The World Economic Crisis and American Capitalism

1997-12-10 Thread Rakesh Bhandari

Let's just take the basics of Marx's theory of the financial and monetary
aspects of the cycle. In the face of bankruptcy, Asian producers are trying
to honor financial obligations (sales having turned out to be at prices
lower than used in preceding obligations); they are ready to sell their
products for cash and not against credit instruments, even at a loss. Say's
Law is inane: these producers are selling in order to pay; they are pleased
if they have simply sold their commodities without immediately thinking of
a purchase (ominous of course since Asia accounted for almost 1/3 of the
growth of many leading US companies). They are all seeking cover behind
hard currency, which is desired as such not to buy goods to be invested in
productive activities. As a consequence the rate of interest becomes more
onerous because they want money at any cost to meet payments. They must
"dump" for ready cash; their exports will only destabilize stagnant Japan,
inducing yen devaluations. Net capital inflow to the US was already over
400 billion dollars last year; it should only increase in the wake of the
Asian crisis. This will increase the value of the dollar vis-a-vis the yen,
compounding the trade imbalance and the threat to domestic production. Why
is the US economy not a house of cards? I must say that I am rather
surprised that Doug thinks it possible to evaluate the "long-wave" vitality
of US capitalism, independently of the situation as a whole.

Rakesh







Re: The World Economic Crisis and American Capitalism

1997-12-10 Thread Doug Henwood

Rakesh Bhandari wrote:

I must say that I am rather
surprised that Doug thinks it possible to evaluate the "long-wave" vitality
of US capitalism, independently of the situation as a whole.

May I quote myself, from LBO #80?

quote
Long upswing? Maybe the estimable Anwar Shaikh, a Marxian economist at the
New School, is right, and the long crisis that began in 1973 is over, and
we're in the early stages of a long upwave of prosperity. Shaikh argues
that that crisis was the result of a decline in corporate profitability
from the late 1940s into the early 1980s, but thanks to the assault on
labor that succeeded in cutting real wages, profitability has been
restored, and is now in an upswing -- at least in the U.S. According to the
laws of classical Marxism, that should mean higher growth rates, strong
stock markets, and maybe even some gains for labor.

Maybe Shaikh is right; as Marx himself said, "permanent crises do not
exist." Lefties have often lusted after crises so passionately that they've
even conjured up a few that turned out to be illusions. Presumably this
craving is motivated by a belief that hard times will prompt a leftward
turn in politics. But during this quarter-century of semi-hard times we've
seen just the opposite -- a sharp right turn in elite political thinking,
and resignation and despair among the masses. It may be that rising
expectations are better fertilizer for radical politics than falling ones.

But outside the U.S., it's hard to make the case for a long upwave. German
unemployment is at levels unseen since the days of Weimar, Russia is a
wreck, Africa is as well, and Asia, once the world's brightest economic
spot, is dimming rapidly. An unidentified U.S. Treasury official worried to
the New York Times that there was a potential for a great "train wreck" in
Japan, South Korea seems on the verge of imploding, and much of the rest of
Asia is sinking into recession. Can the U.S. be in the early phases of a
boom while the rest of the world is stuck in the mud? Or is the rest of the
world entering the endgame of its crisis in preparation for joining America
in an upswing?

[...]

It seems unlikely, though, that the U.S. stock market could head seriously
southwards without Greenspan turning seriously hostile and raising interest
rates, something he's unlikely to do as long as world markets remain
skittish. But he still must worry about three things simultaneously -- the
dangers of the Wall Street bubble reflating; the dangers that persistently
tight labor markets will lead to sustained increases in real wages, and
with that, a serious squeeze on corporate profits; and the risk of the
Asian sickness worsening (and even spreading to Latin America, should
investors get nervous and pull capital out of the region). In Greenspan's
recent public testimony, he's been professing hope that the Asian slump
will slow the U.S. economy enough to take the pressure off our labor
markets -- in effect, to do his tightening work for him. But if Southeast
Asia is now joining Japan in an extended recession, and if the Japanese
slump is deepening rather than climaxing, then the effects on the rest of
the world could be a lot less benign.

The verge of deflation, or the early phases of a generation-long boom? Who
knows? There's nothing more frustrating to a pundit than to confess to
confusion and uncertainty, but honesty demands just that right now.
endquote

So it seems to me that I reported Shaikh's analysis as something to be
taken seriously - he's no dummy - but that there were reasons to be
skeptical too. I don't think anyone can say with any kind of confidence
what the hell is going on. As I've argued here before, you could read the S
Korean bailout as a U.S. takeover of that country, turning a rival into a
subordinate. From the U.S. point of view, that could be very bullish news.
Given their track record over the last 20-25 years, you have to give U.S.
crisis managers the benefit of the doubt in their ability to turn potential
disaster to their advantage. That's not to say they can do it forever,
but

I hope I'm not betraying any confidences, but in a private email to me
yesterday, Rakesh said that Marxism isn't a theory of upswings, but one of
crisis. I can't agree. For one, Marx was a theorist of the expansiveness of
capital, of its ability to break beyond apparent barriers to its expansion,
as much as he was a theorist of contradiction and disaster. And for two,
since capitalism spends most of its time in expansion, you're condeming
Marxism to marginality. And for three, if you believe in crisis, you'll see
one everywhere all the time. So you end up looking really silly when the
crisis passes. So for all these reasons, I think we have to take seriously
the possibility that Shaikh is right, and the long crisis is over in the
U.S. at least.

Doug









Re: The World Economic Crisis and American Capitalism

1997-12-10 Thread Tom Walker

Doug Henwood wrote,

Given their track record over the last 20-25 years, you have to give U.S.
crisis managers the benefit of the doubt in their ability to turn potential
disaster to their advantage. That's not to say they can do it forever,
but

This is the one fact that would tend to dim the prospects of a new long
upswing. In light of these crisis management successes, has there been
enough of a destruction of capital assets that would establish a foundation
for a long upswing? My impression is that there has been a lot of
"reorganization" and "rolling readjustment", but that the net result has
been to prop up the value of capital assets. Is such a thing as a rentier
long upswing even possible?

Regards, 

Tom Walker
^^^
knoW Ware Communications
Vancouver, B.C., CANADA
[EMAIL PROTECTED]
(604) 688-8296 
^^^
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Re: The World Economic Crisis and American Capitalism

1997-12-10 Thread Ricardo Duchesne

 Date sent:  Wed, 10 Dec 1997 10:37:42 -0500
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 Subject:Re: The World Economic Crisis and American Capitalism


Doug Henwood wrote:
 
   Rakesh said that Marxism isn't a theory of upswings, but one of
 crisis. I can't agree. For one, Marx was a theorist of the expansiveness of
 capital, of its ability to break beyond apparent barriers to its expansion,
 as much as he was a theorist of contradiction and disaster. And for two,
 since capitalism spends most of its time in expansion, you're condeming
 Marxism to marginality. And for three, if you believe in crisis, you'll see
 one everywhere all the time. So you end up looking really silly when the
 crisis passes. So for all these reasons, I think we have to take seriously
 the possibility that Shaikh is right, and the long crisis is over in the
 U.S. at least.
 
 Doug


This may be true only in light of our historical understanding of 
capitalism. That is why is so difficult to speak about the "original" 
meaning of Capital, because there is always a mediation between the 
past of the text and the present of the reader. You can't deny there 
was a time Marx was seeing crises everywhere. But history has proven 
capitalism to be a lot more resilient and versatile than even he ever 
anticipated.

Moreover, is it really possible to divorce Marx's theory of crisis 
from his theory of accumulation? Certainly, in Marx's analyis, crisis 
emerge directly from the valorization process of capital.

ricardo