Douglas Dowd on Hugh Stretton's Econ. text

2001-03-01 Thread Lisa Ian Murray



http://www.monthlyreview.org/301dowd.htm
Refuting the Big Lie
by Doug Dowd

Hugh Stretton, Economics: A New Introduction (Pluto Press, 1999), 864 pages, $90
hardcover, $35 paper.

Capitalism was first firmly established in Britain in the eighteenth century and
it was then and there that economics was born, in Adam Smith’s Wealth of Nations
(1776). Economists have served capitalism ever since, but only in the past
quarter-century has capitalism needed—and gotten—so much from them.

As the twentieth century began, given the intrinsic inequalities of capitalism,
the existence of political democracy in almost all capitalist nations
constituted an ongoing threat to capital’s rule, a threat intensified by
capitalism’s tendency toward intermittent economic crisis and socioeconomic
weakness.

For much of the nineteenth century, economics tended toward ideology; by its
end, it was pure ideology. But ideology alone was no match for the challenges of
the new century.

In the first half of the twentieth century, the crises were so pervasive and
became so deep that economists could propose nothing to avoid or alleviate them.
When something was proposed, as with Keynes during the depression of the 1930s,
neither capital nor most economists took heed before the Second World War—except
in Nazi Germany, which invented the military Keynesianism that undergirded
capitalism in the decades of the Cold War.

And what about economics? The years after the war were also the years in which
business had lost its unchallenged power and prestige, having laid a very large
and rotten egg before the war, as had mainstream (“neoclassical”) economics. A
substantial group of “new economists” had also come into being, “educated” by
the depression, the New Deal, and the war, aware and supportive of the need for
socioeconomic reforms. Their ideas and policies were effectively shaped by the
then-relatively powerful labor movement and a liberalized public, with
significant support from those in big business who had learned from the war just
how useful governmental (especially military) expenditures could be. Not for
nothing were the two decades or so after the war called Cold-War liberalism.

Global economic expansion took hold as the 1950s proceeded, and the following
decade was the most expansive ever, aided and abetted by the Cold War. But
superstate or no, capitalism’s laws of motion had only been modified, not
repealed.

In the early 1970s a unique and deep crisis—called stagflation—began to surface;
by 1974, it had become global. Simultaneous, severe, and sustained increases in
both unemployment and prices occurred. Capital had realized in the fifties and
sixties that it could tolerate a bit of shared power and the costs and taxes of
the warfare-welfare state, only so long as their sales and profits kept them
ahead of the game. But the global excess capacities of the seventies ended that
particular honeymoon.

Thus began what Richard DuBoff has aptly termed “the corporate counter-attack.”
It was an attack whose main aims were to weaken unions and get rid of the social
wage in both the private and public spheres: to return to the raw capitalism of
yore.

Corporations could not and did not fight that battle alone. They assiduously and
successfully increased their efforts to influence public opinion through the
media, and it was then that their political “contributions” began their quantum
leap toward present levels, and achieved the key victory of placing Ronald
Reagan in the White House. Reaganomics was initially seen as laughable and its
policies as some combination of stupid and cruel. Now the policies are taken as
common sense, and the economics as the new gospel.

It is that virtually unchallenged economics that Hugh Stretton effectively
demolishes in his superb book. He is a great teacher; he writes clearly and
without the priestly air so common to economists. His scope is extraordinary in
its combination of breadth and depth; by comparison, other texts rightly seem
both absurd and pretentious.

Stretton’s economics answers the two big questions that serious people have been
led to believe economists do answer, but which they really do not: “What do we
need to know about how the economy functions?” and “What can and must we do to
make it meet human, social, and environmental needs?” Rather than answering such
questions, mainstream economics spreads capitalism’s big lie: “What’s good for
business is good for everyone, everything, everywhere”: which is then delivered
daily by the media and politicians.

Stretton puts another economics in the place of the big lie: an economics that
we need and can understand and use. Stretton is an Australian who studied in his
own country, in England, and in the United States and who did a stint in
government. He knows what he’s talking about; he also knows that experience
itself does not guarantee good sense. Here a few excerpts in which he comments
both on the importance and the wrongheadedness of 

Re: Douglas Dowd on Hugh Stretton's Econ. text

2001-03-01 Thread Louis Proyect

The resort to deregulation, privatization and smaller government since the
1970s
proves to have been a mistaken response to the new troubles of “stagflation,”
and an active cause of some of them. 

Interesting. This is exactly what is motivating my research into
deregulation which represents for the USA what privatization represents in
countries where nationalization made headway (Great Britain, France, etc.)

More precisely, the problem for airlines was a classic overproduction
crisis involving huge investments in Jumbo Jets at precisely the time that
the energy crisis kicked in. In order to realize a profit, the airlines had
to not only dispense with regulation but also open up a big attack on
labor. It is no accident that Reagan chose the airline controllers as the
first union to go after. When Frank Lorenzo started up the "new
Continental" after the original went bankrupt, the first thing he did was
to challenge the pilots to take a 50 percent cut in pay.

The main thrust was to make certain hubs central to air transport, mostly
cities which hosted airline companies like TWA's Kansas City,
Northeastern's Minneapolis and Atlanta's Delta. In the first blush of
deregulation, there were bargains galore, especially the no-frills People's
Express which was dirt-cheap and unpleasant. Now we find that traveling by
jet is like taking the People's Express of yore, but without the cheap fares.

And all of it is much more risky. In 1969, when George Stigler told Sir
Ronald Edwards, the British chairman of the committee on air transport,
that the marketplace would sort out the problem of air safety, Edwards
responded, "Are you telling me that I should let airline A kill me to prove
to you that you should travel by airline B?"

Louis Proyect
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