM
Subject: Fwd: Re: [PEIRCE-L] [biosemiotics:6231] Re: biosemiotics is the
basis for
To: Gary Richmond 

 Mensaje original   Asunto: Re: [PEIRCE-L]
[biosemiotics:6231] Re: biosemiotics is the basis for  Fecha: Wed, 06 Aug
2014 15:17:22 -0300  De: Claudio Guerri 
  A: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu

Gary, John, List,

Firstness is really a complex aspect of the sign... but the more important
and difficult aspect for knowledge...
"Symbols grow" and so, First is last... but not least...
and Firstness is essential to all Design disciplines, because related to
Form: conception of form (Math, Geometry...), concrete representation of
form (graphic languages...), aesthetic strategy of form (Renaissance,
Cubism...).
I think that some good should come out of considering a concrete sign
instead of an abstract approach to what can be considered First (examples
are not easy to give, Peirce not excluded from that difficulty).
Everything can be considered a sign, and all signs have to be considered in
its triadic aspects: Firstness, Secondness and Thirdness.
But, Firstness can not be considered in its own, but related to the other
two aspects. Considering a very abstract sign, Firstness can be a feeling
and a Qualisign: redness...
But 'redness' needs a word, so it involves Thirdness, and it can not exist
without the experienced "brute force" of lots of red objects, so Secondness
is also present.

Verbal language is tricky... 'is' and 'are' should not be used for subsigns
or aspects of a sign. The Gioconda IS not an Icon, but a complete SIGN,
from which I can legally emphasize the iconic aspect in a sentence without
naming specifically the other two logically necessary aspects. In this
sense, Louis Althusser is very helpful by stating: some aspect can be
"dominant".

The sign Architecture is an 'easy' example... Somewhere in the old e-mails
in the List there should be a complete Semiotic Nonagon of the 'sign
Architecture'. Resuming:
The three aspects of Architecture are: Design (1ness), Construction (2ness)
and Habitability (3ness).
At his time, Vitruvius considered also three aspects, but naming the three
values or 3ness's of the three aspects (in his own order):  Firmitas
(Dicisign), Utilitas (Argument) and Venustas (Rhema).
In the case of architecture, I would not say that Design is a 'feeling'...
it should be (normally) something very concrete, even if only the
'possibility' of being constructed and inhabited.
By deepening in the 3 aspects of Design (always simplifying), we have:
Geometry, Graphic Languages and Gestalt Theory (for the Qualisign);
plans/drawings, models and texts (for the Iconic aspect); and an aesthetic
value of that proposal (for Rhema). And I would not dare to say that even
Geometry can be considered a 'feeling', except in a very metaphoric way...
In this example, Geometry is not considered as a sign in itself, but as a
1ness of 1ness of 1ness of Architecture, and, since it is considered in the
context of Architecture it is also related unavoidably to Projective
Geometry (2ness, the different graphic languages: Perspective, Monge System
and TSD) and to Gestalt Theory (3ness). Though, Geometry IS not something
concrete and stable but is an aspect of itself, depending on the context in
which it appears.
So, given any sign or aspect of a sign all three Categories will be there
necessarily, in a way or an other, explicitly or not, by cognitive
consciousness or not...
The troglodyte that killed the neighbor to get his 'better' cave (the
equivalent to a better building today) had no IDEA, was not conscious about
DESIGN to decide to kill his neighbor, but, according to Peirce's proposal,
he had to have SOME idea about 'forms' of caves (design, 1ness), some idea
of the of materiality of caves (construction, 2ness) and some idea of the
usability (3ness) of that space, called 'cave'.

It seems to me that it is not completely correct, or say, misleading, to
say "that those direct 'feels' are *not* thoughts, that they are unanalyzed
experiences of qualities" or are "ineffable", because to say so, we have to
imply all knowledge of concrete materialized experiences and use all our
symbolic knowledge of speech to say that, in THIS case, "this is
ineffable"... but actually meaning: after having reviewed all what I know,
I can not recognize the immediate object nor its symbolic meaning. As far
as I can think, there can not be a pure 1ness, nor a pure 2ness nor a pure
3ness, but there is always SOME presence of the three categories... perhaps
with an emphasis on one aspect.

The aspects of 1ness, are not always very ethereal, ineffable, or a mere
sensation... it depends of the