Because it's pathetic? Because it's tragic-comic? Because if we weren't laughing we'd be crying? Because, this guy's a *Marxist*??!! >Why does this make me laugh? > >It's from that commercial working paper abstracting service that most >PEN-Lers seem to hate. Note there's a fee for this paper. Though a few of >these are now distributed from web sites, an increasing number of working >papers now come with a fee. No doubt this service has encouraged charging >for WPs. MIT's fees start at $12. > >> "The Democratic Political Economy of Progressive Income >> Taxation" >> >> BY: JOHN E. ROEMER >> University of California, Davis >> >> Paper ID: UC Davis Working Paper #97-11 >> Date: March 1997 >> >> Contact: Donna Wills Raymond >> E-Mail: MAILTO:[EMAIL PROTECTED] >> Postal: Department of Economics, University of >> California, Davis, CA 95616-8578 >> Phone: (916) 752-9240 >> Fax: (916) 752-9382 >> ERN Ref: PUBLIC:WPS97-154 >> >> HARD COPY PAPER REQUESTS: Papers are $3.00 in the U.S. and >> Canada, $4.00 outside of the U.S. Checks must be payable to >> "Regents of the University of California" and drawn on >> U.S. banks. We do not invoice, accept purchase orders, or >> cash. Requests must be accompanied by payment and mailed >> to Donna Wills Raymond at the Department of Economics, >> University of California, Davis, CA 95616. >> >> >> Why do both left and right political parties almost always >> propose progressive income taxation schemes in political >> competition? Analysis of this problem has been hindered by >> the two-dimensionality of the issue space. To give parties a >> choice over a domain which contains both progressive and >> regressive policies requires an issue space that is at least >> two-dimensional. Nash equilibrium between two parties with >> (complete) preferences over two-dimensional policies fails to >> exist. I introduce a new equilibrium concept for political >> games, based on inner-party struggle. A party consists of >> three factions--reformists, militants, and opportunists: each >> faction has a complete preference order on policy space, but >> together they can only agree on a partial order. Inner-party >> unity equilibrium is defined as Nash equilibrium between two >> parties, each of which maximizes with respect to its quasi- >> order. Such equilibria exist in the two-dimensional model, >> and in them both parties propose progressive income taxation. >> >> JEL Classification: D72, H20 > >Doug > >-- > >Doug Henwood >Left Business Observer >250 W 85 St >New York NY 10024-3217 USA >+1-212-874-4020 voice +1-212-874-3137 fax >email: <mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]> >web: <http://www.panix.com/~dhenwood/LBO_home.html> _________________________________________________ Blair Sandler [EMAIL PROTECTED] Only when the last tree has died and the last river has been poisoned and the last fish been caught will we realise we cannot eat money. -- Cree Indian saying, circa 1909 _________________________________________________
