RE: RE: [PEIRCE-L] multiple-valued logic
Hello Everyone, I’m writing on behalf of my father Charles Pyle. He passed away on 1/12 due to COVID. We have seen that he was fairly active in this list and wanted to let everyone know – my sincere apologies for the group email to the entire list and letting you know in this manner. We are having a small ceremony on Sunday at 2pm which we will livestream. We have received notes and memories from all over the world which we will be reading and sharing along with our memories at the “sharemony”, so if anyone has thoughts, memories or anything, it has been a real blessing to receive and we would love to have more. If anyone wants the private link to the livestream, please message off list and I will provide the link. Link to his obituary: https://www.walkerfuneralhomes.com/obituaries/Charles-Robert-Pyle?obId=19639780#/obituaryInfo Thank you all and again, my apologies for coopting this conversation. Sincerely, Jacob Pyle From: Charles Pyle Sent: Monday, November 23, 2020 9:09 PM To: tabor...@primus.ca; Jerry LR Chandler Cc: Peirce List Subject: RE: RE: [PEIRCE-L] multiple-valued logic Edwina, list: I don’t have access to my Peirce data right now, but I do disagree with the claim that Peirce does not allow for something prior to semiosis. I happened on the following quote from Peirce in some notes, but it doesn’t identify the source. It seems to me that Peirce is talking here about something prior to semiosis. ---begin quote The idea of the absolutely First must be entirely separated from all conception of or reference to anything else; for what involves a second is itself a second to that second. The First must therefore be present and immediate, so as not to be second to a representation. It must be fresh and new, for if old it is second to its former state. It must be initiative, original, spontaneous, and free; otherwise it is second to a determining cause. It is also something vivid and conscious; so only it avoids being the object of some sensation. It precedes all synthesis and all differentiation; it has no unity and no parts. It cannot be articulately thought: assert it, and it has already lost its characteristic innocence; for assertion always implies a denial of something else. Stop to think of it, and it has flown! What the world was to Adam on the day he opened his eyes to it, before he had drawn any distinctions, or had become conscious of his own existence – that is first, present, immediate, fresh, new, initiative, original, spontaneous, free, vivid, conscious, and evanescent. Only, remember that every description of it must be false to it. ---end quote Here too, I wonder what Peirce could mean here by direct experience, collateral experience, and self-experience, if not something prior to semiosis. ---begin quote 1908 [c.] | Letters to Lady Welby | MS [R] L463:14: "A Sign may bring before the Mind, a new hypothesis, or a sentiment, a quality, a respect, a degree, a thing, an event, a law, etc. But it never can convey anything to a person who has not had a direct experience or at least original self-experience of the same object, collateral experience." ---end quote Same here. As I read this and similar statements, he envisions a mode of knowing that is outside of the system of signs. ---begin quote I do not mean by "collateral observation" acquaintance with the system of signs. What is so gathered is not COLLATERAL. It is on the contrary the prerequisite for getting any idea signified by the Sign. (CP 8.179, EP 2:494, 1909) ---end quote And finally, as I recall in defining existential graphs Peirce held that the sheet of assertion represents truth, the context within which assertions are inscribed. Regards, Charles Pyle From: Edwina Taborsky mailto:tabor...@primus.ca>> Sent: Monday, November 23, 2020 8:11 PM To: Jerry LR Chandler mailto:jerry_lr_chand...@icloud.com>>; Charles Pyle mailto:char...@pyle.tv>> Cc: Peirce List mailto:peirce-l@list.iupui.edu>> Subject: Re: RE: [PEIRCE-L] multiple-valued logic Charles, list: I don't see how you can assert that, " there is a truth that is prior to semiosis, in my opinion, also is consistent with Peirce’s thinking. " My understanding of Peirce is that there is nothing outside of semiosis! 'the entire universe - not merely the universe of existents, the universe which we are all accustomed to refer to as 'the truth' - that all this universe is perfused with signs, if it is not composed exclusively of signs' 5.449f. [That is - there is no 'force' aka truth, that is prior to or outside of semiosis]. "Truth is the conformity of a representamen to its object, ITS object, mind you" 5.554. [Truth is obviously operative within the semiosic process - not prior to it]. And the methods of attaining this truth [the conformity of a representamen to its object] - is via..induction, deduct
Aw: Re: RE: RE: [PEIRCE-L] multiple-valued logic
laim that Peirce does not allow for something prior to semiosis. I happened on the following quote from Peirce in some notes, but it doesn’t identify the source. It seems to me that Peirce is talking here about something prior to semiosis. ---begin quote The idea of the absolutely First must be entirely separated from all conception of or reference to anything else; for what involves a second is itself a second to that second. The First must therefore be present and immediate, so as not to be second to a representation. It must be fresh and new, for if old it is second to its former state. It must be initiative, original, spontaneous, and free; otherwise it is second to a determining cause. It is also something vivid and conscious; so only it avoids being the object of some sensation. It precedes all synthesis and all differentiation; it has no unity and no parts. It cannot be articulately thought: assert it, and it has already lost its characteristic innocence; for assertion always implies a denial of something else. Stop to think of it, and it has flown! What the world was to Adam on the day he opened his eyes to it, before he had drawn any distinctions, or had become conscious of his own existence – that is first, present, immediate, fresh, new, initiative, original, spontaneous, free, vivid, conscious, and evanescent. Only, remember that every description of it must be false to it. ---end quote Here too, I wonder what Peirce could mean here by direct experience, collateral experience, and self-experience, if not something prior to semiosis. ---begin quote 1908 [c.] | Letters to Lady Welby | MS [R] L463:14: "A Sign may bring before the Mind, a new hypothesis, or a sentiment, a quality, a respect, a degree, a thing, an event, a law, etc. But it never can convey anything to a person who has not had a direct experience or at least original self-experience of the same object, collateral experience." ---end quote Same here. As I read this and similar statements, he envisions a mode of knowing that is outside of the system of signs. ---begin quote I do not mean by "collateral observation" acquaintance with the system of signs. What is so gathered is not COLLATERAL. It is on the contrary the prerequisite for getting any idea signified by the Sign. (CP 8.179, EP 2:494, 1909) ---end quote And finally, as I recall in defining existential graphs Peirce held that the sheet of assertion represents truth, the context within which assertions are inscribed. Regards, Charles Pyle From: Edwina Taborsky Sent: Monday, November 23, 2020 8:11 PM To: Jerry LR Chandler ; Charles Pyle Cc: Peirce List Subject: Re: RE: [PEIRCE-L] multiple-valued logic Charles, list: I don't see how you can assert that, " there is a truth that is prior to semiosis, in my opinion, also is consistent with Peirce’s thinking. " My understanding of Peirce is that there is nothing outside of semiosis! 'the entire universe - not merely the universe of existents, the universe which we are all accustomed to refer to as 'the truth' - that all this universe is perfused with signs, if it is not composed exclusively of signs' 5.449f. [That is - there is no 'force' aka truth, that is prior to or outside of semiosis]. "Truth is the conformity of a representamen to its object, ITS object, mind you" 5.554. [Truth is obviously operative within the semiosic process - not prior to it]. And the methods of attaining this truth [the conformity of a representamen to its object] - is via..induction, deduction, abduction. I understand that you are a Buddhist - which does indeed, posit an a priori Truth - but I don't find any such concepts within the work of Peirce. Such a view would greatly change the power of semiosis, reducing it to almost a mechanical function. Edwina On Tue 24/11/20 12:38 AM , Charles Pyle char...@pyle.tv sent: Hi Jerry, It is not my hypothesis. The linguistic theory of markedness has been around since at least the 1930’s. Since then it has been tested against a vast body of data from a huge number of languages by generations of linguists. Nevertheless, as with so much of linguistics, markedness theory seems not to have come to the attention of the rest of the academic world, let alone the civilian world. If you do a google search on “markedness theory” you will find a lot of information. The top item returned to me just now had a nice statement about the beginning of markedness theory. begin quote Markedness Theory proposes that in the languages of the world certain linguistic elements are more basic, natural, and frequent (unmarked) than others which are referred to as marked. The concept of Markedness is first proposed by the Prague School scholars Nikolai Sergeyevich Trubetzkoy and Roman Jakobson. https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/c855/a0ad0e00662ee7b813c6d332f7374ef221e4.pdf end quote
Re: RE: RE: [PEIRCE-L] multiple-valued logic
l differentiation; it has no unity and no parts. It cannot be articulately thought: assert it, and it has already lost its characteristic innocence; for assertion always implies a denial of something else. Stop to think of it, and it has flown! What the world was to Adam on the day he opened his eyes to it, before he had drawn any distinctions, or had become conscious of his own existence – that is first, present, immediate, fresh, new, initiative, original, spontaneous, free, vivid, conscious, and evanescent. Only, remember that every description of it must be false to it. ---end quote Here too, I wonder what Peirce could mean here by direct experience, collateral experience, and self-experience, if not something prior to semiosis. ---begin quote 1908 [c.] | Letters to Lady Welby | MS [R] L463:14: "A Sign may bring before the Mind, a new hypothesis, or a sentiment, a quality, a respect, a degree, a thing, an event, a law, etc. But it never can convey anything to a person who has not had a direct experience or at least original self-experience of the same object, collateral experience." ---end quote Same here. As I read this and similar statements, he envisions a mode of knowing that is outside of the system of signs. ---begin quote I do not mean by "collateral observation" acquaintance with the system of signs. What is so gathered is not COLLATERAL. It is on the contrary the prerequisite for getting any idea signified by the Sign. (CP 8.179, EP 2:494, 1909) ---end quote And finally, as I recall in defining existential graphs Peirce held that the sheet of assertion represents truth, the context within which assertions are inscribed. Regards, Charles Pyle From: Edwina Taborsky Sent: Monday, November 23, 2020 8:11 PM To: Jerry LR Chandler ; Charles Pyle Cc: Peirce List Subject: Re: RE: [PEIRCE-L] multiple-valued logic Charles, list: I don't see how you can assert that, " there is a truth that is prior to semiosis, in my opinion, also is consistent with Peirce’s thinking. " My understanding of Peirce is that there is nothing outside of semiosis! 'the entire universe - not merely the universe of existents, the universe which we are all accustomed to refer to as 'the truth' - that all this universe is perfused with signs, if it is not composed exclusively of signs' 5.449f. [That is - there is no 'force' aka truth, that is prior to or outside of semiosis]. "Truth is the conformity of a representamen to its object, ITS object, mind you" 5.554. [Truth is obviously operative within the semiosic process - not prior to it]. And the methods of attaining this truth [the conformity of a representamen to its object] - is via..induction, deduction, abduction. I understand that you are a Buddhist - which does indeed, posit an a priori Truth - but I don't find any such concepts within the work of Peirce. Such a view would greatly change the power of semiosis, reducing it to almost a mechanical function. Edwina On Tue 24/11/20 12:38 AM , Charles Pyle char...@pyle.tv [1] sent: Hi Jerry, It is not my hypothesis. The linguistic theory of markedness has been around since at least the 1930’s. Since then it has been tested against a vast body of data from a huge number of languages by generations of linguists. Nevertheless, as with so much of linguistics, markedness theory seems not to have come to the attention of the rest of the academic world, let alone the civilian world. If you do a google search on “markedness theory” you will find a lot of information. The top item returned to me just now had a nice statement about the beginning of markedness theory. begin quote Markedness Theory proposes that in the languages of the world certain linguistic elements are more basic, natural, and frequent (unmarked) than others which are referred to as marked. The concept of Markedness is first proposed by the Prague School scholars Nikolai Sergeyevich Trubetzkoy and Roman Jakobson. https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/c855/a0ad0e00662ee7b813c6d332f7374ef221e4.pdf [2] end quote There is also an informative Wikipedia page: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Markedness [3] As to falsification of the hypothesis, as I said it has been subject to extensive empirical testing. As to the relation between markedness theory and Peirce, again numerous scholars in many different fields have explored the relationship. Michael Shapiro is a well-known scholar of markedness theory and he has been active on this list for many years. See this article for example. https://cspeirce.iupui.edu/menu/library/aboutcsp/shapiro/shapiro-mclc.pdf [4]
Re: RE: RE: [PEIRCE-L] multiple-valued logic
Charles, list 1] The categorical mode of Firstness is not an a priori Truth but an essential part of semiosis. 2] Direct experience functions within semiosis - with the Dynamic Object being mediated into an Interpretant 3] There is no such 'thing' or 'force' as an a priori Truth within Peircean semiosis. Edwina On Tue 24/11/20 2:09 AM , Charles Pyle char...@pyle.tv sent: Edwina, list: I don’t have access to my Peirce data right now, but I do disagree with the claim that Peirce does not allow for something prior to semiosis. I happened on the following quote from Peirce in some notes, but it doesn’t identify the source. It seems to me that Peirce is talking here about something prior to semiosis. ---begin quote The idea of the absolutely First must be entirely separated from all conception of or reference to anything else; for what involves a second is itself a second to that second. The First must therefore be present and immediate, so as not to be second to a representation. It must be fresh and new, for if old it is second to its former state. It must be initiative, original, spontaneous, and free; otherwise it is second to a determining cause. It is also something vivid and conscious; so only it avoids being the object of some sensation. It precedes all synthesis and all differentiation; it has no unity and no parts. It cannot be articulately thought: assert it, and it has already lost its characteristic innocence; for assertion always implies a denial of something else. Stop to think of it, and it has flown! What the world was to Adam on the day he opened his eyes to it, before he had drawn any distinctions, or had become conscious of his own existence – that is first, present, immediate, fresh, new, initiative, original, spontaneous, free, vivid, conscious, and evanescent. Only, remember that every description of it must be false to it. ---end quote Here too, I wonder what Peirce could mean here by direct experience, collateral experience, and self-experience, if not something prior to semiosis. ---begin quote 1908 [c.] | Letters to Lady Welby | MS [R] L463:14: "A Sign may bring before the Mind, a new hypothesis, or a sentiment, a quality, a respect, a degree, a thing, an event, a law, etc. But it never can convey anything to a person who has not had a direct experience or at least original self-experience of the same object, collateral experience." ---end quote Same here. As I read this and similar statements, he envisions a mode of knowing that is outside of the system of signs. ---begin quote I do not mean by "collateral observation" acquaintance with the system of signs. What is so gathered is not COLLATERAL. It is on the contrary the prerequisite for getting any idea signified by the Sign. (CP 8.179, EP 2:494, 1909) ---end quote And finally, as I recall in defining existential graphs Peirce held that the sheet of assertion represents truth, the context within which assertions are inscribed. Regards, Charles Pyle From: Edwina Taborsky Sent: Monday, November 23, 2020 8:11 PM To: Jerry LR Chandler ; Charles Pyle Cc: Peirce List Subject: Re: RE: [PEIRCE-L] multiple-valued logic Charles, list: I don't see how you can assert that, " there is a truth that is prior to semiosis, in my opinion, also is consistent with Peirce’s thinking. " My understanding of Peirce is that there is nothing outside of semiosis! 'the entire universe - not merely the universe of existents, the universe which we are all accustomed to refer to as 'the truth' - that all this universe is perfused with signs, if it is not composed exclusively of signs' 5.449f. [That is - there is no 'force' aka truth, that is prior to or outside of semiosis]. "Truth is the conformity of a representamen to its object, ITS object, mind you" 5.554. [Truth is obviously operative within the semiosic process - not prior to it]. And the methods of attaining this truth [the conformity of a representamen to its object] - is via..induction, deduction, abduction. I understand that you are a Buddhist - which does indeed, posit an a priori Truth - but I don't find any such concepts within the work of Peirce. Such a view would greatly change the power of semiosis, reducing it to almost a mechanical function. Edwina On Tue 24/11/20 12:38 AM , Charles Pyle char...@pyle.tv [1] sent: Hi Jerry, It is not my hypothesis. The linguistic theory of markedness has been around since at least the 1930’s. Since then it has been tested against a vast body of data from a huge number of languages by generations of linguists. Nevertheless, as with so much o
RE: RE: [PEIRCE-L] multiple-valued logic
Edwina, list: I don’t have access to my Peirce data right now, but I do disagree with the claim that Peirce does not allow for something prior to semiosis. I happened on the following quote from Peirce in some notes, but it doesn’t identify the source. It seems to me that Peirce is talking here about something prior to semiosis. ---begin quote The idea of the absolutely First must be entirely separated from all conception of or reference to anything else; for what involves a second is itself a second to that second. The First must therefore be present and immediate, so as not to be second to a representation. It must be fresh and new, for if old it is second to its former state. It must be initiative, original, spontaneous, and free; otherwise it is second to a determining cause. It is also something vivid and conscious; so only it avoids being the object of some sensation. It precedes all synthesis and all differentiation; it has no unity and no parts. It cannot be articulately thought: assert it, and it has already lost its characteristic innocence; for assertion always implies a denial of something else. Stop to think of it, and it has flown! What the world was to Adam on the day he opened his eyes to it, before he had drawn any distinctions, or had become conscious of his own existence – that is first, present, immediate, fresh, new, initiative, original, spontaneous, free, vivid, conscious, and evanescent. Only, remember that every description of it must be false to it. ---end quote Here too, I wonder what Peirce could mean here by direct experience, collateral experience, and self-experience, if not something prior to semiosis. ---begin quote 1908 [c.] | Letters to Lady Welby | MS [R] L463:14: "A Sign may bring before the Mind, a new hypothesis, or a sentiment, a quality, a respect, a degree, a thing, an event, a law, etc. But it never can convey anything to a person who has not had a direct experience or at least original self-experience of the same object, collateral experience." ---end quote Same here. As I read this and similar statements, he envisions a mode of knowing that is outside of the system of signs. ---begin quote I do not mean by "collateral observation" acquaintance with the system of signs. What is so gathered is not COLLATERAL. It is on the contrary the prerequisite for getting any idea signified by the Sign. (CP 8.179, EP 2:494, 1909) ---end quote And finally, as I recall in defining existential graphs Peirce held that the sheet of assertion represents truth, the context within which assertions are inscribed. Regards, Charles Pyle From: Edwina Taborsky Sent: Monday, November 23, 2020 8:11 PM To: Jerry LR Chandler ; Charles Pyle Cc: Peirce List Subject: Re: RE: [PEIRCE-L] multiple-valued logic Charles, list: I don't see how you can assert that, " there is a truth that is prior to semiosis, in my opinion, also is consistent with Peirce’s thinking. " My understanding of Peirce is that there is nothing outside of semiosis! 'the entire universe - not merely the universe of existents, the universe which we are all accustomed to refer to as 'the truth' - that all this universe is perfused with signs, if it is not composed exclusively of signs' 5.449f. [That is - there is no 'force' aka truth, that is prior to or outside of semiosis]. "Truth is the conformity of a representamen to its object, ITS object, mind you" 5.554. [Truth is obviously operative within the semiosic process - not prior to it]. And the methods of attaining this truth [the conformity of a representamen to its object] - is via..induction, deduction, abduction. I understand that you are a Buddhist - which does indeed, posit an a priori Truth - but I don't find any such concepts within the work of Peirce. Such a view would greatly change the power of semiosis, reducing it to almost a mechanical function. Edwina On Tue 24/11/20 12:38 AM , Charles Pyle char...@pyle.tv<mailto:char...@pyle.tv> sent: Hi Jerry, It is not my hypothesis. The linguistic theory of markedness has been around since at least the 1930’s. Since then it has been tested against a vast body of data from a huge number of languages by generations of linguists. Nevertheless, as with so much of linguistics, markedness theory seems not to have come to the attention of the rest of the academic world, let alone the civilian world. If you do a google search on “markedness theory” you will find a lot of information. The top item returned to me just now had a nice statement about the beginning of markedness theory. begin quote Markedness Theory proposes that in the languages of the world certain linguistic elements are more basic, natural, and frequent (unmarked) than others which are referred to as marked. The concept of Markedness is first proposed by the Prague School scholars Nik
Re: RE: [PEIRCE-L] multiple-valued logic
Charles, list: I don't see how you can assert that, " there is a truth that is prior to semiosis, in my opinion, also is consistent with Peirce’s thinking. " My understanding of Peirce is that there is nothing outside of semiosis! 'the entire universe - not merely the universe of existents, the universe which we are all accustomed to refer to as 'the truth' - that all this universe is perfused with signs, if it is not composed exclusively of signs' 5.449f. [That is - there is no 'force' aka truth, that is prior to or outside of semiosis]. "Truth is the conformity of a representamen to its object, ITS object, mind you" 5.554. [Truth is obviously operative within the semiosic process - not prior to it]. And the methods of attaining this truth [the conformity of a representamen to its object] - is via..induction, deduction, abduction. I understand that you are a Buddhist - which does indeed, posit an a priori Truth - but I don't find any such concepts within the work of Peirce. Such a view would greatly change the power of semiosis, reducing it to almost a mechanical function. Edwina On Tue 24/11/20 12:38 AM , Charles Pyle char...@pyle.tv sent: Hi Jerry, It is not my hypothesis. The linguistic theory of markedness has been around since at least the 1930’s. Since then it has been tested against a vast body of data from a huge number of languages by generations of linguists. Nevertheless, as with so much of linguistics, markedness theory seems not to have come to the attention of the rest of the academic world, let alone the civilian world. If you do a google search on “markedness theory” you will find a lot of information. The top item returned to me just now had a nice statement about the beginning of markedness theory. begin quote Markedness Theory proposes that in the languages of the world certain linguistic elements are more basic, natural, and frequent (unmarked) than others which are referred to as marked. The concept of Markedness is first proposed by the Prague School scholars Nikolai Sergeyevich Trubetzkoy and Roman Jakobson. https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/c855/a0ad0e00662ee7b813c6d332f7374ef221e4.pdf [1] end quote There is also an informative Wikipedia page: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Markedness [2] As to falsification of the hypothesis, as I said it has been subject to extensive empirical testing. As to the relation between markedness theory and Peirce, again numerous scholars in many different fields have explored the relationship. Michael Shapiro is a well-known scholar of markedness theory and he has been active on this list for many years. See this article for example. https://cspeirce.iupui.edu/menu/library/aboutcsp/shapiro/shapiro-mclc.pdf [3] Finally, I note that markedness theory in no way vitiates Peirce’s doctrine of the tripartite nature of the sign. And the idea that there is a truth that is prior to semiosis, in my opinion, also is consistent with Peirce’s thinking. Cheers, Charles Pyle From: Jerry LR Chandler Sent: Monday, November 23, 2020 6:57 PM To: Charles Pyle Cc: Peirce List Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] multiple-valued logic Hi Charles Your post below left me stone cold! One counter example to your hypothesis (conjecture?) is the language of chemistry. It is built on positive evidence and reproducible empirical observations. The propositional webs of inferences of chemical structures is one of the several facets of chemical logic that CSP exploited in constructing his philosophies. The sensory properties of matter are fixed by experience. Taste and smell are remembered and associated with activities and events. The timelessness of chemical names, such as water, or sugar or gold or…. are deeply embedded in human communication. Chemical language grows from these positive impressions of sensory experiences on feelings / emotions. The connections between chemical receptor encoded directly from the chemical genetic structures and the chemical circumstances is firmly grounded in decades of experience and centuries of experience. The consistency of the chemical language has remained unchallenged for centuries. What separates the acquisition of chemical language from other languages? What, if any, role does Popperian falsification theory play in your assertions? Cheers Jerry On Nov 22, 2020, at 6:14 PM, Charles Pyle wrote: Hi Helmut, Yes, as you surmise. I think it is reasonable to take this as a refinement of Spencer-Brown. Let me explain it a little further. The space in which language grows is a kind of gravitational field where truth is the center from which language arises in the f
Aw: Re: RE: RE: [PEIRCE-L] multiple-valued logic
Supplement: But perhaps this comparison with objective (or ontological) models is not even necessary, as it might be enough to go from subjectivity to intersubjectivity. I must read your texts, Charles, maybe it is in them. I just am thinking, is the falsity in language due to what I would call "classification fallacy"? That is, if one suggests an XOR, where there is an OR? Suggesting a taxonomy where there in fact is a composition? A spoken word or sound, a legisign, (mis)represents a part of the outside continuum for a distinct discreteness. For this fallacy there are many rethoric moves as examples, when e.g. a politican says: "Instead of doing A, we should better do B" (like helping refugeees and also improving their home situations), when in fact both actions are necessary. Or saying: "He married her for her money, not because of love", when in fact he married her for both, and maybe more reasons. On the other hand, I dont think, that every word is false by commiting a classification fallacy. For example the word "horse" is not a fallacy, because the taxonomy exists in reality too, although a horse can interbreed with a donkey, but the resulting mule is infertile, so there is no continuum between horses and donkeys neither in reality. Charles, Edwina, List, I understand the falsity-truth distinction abstractly, because Spencer-Brown´s calculus is isomorphic with Peirce´s Entitive Graphs, and the cut in them is, translated to Boolean, a "NOT". The truth of the unmarked space then would not be ultimate, but original truth. I think, S.-Brown´s calculus suits well to linguistics, because speech is a constructive action of a subject, and the said calculus is also subjective and constructivistic, it starts with the imperative "Draw a distinction". I guess that here mostly the commander and the obeyer is the same subject, as both decider and acter. So I think, that this model is constructivistic and subjective. I wonder how to compare this model and make it come close with other models, e.g existentialistic ones, or ones that claim objectivity. I am suspecting, that this compartison might show, that a distinction, especially a re-entry can be blurred and dissolved, or elsehow conditioned. Best, Helmut 23. November 2020 um 15:59 Uhr "Edwina Taborsky" wrote: Sounds rather Buddhist - ie, 'ultimate truth which is empty of concrete characteristics - vs -provisional or concrete instantiations.. I don't see this as Peircean - for all three categories [1ns, 2ns and 3ns] are necessarily functional in his Realism. And his Objective Idealism includes matter with the idea. Edwina On Mon 23/11/20 12:14 AM , Charles Pyle char...@pyle.tv sent: Hi Helmut, Yes, as you surmise. I think it is reasonable to take this as a refinement of Spencer-Brown. Let me explain it a little further. The space in which language grows is a kind of gravitational field where truth is the center from which language arises in the form of marks each of which is an elaboration of some prior, and each mark is a sign of falsity. Thus the structure of language arises layer by layer as a structure of falsity. The more marked, the more false. And it is a gravitational space because the false tends by its nature to fall apart and reveal the underlying, whether it is only a relatively less false underlying layer, or the ultimate underlying layer of truth itself. Because of the nature of the relation between truth and falsity, falsity must be continually reinforced, repaired, defended, etc. or it will fall apart. In terms of markedness, truth is unmarked and unmarkable. Truth is silent. Every element of language arises from some prior by elaborating on the prior. Thus the first event in the arising of language is the production of a sound that interrupts silence and in doing so creates the derivative ground on which language is elaborated. The most unmarked vowel, the most open vowel, the most sonorant vowel is a. So in theory we can hypothecate a as the first mark which establishes the space of language as deviant from truth. Both truth and its manifestation as silence are actual continuities. Sound is a kind of false continuity. It sounds like a continuity. But it has a beginning and an end, whereas silence was already there before the sound begins, and it will be there after the sound ends. Silence is even there during the sound: sound consists of a rapid sequence of pulses of energy; between each of the pulses of energy is a brief gap that has the characteristics of silence, i.e. the absence of sound. Sound is a kind of continuity of discontinuity. You can clearly see this in a sonographic analysis of sound. And here we can also see how it is that the very ground of language is deviant from sound, seeking to interrupt the continuity of truth by means of a faux continuity, and thus is essentially a sign of falsity. Given this fundamental ground, the next logical step would be t
Aw: Re: RE: RE: [PEIRCE-L] multiple-valued logic
Charles, Edwina, List, I understand the falsity-truth distinction abstractly, because Spencer-Brown´s calculus is isomorphic with Peirce´s Entitive Graphs, and the cut in them is, translated to Boolean, a "NOT". The truth of the unmarked space then would not be ultimate, but original truth. I think, S.-Brown´s calculus suits well to linguistics, because speech is a constructive action of a subject, and the said calculus is also subjective and constructivistic, it starts with the imperative "Draw a distinction". I guess that here mostly the commander and the obeyer is the same subject, as both decider and acter. So I think, that this model is constructivistic and subjective. I wonder how to compare this model and make it come close with other models, e.g existentialistic ones, or ones that claim objectivity. I am suspecting, that this compartison might show, that a distinction, especially a re-entry can be blurred and dissolved, or elsehow conditioned. Best, Helmut 23. November 2020 um 15:59 Uhr "Edwina Taborsky" wrote: Sounds rather Buddhist - ie, 'ultimate truth which is empty of concrete characteristics - vs -provisional or concrete instantiations.. I don't see this as Peircean - for all three categories [1ns, 2ns and 3ns] are necessarily functional in his Realism. And his Objective Idealism includes matter with the idea. Edwina On Mon 23/11/20 12:14 AM , Charles Pyle char...@pyle.tv sent: Hi Helmut, Yes, as you surmise. I think it is reasonable to take this as a refinement of Spencer-Brown. Let me explain it a little further. The space in which language grows is a kind of gravitational field where truth is the center from which language arises in the form of marks each of which is an elaboration of some prior, and each mark is a sign of falsity. Thus the structure of language arises layer by layer as a structure of falsity. The more marked, the more false. And it is a gravitational space because the false tends by its nature to fall apart and reveal the underlying, whether it is only a relatively less false underlying layer, or the ultimate underlying layer of truth itself. Because of the nature of the relation between truth and falsity, falsity must be continually reinforced, repaired, defended, etc. or it will fall apart. In terms of markedness, truth is unmarked and unmarkable. Truth is silent. Every element of language arises from some prior by elaborating on the prior. Thus the first event in the arising of language is the production of a sound that interrupts silence and in doing so creates the derivative ground on which language is elaborated. The most unmarked vowel, the most open vowel, the most sonorant vowel is a. So in theory we can hypothecate a as the first mark which establishes the space of language as deviant from truth. Both truth and its manifestation as silence are actual continuities. Sound is a kind of false continuity. It sounds like a continuity. But it has a beginning and an end, whereas silence was already there before the sound begins, and it will be there after the sound ends. Silence is even there during the sound: sound consists of a rapid sequence of pulses of energy; between each of the pulses of energy is a brief gap that has the characteristics of silence, i.e. the absence of sound. Sound is a kind of continuity of discontinuity. You can clearly see this in a sonographic analysis of sound. And here we can also see how it is that the very ground of language is deviant from sound, seeking to interrupt the continuity of truth by means of a faux continuity, and thus is essentially a sign of falsity. Given this fundamental ground, the next logical step would be to mark the vocalic ground continuity by its opposite, that is, to interrupt the continuity, which is done in language by a consonant resulting in such basic infantile linguistic forms as ama, aba, aka, ata, etc. Driven by factors of timing these are often morphed into mama, baba, kaka, tata, etc. From here phonologically the vowel space is further divided into at least three elements naturally occupying the extreme margins of the vocalic space resulting in a vowel inventory of a, i, u. And of course these can be further divided. Consonants are similarly elaborated by the logic of opposition. Roman Jakobson provided the classical explanation of this process of development here: Jakobson, Roman. 1968. Child Language Aphasia and Phonological Universals, Janua Linguarum, Series Minor, 72, Moutoun, The Hague. And I reframed his explanation in the context of Peirce’s theory of signs in “Wild Language” which can be found here: https://umich.academia.edu/CharlesPyle Charles Pyle From: Helmut Raulien Sent: Sunday, November 22, 2020 4:25 PM To: Charles Pyle Cc: Peirce-L Subject: Aw: RE: [PEIRCE-L] multiple-valued logic Charles, wow, interesting! I think about it. By first glance it seems to me like a linguistic elaboration of Spencer-Brown.
Re: RE: RE: [PEIRCE-L] multiple-valued logic
Sounds rather Buddhist - ie, 'ultimate truth which is empty of concrete characteristics - vs -provisional or concrete instantiations.. I don't see this as Peircean - for all three categories [1ns, 2ns and 3ns] are necessarily functional in his Realism. And his Objective Idealism includes matter with the idea. Edwina On Mon 23/11/20 12:14 AM , Charles Pyle char...@pyle.tv sent: Hi Helmut, Yes, as you surmise. I think it is reasonable to take this as a refinement of Spencer-Brown. Let me explain it a little further. The space in which language grows is a kind of gravitational field where truth is the center from which language arises in the form of marks each of which is an elaboration of some prior, and each mark is a sign of falsity. Thus the structure of language arises layer by layer as a structure of falsity. The more marked, the more false. And it is a gravitational space because the false tends by its nature to fall apart and reveal the underlying, whether it is only a relatively less false underlying layer, or the ultimate underlying layer of truth itself. Because of the nature of the relation between truth and falsity, falsity must be continually reinforced, repaired, defended, etc. or it will fall apart. In terms of markedness, truth is unmarked and unmarkable. Truth is silent. Every element of language arises from some prior by elaborating on the prior. Thus the first event in the arising of language is the production of a sound that interrupts silence and in doing so creates the derivative ground on which language is elaborated. The most unmarked vowel, the most open vowel, the most sonorant vowel is a. So in theory we can hypothecate a as the first mark which establishes the space of language as deviant from truth. Both truth and its manifestation as silence are actual continuities. Sound is a kind of false continuity. It sounds like a continuity. But it has a beginning and an end, whereas silence was already there before the sound begins, and it will be there after the sound ends. Silence is even there during the sound: sound consists of a rapid sequence of pulses of energy; between each of the pulses of energy is a brief gap that has the characteristics of silence, i.e. the absence of sound. Sound is a kind of continuity of discontinuity. You can clearly see this in a sonographic analysis of sound. And here we can also see how it is that the very ground of language is deviant from sound, seeking to interrupt the continuity of truth by means of a faux continuity, and thus is essentially a sign of falsity. Given this fundamental ground, the next logical step would be to mark the vocalic ground continuity by its opposite, that is, to interrupt the continuity, which is done in language by a consonant resulting in such basic infantile linguistic forms as ama, aba, aka, ata, etc. Driven by factors of timing these are often morphed into mama, baba, kaka, tata, etc. From here phonologically the vowel space is further divided into at least three elements naturally occupying the extreme margins of the vocalic space resulting in a vowel inventory of a, i, u. And of course these can be further divided. Consonants are similarly elaborated by the logic of opposition. Roman Jakobson provided the classical explanation of this process of development here: Jakobson, Roman. 1968. Child Language Aphasia and Phonological Universals, Janua Linguarum, Series Minor, 72, Moutoun, The Hague. And I reframed his explanation in the context of Peirce’s theory of signs in “Wild Language” which can be found here: https://umich.academia.edu/CharlesPyle [1] Charles Pyle From: Helmut Raulien Sent: Sunday, November 22, 2020 4:25 PM To: Charles Pyle Cc: Peirce-L Subject: Aw: RE: [PEIRCE-L] multiple-valued logic Charles, wow, interesting! I think about it. By first glance it seems to me like a linguistic elaboration of Spencer-Brown. Do all polarities come from a marked starting point, looking out for an opposite in unmarked space? I apologize to everybody "conservative". Please see my use of the term confined within the example I gave, and not generalized to its political meaning. Or replaced with "conventional" or "formerly conventional". Best, Helmut 22. November 2020 um 22:06 Uhr "Charles Pyle" wrote: Helmut, Speaking as a linguist, I must point out that the view of language you take in the paragraph I quote below is profoundly mistaken. --begin quote from Helmut-- The conservative concept of sexuality is male-female, so binary, like black-white, hot-cold, right-wrong, up-down, open-closed, well-unwell. When somebody claims for him*herself to belong to a third gender, conservative people see, that this way their world is made more complicated and harder to grasp, they feel a lo
RE: RE: [PEIRCE-L] multiple-valued logic
Hi Helmut, Yes, as you surmise. I think it is reasonable to take this as a refinement of Spencer-Brown. Let me explain it a little further. The space in which language grows is a kind of gravitational field where truth is the center from which language arises in the form of marks each of which is an elaboration of some prior, and each mark is a sign of falsity. Thus the structure of language arises layer by layer as a structure of falsity. The more marked, the more false. And it is a gravitational space because the false tends by its nature to fall apart and reveal the underlying, whether it is only a relatively less false underlying layer, or the ultimate underlying layer of truth itself. Because of the nature of the relation between truth and falsity, falsity must be continually reinforced, repaired, defended, etc. or it will fall apart. In terms of markedness, truth is unmarked and unmarkable. Truth is silent. Every element of language arises from some prior by elaborating on the prior. Thus the first event in the arising of language is the production of a sound that interrupts silence and in doing so creates the derivative ground on which language is elaborated. The most unmarked vowel, the most open vowel, the most sonorant vowel is a. So in theory we can hypothecate a as the first mark which establishes the space of language as deviant from truth. Both truth and its manifestation as silence are actual continuities. Sound is a kind of false continuity. It sounds like a continuity. But it has a beginning and an end, whereas silence was already there before the sound begins, and it will be there after the sound ends. Silence is even there during the sound: sound consists of a rapid sequence of pulses of energy; between each of the pulses of energy is a brief gap that has the characteristics of silence, i.e. the absence of sound. Sound is a kind of continuity of discontinuity. You can clearly see this in a sonographic analysis of sound. And here we can also see how it is that the very ground of language is deviant from sound, seeking to interrupt the continuity of truth by means of a faux continuity, and thus is essentially a sign of falsity. Given this fundamental ground, the next logical step would be to mark the vocalic ground continuity by its opposite, that is, to interrupt the continuity, which is done in language by a consonant resulting in such basic infantile linguistic forms as ama, aba, aka, ata, etc. Driven by factors of timing these are often morphed into mama, baba, kaka, tata, etc. From here phonologically the vowel space is further divided into at least three elements naturally occupying the extreme margins of the vocalic space resulting in a vowel inventory of a, i, u. And of course these can be further divided. Consonants are similarly elaborated by the logic of opposition. Roman Jakobson provided the classical explanation of this process of development here: Jakobson, Roman. 1968. Child Language Aphasia and Phonological Universals, Janua Linguarum, Series Minor, 72, Moutoun, The Hague. And I reframed his explanation in the context of Peirce’s theory of signs in “Wild Language” which can be found here: https://umich.academia.edu/CharlesPyle Charles Pyle From: Helmut Raulien Sent: Sunday, November 22, 2020 4:25 PM To: Charles Pyle Cc: Peirce-L Subject: Aw: RE: [PEIRCE-L] multiple-valued logic Charles, wow, interesting! I think about it. By first glance it seems to me like a linguistic elaboration of Spencer-Brown. Do all polarities come from a marked starting point, looking out for an opposite in unmarked space? I apologize to everybody "conservative". Please see my use of the term confined within the example I gave, and not generalized to its political meaning. Or replaced with "conventional" or "formerly conventional". Best, Helmut 22. November 2020 um 22:06 Uhr "Charles Pyle" mailto:char...@pyle.tv>> wrote: Helmut, Speaking as a linguist, I must point out that the view of language you take in the paragraph I quote below is profoundly mistaken. --begin quote from Helmut-- The conservative concept of sexuality is male-female, so binary, like black-white, hot-cold, right-wrong, up-down, open-closed, well-unwell. When somebody claims for him*herself to belong to a third gender, conservative people see, that this way their world is made more complicated and harder to grasp, they feel a loss of control, and blame this person for deliberately being the reason for that. --end quote from Helmut--- To begin with, the examples you cite exemplify the particular kind of asymmetric binary opposition, in technical linguistic terms is called the logic of ‘markedness’, of which the entire structure of language is comprised from bottom to top: phonology morphology, syntax, semantics. For example in phonology we find the same type of asymmetric opposition in the pairs p-b, p-f, p-t, t-d, etc. Taking p-f as a specif
Aw: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] multiple-valued logic
Edwina, I see. I think, I mistakenly have compared the thing I was talking about with semiotics. Maybe it might better refer to LOR. I guess, the triadic sign is something too special to be suggested for model in this respect. The triadicity in the Logic Of Relatives probably suits better to the emergence hypothesis, that binarities may create a triadicity, which from then on cannot be reduced back to binarities. The sexuality-example can only be understood with the hypothesis, that culture, habits, feelings are not something self-created, but are due to logic, which is universal. Meaning, yes, a human may, with some empathy, roughly know what it is like to be a bat, and in an alien culture 2000 light years away they have similar social problems like we have. Best, Helmut 22. November 2020 um 18:18 Uhr "Edwina Taborsky" wrote: Helmut My apologies - I see your point against the yes-no-maybe. But I don't think that the middle action of mediation emerges from the interaction of polarities. This is almost a type of 'averaging' where all individual units partake of 'some' of each other. The middle term is a set of 'normative habits of organization' - That's not the same as that 'dilution of types'. The mediative process is extremely powerful in moving data from original sensate input [Dynamic Object] to resultant specific Interpretant [Dynamic Interpretant]. ..whether that Interpretant is the meaning of a word or a nutrient transformed into a healthy cell. Edwina On Sun 22/11/20 12:05 PM , Helmut Raulien h.raul...@gmx.de sent: Edwina, Yes, I agree, that the so-called progressives are not per se better argumenting or more ethical people than conservatives. An overreacting progressive can be a real monster. But you told me, that "The Peircean triad doesn't mean that there are three options [ie black, white and gray]. The Peircean triad is an irreducible process, where the middle term is an action-of-mediation. Not a third option.The Peircean triad doesn't mean that there are three options [ie black, white and gray]. The Peircean triad is an irreducible process, where the middle term is an action-of-mediation. Not a third option. " But isnt that, what I wrote myself? I wrote: "I think, this is wrong.", and meant by it your black-white-gray distinction, I have called it the yes-no-maybe-distinction by Lukasiewicz. So, dont you think, that the middle term action-of-mediation might come from, or supplemetarily be analysed as, an emergence caused by the interaction of different polarity dimensions as I was writing? Best, Helmut 22. November 2020 um 17:30 Uhr "Edwina Taborsky" wrote: Helmut - I think you've fallen into your own definitional trap. The Peircean triad doesn't mean that there are three options [ie black, white and gray]. The Peircean triad is an irreducible process, where the middle term is an action-of-mediation. Not a third option. And I don't see what this triadic process has to do with 'homophobia and transphobia'. Nor would I define a conservative perspective as 'binary'. I would define a closed perspective as...closed - and its opinions could be binary or completely relativistic and anarchistic. After all, the so-called 'progressives' can be as rigid and unyielding in their relativism as any so-called conservative. I would define an open perspective as - open to change. That's all. Edwina On Sun 22/11/20 10:59 AM , Helmut Raulien h.raul...@gmx.de sent: List, As Peircean semiotics is a three-valued logic, I think it bears relevance for the discussion about multiple-valued logic. But I have the impression, that multipleness is sometimes explained away by just adding a "maybe" to the values "yes" and "no" (e.g. Lukasiewicz). I think, this is wrong. I think, multipleness comes from more than one dimension of (binary) polarities being relevant for one problem. If a problem is analysed by more than one dimension of polarities, it can be shown, that the logic, the problem depends on, is tri- or more- adic. According to Peirce and others, a more-than-three-adicity can be reduced to three-adicities, but a three-adicity cannot always, or can hardly ever, be reduced to binarities. I would say, when different polarities create a triadicity, which from then on cannot be reduced back to them, this is an emergence. A polarity is logically an easy thing to grasp, and a traidicity is not. So this emergence often brings with it a feeling of loss of control, and anger. This is an explanation for homophobia and transphobia: The conservative concept of sexuality is male-female, so binary, like black-white, hot-cold, right-wrong, up-down, open-closed, well-unwell. When somebody claims for him*herself to belong to a third gender, conservative people see, that this way their world is made more complicated and harder to grasp, they feel a loss of control, and blame this person for deliberately being the reason for that. The reason for sexuality bei
