On Mon, May 19, 1997 at 09:41:20 (-0700) Wojtek Sokolowski writes:
>As I see it, the disagreement between Bill and myself boils down to one
>point: what is the actual effect, if any, of formal structures, institutions
>and people who hide behing them on the everyday behaviour of the so-called
>"ordinary" people?  Beside that one point, I do not think that anyone can in
>a good faith construe my postings as a rejection of the principle of
>particiaptory democracy & self-management or a defence of Stalinism.

I did not intend in any way to imply that you rejected principles of
participatory democracy or were defending Stalinism.  I am also
beginning to think that our approaches are not necessarily exclusive.
We seem to be emphasizing different aspects of what is perhaps the
same goal---to promote a more democratic and just order, etc.

>So addressing the point of disagreement, it is my impression that Bill
>thinks that institutions and institutional constraints have a quite
>deterministic influence over individual behaviour -- as his metaphor of DOS
>and multitasking seems to suggest.  At the same time, Bill strongly argues
>for self-management and participatory democracy.  The combination of those
>two arguments strikes me as rather odd, because it is not at all clear to me
>how the so-called people are going to exercise their self-management and
>participatory democracy if they are not handed down the right set of
>social-political institutions on a silver platter.  Are we to assume that
>particpatory democracy and self-management is only possible when the elites
>consent to the "proper" sets of instituions?

I strongly reject the contention that I believe in a "deterministic
influence" of institutions.  Rather I believe that institutions can
often be very powerful shapers of behavior.  My DOS example was (I
think obviously) a simplistic example of constraints, while my example
of the Fed was a much more realistic one.  The Fed is one of the
institutions best-insulated from popular participation in our
country.  Ask yourself how people can affect its decisions.  The
answer is that it is well-nigh impossible to do so.  The question, in
this case, is not how we work within the framework set down by the Fed
(which excludes democratic action in principle), but how we replace
the Fed with something better.

The conclusions drawn from this deformation of my argument differ
wildly from my own.  I argue, simply, that powerful institutional
constraints on action must be removed if we are to have a
*flourishing* democracy.  How to go about that?  Do we need these
institutions handed down from above?  No, we simply have to struggle
in familiar ways (from education, organizing outside "approved"
institutions, nonviolent resistance, strikes, etc. to revolutionary
action, the latter of which I would essentially reject today) to
replace these institutions.  Today, I emphasize, this *must* take
place, by definition, largely outside of the formal arrangements which
are handed down from above.  So, first we identify/destroy/replace the
current repressive institutions (how we do this is, naturally, not a
simple task), then we build new ones democratically, perhaps
"bootstrapping" ourselves with primitive institutions until more
satisfactory ones can evolve.

>My own position is that in reality people have much more power and much more
>options to pursue than it may appear from the formal institutional
>arrangemnts.

My position is that this is true, though the opposite is often the
case as well.  I believe that people often have much less power and
much fewer options to pursue than may appear from the formal
institutional arrangements (we vote, but for Tweedledum and
Tweedledee, as Helen Keller said), and this is more true in advanced
systems of government which rely on propaganda than those that rely on
direct violence.  I'll pursue this below, but it will be interesting
to see if we can actually come to some agreement, given our seemingly
divergent viewpoints (but, I think this is actually more apparent than
real).

>              For various reasons, they may or may not exercise those
>options -- but that is a quite different matter that requires an
>explanation.  For the same token, institutions and people who hide behind
>them have in reality much less power and influence over "ordinary" people
>than it may appear on the surface.  The only instance when the powers that
>be can actually compel people to do something against their own will is to
>use a direct violence or a directr threat thereof.  But that does not happen
>very often for a very simple reason - it is not possible to stay in power
>for very long by the means of violence alone.  As Napoleon aptly observed
>"one can do many things with bayonets, except to sit on them."  

Yes, this is an excellent point, and I agree that direct violence is
quite crude and ultimately less effective than what David Hume
referred to as "opinion".  He wrote the following, which though
ignoring the fact that violence can often back up "opinion" quite
effectively, captures part of my position quite well:

     Nothing  is  more surprising to those, who consider human affairs
     with a philosophical eye, than to see the easiness with which the
     many  are  governed  by  the  few;  and  to observe the implicite
     submission  with  which  men  resign  their  own  sentiments  and
     passions  to those of their rulers. When we enquire by what means
     this wonder is brought about, we shall find,  that  as  Force  is
     always on the side of the governed, the governors have nothing to
     support them but opinion. 'Tis therefore, on  opinion  only  that
     government  is  founded;  and  this  maxim  extends  to  the most
     despotic and most military governments, as well as  to  the  most
     free and most popular.
 
     ---David  Hume,  ``Of  the First Principles of Government,'',
     _Essays  and  Treatises  on  Several  Subjects_,  1758 edition.
     [Found in Edmund S. Morgan, _Inventing the People_, p.13]

>But despite those much different levels of repression, the opposition in
>Latin America was much stronger -- taking the form of a prolonged guerilla
>warfare -- than in Eastern Europe -- where it was limited to general
>dissatisfaction with the system and occassional riots -- pretty much the
>same way dissatisfaction is expressed in the US, isn't it?  Clearly, people
>in Eastern Europe went along with the undemocratic system much better than
>people of Latin America, even thous the cost of non-complinace was
>substantially lower for the former than it was for the latter.  

Yes, again an excellent point.  This agrees with my notion that crude
barriers to resistance are often the least effective.  Giving a few
carrots, soap operas, and a commercial culture soaked in pro-business
propaganda is a much more effective constraint to democratic action.
Didn't Bakunin call this "beating the people with the people's stick"?

>So form that standpoint, the study of the process whereby people come to
>believe that they have no alternatives other than those insctibed in the
>existing institutions and they cease to perceive certain courses of action
>as viable options -- so the study of that process can tell us quite a bit
>how particiaptory democracy is destroyed by those who call themselves "the
>representatives of the people", "the markets" or what not, and how the very
>people who are being robbed of self-management go along with that process.

OK, so perhaps we attack this from two directions.  First, we examine
the "manufacturing of consent" which might lead people to believe that
they have less options than they do, then we look at the institutional
barriers themselves?  This is actually a project I have been pursuing
in sloppy form and on my own for a number of years, though perhaps in
my zeal I have made it less than clear that I do (very strongly)
appreciate the need to examine popular compliance with the robbery of
self-determination.

Here's a crude first shot at synthesis: In crudely functioning systems
of oppression it is easier to recognize that the institutions are
worthless and directly harmful, and thus easier to organize outside of
them.  In countries which the institutions are "better built", and
accompanied by a sophisticated system of propaganda, people are more
likely to be apathetic and to take no direct action to overturn the
institutions.  Perhaps a layered approach might work: 1st barrier is
education and propaganda ("just leave things to us and enjoy your
Seinfeld"), then should that fail, the legal morass for democratic
action (the Constitution included), then should that fail, covert
activity, "disappearances", IRS harassment, private and public police
action, etc.  This is clearly inadequate, but perhaps could serve as a
point of departure...

>I reply:  To my understanding, the US Constitution was a fairly undemocratic
>instrument in the beginning, as it extended only to landowners while it
>excluded everyone else, Native Americans, Blacks, women and workers.  Even
>today, labor suppression in this country is very high by European standards.
>So the question is how this essentially undemocractioc and oppressive
>(permitting slavery) institutional arrangment of the past was transformed
>into something that todel passes, albeit barely, for a democracy?  My own
>take on is that, if it were not for the ordinary people who were determined
>to squeeze of the existing instituions much more than the big men who were
>behind them intended them to be -- this country would be screwed as Russia
>is today.

Absolutely.  I agree 100% about the U.S. barely passing for a
democracy, and I agree that much of the change that has occurred has
been due to action "from below".  However, look at, say the support
for FDR in this country.  The reason we got the "New Deal" rather than
the "New Order" of Germany was not due solely (or, largely, I think)
to popular struggle.  It was due largely to a different makeup of the
business community here in the U.S., a portion of which could tolerate
throwing a few more crumbs to labor, rather than "liquidating" it, as
many urged.

Perhaps we really are not arguing at cross purposes, and it would be
quite reasonable to combine our two interests, one examining
propaganda, the other examining legal barriers (just as one example of
a synthetic approach).

Thanks for the stimulating discussion, Wojtek, and I hope I have not
left anyone with the impression that you are a stooge for the forces
of anti-democracy and/or Stalinism.


Bill


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