Aw: Re: Re: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 3.6

[Helmut Raulien]

Gary,

I am feeling quite dull at the moment about all this, I have lost tracks, what remains is the idea, that the meaning of the term "is" might be something that can be symbolized with EGs, though by negations only, but why not, and that EGs (or at least their non-textual symbols like cuts and lines) are merely about existence, identity, classification, that would be what "is" is about, but not about composition (mereology, being a part of). So I think, that the part-whole-topic is something else, that is worth of further elaboration. So let us elaborate it. I can only throw in my theory (of which I however am not so sure about ), that there may be three kinds of composition: Composition from traits or qualities (1ns), spatial (domains) composition (2ns), functional composition (a function, like a sign, consisting of subfunctions, 3ns). But that is just one of those ideas or guesses, mines are based on stating the difference between classification and composition. But this statement mightbe opposed by e.g. saying: You can replace "A is a class of B" by "A is a part of the concept of B".  This is all very difficult.

Best,

Helmut

 

 23. Dezember 2017 um 21:08 Uhr
Von: "Gary Richmond" 
 



Helmut, Gary f. Jeff, list,

 

I have found at least some of the parts/whole, classification/composition discussion not quite to the point of Peirce'comments in this section of Lowell 3. Gary f's formulation today was, however, helpful for me in sorting at least some of this out. 

 



Gf: I don’t see a clear case here of Peirce referring to a part of a relation. . .



 



Generalizing from this [Jeff's] sample, then, I think we can say that Peirce speaks often enough of parts of a sign, but does not speak of parts of a relation. If that’s the case, I think it gives another reason why we should not say that a sign is a (triadic) relation, but that a sign relation is triadic — and its correlates should not be regarded as parts.




 


I tend to strongly agree with his conclusion.

 

Best,

 

Gary R

 

 

 


 








 

Gary Richmond

Philosophy and Critical Thinking

Communication Studies

LaGuardia College of the City University of New York

718 482-5690






 

On Sat, Dec 23, 2017 at 11:53 AM, Helmut Raulien  wrote:




 
 

Supplement:

Kirsti, All, to be frank, I think I have lost the overview about this whole topic a bit. I was thinking, that classification "is a kind of" and composition "is a part of" were two completely different affairs. But on the other hand one can say instead of "is a kind of": "is a part of the concept of". This is all very complicated.

Is it so, tat the EGs are about all that can be expressed with the term "is", respectively by negations/exclusions and operators, that would be existence, identity, and classification. EGs are not about composition (parts), is that so?


 



Kirsti,

is the term "part" already defined? I think, if it is defined geometrically, then a sign does not have parts. If a sign is a function that depends on subfunctions, which may be seen as parts, then I think it has the parts sign itself, object, interpretant. But, because you cannot take a sign apart in reality (the subfunctions cannot exist alone), these parts are ideational or virtual ones. But any way you see it, I donot see the connection with the continuum problem (line consisting or not of points).

Best,

Helmut

 

 22. Dezember 2017 um 06:30 Uhr
 kirst...@saunalahti.fi
wrote:

Helmut,

I was not using a metaphor. Nor was I suggesting what you inferred I
did. I just posed two questions, one on sign, one on meaning. Which, of
course, are deeply related. But how?

To my mind both questions are worth careful ponderings. Especially in
connection with this phase in the Lowell lectures.

Peirce was an experimentalist. In philosophy one does not need a
laboratory, but one needs though experiments.

I was inviting to participate in such experimenting. Writing down the
question and searching for answers which logically fit with the
question, is such an experiment.

Simplest math is recommended by CSP as starting point. To clear our
logical muddles and confusions, so I have inferred.

EGs are based on simple geometrical ideas, such as points and lines.
Which are cafefully developed into logical instruments, vehicles for
logical thinking.

Comments?

Kirsti


Helmut Raulien kirjoitti 21.12.2017 21:32:
> Gary, Kirsti, List,
> I do not agree, that the geometrical metaphor suits. "Part of",
> geometrically or spatially understood, is only one kind of being a
> part of. Kirsti suggested, that meaning is a part of a sign. But is
> meaning metaphorizable as a point on the line, with the line
> metphorizable as a sign? Ok, a common speech metaphor is "I get the
> point" for "I get the meaning". But still I think, that a functional
> part is something completely different from a spatial, geometrical
> part, a compartment. A sign is a function, not a range with a 

Re: Re: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 3.6

[Gary Richmond]

Helmut, Gary f. Jeff, list,

I have found at least some of the parts/whole, classification/composition
discussion not quite to the point of Peirce'comments in this section of
Lowell 3. Gary f's formulation today was, however, helpful for me in
sorting at least some of this out.

Gf: I don’t see a clear case here of Peirce referring to a *part of a
relation*. . .



Generalizing from this [Jeff's] sample, then, I think we can say that
Peirce speaks often enough of *parts of a sign*, but does not speak of *parts
of a relation*. If that’s the case, I think it gives another reason why we
should not say that a sign is a (triadic) relation, but that a *sign
relation* is triadic — and its *correlates* should not be regarded as
* parts*.


I tend to strongly agree with his conclusion.

Best,

Gary R



[image: Gary Richmond]

*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
*718 482-5690*

On Sat, Dec 23, 2017 at 11:53 AM, Helmut Raulien  wrote:

>
>
> Supplement:
> Kirsti, All, to be frank, I think I have lost the overview about this
> whole topic a bit. I was thinking, that classification "is a kind of" and
> composition "is a part of" were two completely different affairs. But on
> the other hand one can say instead of "is a kind of": "is a part of the
> concept of". This is all very complicated.
> Is it so, tat the EGs are about all that can be expressed with the term
> "is", respectively by negations/exclusions and operators, that would be
> existence, identity, and classification. EGs are not about composition
> (parts), is that so?
>
> Kirsti,
> is the term "part" already defined? I think, if it is defined
> geometrically, then a sign does not have parts. If a sign is a function
> that depends on subfunctions, which may be seen as parts, then I think it
> has the parts sign itself, object, interpretant. But, because you cannot
> take a sign apart in reality (the subfunctions cannot exist alone), these
> parts are ideational or virtual ones. But any way you see it, I donot see
> the connection with the continuum problem (line consisting or not of
> points).
> Best,
> Helmut
>
>  22. Dezember 2017 um 06:30 Uhr
>  kirst...@saunalahti.fi
> wrote:
> Helmut,
>
> I was not using a metaphor. Nor was I suggesting what you inferred I
> did. I just posed two questions, one on sign, one on meaning. Which, of
> course, are deeply related. But how?
>
> To my mind both questions are worth careful ponderings. Especially in
> connection with this phase in the Lowell lectures.
>
> Peirce was an experimentalist. In philosophy one does not need a
> laboratory, but one needs though experiments.
>
> I was inviting to participate in such experimenting. Writing down the
> question and searching for answers which logically fit with the
> question, is such an experiment.
>
> Simplest math is recommended by CSP as starting point. To clear our
> logical muddles and confusions, so I have inferred.
>
> EGs are based on simple geometrical ideas, such as points and lines.
> Which are cafefully developed into logical instruments, vehicles for
> logical thinking.
>
> Comments?
>
> Kirsti
>
>
> Helmut Raulien kirjoitti 21.12.2017 21:32:
> > Gary, Kirsti, List,
> > I do not agree, that the geometrical metaphor suits. "Part of",
> > geometrically or spatially understood, is only one kind of being a
> > part of. Kirsti suggested, that meaning is a part of a sign. But is
> > meaning metaphorizable as a point on the line, with the line
> > metphorizable as a sign? Ok, a common speech metaphor is "I get the
> > point" for "I get the meaning". But still I think, that a functional
> > part is something completely different from a spatial, geometrical
> > part, a compartment. A sign is a function, not a range with a clear
> > spatial border, and there are different laws applying, which are not
> > geometrical, though there may be geometrical metaphors, but I think
> > they stumble. And: Metaphorization is not analysis. It is poetry.
> > Best,
> > Helmut
> >
> > 21. Dezember 2017 um 15:39 Uhr
> > g...@gnusystems.ca
> > wrote:
> >
> > Kirsti, list,
> >
> > Asking whether a sign has parts is like asking whether a line has
> > points. Peirce has a comment on that in one of my blog posts from last
> > month, http://gnusystems.ca/wp/2017/11/stigmata/ [1]. By the way,
> > according to my sources, Aristotle used the word σημεῖον for
> > _point_ before Euclid.
> >
> > Gary f.
> >
> > -Original Message-
> > From: kirst...@saunalahti.fi [mailto:kirst...@saunalahti.fi]
> > Sent: 21-Dec-17 01:25
> >
> > Listers,
> >
> > Perhaps It is good to remember historical changes with names used for
> > geometrical point. Euclid introduced the word SEMEION, and defined it
> > as that which has no parts, and his followers started to that word
> > instead of the earlier STIGME . - But (with latin) the Romans & later
> > Boethius changed it to PUNCTUM in their