Dear John, list - I perfectly agree there are two quite different question here - the ideal, conceptual question of the synthesis of e.g. subject and predicate in propositions - and the actual, empirical question of how brains perform that synthesis. Both of them are crucially important questions. The solution of the former will set the frame for the latter; the solution of the latter will provide input to the former. In my book, I treat the linguist James Hurford's intriguing proposal that the ventral-dorsal split in perception forms a central part of the latter question. Best F ________________________________ Fra: John Collier [colli...@ukzn.ac.za] Sendt: 24. januar 2016 19:07 Til: Robert Eckert; peirce-l@list.iupui.edu Emne: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Thirdness, coupling and merging
OK, Robert. That puts a somewhat different light on it, since the issue is then an empirical one rather than the conceptual relations. I was mostly addressing the latter issue. (As was Frederik, I think.) It is certainly possible that the same brain processes could be involved in more than one function, depending on how they are connected to other brain areas that might serve different functions, or to external factors that govern functions. My understanding is that syntactic and semantic functions interact, but are distinguished by different brain processes. That doesn’t mean that there might not be a common area that actually carries out the process of both coupling and merging, and then feeds them back to the relevant divergent functional regions for further processing. Chomsky and his colleagues in their recent work argue for the convergence of a number of different processes in syntax, but the most significant for its power is recursion, which underlies the merge function in particular. They argue that this function is especially general in humans, but not other animals, and there is a lot of experimental evidence for this (but based on behaviour, not brain studies). It might well be that the RAS plays an essential role here for recursion in general, whether semantic or syntactic (also tool use). I don’t know of any studies, though, that would make the RAS function in recursion show the right sort of activity and structure to explain the human capacity for recursion. One worry I have is that tool use also requires recursion, and some birds show this ability, even showing planning of tool use (in corvids in particular). This has led me to suspect that an old hypothesis that language capacity has an evolutionary origin in tool use might have something to it. However I know little about the equivalent of the RAS in corvids, if any. Their forebrains are quite different from ours and our close relatives that also use tools. Again, more to untangle here, but it seems to me that the conceptual issues and the brain structure and function issues are at least partially independent. Your hypothesis might be correct, but still not tell us very much about the functions involved and their relations to each other. John Collier Professor Emeritus and Senior Research Associate University of KwaZulu-Natal http://web.ncf.ca/collier From: Robert Eckert [mailto:recke...@mail.naz.edu] Sent: Sunday, 24 January 2016 6:21 PM To: John Collier; peirce-l@list.iupui.edu Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Thirdness, coupling and merging John, List, What I am suggesting is that the same triadic neurophysiological synthesizing mechanism accounts for both semantic coupling and syntactic merging. The same neurophysiological structure, the "coupler", that Percy suggests accomplishes symbolization makes the formation of both words and sentences possible. The elements of grammar are themselves signs. Universal grammar restricts output and structure. The coupler synthesizes the relation between meaningful elements. The results of this throwing together mechanism are different--semantics is not syntax, but the underlying merging/coupling mechanism can still be the same. This hypothesis is a bit of a stretch.... my guess--the coupler is the reticular formation, or reticualr activating system, as it controls the pryamidal system from its position at the decussation of pyramids (where the neurons of our "cross-wired" nervous system cross) in the brain stem. The system responsible for wakefulness and arousal is the same system that wakes us into the form of consciousness made possible by the use of symbol systems lie language. The recognized areas of the cortex like Wernicke's and Broca's areas are involved, but do not control, the elements of language which suffer when these areas are damaged. The neurophysiological activating mechanism for language is the reticular activating system. ========================================= On Wed, Jan 20, 2016 at 12:40 AM, John Collier <colli...@ukzn.ac.za<mailto:colli...@ukzn.ac.za>> wrote: Interesting questions, Robert. They certainly deserve further investigation. One difference I see is that Chomsky’s merge is a syntactic operation, whereas, If I understand him correctly, Peircean coupling has a semantic aspect as well. Chomsky consistently separates syntax and semantics, but he perhaps has a more narrow view of semantics than Peirce did. This latter issue is especially worth exploring, I think. I believe that Chomsky’s merge (and many if not all of his earlier syntactic operations) is nonreducible to component parts (especially linguistic behaviours), and in this respect seems to be a Peircean third. Likewise for Peircean coupling. So in this respect they are species of a common genus. But I don’t think this directly implies they are of the same species of this genus for the reasons I gave before. I have considerably more I could say, but I will leave it at that for now. I was exposed to Chomsky (as a professor of mine) and to Peirce (by independent study) more or less at the same time as an undergraduate, and I am probably more inclined than many to see connections between the two. This has only been reinforced by my subsequent studies, though the differences have also become more apparent. John Collier Professor Emeritus and Senior Research Associate University of KwaZulu-Natal http://web.ncf.ca/collier From: Robert Eckert [mailto:recke...@mail.naz.edu<mailto:recke...@mail.naz.edu>] Sent: Wednesday, 20 January 2016 1:49 AM To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu<mailto:peirce-l@list.iupui.edu> Subject: [PEIRCE-L] Thirdness, coupling and merging Dear list, Is it possible that Peirce's thirdness, Percy's coupling and Chomsky's merging are the same? Could this bringing together, symbolization, merging, of two other things, explain our language ability? If so, this basic exemplification in diagrammatic form defines humans.
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