[peirce-l] Re: NEW ELEMENTS: So what is it all about?
Theresa and list: Thanks for reporting on that shameful incident here, which most people on the list may not have been aware of. What Royce did was despicable and Peirce's defence of Abbot against him was admirable. But I don't see any connection between that and Peirce's later regard for Royce as a philosopher. My impression of Peirce's personal character -- which seems to me evident in his work to an unusually high degree -- is that although he was short-tempered and emotionally volatile (there is external evidence to that effect) he was incapable of bearing a grudge against anyone. If that is an exaggeration, it is nevertheless at least unlikely that Peirce would still have it on his mind a dozen or more years later. So I don't see any connection between the Abbot-Royce incident and what I was suggesting. I agree about the affinity of the New Elements with the 1903 lectures and will point out a couple of things that seem to me to be important about that in a later message. MS 318 is another matter and I have no comment on that at this time. Joe Ransdell - Original Message - From: "Theresa Calvet" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> To: "Peirce Discussion Forum" Sent: Friday, January 27, 2006 1:57 PM Subject: [peirce-l] Re: NEW ELEMENTS: So what is it all about? Dear Joe, What I had in mind is something quite different and before suggesting "that Peirce had good reason to formulate his views in a way that would make contact with the way Royce formulated his, which is surely in the spirit of cooperative inquiry and the legitimate aims of philosophical rhetoric", perhaps one has to go back in time and read Peirce's defense of Abbot in The Nation (12 November 1891), or read Royce's libel "A Public Appeal for Redress to the Corporation and Overseers of Harvard University". Boston, Mass., 1891 (48 pp) and Abbot's "Is Not Harvard Responsible for the Conduct of her Professors, as well as of her Students? A Public Remonstrance Addressed to the Board of Overseers of Harvard University". Boston, Mass., 1892 (20 pp). I will just recall this very nasty, and most absurd, philosophical dispute: "In 1881 Abbot earned the second doctorate conferred by Harvard in Philosophy. But, like Peirce, he was unable to secure an academic post. In 1888 he was invited to lecture at Harvard during Royce's absence (and at Royce's request). In 1890 the substance of these lectures was published as The Way Out of Agnosticism: "For some reason.Royce [now] set out to annihilate Abbot's reputation.. he wrote a long and devastating review.. He accused Abbot of an unconscious and blundering borrowing from Hegel, but more importantly, issued a 'professional warning' against Abbot's 'philosophical pretensions'.. Abbot's attempt at vindicating himself dragged on until 1892, culminating in a public appeal to the Harvard Corporation and Board of Overseers."-Kuklick (1977). Royce was promoted to full professor on the same day Abbot's claims were finally dismissed by the Board. Ironically, only Peirce among his peers had come to Abbot's defense. Some ten years later, in 1903, following the completion of his magnum opus, The Syllogistic Philosophy or Prologomena to Science, Abbot committed suicide at his wife's grave: "Royce's enthusiasm for idealism led him to extend his criticism beyond proper philosophical limits and to engage in personal attacks on Abbot. In view of twentieth century philosophical developments.it is clear that Abbot was far more original than Royce would admit." (Joseph Blau)". In his defense of Abbot, Peirce writes: "I propose to consider impartially what the verdict of students of philosophy ought to be regarding these public accusations [1. That Prof. Royce libelled Dr. Abbot, and that maliciously. 2. That Prof. Royce used unfair means to stifle Dr. Abbot's reply] against one of the most eminent of their number. (...) All this would be abominable to the last degree in the case of a philosophical discussion. But then it must not be forgotten that the contention had never had that character. Prof. Royce's article was written with the avowed purpose, clearly and openly conveyed, though not by direct declaration, of ruining Dr. Abbot's reputation; and what little discussion there was was merely to subserve that purpose, not to ascertain or prove any truth of philosophy. Thus, it was a brutal, life-and-death fight from the first. Prof. Royce clearly perceived this, for he ends the article by saying that he shows no mercy and asks none! That's ethics. And his subsequent proceedings make it, in my judgment, as plain as such a thing can be, that his cruel purpose never left his heart. Dr. Abbot, on the other hand, stood like a baited bull, bewildered at such seemingly motiveless hostilities. It is quite impossible not to suppose that Prof.Royce conceived it was his duty thus to destroy Dr. Abbot's reputation, and with that the happiness of his life. A critic's stern and sacred duty, and all that! Besides
[peirce-l] Re: NEW ELEMENTS: So what is it all about?
List, Well, Peirce's comments on Royce are proof beyond all doubt that Peirce did indeed sometimes write ironically or sarcastically without use of quotation marks. That's relevant to the following, though of course it doesn't _prove_ that Peirce was at least somewhat being tongue-in-cheek about the monstrous mysticism and the bacilli. == CP 6.102 . . . I may mention, for the benefit of those who are curious in studying mental biographies, that I was born and reared in the neighborhood of Concord -- I mean in Cambridge -- at the time when Emerson, Hedge, and their friends were disseminating the ideas that they had caught from Schelling, and Schelling from Plotinus, from Boehm, or from God knows what minds stricken with the monstrous mysticism of the East. But the atmosphere of Cambridge held many an antiseptic against Concord transcendentalism; and I am not conscious of having contracted any of that virus. Nevertheless, it is probable that some cultured bacilli, some benignant form of the disease was implanted in my soul, unawares, and that now, after long incubation, it comes to the surface, modified by mathematical conceptions and by training in physical investigations. == I remember a long argument at peirce-l about that one, Howard Callaway arguing that Peirce meant it flatly literally and Joe arguing no, though I seem to recall Howard's eventually softening his position somewhat. I've reread Theresa Calvet's comments and don't quite get them. I don't mean that they're senseless, but there's a bit of vagueness. Peirce knew of what happened Royce did to Abbot. Peirce also knew of what the constructivist Kronecker did to Cantor in the early 1880s. Weierstrass was still trying to work with Kronecker as late as, I think 1888. Inquiry goes on. If Peirce became more disposed against Royce than he might otherwise have been, all the same Peirce still had to deal with or confront him philosophically and thus Peirce might think that he needed to arrange for his thought to make contact with Royce's thought. I mean, it seems plausible. But I'm not sure that my point there is quite to the point, and I suspect that this is one of those things which it helps to have a career in academe in order to understand it, it seems a little too connect-the-dots for me. Best, Ben Udell - Original Message - From: "Theresa Calvet" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> To: "Peirce Discussion Forum" Sent: Friday, January 27, 2006 2:57 PM Subject: [peirce-l] Re: NEW ELEMENTS: So what is it all about? Dear Joe, What I had in mind is something quite different and before suggesting "that Peirce had good reason to formulate his views in a way that would make contact with the way Royce formulated his, which is surely in the spirit of cooperative inquiry and the legitimate aims of philosophical rhetoric", perhaps one has to go back in time and read Peirce's defense of Abbot in The Nation (12 November 1891), or read Royce's libel "A Public Appeal for Redress to the Corporation and Overseers of Harvard University". Boston, Mass., 1891 (48 pp) and Abbot's "Is Not Harvard Responsible for the Conduct of her Professors, as well as of her Students? A Public Remonstrance Addressed to the Board of Overseers of Harvard University". Boston, Mass., 1892 (20 pp). I will just recall this very nasty, and most absurd, philosophical dispute: "In 1881 Abbot earned the second doctorate conferred by Harvard in Philosophy. But, like Peirce, he was unable to secure an academic post. In 1888 he was invited to lecture at Harvard during Royce's absence (and at Royce's request). In 1890 the substance of these lectures was published as The Way Out of Agnosticism: "For some reason.Royce [now] set out to annihilate Abbot's reputation.. he wrote a long and devastating review.. He accused Abbot of an unconscious and blundering borrowing from Hegel, but more importantly, issued a 'professional warning' against Abbot's 'philosophical pretensions'.. Abbot's attempt at vindicating himself dragged on until 1892, culminating in a public appeal to the Harvard Corporation and Board of Overseers."-Kuklick (1977). Royce was promoted to full professor on the same day Abbot's claims were finally dismissed by the Board. Ironically, only Peirce among his peers had come to Abbot's defense. Some ten years later, in 1903, following the completion of his magnum opus, The Syllogistic Philosophy or Prologomena to Science, Abbot committed suicide at his wife's grave: "Royce's enthusiasm for idealism led him to extend his criticism beyond proper philosophical limits and to engage in personal attacks on Abbot. In view of twentieth century philosophical developments.it is clear that Abbot was far more original than Royce would admit." (Joseph Blau)". In his defense of Abbot, Peirce writes: "I propose to consider impartially what the verdict of students of philosophy ought to be regarding these public accusa
[peirce-l] Re: NEW ELEMENTS: So what is it all about?
Dear Joe, What I had in mind is something quite different and before suggesting "that Peirce had good reason to formulate his views in a way that would make contact with the way Royce formulated his, which is surely in the spirit of cooperative inquiry and the legitimate aims of philosophical rhetoric", perhaps one has to go back in time and read Peirce's defense of Abbot in The Nation (12 November 1891), or read Royce's libel "A Public Appeal for Redress to the Corporation and Overseers of Harvard University". Boston, Mass., 1891 (48 pp) and Abbot's "Is Not Harvard Responsible for the Conduct of her Professors, as well as of her Students? A Public Remonstrance Addressed to the Board of Overseers of Harvard University". Boston, Mass., 1892 (20 pp). I will just recall this very nasty, and most absurd, philosophical dispute: "In 1881 Abbot earned the second doctorate conferred by Harvard in Philosophy. But, like Peirce, he was unable to secure an academic post. In 1888 he was invited to lecture at Harvard during Royce's absence (and at Royce's request). In 1890 the substance of these lectures was published as The Way Out of Agnosticism: "For some reason.Royce [now] set out to annihilate Abbot's reputation.. he wrote a long and devastating review.. He accused Abbot of an unconscious and blundering borrowing from Hegel, but more importantly, issued a 'professional warning' against Abbot's 'philosophical pretensions'.. Abbot's attempt at vindicating himself dragged on until 1892, culminating in a public appeal to the Harvard Corporation and Board of Overseers."-Kuklick (1977). Royce was promoted to full professor on the same day Abbot's claims were finally dismissed by the Board. Ironically, only Peirce among his peers had come to Abbot's defense. Some ten years later, in 1903, following the completion of his magnum opus, The Syllogistic Philosophy or Prologomena to Science, Abbot committed suicide at his wife's grave: "Royce's enthusiasm for idealism led him to extend his criticism beyond proper philosophical limits and to engage in personal attacks on Abbot. In view of twentieth century philosophical developments.it is clear that Abbot was far more original than Royce would admit." (Joseph Blau)". In his defense of Abbot, Peirce writes: "I propose to consider impartially what the verdict of students of philosophy ought to be regarding these public accusations [1. That Prof. Royce libelled Dr. Abbot, and that maliciously. 2. That Prof. Royce used unfair means to stifle Dr. Abbot's reply] against one of the most eminent of their number. (...) All this would be abominable to the last degree in the case of a philosophical discussion. But then it must not be forgotten that the contention had never had that character. Prof. Royce's article was written with the avowed purpose, clearly and openly conveyed, though not by direct declaration, of ruining Dr. Abbot's reputation; and what little discussion there was was merely to subserve that purpose, not to ascertain or prove any truth of philosophy. Thus, it was a brutal, life-and-death fight from the first. Prof. Royce clearly perceived this, for he ends the article by saying that he shows no mercy and asks none! That's ethics. And his subsequent proceedings make it, in my judgment, as plain as such a thing can be, that his cruel purpose never left his heart. Dr. Abbot, on the other hand, stood like a baited bull, bewildered at such seemingly motiveless hostilities. It is quite impossible not to suppose that Prof.Royce conceived it was his duty thus to destroy Dr. Abbot's reputation, and with that the happiness of his life. A critic's stern and sacred duty, and all that! Besides, it must be remembered that he is a student of ethics; and it is not to be imagined that a person can study ethics all his life long without acquiring conceptions of right or wrong that the rest of the world cannot understand" (Charles Sanders Peirce: Contributions to The Nation. Part One: 1869-1893 (published in 1975), pp. 115-116. I don't have to remind you that James immediately wrote to the Editor of The Nation (a letter published on the 19 November 1891) defending Royce! But no more on this. The New Elements seem consistent with the Harvard Lectures of 1903 and with the part of MS. 318 that Max Fisch sent me and described in 1975 as the "best statement so far of his [Peirce's] general theory of signs". Theresa --- Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber archive@mail-archive.com
[peirce-l] NEW ELEMENTS: entelechy
Turning to section 1 of Part 3 of the New Elements, the notion of the entelechy is introduced and defined. Here are, first, the entry for "entelechy" in the Century Dictionary, and, below that, four passages on the conception from the Collected Papers: >From CENTURY DICTIONARY p. 1946 (1889) ENTELECHY (en-tel'e-ki), n. [( L. entelechia, (Gr. entelecheia, actuality, ( en telei echein, be complete (cf. Enteles, complete, full): ev, in; telei, dat. of telos, end, completion; echein, have, hold, intr. be.] Realization: opposed to power or potentiality, and nearly the same as energy or act (actuality). The only difference is that entelechy implies a more perfect realization. The idea of entelechy is connected with that of form, the idea of power with that of matter. Thus, iron is potentially in its ore, which to be made iron must be worked; when this is done, the iron exists in entelechy. The development from being in posse or in germ to entelechy takes place, according to Aristotle, by means of a change, the imperfect action or energy, of which the perfected result is the entelechy. Entelechy is, however, either first or second. First entelechy is being in working order; second entelechy is being in action. The soul is said to be the first entelechy of the body, which seems to imply that it grows out of the body as its germ; but the idea more insisted upon is that man without the soul would be but a body, while the soul, once developed, is not lost when the man sleeps. Cudworth terms his plastic nature (which see, under nature) a first entelechy, and Leibniz calls a monad an entelechy. ==quote from E. Wallace= To express this aspect of the mental functions, Aristotle makes use of the word entelechy. The word is one which explains itself. Frequently, it is true, Aristotle fails to draw any strict line of demarcation between entelechy and energy; but in theory, at least, the two are definitely separated from each other, and energeia represents merely a stage on the path toward entelecheia. Entelechy in short is the realization which contains the end of a process: the complete expression of some function -- the perfection of some phenomenon, the last stage in that process from potentiality to reality which we have already noticed. Soul then is not only the realization of the body; it is its perfect realization or full development. ---E. Wallace, Aristotle's Psychology, p. xlii. ===end quote= PASSAGES IN THE COLLECTED PAPERS: CP 6.36 (1891) The Doctrine of Necessity Examined I propose here to examine the common belief that every single fact in the universe is precisely determined by law. It must not be supposed that this is a doctrine accepted everywhere and at all times by all rational men. Its first advocate appears to have been Democritus, the atomist, who was led to it, as we are informed, by reflecting upon the "impenetrability, translation, and impact of matter (antitypia kai phora kai plege tes hule)." That is to say, having restricted his attention to a field where no influence other than mechanical constraint could possibly come before his notice, he straightway jumped to the conclusion that throughout the universe that was the sole principle of action -- a style of reasoning so usual in our day with men not unreflecting as to be more than excusable in the infancy of thought. But Epicurus, in revising the atomic doctrine and repairing its defenses, found himself obliged to suppose that atoms swerve from their courses by spontaneous chance; and thereby he conferred upon the theory life and entelechy. For we now see clearly that the peculiar function of the molecular hypothesis in physics is to open an entry for the calculus of probabilities. CP 6.356 (1901) Baldwin's Dictionary: "Matter and Form" 356. It must not be forgotten that Aristotle was an Asclepiad, that is, that he belonged to a family which for generation after generation, from prehistoric times, had had their attention turned to vital phenomena; and he is almost as remarkable for his capacity as a naturalist as he is for his incapacity in physics and mathematics. He must have had prominently before his mind the fact that all eggs are very much alike, and all seeds are very much alike, while the animals that grow out of the one, the plants that grow out of the other, are as different as possible. Accordingly, his dunamis is germinal being, not amounting to existence; while his entelechy is the perfect thing that ought to grow out of that germ. Matter, which he associates with stuff, timber, metal, is that undifferentiated element of a thing which it must possess to have even germinal being. Since matter is, in itself, indeterminate, it is also in itself unknowable; but it is both determinable by form and knowable, even sensible, through form. The notion that the form can antecede matter is, to Aristotle, perfectly ridiculous.
[peirce-l] Re: NEW ELEMENTS: So what is it all about?
Theresa and list: Theresa, you say: I agree that Peirce here was implicitly opposing himself to Royce as a Pragmatist (and a Realist) vs. a non-Pragmatist. But I disagree with what Joe suggests ["And what I am suggesting is that at least some of what I find most puzzling in what Peirce is saying in certain places in the New Elements seems to me to be being said by him as a kind of emulation of Royce's way of framing those grand questions about being, purpose, perfection, entelechy, and so forth. I am not suggesting that Peirce was changing his view but that he was filling it out in certain ways so that his view and Royce's would be regardable or comparable with use of a common vocabulary, expressing to some extent a shared sensibility, etc. There are a number of different themes mentioned in the New Elements which Peirce shared with Royce To me these are important clues as to what Peirce was saying and why he was saying it"]. REPLY: I don't know what it is in what I say that you disagree with, unless you read me as suggesting that Peirce was somehow pandering to Royce in formulating things as he does in the New Elements. Maybe I should explain that my point was not that, but rather that Peirce had good reason to formulate his views in a way that would make contact with the way Royce formulated his, which is surely in the spirit of cooperative inquiry and the legitimate aims of philosophical rhetoric. But maybe that is not what you had in mind. You go on to say: [THERESA:] If one wants to read what I consider a mistaken account not only of Peirce's influence on Royce but of pragmaticism, then one could read Ludwig Nagl's "Beyond Absolute Pragmatism: the Concept of Community in Josiah Royce's Mature Philosophy", published in Cognitio, Vol. 5, N. 1 (January-July 2004), pp. 44-74). REPLY: Thanks for the reference on that. Some time when you have time, I wonder if there is some especially important thing way in which you think Nagl misconstrues Peirce's influence on Royce, i.e. what it is in Royce's later view he thinks of as due to Peirce which really is not. A related but distinct question which I've wondered about but not got around to investigating is whether Royce modified his absolute idealism in the direction of Peirce's conditional idealism in consequence of Peirce's advice and criticism? This would go towards answering the question of whether Royce actually became an inheritor of Peirce's pragmaticism in in his later work or was tending in that direction when he died. In any case, it is was a disaster for Peirce that Royce died when he did since it left Peirce without defense against the savaging of his Nachlass at Harvard, among other things, such as whatever other tendencies were at work there that resulted in his marginalization. . Joe Ransdell -- No virus found in this outgoing message. Checked by AVG Free Edition. Version: 7.1.375 / Virus Database: 267.14.22/239 - Release Date: 1/24/2006 --- Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber archive@mail-archive.com
[peirce-l] Re: NEW ELEMENTS: So what is it all about?
Joe and list, If I had more time I would really try to write more on Peirce's review of Royce's The World and the Individual, but will only insist now on what Peirce himself wrote in that review: "The truth is, that Professor Royce is blind to a fact which all ordinary people will see plainly enough; that the essence of the realist's opinion is that it is one thing to be and another thing to be represented; and the cause of this cecity is that the Professor is completely immersed in his absolute idealism, which precisely consists in denying that distinction. (...) Professor Royce, armed with his wrong definition of realism (...)" (CP 8.129-130), and his conclusion: "Now lets us address a few words to the author. A healthy religious spirit will not allow its religion to be disturbed by all the philosophy in the world. Nevertheless, a philosophy of religion deeply concerns us all. It is not a religious, but an intellectual need to bring our ideas into some harmony. Prof. Royce has inaugurated a vast reform (...).What he has done is merely a preliminary essay. It is a pity that it fills a thousand pages. We want another book of about the same size; only instead of being written in the loose form of lectures, we want it to be a condensed and severe treatise, in which the innumerable vague and unsatisfactory points of the present exposition shall be minutely examined, in which all the new conceptions of multitude and continuity, and not merely that of an endless series, shall be applied not merely in the single narrow way in which that one is here applied, but in every way, not merely to the one matter to which it is here applied but to every subject of metaphysics from top to bottom, together with whatsoever other exact diagrammatic conceptions can be produced, and the whole reasoning, so far as it is demonstrative, be rendered diagrammatic, and so far as it relates to questions of fact be made scientific." (CP 8.131). Read this conclusion together with the letter Peirce wrote to Royce (27 May 1902) and particularly this paragraph: "Your best years of philosophic reflection are still before you. The tome is ripe and you are the very man to accomplish the great achievement of covering that distance [between Philosophy and the rest of the peaceable sciences]. Yet you could not do it with your present views of logic, antagonistic to all that is possible for progressive science. My entreaty is that you study logic." (CP 8. 117, footnote 10). I agree that Peirce here was implicitly opposing himself to Royce as a Pragmatist (and a Realist) vs. a non-Pragmatist. But I disagree with what Joe suggests ["And what I am suggesting is that at least some of what I find most puzzling in what Peirce is saying in certain places in the New Elements seems to me to be being said by him as a kind of emulation of Royce's way of framing those grand questions about being, purpose, perfection, entelechy, and so forth. I am not suggesting that Peirce was changing his view but that he was filling it out in certain ways so that his view and Royce's would be regardable or comparable with use of a common vocabulary, expressing to some extent a shared sensibility, etc. There are a number of different themes mentioned in the New Elements which Peirce shared with Royce To me these are important clues as to what Peirce was saying and why he was saying it"]. Joe also asks "Does anyone know of anyone who is working on a overall comparison of Royce and Peirce, i.e. of Peirce's influence on Royce?" If one wants to read what I consider a mistaken account not only of Peirce's influence on Royce but of pragmaticism, then one could read Ludwig Nagl's "Beyond Absolute Pragmatism: the Concept of Community in Josiah Royce's Mature Philosophy", published in Cognitio, Vol. 5, N. 1 (January-July 2004), pp. 44-74). Theresa Calvet --- Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber archive@mail-archive.com
