Re: [PEIRCE-L] Did Peirce Anticipate the Space-Time Continuum?

[Clark Goble]

> On Jun 6, 2017, at 11:55 AM, Jeffrey Brian Downard  
> wrote:
> 
> Clark, List,
> 
> You say:  "So Peirce clearly didn’t see conservation of energy as universal 
> due to the role of chance. While I don’t think he put it in quite those 
> terms, I believe the implication is that chance breaks symmetries enabled by 
> determinism."
> 
> In saying this, you seem to be putting greater weight on points 2 and 3 
> below. 
> 
> 1. The general prevalence of growth, which seems to be opposed to the 
> conservation of energy.
> 2. The variety of the universe, which is chance, and is manifestly 
> inexplicable.
> 3. Law, which requires to be explained, and like everything which is to be 
> explained must be explained by something else, that is, by non-law or real 
> chance.
> 4. Feeling, for which room cannot be found if the conservation of energy is 
> maintained. (CP 6.613)
> 
> I would have thought that points 1 and 4 would be particularly important for 
> understanding some of the reasons for limiting the scope of the 1st and 2nd 
> laws of thermodynamics as explanatory for the growth of order in natural 
> systems (i.e., that they govern closed systems, but are limited, in some 
> sense, in the application to open systems). Here are two questions. 

In the discussion we were talking about habits as related to physics. I think 
Peirce recognized all four as important but the question was how chance could 
lead to habits, the way he argues in his cosmology. He provides a few arguments 
for this although not everyone will be convinced. And of course his cosmology, 
as I frequently note as a caveat, is among his more controversial positions. 
I’m not sure I agree with him there although I find myself also unable to fully 
dismiss his reasoning.

> 
> (a) In what ways do points 1 and 4 add something that is not already found in 
> points 2 and 3? 

I think (3) is important in terms of what is demanded for explanation. i.e. we 
can’t just take regularities for granted but must ask how and why they arise. 
(1) and (2) are just premises due to observation. I don’t see (2) & (3) 
entailing (1) since (3) is just a demand for explanation not a conclusion.

> (b) How might Peirce's account of the law of mind--which I take to be 
> embodied in a summary way in the 1st and 4th points--help us better 
> understand the relationships between the making and breaking of fundamental 
> symmetries and the growth of order in natural systems?

I think they end up being the same thing. The earlier back cosmologically in 
terms of physics, not ontology, one goes the more symmetries you have. Thus the 
evolution of the early universe is a series of symmetry breaking by chance. 
Those in turn result in new natural laws due to the symmetry breaking. (Not 
fundamental natural law obviously) The justification for this in physics is due 
to cosmological expansion. That acts in a fashion akin to state change in 
general thermodynamics. Think starting with a gas and compressing until it’s a 
liquid and then a solid. Here the process goes the opposite direction but is 
analogous in terms of symmetry breaking.

Now where it gets trickier is when Peirce moves to his more neoplatonic 
thinking before time to the ultimate ontological cosmology. There he’s doing 
something more akin to the Timaeus. But I’m not quite sure I buy it as he ends 
up not having time proper but something very much like time in terms of 
precession. Yet that’s a hidden ontological feature he doesn’t analyze. So from 
a purely philosophical perspective those ontological muses seem problematic due 
to the way he grapples with time.

In a somewhat similar fashion the closer to the big bang one gets the more 
problematic time becomes in terms of quantum mechanics. To the point that I 
don’t think we can say much. That’s not an ontological analogue to Peirce’s 
cosmology though. Just that time is a tricky thing.
> 
> These two questions are not yet well formulated. I'm posing them here in the 
> hopes of working towards a better formulation of what it is that I find 
> puzzling about the law of mind and its application to these questions about 
> the growth of order.

There are some interesting quotes by Peirce here. I’m not sure his solutions 
are fully satisfactory though. Here’s one quote to keep in mind.

We are brought, then, to this: conformity to law exists only within a limited 
range of events and even there is not perfect, for an element of pure 
spontaneity or lawless originality mingles, or at least must be supposed to 
mingle, with law everywhere. Moreover, conformity with law is a fact requiring 
to be explained; and since law in general cannot be explained by any law in 
particular, the explanation must consist in showing how law is developed out of 
pure chance, irregularity, and indeterminacy. (CP 1.407)

While not explicitly about mind, it does explain the mind-like constitution of 
the universe. Mind is mind because of its 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Did Peirce Anticipate the Space-Time Continuum?

[Jeffrey Brian Downard]

Clark, List,

You say:  "So Peirce clearly didn’t see conservation of energy as universal due 
to the role of chance. While I don’t think he put it in quite those terms, I 
believe the implication is that chance breaks symmetries enabled by 
determinism."

In saying this, you seem to be putting greater weight on points 2 and 3 below.

1. The general prevalence of growth, which seems to be opposed to the 
conservation of energy.
2. The variety of the universe, which is chance, and is manifestly inexplicable.
3. Law, which requires to be explained, and like everything which is to be 
explained must be explained by something else, that is, by non-law or real 
chance.
4. Feeling, for which room cannot be found if the conservation of energy is 
maintained. (CP 6.613)

I would have thought that points 1 and 4 would be particularly important for 
understanding some of the reasons for limiting the scope of the 1st and 2nd 
laws of thermodynamics as explanatory for the growth of order in natural 
systems (i.e., that they govern closed systems, but are limited, in some sense, 
in the application to open systems). Here are two questions.

(a) In what ways do points 1 and 4 add something that is not already found in 
points 2 and 3?

(b) How might Peirce's account of the law of mind--which I take to be embodied 
in a summary way in the 1st and 4th points--help us better understand the 
relationships between the making and breaking of fundamental symmetries and the 
growth of order in natural systems?

These two questions are not yet well formulated. I'm posing them here in the 
hopes of working towards a better formulation of what it is that I find 
puzzling about the law of mind and its application to these questions about the 
growth of order.

--Jeff




Jeffrey Downard
Associate Professor
Department of Philosophy
Northern Arizona University
(o) 928 523-8354



From: Clark Goble <cl...@lextek.com>
Sent: Thursday, June 1, 2017 12:33 PM
To: Peirce-L
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Did Peirce Anticipate the Space-Time Continuum?


On May 30, 2017, at 2:49 PM, Helmut Raulien 
<h.raul...@gmx.de<mailto:h.raul...@gmx.de>> wrote:

I am not happy with tychism: Conservation laws require infinite exactness of 
conservation: Energy or impulse before a reaction must be exactly the same 
before and after a reaction. Though in a very small (quantum) scale it is not 
so, but then there must be some kind of counting buffer mechanism to make sure 
that in a bigger scale infinite exactness is granted. This one is also governed 
by laws. I do not believe in the dualism sui-generis versus laws, I rather 
guess that it is all laws providing the possibility of evolution and generation 
of new things, self-organization and so on. Without laws nothing would happen, 
I´d say. I think that natural constants may change, but that there are some 
laws that dont. And if these laws are only the ones based on tautology: One 
plus one can never be 2.001, because 2 is defined as 1+1. I guess these 
eternal laws are the laws of logic. I think they are tautologies, like a 
syllogism is a tautology: The conclusion is nothing new, all is already said in 
the two premisses: "Arthur is a human, all humans are mortal, so Arthur is 
mortal", you can forget the conclusion by just putting an "and" between the 
premisses: "Arthur is a human, and all humans are mortal". The conclusion ", so 
Arthur is mortal" is redundant, except you do not believe in continuity which 
is indicated by the word "and" between the two premisses.
My conclusion: "Law" is an inexact term. A "law" is a compound constructed of 
an eternal part (tautology, continuity), and a changeable part ((temporary) 
constants).

Mathematically of course conservation laws arise out of Noether’s Theorem. That 
more or less just states the relationship between symmetries and conservation 
laws. I don’t think we need a “buffer” to deal with this, just symmetries. It 
would seem that continuity may (or may not) apply to those symmetries and thus 
determines the conservation.

Of course Noether did her important work both on the theorem that bares her 
name as well as linear algebra well after Peirce died. But Peirce did do some 
work in the logic of linear algebra that is tied to the theorem. So far as I 
know he never approached the insight of her theorem though. He was familiar 
with the abstract principles though. However Peirce did write on conservation 
laws which we discussed here a few months back as tied to chance and 
determinism relative to habits.

In my attack on "The Doctrine of Necessity" I offered four positive arguments 
for believing in real chance. They were as follows:
1. The general prevalence of growth, which seems to be opposed to the 
conservation of energy.
2. The variety of the universe, which is chance, and is manifestly inexplicable.
3. Law, 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Did Peirce Anticipate the Space-Time Continuum?

[kirstima]

Clark,

I fully agree with your points.

Kirsti

Clark Goble kirjoitti 1.6.2017 22:33:

On May 30, 2017, at 2:49 PM, Helmut Raulien 
wrote:

I am not happy with tychism: Conservation laws require infinite
exactness of conservation: Energy or impulse before a reaction must
be exactly the same before and after a reaction. Though in a very
small (quantum) scale it is not so, but then there must be some kind
of counting buffer mechanism to make sure that in a bigger scale
infinite exactness is granted. This one is also governed by laws. I
do not believe in the dualism sui-generis versus laws, I rather
guess that it is all laws providing the possibility of evolution and
generation of new things, self-organization and so on. Without laws
nothing would happen, I´d say. I think that natural constants may
change, but that there are some laws that dont. And if these laws
are only the ones based on tautology: One plus one can never be
2.001, because 2 is defined as 1+1. I guess these eternal laws
are the laws of logic. I think they are tautologies, like a
syllogism is a tautology: The conclusion is nothing new, all is
already said in the two premisses: "Arthur is a human, all humans
are mortal, so Arthur is mortal", you can forget the conclusion by
just putting an "and" between the premisses: "Arthur is a human, and
all humans are mortal". The conclusion ", so Arthur is mortal" is
redundant, except you do not believe in continuity which is
indicated by the word "and" between the two premisses.
My conclusion: "Law" is an inexact term. A "law" is a compound
constructed of an eternal part (tautology, continuity), and a
changeable part ((temporary) constants).


Mathematically of course conservation laws arise out of Noether’s
Theorem. That more or less just states the relationship between
symmetries and conservation laws. I don’t think we need a
“buffer” to deal with this, just symmetries. It would seem that
continuity may (or may not) apply to those symmetries and thus
determines the conservation.

Of course Noether did her important work both on the theorem that
bares her name as well as linear algebra well after Peirce died. But
Peirce did do some work in the logic of linear algebra that is tied to
the theorem. So far as I know he never approached the insight of her
theorem though. He was familiar with the abstract principles though.
However Peirce did write on conservation laws which we discussed here
a few months back as tied to chance and determinism relative to
habits.


In my attack on "The Doctrine of Necessity" I offered four positive
arguments for believing in real chance. They were as follows:

1. The general prevalence of growth, which seems to be opposed to
the conservation of energy.

2. The variety of the universe, which is chance, and is manifestly
inexplicable.

3. Law, which requires to be explained, and like everything which is
to be explained must be explained by something else, that is, by
non-law or real chance.

4. Feeling, for which room cannot be found if the conservation of
energy is maintained. (CP 6.613)


So Peirce clearly didn’t see conservation of energy as universal due
to the role of chance. While I don’t think he put it in quite those
terms, I believe the implication is that chance breaks symmetries
enabled by determinism.



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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Did Peirce Anticipate the Space-Time Continuum?

[Clark Goble]

> On May 30, 2017, at 2:49 PM, Helmut Raulien  wrote:
> 
> I am not happy with tychism: Conservation laws require infinite exactness of 
> conservation: Energy or impulse before a reaction must be exactly the same 
> before and after a reaction. Though in a very small (quantum) scale it is not 
> so, but then there must be some kind of counting buffer mechanism to make 
> sure that in a bigger scale infinite exactness is granted. This one is also 
> governed by laws. I do not believe in the dualism sui-generis versus laws, I 
> rather guess that it is all laws providing the possibility of evolution and 
> generation of new things, self-organization and so on. Without laws nothing 
> would happen, I´d say. I think that natural constants may change, but that 
> there are some laws that dont. And if these laws are only the ones based on 
> tautology: One plus one can never be 2.001, because 2 is defined as 1+1. 
> I guess these eternal laws are the laws of logic. I think they are 
> tautologies, like a syllogism is a tautology: The conclusion is nothing new, 
> all is already said in the two premisses: "Arthur is a human, all humans are 
> mortal, so Arthur is mortal", you can forget the conclusion by just putting 
> an "and" between the premisses: "Arthur is a human, and all humans are 
> mortal". The conclusion ", so Arthur is mortal" is redundant, except you do 
> not believe in continuity which is indicated by the word "and" between the 
> two premisses.
> My conclusion: "Law" is an inexact term. A "law" is a compound constructed of 
> an eternal part (tautology, continuity), and a changeable part ((temporary) 
> constants).

Mathematically of course conservation laws arise out of Noether’s Theorem. That 
more or less just states the relationship between symmetries and conservation 
laws. I don’t think we need a “buffer” to deal with this, just symmetries. It 
would seem that continuity may (or may not) apply to those symmetries and thus 
determines the conservation.

Of course Noether did her important work both on the theorem that bares her 
name as well as linear algebra well after Peirce died. But Peirce did do some 
work in the logic of linear algebra that is tied to the theorem. So far as I 
know he never approached the insight of her theorem though. He was familiar 
with the abstract principles though. However Peirce did write on conservation 
laws which we discussed here a few months back as tied to chance and 
determinism relative to habits.

In my attack on "The Doctrine of Necessity" I offered four positive arguments 
for believing in real chance. They were as follows:
1. The general prevalence of growth, which seems to be opposed to the 
conservation of energy.
2. The variety of the universe, which is chance, and is manifestly inexplicable.
3. Law, which requires to be explained, and like everything which is to be 
explained must be explained by something else, that is, by non-law or real 
chance.
4. Feeling, for which room cannot be found if the conservation of energy is 
maintained. (CP 6.613)

So Peirce clearly didn’t see conservation of energy as universal due to the 
role of chance. While I don’t think he put it in quite those terms, I believe 
the implication is that chance breaks symmetries enabled by determinism.




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Aw: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Did Peirce Anticipate the Space-Time Continuum?

[Helmut Raulien]

List,

I am not happy with tychism: Conservation laws require infinite exactness of conservation: Energy or impulse before a reaction must be exactly the same before and after a reaction. Though in a very small (quantum) scale it is not so, but then there must be some kind of counting buffer mechanism to make sure that in a bigger scale infinite exactness is granted. This one is also governed by laws. I do not believe in the dualism sui-generis versus laws, I rather guess that it is all laws providing the possibility of evolution and generation of new things, self-organization and so on. Without laws nothing would happen, I´d say. I think that natural constants may change, but that there are some laws that dont. And if these laws are only the ones based on tautology: One plus one can never be 2.001, because 2 is defined as 1+1. I guess these eternal laws are the laws of logic. I think they are tautologies, like a syllogism is a tautology: The conclusion is nothing new, all is already said in the two premisses: "Arthur is a human, all humans are mortal, so Arthur is mortal", you can forget the conclusion by just putting an "and" between the premisses: "Arthur is a human, and all humans are mortal". The conclusion ", so Arthur is mortal" is redundant, except you do not believe in continuity which is indicated by the word "and" between the two premisses.

My conclusion: "Law" is an inexact term. A "law" is a compound constructed of an eternal part (tautology, continuity), and a changeable part ((temporary) constants).


Best,

Helmut


 30. Mai 2017 um 21:39 Uhr
 "James Albrecht"  wrote:
 



This always struck me as being, at least, a parallel articulation of quantum mechanics. Peirce knew that macro-scale knowledge was beset by limits, and that these limitations became more problematic as precision increased.  

 
59. (2) By thus admitting pure spontaneity or life as a character of the universe, acting always and everywhere though restrained within narrow bounds by law, producing infinitesimal departures from law continually, and great ones with infinite infrequency, I account for all the variety and diversity of the universe, in the only sense in which the really sui generis and new can be said to be accounted for. 
 
Also, in the same work on chance, Peirce references Boltzmann, whose gas laws helped lead Planck to the quantum nature of radiation.


 
On Sat, May 13, 2017 at 10:34 PM, Mike Bergman  wrote:



I just encountered this assertion:

"In the present work we have indicated that a form of logic, relational logic developed by C. S. Peirce, may serve as the foundation of both quantum mechanics and string theory." [1]
Does the list have any comments, further references or criticisms on this pretty bold statement?

Thanks, Mike

[1] A. Nicolaidis, 2008. "Categorical Foundation of Quantum Mechanics and String Theory," arXiv:0812.1946, 10 Dec 2008. See https://arxiv.org/pdf/0812.1946.pdf


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