[PEN-L:11223] (Fwd) (Fwd) An appeal
Dear Ajit, You may not remember my friend ela from D. school, Sanjoy Ghose is her brother and an old acquaintance of mine. Can you please circulate this message on your various discussion groups? regards, sanjay An Appeal For the Release of Sanjoy Ghose We the undersigned are deeply distressed and concerned over the abduction of Sanjoy Ghose, social worker, by suspected ULFA militants in Upper Assam on Friday 4th July 1997. Sanjoy was abducted along with Chandra Doley, a colleague from their place of work in Bongaon on Majuli Islands in the Brahmaputra. Chandra Doley after being roughed up escaped from the abductors and returned the next day. A graduate from the Institute of Rural Management, Anand (IRMA), Sanjoy Ghose for the last year and half was involved with the setting up and running the Association of Voluntary Agencies for Rural Development ( AVARD ) North East. From 1986 to 1995 Sanjoy did pioneering work in Western Rajasthan. He set up URMUL Trust in 1986 in Bikaner with the chief objective of empowering the local people to address their own development needs. By 1995, URMUL expanded into a network of organisations addressing the concerns of the poor in the districts of Bikaner, Jodhpur and Jaisalmer in western Rajasthan. Sanjoy's activities in the field were matched by the writer in him who wrote extensively and spiritedly on development issues. Sanjoy was one of the first to realise the need for media advocacy for the NGOs and struggle based groups, and established CHARKHA as an interface between NGOs and the mainstream media. It was the same pioneering spirit that took him to the Majuli Islands in upper Assam along with Shumita a women's activist and also his wife and Dr. Sunil Kaul who after having resigned from the Indian army chose to work as a health worker in the rural areas. In the course of the last year and a half Sanjoy and his team established an excellent rapport with the local community especially the women and the youth. They became an inspiration for the young adults on the Islands who joined them in attending to the needs of the community. They motivated the community to volunteer labour for various activities, including checking soil erosion on the island. They were also involved in initiating a continuous dialogue on "Development" with voluntary organisations and individuals from most of the North East states. More significantly, the local community began to ask uncomfortable questions not only of those who had grown rich by skimming off the money meant for the development of the poor, but also of the prevailing gun culture.When a series of anonymous but slanderous allegations began to be raised against AVARD-NE, the Majuli group decided to hold a public meeting and audit of all development works in the area. The meeting on June 1, 1997 was very well attended and opinions were expressed openly by a cross section of society. The vested interests and militant outfits were obviously affected by this process.. There can be no justification for abducting an individual who was initiating a process of dialogue and debate of even the works and efforts initiated by the organisation he represented. We appeal to the conscience of the ULFA militants and urge them to release Sanjoy Ghose immediately. We express our solidarity and extend our moral support to Shumita, the AVARD- NE team and the women and youth who have been urging ULFA militants to release Sanjoy. This appeal is from friends of Sanjoy Ghose in Rajasthan. Please circulate it as widely as possible and send the signed copy to newspapers and to AVARD- NE at P. O. Box 91, Jorhat 785001, Assam, India .Tele/fax : 0376-325528. Majuli camp office telephone no : 03775- 3451. E.mail: Sanjoy@ avard.unv.ernet.in Name Organisation Signature
[PEN-L:11221] on CEO Pay
I must admit I am a little suprised that Pen-l-ers would be debating this issue in terms of neoclassical marginal productivity. This is the equivalent of arguing, what is the marginal productivity of a mugger? (i.e. someone who has market power because of some non-market force.) The moment one moves to a non-neoclassic frameworke (as Jim D suggests) then the problem is "solved". There is a surplus distribution problem. This is not a market problem, but a power problem. (Why is it that non-neoclassical economists avoid the issue of power?) One can utilize rent theory to justify the resulting justification. But, if we were honest, that is really crap. Let us put it a different way, what is the mp of a crime king (and are CEOs really different?) And on a different stream, a colleague of mine posted a document documenting horrendous war crimes against the Unites States Government, specifically with regard to the use of biological warfare against Cuba. Yet, despite the level of despisity (is that a word) of the offense, not one member of this list from the US has responded. Comment? Paul Phillips, Economics, University of Manitoba
[PEN-L:11219] Re: on CEO Pay
Yesterday, I mentioned an event study approach, looking at the executives who get higher pay while their companies perform more poorly. Today, I would like to take note of another perversity. Now that universities are becoming more like other corporations, university presidents are commanding corporate-like salaries. I challenge anyone to find any marginal productivity in their performance. At best, they are marginally productive. -- Michael Perelman Economics Department California State University Chico, CA 95929 Tel. 916-898-5321 E-Mail [EMAIL PROTECTED]
[PEN-L:11217] Re: on CEO Pay
At 08:47 AM 7/9/97 -0700, James Michael Craven wrote: [SNIP] purported CEO "marginal productivity" or MRP. Often, behind the slick suits, executive penthouses and the trappings of executive power, one finds individuals who might best be described as fluff n' puff, predatory, machiavellian, superficial, sycophantic, calculating, narrow, myopic, cliche-based, corporate creatures whose real MRPs, if they could be really calculated, would be closer to that of a pimp or a counter person at Mc Donalds. Just watch some of these business programs and when these imperial creatures deign to give an interview- -highly structured and mostly softball questions--many unintentionally reveal themselves to be quite empty and devoid of substance. Jim: You do an injustice to the hard-working minimum wage workers at McDonalds. Unlike the CEOs about whom you speak, they actually work for wages, earn their paychecks, and suffer the indignities of fast-food exploitation. By comparison, CEOs are just large-scale thieves. In solidarity, Michael Michael, I know exactly what you are saying and that thought crossed my mind before I wrote what I wrote. The MRP of a typical Mc Donald's worker is relatively low in money terms (MPP X relatively low-priced output) not in physical productivity terms--you-re right they do wok hard; my comment was about the money value of the MRP of the CEO. In fact, I would argue that many of these CEO's and their downsizing/hollowing out actually damage the long-run productivity and competitiveness of the firms they oversee and therefore maybe their MRPs are even negative. I do note and share the sentiments you express. I hope that my writing indicates attitudes and a paradigm such that I would never demean or diminish those who really work for a living and do really generate tangible products and productivity. Jim Craven *--* * James Craven * " For those who have fought for it, * * Dept of Economics* freedom has a taste the protected * * Clark College* will never know." * * 1800 E. McLoughlin Blvd. *Otto von Bismark * * Vancouver, Wa. 98663 * * * (360) 992-2283 * * * [EMAIL PROTECTED]* * * MY EMPLOYER HAS NO ASSOCIATION WITH MY PRIVATE/PROTECTED OPINION *
[PEN-L:11215] Re: Econ Rent/tenure
While some interesting points have been made concerning the relationship of CEOs salaries to performance, there is a ceteris paribus problem. Marginal productivity theory posits that other factors are held constant. That is, there may be a multitude of other factors which are affecting stock performance, including secular trends in Price/Earnings ratios which have nothing to do with CEO performance. Moreover, many other factors can affect earnings other than CEO performance including the state of the economy. (In sum sense, linking CEO performance to some combination of changes in profit rate and market share may be better to measure productivity since market share may look at performance independent of the business cycle and P/E changes.) What I am most interested in, however, is the validity of relating the notion of economic rents to faculty tenure, particularly that of full professors when there is no merit raises. This is the situation in the CUNY system. Would it be correct to argue that given lack of accountability, tenured full professors are earning economic rents? Robert Cherry Brooklyn College
[PEN-L:11213] Re: Rent question
Doug writes: In the higher rentier consciousness, the product of a CEO is, or should be, a higher stock price, which may be the same as reported profits, but hardly always. To that end, compensation packages have been refashioned to depend more on stock options and less on straight salaries. Headline levels of booty, like Eisner's depend heavily on the imputed value of options. Are those "rents"? I think you've raised two separate issues here, Doug, one of which overlaps a point made earlier by Jim Devine. In overview I'll just say that I agree with the sense of both points, but neither contradicts the main conclusion I was driving at in my post, which is that given the nature of executive labor, execs could earn economic rent whether or not they are paid an amount that might be construed as their "marginal product" 1) Concerning the (lack of) equivalence between firm value, as reflected in current stock prices, and (discounted expected profits), which was the basis I used for discussing what the "marginal productivity" of a chief executive might mean: I agree that the two are not necessarily equivalent (and I certainly agree that stock value does not necessarily equal "reported profits"). As you know, the "capital asset pricing model" predicts this equivalence, and if stockholders are sufficiently awake and calculating, one could see why there might be a (constantly interrupted) *tendency* toward equivalence. Thus you could say I was simply following Marx's time-honored method of starting with a simple, if possibly unrealistic, basic scenario in analyzing a problem.In any case, I could have made the same point using either measure. Explaining that claim leads me to the second issue--- 2) Concerning the structure of executive compensation packages: This has to do with the *form* of executive pay, rather than the *level*, which is what I was getting at in my earlier post. The form of pay addresses the problem of incentives, a question not immediately at issue, so I ignored it for the sake of brevity. But granting your point about non-equivalence of stock value and discounted expected profit, executive compensation could in principle be linked to whichever of the two measures firm owners think CEOs should pay more attention to: pay could take the form of stock options if the former mattered, or profit-sharing if the latter. In other words, I think the tradeoff you highlight is a non sequitur: the question is not straight salary vs. stock options, it's salary plus profit-sharing (or bonuses tied to profit performance) vs. salary plus stock options. 3) Footnote: the *form* of executive pay adds a new complication to the earlier story: if a component of CEO compensation takes the form of stock options or profit-sharing, rather than straight salary, then given capitalist reality CEOs are made to bear risk. If CEOs are risk averse and mobile, firms that attempt to impose a higher than average degree of riskiness in pay will have to pay a risk premium, which under the stated conditions would logically have to be subtracted in determining what portion of exec pay constitutes economic rent. This underscores my earlier point that identifying such rent, or its absence, is likely to be difficult in practice. For example: it is well known that US CEOs earn more on average than their counterparts in West Germany and Japan. But it's also true that US CEOs receive a higher percentage of their total pay in (risky) stock options and/or performance bonuses. So what portion of the difference, if any, is due to a risk premium? to economic rent? to higher productivity of US CEOs, however measured? In solidarity, Gil
[PEN-L:11210] On Efficiency
On the first day of all of my classes, when introducing various concepts of "efficiency" (technological, economic, productive, consumer, exchange and allocative), I hand out the following: Rentabilitatsberechnung der SS uber Ausnutzung der Haftlinge in den Konzentrationslagern (Table of Profits (or yield) per prisoner in concentration camps (established by SS) Rentabilitatsberechnung (Rental accounting) Taglicher Verlheilohn durchschnittlich RM [Reichsmark] 6.00 (Average income from rental of prisoner per day) abzuglich Ernahrung RM 0.60 (Deduction for nourishment per day) durchschnittl Lebensdauer 9 Mt = 270 x RM 5.30 = RM 1631.00 (Average life expectancy:9 months) abzuglich Bekl Amort. RM -.10 (minus amoprtization on clothing) _ Erlos aus rationeller Verwertung der Leiche: (Profits from rational utilization of corpse) 1. Zahngold (Gold Teeth)3. Wertsachen (Articles of value) 2. Kleidung (Clothing) 4. Geld (Money) abzuglich Verbrennungskosten RM 2.00 (Minus costs of cremation) durchschnittlicher Nettogewinn RM 200.00 (Average Net Profit) Gesamtgewinn nach 9 MonatenRM 1631.00 (Total profit after 9 months) zuruglich Erlos aus Knochen und Aschenverwertung (This estimate does not include profits from sale of bones and ashes) This is from a copy of a captured SS document on concentration camp accounting/"efficiency" or as the neoclassical texts promote, "efficiency uber alles". I use this to povoke thought about how, by whom, in whose interests, under what conditions/constraints is "efficiency" defined and operationalized. In this case, increased "efficiency" meant more death and genocide. Jim Craven *--* * James Craven * " For those who have fought for it, * * Dept of Economics* freedom has a taste the protected * * Clark College* will never know." * * 1800 E. McLoughlin Blvd. *Otto von Bismark * * Vancouver, Wa. 98663 * * * (360) 992-2283 * * * [EMAIL PROTECTED]* * * MY EMPLOYER HAS NO ASSOCIATION WITH MY PRIVATE/PROTECTED OPINION *
[PEN-L:11209] on CEO Pay
Yes, addenDUMB: I got so hung up with the idea of execs being paid a scarcity rent that I lost sight of what they get paid when they don't receive a scarcity rent, i.e., when they're paid their "Marginal physical product." Since corporate execs are, strictly speaking, unproductive workers -- i.e., not producing surplus-value directly -- the "marginal product" of an exec's "labor" is problematic. To a neoclassical, it's no problem: hey, divide the extra production that results from the exec's exertions by the amount of those efforts and you've got the MPP. But to a Marxian economist, that's obfuscating. The "MPP" of the exec would be the rise in the amount that productive workers produce (extorted by the exec's minions under the supervision of the exec) divided by the amount of the exec's efforts. Most execs wouldn't have their salaries determined by that "MPP," by the way, since much of what they do is pure financial paper-shuffling. Much of that is quite profitable to the owners of the corporation, thank you very much, even it doesn't add to the aggregate surplus-value at all. mea culpa: I've broken two resolutions in one day. in pen-l solidarity, Jim Devine [EMAIL PROTECTED] [EMAIL PROTECTED] Econ. Dept., Loyola Marymount Univ. 7900 Loyola Blvd., Los Angeles, CA 90045-8410 USA 310/338-2948 (daytime, during workweek); FAX: 310/338-1950 "Segui il tuo corso, e lascia dir le genti." (Go your own way and let people talk.) -- K. Marx, paraphrasing Dante A. Response: Yes and still there is the problem of the usual post hoc ergo propter hoc and correlation = causation fallacies, the time lagging and multiple independent variable problems (various factors and various times/places shape overall productivity and relative productivities) and the fact that many of the variables shaping supposed marginal productivities are beyond the control of even a group of these CEO types in attempting to discuss/measure so-called CEO MPPs and MR contributions. With real-world integrated production functions and path dependency and other non-linear effects, I believe that talking about real-world marginal productivities or even marginal revenues attributed to a particular isolated individual worker, CEO, "unit" of capital or "acre" of land is simply nonsense designed to ratify and suggest real- world applicability of a fundamentally bankrupt tautology-riddled paradigm designed to rationalize/promote the gross inequalities and brutal effects of capitalism and the core structures, imperatives, relations and institutions of capitalism that promote and widen them. It is clear that capitalism cannot survive and expand without the constant degradation of those who work--in order to diminish real wages (costs) and coerce higher levels of productivity and profits. The grotesque levels of pay of some of these CEO's are more about promoting the "hero" culture, ultra-individualism and the notion of "capital" as the "sole" or "real" creator of wealth than about some purported CEO "marginal productivity" or MRP. Often, behind the slick suits, executive penthouses and the trappings of executive power, one finds individuals who might best be described as fluff n' puff, predatory, machiavellian, superficial, sycophantic, calculating, narrow, myopic, cliche-based, corporate creatures whose real MRPs, if they could be really calculated, would be closer to that of a pimp or a counter person at Mc Donalds. Just watch some of these business programs and when these imperial creatures deign to give an interview- -highly structured and mostly softball questions--many unintentionally reveal themselves to be quite empty and devoid of substance. Jim Craven *--* * James Craven * " For those who have fought for it, * * Dept of Economics* freedom has a taste the protected * * Clark College* will never know." * * 1800 E. McLoughlin Blvd. *Otto von Bismark * * Vancouver, Wa. 98663 * * * (360) 992-2283 * * * [EMAIL PROTECTED]* * * MY EMPLOYER HAS NO ASSOCIATION WITH MY PRIVATE/PROTECTED OPINION *
[PEN-L:11207] Re: Rent question
A concrete "experiment" in relation to this question is the executive salaries in the British utility privatizations. In all cases, CEO salaries rose substantially after privatization. This is interesting because the neoclassical maximum competitive market value of these individuals had been determined in the market prior to privatization. Also the substantially lower salaries of Japanese CEOs would seem to set a limit on the MP related compensation of CEOs with the rest having to be ascribed to cultural and institutional rather than market considerations. The neoclassical defense of CEO salaries is clearly untenable. Why do they do it? Some of it is ideological hegemony. Some of it is a personal identification with other "professionals". The major reason is, I think, to assert the universal existence of efficient markets, even in the face of all evidence to the contrary. Why not just admit that CEO salaries are outrageous and prescribe the elimination of market imperfections? Terry McDonough
[PEN-L:11212] Re: Rent question
Gil Skillman wrote: So the claim that executives do not typically receive rents depends on pretty strenuous conditions. How to prove that they in fact receive rents? Ask first who has proved that they receive _no_ rents--I'd love to see the study claiming to do this. As a first pass, the evidence that executive pay _does not_ vary predictably with firm profitability argues against the relevance of marginal productivity theory in markets for executive labor power, since the marginal product of an executive, especially the chief executive, is best thought of in terms of differences in profitability flowing from the presence of that input. In the higher rentier consciousness, the product of a CEO is, or should be, a higher stock price, which may be the same as reported profits, but hardly always. To that end, compensation packages have been refashioned to depend more on stock options and less on straight salaries. Headline levels of booty, like Eisner's depend heavily on the imputed value of options. Are those "rents"? Doug -- Doug Henwood Left Business Observer 250 W 85 St New York NY 10024-3217 USA +1-212-874-4020 voice +1-212-874-3137 fax email: mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] web: http://www.panix.com/~dhenwood/LBO_home.html
[PEN-L:11214] query
Friends, Is Dave Richardson of the BLS Daily Reports off the list. I'm trying to get in touch with him. Michael Yates
[PEN-L:11216] Re: on CEO Pay
At 08:47 AM 7/9/97 -0700, James Michael Craven wrote: [SNIP] purported CEO "marginal productivity" or MRP. Often, behind the slick suits, executive penthouses and the trappings of executive power, one finds individuals who might best be described as fluff n' puff, predatory, machiavellian, superficial, sycophantic, calculating, narrow, myopic, cliche-based, corporate creatures whose real MRPs, if they could be really calculated, would be closer to that of a pimp or a counter person at Mc Donalds. Just watch some of these business programs and when these imperial creatures deign to give an interview- -highly structured and mostly softball questions--many unintentionally reveal themselves to be quite empty and devoid of substance. Jim: You do an injustice to the hard-working minimum wage workers at McDonalds. Unlike the CEOs about whom you speak, they actually work for wages, earn their paychecks, and suffer the indignities of fast-food exploitation. By comparison, CEOs are just large-scale thieves. In solidarity, Michael
[PEN-L:11218] NAFTA in Caribbean?! Action Requested!
From: Nicaragua Network [EMAIL PROTECTED] [The information for this alert was provided on July 9, 1997, by the U.S./Guatemala Labor Education Project, P.O. Box 268-290, Chicago, IL 60626; Tel: (773) 262-6502; e-mail: [EMAIL PROTECTED]] URGENT!!! PLEASE ACT ON THIS ALERT: House Tax Bill Contains $200 Million in New Benefits For Central American Maquiladora Businesses; No New Benefits for Maquila Workers The House of Representatives is quietly trying to extend NAFTA trade benefits to the Central American and Caribbean apparel-for-export sector. The so-called Caribbean Basin Initiative (CBI) parity measure, originally introduced by Rep. Phil Crane, R-IL, is part of the omnibus reconciliation tax bill that has already passed the House. The Crane measure would expand the long-standing Caribbean Basin Initiative duty-free trade program to phase in NAFTA-equivalent trade benefits for apparel, shoes and petroleum, commodities that are currently excluded from the CBI trade program. The Senate version of the reconciliation bill does not contain a CBI-parity provision. Central American governments and business leaders have lobbied for three years to obtain the same trade benefits provided to Mexico under NAFTA, arguing that Mexico has an unfair trade advantage that has harmed the Central American maquiladora sector. However, the Central American maquiladora sector has continued to grow, despite Mexico's lower duties. Since NAFTA was passed, CBI countries have increased their total share of U.S. imports of apparel from 19% to 23%. The Crane bill does nothing to ensure that Central American workers obtain a share of the new trade benefits. While the version of the Crane measure in the reconciliation bill apparently does not remove current provisions that link CBI benefits to progress on respecting worker rights, these provisions have proven to be inadequate. Central American trade unions and those in the U.S. who support Central American workers believe that the extension of new trade benefits to the Central American maquiladora sector should be conditioned on measures to ensure that the benefits be shared by Central American workers through strong worker rights provisions. The attempt to sneak the controversial Crane measure through the reconciliation bill represents an attack on both Central American and U.S. workers and worker rights advocates, depriving fair trade supporters an opportunity to engage in efforts to strengthen to worker rights provisions of U.S. trade laws and build a trading system that is not based on the exploitation of Third World workers who are denied their basic rights. The House's action is a back-door attempt to ensure that worker rights advocates have no opportunity to push for stronger worker rights provisions. The drum beat of media coverage of worker rights violations in the Central American maquiladora sector no doubt has CBI-parity supporters concerned about having an honest and public debate on U.S. trade-worker rights policy vis-a-vis the Central American maquiladora sector. In a clear indication of efforts to side-step a public debate, the bill authorizes the new trade benefits for only one year, thereby keeping down costs represented by the loss of duties that would no longer be imposed. However, the strategy of the provision's sponsors is to get the nose of the camel under the tent, knowing that once the benefits are provided for one year they will be extended in future years. The five- year cost of CBI-parity would be $1 billion. Senators Patrick Moynihan, Trent Lott and William Roth have been named to represent the Senate in a conference committee with House counterparts on the section of the reconciliation bill that contains CBI- parity. TIMELINE: IMMEDIATE. This bill is going to conference July 10 and observers expect a conference (i.e. compromise) version of the bill to be completed as early as the middle of the week of July 14. ACTION: Contact your U.S. senators immediately. Ask them to contact Senators Moynihan, Lott and Roth and urge that they remove CBI- parity from the reconciliation bill. For more information, contact Steve Coats at the U.S./Guatemala Labor Education Project; Tel: 773-262-6502; e-mail: [EMAIL PROTECTED] CAMPAIGN FOR LABOR RIGHTS memberships: Send $35.00 to CLR, 1247 "E" Street SE, Washington, DC 20003. For a sample copy of our newsletter, send your postal address to [EMAIL PROTECTED] -- To receive our e-mail Labor Alerts send a message to [EMAIL PROTECTED] with "labor alerts -- all campaigns" in the subject line or specify which labor issues interest: Nike, Disney, Guess, child labor, Guatemala, Mexico, Nicaragua, El Salvador, US farm workers, US poultry processing workers. If you would like to receive information which falls outside those categories (prison labor, workfare, other policy issues, additional briefing
[PEN-L:11211] Re: Re: imperialist competition?
Bill Burgess writes: US hegemony partially functioned during the long
post WW2 boom;
those days are over. The military fact of the USSR blunted open rivalry
between imperialist powers for awhile, but its (partial) demise opens more
room for fighting over profit potentials. We're leaving off the economy
from political economy if we don't connect this to the wars happening,
including Iraq and intervention in Yugoslavia.
Sure, the end of the cold war brought some competition among the big powers
to the fore, over foreign policy and economics ("competitiveness"). But is
there anything going on which is remotely similar to the UK/German
battleship-building arms race before WW I? is there a scramble for colonies
and coaling stations? These are the kinds of thing Lenin wrote about.
These days, instead of building battleships to compete with each other
militarily, the capitalist powers are competing to sell fighter planes
(modern battleships) to developing countries. Instead of scrambling for
colonies, the powers are uniting behind the war against Iraq, the World
Bank's structural adjustment programs in developing countries, and (after
initial diplomatic discord, with Germany backing Slovenia's independence)
uniting to pacify the former Yugoslavia.
On other subjects: Today's L.A. TIMES reports that "experts say" that the
point of NAFTA was not "jobs" but instead ensuring that Mexico went all the
way with "free market economics."
The TIMES also reports that the "health" industry is currently denying
insurance coverage to babies who need reconstructive surgery at birth
(e.g., supplying a missing external ear) because it is wholely cosmetic.
How does one pronounce "HMO" (health maintenance organization)? If the M is
silent, pronounce it "ho." But perhaps the H should be silent, since
there's no health there.
that's it for today.
in pen-l solidarity,
Jim Devine [EMAIL PROTECTED]
[EMAIL PROTECTED]
Econ. Dept., Loyola Marymount Univ.
7900 Loyola Blvd., Los Angeles, CA 90045-8410 USA
310/338-2948 (daytime, during workweek); FAX: 310/338-1950
"Segui il tuo corso, e lascia dir le genti." (Go your own way
and let people talk.) -- K. Marx, paraphrasing Dante A.
[PEN-L:11208] Re: Capital and the State
Bill B wonders if competitive austerity and the "high productivity" strategy could be different forms of national capitalist competition. The problem with this is that they are more evidently different forms of competition between national working classes. Nevertheless Bill's emphasis on the continuing relationship between capital and nation states is constructive. Capital is still integrated with other social structures in different ways in different localities and hence not completely "global" in its effects. Terry McDonough
