------- Forwarded Message Follows -------
Date sent:              Thu, 27 May 1999 11:56:57 -0700
To:                     [EMAIL PROTECTED]
From:                   Sid Shniad <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject:                The US: MAKING FOREIGN POLICY WHILE IN A STATE OF SHOCK

Stratfor Analysis of the Crisis in Kosovo

MAKING FOREIGN POLICY WHILE IN A STATE OF SHOCK 
1145 GMT, 990527 

One of the critical dimensions of the Kosovo conflict is the state of 
mind of U.S. policy makers. Their view of Kosovo is, quite 
naturally, part of their general perception both of the world and of 
their place in it. It is, therefore, important to understand that Bill 
Clinton and his foreign policy team are experiencing a crisis of 
confidence of monumental proportions. Actually, saying they are in 
a state of shock is probably a better way to put it. They have gone 
in less than 90 days from being a fairly credible foreign policy team 
to a group in total, and probably unrecoverable, disarray.

Obviously it started with Kosovo. They did not expect Milosevic to 
resist as he has. One result has been the near disappearance of the 
administration’s expert on Yugoslavia and Milosevic, Richard 
Holbrooke. His nomination for UN Representative stalled, 
Holbrooke’s bad advice led the administration into a war for which 
it was unprepared. However, it has been their China policy that has 
truly shaken the administration. Sandy Berger, National Security 
Advisor, was particularly close to the Chinese and a strong 
relationship with China has been one of the foundations of Clinton’s 
foreign policy. China’s crackdown on dissidents struck the 
administration as a betrayal of their tacit understanding with the 
Chinese, and the administration struck back with bitter rhetoric. 
The Chinese merely hardened their position. The Chinese response 
to the bombing of their Embassy further stunned the administration. 
The release of the Cox report has left their China policy in a 
shambles and the speed of the collapse has left Clinton’s staff 
stunned. Add to that the near collapse of relations with Russia at 
the beginning of the war, German and Italian mistrust of U.S. 
competence and motives, and we are seeing the near collapse not 
only of foreign policy, but also of the leadership of the foreign 
policy apparatus. 

With the departure of Robert Rubin, the loss of credibility for 
Clinton’s foreign policy team is breath taking. Berger is being held 
by many as personally responsible (along with Janet Reno) for not 
stanching Chinese espionage. Albright is being treated with 
increasing contempt in Washington and foreign capitals. George 
Tenet, head of CIA, was forced to take responsibility for the China 
bombing incident. After his humiliation over Monica Lewinsky, 
Clinton was going to use foreign policy to redeem himself. That 
search for redemption has turned into a nightmare. Clinton cannot 
fire his top foreign policy advisors in the middle of a war and a 
foreign policy scandal. Clinton’s natural inclination, judging from 
past performance, is to become inflexible in the face of reversal, 
counting on his ability to out wait and out maneuver his critics. His 
problem now is that he is not dealing with a crisis of image but a 
crisis of substance. The war cannot simply be "spun." It requires 
difficult decisions. Under the current circumstances it is difficult to 
imagine his senior foreign policy staff having the stamina to think 
through the situation. They are on the defensive and barely hanging 
on. That is one of the reasons for the current immobility in the 
peace process. These guys still can’t figure out what hit them. 



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