RE: [PEIRCE-L] 6 vectors and 3 inference patterns

[John Collier]

Clark, on my information-theoretic account of causation (and I think generally 
on Russellian “at-at” accounts of causal connection, the evolution of the wave 
function is causal. As Nancy Cartwright has argued, causation is used in many 
ways that overlap like a family resemblance. Perhaps I should have made it 
clear that I was thinking in terms of causation as a process, not some general 
unrestricted view of causation (which I don’t think exists, despite centuries 
of philosophers trying to find one).

John Collier
Professor Emeritus and Senior Research Associate
University of KwaZulu-Natal
http://web.ncf.ca/collier

From: Clark Goble [mailto:cl...@lextek.com]
Sent: Monday, 23 May 2016 8:25 PM
To: Peirce-L <PEIRCE-L@LIST.IUPUI.EDU>
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] 6 vectors and 3 inference patterns


On May 20, 2016, at 2:56 PM, John Collier 
<colli...@ukzn.ac.za<mailto:colli...@ukzn.ac.za>> wrote:

There are versions of what science is supposed to do that don’t worry about 
causation, but just try to find regularities. The more extreme forms of this 
are instrumentalism (like Mach) or Pierre Duhem’s antirealist view of physics 
in Aim and Structure of Physical Theory. Duhem thought that the real causes 
were supernatural (he was very religious) and were not captured by physics, 
which merely “saves the appearances”.

I prefer the causal view of scientific explanation because it puts on a 
stronger constraint (though Bas van Fraassen, another believer, would argue 
that it doesn’t really). In any case, testing scientific theories typically 
requires interacting with their objects, which can only be done causally – our 
connection to the natural world is causal. If there is no difference in 
detectable causes, then there is no real difference in the theories. This is 
not quite the same as Peirce, but not so different to his pragmaticism either.

It’s worth asking how Peirce would have seen Dewey’s particular form of 
instrumentalism. Of course Dewey’s tendency to deny that truth was relevant for 
such instruments goes against Peirce’s particular conceptions. But I think once 
we break out the ideas of “in the long run” as Peirce’s conception of truth 
from more short term facets of instrumental use that perhaps Dewey and Peirce 
are more compatible here than many assume.

I confess I get skeptical about the way causation tends to get thrown around in 
descriptions. Perhaps it’s just from calculating far too many Hamiltonians in 
my undergraduate education. With the Hamiltonian it’s just harder to think in 
terms of causation rather than evolution of the wave function.

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Aw: Re: [PEIRCE-L] 6 vectors and 3 inference patterns

[Helmut Raulien]

Clark, John, list,

still having in mind "reverse-engineering", which does not underly copyright:

I think, when Duhem says, that the real causes are supernatural, and physics only saves the appearances, these two aspects are not contradictorial or contingent with each other, i.e. not parallel alternatives, but they are in a line. It is like Newtonian and Einsteinean physics: Newtonian physics is not an alternative, but a border case of Einsteinean physics. Another example is: You can believe in both, evolution and God, by saying: Organisms are created by the evolution, but God is somehow responsible for the evolution. I think, if in informatics reverse-engineered programs are not due to the copyright of the original program, then either the function is different too, or the patent office worker has not compared both with each other thoroughly. I donot believe, that there can be two ways of proving a truth, with the two ways being not derivable from each other. Like eg. the creationists say, that God has made things up, like hiding dinosaur bones in the soil, in order to test peoples belief in Him. This is to claim, that God has a severe neurotic psychological problem, and that contradicts the definition of God as being wise. So, my work-hypothesis is, that there can not be alternative parallel ways of proving a hypothesis, and that the causes in a proved hypothesis must be the same as in nature. Perhaps the causes themselves are products of wave functions? This also would be in line, not alternative.

Best,

Helmut

 

 23. Mai 2016 um 20:24 Uhr
 "Clark Goble" 
 


 



On May 20, 2016, at 2:56 PM, John Collier  wrote:
 


There are versions of what science is supposed to do that don’t worry about causation, but just try to find regularities. The more extreme forms of this are instrumentalism (like Mach) or Pierre Duhem’s antirealist view of physics in Aim and Structure of Physical Theory. Duhem thought that the real causes were supernatural (he was very religious) and were not captured by physics, which merely “saves the appearances”.

 

I prefer the causal view of scientific explanation because it puts on a stronger constraint (though Bas van Fraassen, another believer, would argue that it doesn’t really). In any case, testing scientific theories typically requires interacting with their objects, which can only be done causally – our connection to the natural world is causal. If there is no difference in detectable causes, then there is no real difference in the theories. This is not quite the same as Peirce, but not so different to his pragmaticism either.



 

It’s worth asking how Peirce would have seen Dewey’s particular form of instrumentalism. Of course Dewey’s tendency to deny that truth was relevant for such instruments goes against Peirce’s particular conceptions. But I think once we break out the ideas of “in the long run” as Peirce’s conception of truth from more short term facets of instrumental use that perhaps Dewey and Peirce are more compatible here than many assume.

 

I confess I get skeptical about the way causation tends to get thrown around in descriptions. Perhaps it’s just from calculating far too many Hamiltonians in my undergraduate education. With the Hamiltonian it’s just harder to think in terms of causation rather than evolution of the wave function. 

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Re: [PEIRCE-L] 6 vectors and 3 inference patterns

[Clark Goble]

> On May 20, 2016, at 2:56 PM, John Collier  > wrote:
> 
> There are versions of what science is supposed to do that don’t worry about 
> causation, but just try to find regularities. The more extreme forms of this 
> are instrumentalism (like Mach) or Pierre Duhem’s antirealist view of physics 
> in Aim and Structure of Physical Theory. Duhem thought that the real causes 
> were supernatural (he was very religious) and were not captured by physics, 
> which merely “saves the appearances”.
>  
> I prefer the causal view of scientific explanation because it puts on a 
> stronger constraint (though Bas van Fraassen, another believer, would argue 
> that it doesn’t really). In any case, testing scientific theories typically 
> requires interacting with their objects, which can only be done causally – 
> our connection to the natural world is causal. If there is no difference in 
> detectable causes, then there is no real difference in the theories. This is 
> not quite the same as Peirce, but not so different to his pragmaticism either.

It’s worth asking how Peirce would have seen Dewey’s particular form of 
instrumentalism. Of course Dewey’s tendency to deny that truth was relevant for 
such instruments goes against Peirce’s particular conceptions. But I think once 
we break out the ideas of “in the long run” as Peirce’s conception of truth 
from more short term facets of instrumental use that perhaps Dewey and Peirce 
are more compatible here than many assume.

I confess I get skeptical about the way causation tends to get thrown around in 
descriptions. Perhaps it’s just from calculating far too many Hamiltonians in 
my undergraduate education. With the Hamiltonian it’s just harder to think in 
terms of causation rather than evolution of the wave function. 
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Re: [PEIRCE-L] 6 vectors and 3 inference patterns

[Jerry Rhee]

*Socrates:** Don't you think the parts of the discourse are thrown out
helter-skelter? Or does it seem to you that the second topic had to be put
second for any cogent reason, or that any of the other things he says are
so placed? It seemed to me, who am wholly ignorant, that the writer uttered
boldly whatever occurred to him. Do you know any rhetorical reason why he
arranged his topics in this order?*



*Phaedrus:** You flatter me in thinking that I can discern his motives so
accurately.*

*Socrates:** But I do think you will agree to this, that every discourse
must be organized, like a living being, with a body of its own, as it were,
so as not to be headless or footless, but to have a middle and members,
composed in fitting relation to each other and to the whole.*

*Phaedrus:** Certainly.*

*Socrates:** See then whether this is the case with your friend's
discourse, or not.*

~Phaedrus, (264b-c)



*Peirce:* *Long before I first classed abduction as an inference it was
recognized by logicians that the operation of adopting an explanatory
hypothesis,- which is just what abduction is,- was subject to certain
conditions…*



*The form of inference therefore is this:*



*The surprising fact, C, is observed;*

*But if A were true, C would be a matter of course.*

*Hence, there is reason to suspect that A is true.*



*…Namely, in the first place, it may be said that even if this be the
normative form of abduction, the form to which abduction **ought to conform*
*…*



*If you carefully consider the question of pragmatism you will see that it
is nothing else than the question of the logic of abduction.*



*Peter Lipton:* *In short, should Inference to the Best Explanation be
construed as inference to the likeliest explanation, or as inference to the
loveliest explanation?”*



*Peirce:* *I can hardly be supposed to have selected the unusual word
“uberty” instead of “fruitfulness” merely because it is spelled with half
as many letters.  Observations may be as fruitful as you will, but they
cannot be said to be gravid with young truth in the sense in which
reasoning may be, not because of the nature of the subject it considers,
but because of the manner in which it is supported by the ratiocinative
instinct.*



Best,
Jerry Rhee

On Wed, May 18, 2016 at 7:55 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt 
wrote:

> Clark, List:
>
> Jerry R. was referring (again) to CP 5.189.
>
> *The *surprising fact, C, is observed.
>
> *But *if A were true, C would be a matter of course.
>
> *Hence, *there is reason to suspect that A is true.
>
>
> However, I confess that I am not quite sure what he was getting at in his
> earlier message.
>
> Regards,
>
> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
> Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
>
> On Wed, May 18, 2016 at 7:20 PM, Clark Goble  wrote:
>
>> On May 18, 2016, at 4:46 PM, Jerry Rhee  wrote:
>>
>> That's yet another reason to start at *the* and not *but* or *hence*...
>>
>> Not quite sure what you mean by that.
>>
>
>
> -
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>
>
>
>
>
>

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Re: [PEIRCE-L] 6 vectors and 3 inference patterns

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

Clark, List:

Jerry R. was referring (again) to CP 5.189.

*The *surprising fact, C, is observed.

*But *if A were true, C would be a matter of course.

*Hence, *there is reason to suspect that A is true.


However, I confess that I am not quite sure what he was getting at in his
earlier message.

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Wed, May 18, 2016 at 7:20 PM, Clark Goble  wrote:

> On May 18, 2016, at 4:46 PM, Jerry Rhee  wrote:
>
> That's yet another reason to start at *the* and not *but* or *hence*...
>
> Not quite sure what you mean by that.
>

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Re: [PEIRCE-L] 6 vectors and 3 inference patterns

[Clark Goble]

> On May 18, 2016, at 4:46 PM, Jerry Rhee  wrote:
> 
> That's yet another reason to start at the and not but or hence...

Not quite sure what you mean by that.

BTW - regarding one of the quotes you had.

Circa 1897, Peirce wrote this: 

The development of my ideas…but of course it is not I who have to pass 
judgment.  It is not quite you, either, individual reader: it is experience and 
history (1.12).


I’ve been intrigued by discussion of middle voice and the philosophical use of 
this grammar that is in some languages (not English). It’s a big deal in 
Heidegger & Gadamer for instance as well as certain parts of scholastic 
philosophy. (It became significant there as Latin doesn’t have middle voice but 
Greek does which led to issues dealing with Greek texts) 

The middle voice is interesting as it’s between the active and the passive and 
thus blurs many traditional distinctions between object and subject in some 
ways. When Peirce almost reifies experience I think he’s making a similar move. 
So far as I know no one’s really written much on that, unlike the other 
figures. Reflexive plurals have some interesting connection to aspects of 
Peirce’s thought - especially aspects of his externalism in signs.

I think that his notion of experience and likely Dewey’s as well falls into 
this sort of analysis. (With regards to Dewey and experience people have 
discussed the place of middle voice, or rather Dewey’s lack of using it) For 
Dewey to have an experience is to already be in a web of relations and a 
background of practices, aims, and consequences. Thus action is always more 
akin to biology in its complexity and weblike nature.

While Peirce doesn’t usually push this quite the way Dewey does, I think his 
semiotics ends up in a similar sort of place. (Only with a far superior logic 
to Dewey’s)
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Re: [PEIRCE-L] 6 vectors and 3 inference patterns

[Jerry Rhee]

Clark, list:

That's yet another reason to start at *the* and not *but* or *hence*...

Best,
Jerry R

On Wed, May 18, 2016 at 4:04 PM, Clark Goble  wrote:

>
> On May 18, 2016, at 1:15 PM, Jerry Rhee  wrote:
>
> In the *1980s*, the study of abduction found a new home in Artificial
> Intelligence…
>
>
> It’s worth noting that a lot of literature on abduction is using the term
> as inference to best explanation. This is somewhat different from Peirce,
> although clearly influenced from Peirce. The SEP does a surprisingly good
> job distinguishes the two.
>
> http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/abduction/
> http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/abduction/peirce.html
>
>
>
>
> -
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>
>
>
>
>
>

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Re: [PEIRCE-L] 6 vectors and 3 inference patterns

[Clark Goble]

> On May 18, 2016, at 1:15 PM, Jerry Rhee  wrote:
> 
> In the 1980s, the study of abduction found a new home in Artificial 
> Intelligence…

It’s worth noting that a lot of literature on abduction is using the term as 
inference to best explanation. This is somewhat different from Peirce, although 
clearly influenced from Peirce. The SEP does a surprisingly good job 
distinguishes the two.

http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/abduction/
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/abduction/peirce.html



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Re: [PEIRCE-L] 6 vectors and 3 inference patterns

[Jerry Rhee]

What is surprise other than a break in the habit of expectation of the
inquisiturus?

..."some surprising phenomenon, some experience which either disappoints an
expectation, or breaks in upon some habit of expectation of the
inquisiturus"

Is surprise/suspect = B surprising, then?

J

On Fri, May 13, 2016 at 1:33 PM, Clark Goble  wrote:

>
> On May 13, 2016, at 12:16 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt 
> wrote:
>
> Does "feeling," understood in this context as a manifestation of
> Firstness, entail psychology?  Of course, Peirce was very concerned about
> NOT grounding any aspect of logic in psychology or any other special
> science.
>
>
> Psychology in this aspect would be thirdness although for any
> psychological phenomena there will be an associated firstness and
> secondness. Psychology to be psychology would be about patterns which
> requires habits.
>
>
>
>
>
>
> -
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>
>
>
>
>

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Re: [PEIRCE-L] 6 vectors and 3 inference patterns

[Clark Goble]

> On May 13, 2016, at 12:16 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt  
> wrote:
> 
> Does "feeling," understood in this context as a manifestation of Firstness, 
> entail psychology?  Of course, Peirce was very concerned about NOT grounding 
> any aspect of logic in psychology or any other special science.
> 

Psychology in this aspect would be thirdness although for any psychological 
phenomena there will be an associated firstness and secondness. Psychology to 
be psychology would be about patterns which requires habits.





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