forwarded by Michael Hoover > [www.IraqWar.org] > Americans Against World Empire > > www.IRAQWAR.org > > Very important documents. German govt. reports state that no extensive > persecution of Albanians in Kosovo was taking place prior to the Nato > bombing. ( The German govt. nonetheless supported the bombing decision. ) > This revelation completely undercuts the pro-war argument that Nato bombing > was intended to prevent "genocide." It is not that the "genocide" or "ethnic > cleansing" accelerated after the bombing; it simply did not exist prior to > the bombing--it began with the bombing. The documents point out that the > Serbian forces were fighting the KLA, not Albanians in general. > > http://www.zmag.org/ZNETTOPnoanimation.html > > IMPORTANT INTERNAL DOCUMENTS > =46ROM GERMANY'S FOREIGN OFFICE > REGARDING PRE-BOMBARDMENT > GENOCIDE IN KOSOVO > > As in the case of the Clinton Administration, the present regime in > Germany, specifically Joschka Fischer's Foreign Office, has justified its > intervention in Kosovo by pointing to a "humanitarian catastrophe," > "genocide" and "ethnic cleansing" occurring there, especially in the > months immediately preceding the NATO attack. The following internal > documents from Fischer's ministry and from various regional > Administrative Courts in Germany spanning the year before the start of > NATO's air attacks, attest that criteria of ethnic cleansing and genocide > were not met. The Foreign Office documents were responses to the > courts' needs in deciding the status of Kosovo-Albanian refugees in > Germany. Although one might in these cases suppose a bias in favor of > downplaying a humanitarian catastrophe in order to limit refugees, it > nevertheless remains highly significant that the Foreign Office, in contrast > to its public assertion of ethnic cleansing and genocide in justifying > NATO intervention, privately continued to deny their existence as > Yugoslav policy in this crucial period. And this continued to be their > assessment even in March of this year. Thus these documents tend to > show that stopping genocide was not the reason the German government, > and by implication NATO, intervened in Kosovo, and that genocide (as > understood in German and international law) in Kosovo did not precede > NATO bombardment, at least not from early 1998 through March, 1999, > but is a product of it. > > Excerpts from the these official documents were obtained by IALANA > (International Association of Lawyers Against Nuclear Arms) which sent > them to various media. The texts used here were published in the German > daily junge welt on April 24, 1999. (See > http://www.jungewelt.de/1999/04-24/011.shtml as well as the commentary > at http://www.jungewelt.de/1999/04-24/001.shtml). According to my > sources, this is as complete a reproduction of the documents as exists in > the German media at the time of this writing. What follows is my > translation of these published excerpts. > > Eric Canepa Brecht Forum, New York April 28, 1999 > > I: Intelligence report from the Foreign Office January 6, 1999 to the > Bavarian Administrative Court, Ansbach: > > "At this time, an increasing tendency is observable inside the > =46ederal Republic of Yugoslavia of refugees returning to their > dwellings. ... Regardless of the desolate economic situation in > the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (according to official > information of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia 700,000 > refugees from Croatia, Bosnia and Herzogovina have found > lodging since 1991), no cases of chronic malnutrition or > insufficient medical treatment among the refugees are known > and significant homelessness has not been observed. ... > According to the Foreign Office's assessment, individual > Kosovo-Albanians (and their immediate families) still have > limited possibilities of settling in those parts of Yugoslavia in > which their countrymen or friends already live and who are > ready to take them in and support them." > > II. Intelligence report from the Foreign Office, January 12, 1999 to the > Administrative Court of Trier (Az: 514-516.80/32 426): > > "Even in Kosovo an explicit political persecution linked to > Albanian ethnicity is not verifiable. The East of Kosovo is still > not involved in armed conflict. Public life in cities like Pristina, > Urosevac, Gnjilan, etc. has, in the entire conflict period, > continued on a relatively normal basis." The "actions of the > security forces (were) not directed against the > Kosovo-Albanians as an ethnically defined group, but against > the military opponent and its actual or alleged supporters." > > III. Report of the Foreign Office March 15, 1999 (Az: 514-516,80/33841) > to the Administrative Court, Mainz: > > "As laid out in the status report of November 18, 1998, the > KLA has resumed its positions after the partial withdrawal of > the (Serbian) security forces in October 1998, so it once > again controls broad areas in the zone of conflict. Before the > beginning of spring 1999 there were still clashes between the > KLA and security forces, although these have not until now > reached the intensity of the battles of spring and summer > 1998." > > IV: Opinion of the Bavarian Administrative Court, October 29, 1998 (Az: > 22 BA 94.34252): > > "The Foreign Office's status reports of May 6, June 8 and July > 13, 1998, given to the plaintiffs in the summons to a verbal > deliberation, do not allow the conclusion that there is group > persecution of ethnic Albanians from Kosovo. Not even > regional group persecution, applied to all ethnic Albanians > from a specific part of Kosovo, can be observed with sufficient > certainty. The violent actions of the Yugoslav military and > police since February 1998 were aimed at separatist > activities and are no proof of a persecution of the whole > Albanian ethnic group in Kosovo or in a part of it. What was > involved in the Yugoslav violent actions and excesses since > =46ebruary 1998 was a selective forcible action against the > military underground movement (especially the KLA) and > people in immediate contact with it in its areas of operation. > =2E..A state program or persecution aimed at the whole ethnic > group of Albanians exists neither now nor earlier." > > V. Opinion of the Administrative Court of Baden-W=8Drttemberg, February > 4, 1999 (Az: A 14 S 22276/98): > > "The various reports presented to the senate all agree that the > often feared humanitarian catastrophe threatening the > Albanian civil population has been averted. ... This appears to > be the case since the winding down of combat in connection > with an agreement made with the Serbian leadership at the > end of 1998 (Status Report of the Foreign Office, November > 18, 1998). Since that time both the security situation and the > conditions of life of the Albanian-derived population have > noticeably improved. ... Specifically in the larger cities public > life has since returned to relative normality (cf. on this Foreign > Office, January 12, 1999 to the Administrative Court of Trier; > December 28, 1998 to the Upper Administrative Court of > L=8Dneberg and December 23, 1998 to the Administrative Court > at Kassel), even though tensions between the population > groups have meanwhile increased due to individual acts of > violence... Single instances of excessive acts of violence > against the civil population, e.g. in Racak, have, in world > opinion, been laid at the feet of the Serbian side and have > aroused great indignation. But the number and frequency of > such excesses do not warrant the conclusion that every > Albanian living in Kosovo is exposed to extreme danger to life > and limb nor is everyone who returns there threatened with > death and severe injury." > > VI: Opinion of the Upper Administrative Court at M=8Dnster, February 24, > 1999 (Az: 14 A 3840/94,A): > > "There is no sufficient actual proof of a secret program, or an > unspoken consensus on the Serbian side, to liquidate the > Albanian people, to drive it out or otherwise to persecute it in > the extreme manner presently described. ... If Serbian state > power carries out its laws and in so doing necessarily puts > pressure on an Albanian ethnic group which turns its back on > the state and is for supporting a boycott, then the objective > direction of these measures is not that of a programmatic > persecution of this population group ...Even if the Serbian > state were benevolently to accept or even to intend that a part > of the citizenry which sees itself in a hopeless situation or > opposes compulsory measures, should emigrate, this still > does not represent a program of persecution aimed at the > whole of the Albanian majority (in Kosovo)." > > "If moreover the (Yugoslav) state reacts to separatist strivings > with consistent and harsh execution of its laws and with > anti-separatist measures, and if some of those involved > decide to go abroad as a result, this is still not a deliberate > policy of the (Yugoslav) state aiming at ostracizing and > expelling the minority; on the contrary it is directed toward > keeping this people within the state federation." > > "Events since February and March 1998 do not evidence a > persecution program based on Albanian ethnicity. The > measures taken by the armed Serbian forces are in the first > instance directed toward combatting the KLA and its > supposed adherents and supporters." > > VII: Opinion of the Upper Administrative Court at M=8Dnster, March 11, 1999 > (Az: 13A 3894/94.A): > > "Ethnic Albanians in Kosovo have neither been nor are now > exposed to regional or countrywide group persecution in the > =46ederal Republic of Yugoslavia." (Thesis 1)