michael, i think i know what you're saying, but at the same time there are implications about the way you plot the issue that are worth thinking about a little more critically. 1. the idea of japanese homogeneity is a well-contested one. identity and homogeneity is as much a state doctrine of japanese nationalism as a demographic statement - disentanglng the two is not that easy to do, especially once you accept the premises that social division and categorisation is only evident in 'ethnic differences' recognised by the state; 2. by 'relative homogeneity' you clearly do not mean 'relatively egalitarian', and there is a tendency to assume in this depiction that conflict (and therefore expenditures of means of social control) only arises when there are different ethnicities within the same nation-state; 3. you've implied that it is the relative absence of 'other ethnicities' which makes for the relative absence of social conflict. in the line of causation then, and by implication, if there are no 'ethnic differences' there is no conflict, and hence no need for repression. in a more emphatic way, this is the foundational premise of racist groups like One Nation and americanfront, and one which lends itself readily to the 'solution' of separating 'races' as the logical approach to questions of social conflict. some excerpts from Koichi Iwabuchi's, "Complicit exoticism: Japan and its other" the rest is at: http://kali.murdoch.edu.au/cntinuum/8.2/Iwabuchi.html "Japan's constructed and celebrated unity has never been a monolith but is precarious. However, debunking the myth of "Japaneseness" is quite different from understanding the symbolic power of national identity. In spite of the easily-known falsity of a unified "Japaneseness", and of the inequalities which exist in the "real" national society, why and how are 'imagined communities' (Anderson) maintained? The crucial issue here is how the differences 'stitch up'...'into one identity' (Hall "Question" 299). .... Purity cannot mark itself through itself. Only impurity marks purity. .... As for Japan, in the path to Japan's modernisation, the emphasis on "Japaneseness" has been crucial for the power bloc as a means of mobilising the people. This strategic "Japaneseness" is something which maximises national interests and minimises individualism, consisting of traits such as loyalty to or devotion for the country. As Gluck noted 'in the imagined West, people were incapable of loyalty and filiality, and this was sufficient to define these traits as essentially Japanese.' ('37) Thus "the West" has been utilised to counter "undesirable" consequences of modernisation such as the rise of individualism or labor unionism, which give priority to people's rights. For example, it was when social movements like labor unionism became popular in the '9'0s that ie (household) ideology was intensively advocated (Crawcour). This ideology stressed the traditional values of paternalism, through which Japan itself and companies were compared with families. Clearly, this myth of "Japaneseness" was utilised to repress people's demands for "democracy" or human rights, by attributing social conflict and dissent to western "disease". Through selective comparisons with key significant Others, self-Orientalism also unmarks the exclusion of the voices of the repressed such as minority groups like Ainu, Koreans and burakumin (Japanese Untouchable) which make up four per cent of the population, and women or the working class. By asserting "we Japanese" as opposed to "them, the westerners", the discursively constructed "Japaneseness" is reified. Kano has argued that the strength of the concept of "the Japanese" lies in its all-inclusive meanings and that the concept of "the Japanese" implicitly includes all aspects of land, inhabitants, language, race, ethnicity and the nationality, all of which have not been historically differentiated from each other (quoted in Nishikawa 226-7). Any discourse of "Japaneseness" tends to start with taking such an ambiguous definition of "the Japanese" for granted. Thus, Japan's self-Orientalism has been quite selectively manipulative and repressive. Self-Orientalism obscures the fact that Japan's particularism is actually hegemonic within Japan. "The West" is necessary for Japan's "invention of tradition", the suppression of heterogeneous voices within Japan, and the creation of a modern nation whose people are loyal to "Japan". Self-Orientalism is a strategy of inclusion through exclusion, and of exclusion through inclusion. Both strategies cannot be separated from each other and work efficiently only when combined together." Angela --- [EMAIL PROTECTED] -------------------------------------- michael p wrote: >This meant that it did not have to waste its potential on bigotry. I >understand that Japan is as bad as the rest of the world in asserting >the superiority of its people, but the appointed inferiors in Japan are, >as I understanding it Koreans and the untouchables. Neither make up a >large share of the population. > >So Japan does not have to build large prison complexes to house young >Koreans or does not have to contend with a large undeducated Korean or >untouchable class who are not give the opportunity to contribute to >society. > >rc-am wrote: > >> Michael p wrote: >> >> >Japan had a relatively homogeneous population... >> >> what does this mean?
