RE: Re: Israel as a Client
Michael Perelman writes: Doesn't the United States have a poor record in selecting its clients? Mobutu, Marcos, Somoza, comment: don't forget Noriega, Saddam Hussein, Osama bin Laden, etc. JD shah pahlavi's iran, intended to check 'radical' iraq, block soviet overland access to region, police oil-rich persian gulf... poor record in selecting clients comes with being hegemon (although i guess even neo-realists like robert gilpin might recognize potential for future hegemon in state-based international system to employ different policies/principles than those adhered to by u.s.)... michael hoover
Re: Israel as a Client
Is it possible that the United States leaders felt more comfortable around the European Israelis rather than the Arab leaders? Michael Perelman george kennan called arabs dirty and ignorant... michael hoover
RE: Re: Israel as a Client
Michael Perelman writes: Doesn't the United States have a poor record in selecting its clients? Mobutu, Marcos, Somoza, comment: don't forget Noriega, Saddam Hussein, Osama bin Laden, etc. JD
Israel as a Client
I've been thinking about this a bit more. What follows is today's hypothesis. Next week, who knows. If you look at it from one end, there was little to recommend Israel as a client state, in and of itself, relative to other states. Why not make Egypt a military collossus on behalf of the U.S.? Why indulge a nation of six million rather than its far more populous neighbors? U.S. public opinion is a factor, I would acknowledge, but is not sufficient to explain U.S. policy in support of Israel. A factor in British thinking around and after WWI was Palestine's location in re: the Suez Canal and Britain's connection to India. But the Brits were not interested in limiting themselves to one client. The more the merrier. They were more interested in denying clients to Russia (and later, the USSR) and Germany. Similarly, the interests of any would-be imperialism would logically be to enlist as many clients as possible in strategic locations. A key caveat is that the actions of one client should not be so odious as to drive away other clients. So Israel can survive as long as it doesn't get too big for its britches. No Nile to Euphrates nonsense. It is all right for your clients to hate each other, not all right for them to destroy each other. Everybody is kept on a leash. The Oslo process can be explained in this light as an ambitious effort to recast arrangements among clients who happen to be mutual enemies for the sake of regional stabilization. Islamic and Jewish fundamentalism in the ME have both pushed this project off the rails. Fundamentalism has an autonomous, intransigent, volatile character that can get away from you -- the proverbial blowback. This development feeds and is fed by the emergence of a new strategic orientation in the Son-of-Bush Administration, as discussed in Lemann's New Yorker piece. The adoption of agressive, military projection to pacify the U.S.'s Islamic clients and destroy the most recalcitrant ones (Iraq, Iran, Syria). Naturally in this scenario Israel's role is paramount. Not incidentally, Israel's most vociferous partisans are also those most committed to U.S. power projection. In a nutshell, there are two alternative imperialisms in question here, each with their own cohort of apologists in the U.S. and associates in the ME, each moving to make the other untenable. In this context, pipelines are a small part of the puzzle, just one stand of trees in the forest of the Great Game of this century -- control of Central Asia and the ME in conditions of increasing scarcity of oil. mbs
Israel as a Client
Israel as a Client by Max Sawicky 26 April 2002 14:55 UTC CB: Since Max is taking the responsibility to think out the complexities, let me take the privilege of responding with what popped into my head when I read his post: Divide and rule is the old game. The Brits and Yanks get a lot more divisive bangs for their bucks out of the heavily armed Israeli presence than trying to somehow pit some of the other countries in the region against each other. Secondly, speaking of the Great Game of the century, is there a game theory analysis of all this ? I've been thinking about this a bit more. What follows is today's hypothesis. Next week, who knows. If you look at it from one end, there was little to recommend Israel as a client state, in and of itself, relative to other states. Why not make Egypt a military collossus on behalf of the U.S.? Why indulge a nation of six million rather than its far more populous neighbors? U.S. public opinion is a factor, I would acknowledge, but is not sufficient to explain U.S. policy in support of Israel. A factor in British thinking around and after WWI was Palestine's location in re: the Suez Canal and Britain's connection to India. But the Brits were not interested in limiting themselves to one client. The more the merrier. They were more interested in denying clients to Russia (and later, the USSR) and Germany. Similarly, the interests of any would-be imperialism would logically be to enlist as many clients as possible in strategic locations. A key caveat is that the actions of one client should not be so odious as to drive away other clients. So Israel can survive as long as it doesn't get too big for its britches. No Nile to Euphrates nonsense. It is all right for your clients to hate each other, not all right for them to destroy each other. Everybody is kept on a leash. The Oslo process can be explained in this light as an ambitious effort to recast arrangements among clients who happen to be mutual enemies for the sake of regional stabilization. Islamic and Jewish fundamentalism in the ME have both pushed this project off the rails. Fundamentalism has an autonomous, intransigent, volatile character that can get away from you -- the proverbial blowback. This development feeds and is fed by the emergence of a new strategic orientation in the Son-of-Bush Administration, as discussed in Lemann's New Yorker piece. The adoption of agressive, military projection to pacify the U.S.'s Islamic clients and destroy the most recalcitrant ones (Iraq, Iran, Syria). Naturally in this scenario Israel's role is paramount. Not incidentally, Israel's most vociferous partisans are also those most committed to U.S. power projection. In a nutshell, there are two alternative imperialisms in question here, each with their own cohort of apologists in the U.S. and associates in the ME, each moving to make the other untenable. In this context, pipelines are a small part of the puzzle, just one stand of trees in the forest of the Great Game of this century -- control of Central Asia and the ME in conditions of increasing scarcity of oil. mbs
Re: Israel as a Client
Doesn't the United States have a poor record in selecting its clients? Mobutu, Marcos, Somoza, Is it possible that the United States leaders felt more comfortable around the European Israelis rather than the Arab leaders? -- Michael Perelman Economics Department California State University Chico, CA 95929 Tel. 530-898-5321 E-Mail [EMAIL PROTECTED]
