re: immanent critique
Date sent: Mon, 8 Dec 1997 20:09:20 -0800 Send reply to: [EMAIL PROTECTED] From: James Devine [EMAIL PROTECTED] To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Subject:re: immanent critique The following continuation of my discussion with Ricardo is becoming extremely boring and repetitive -- not to mention long. Feel free to hit "delete" at this point. It is my last contribution on pen-l -- unless people really want it. If Ricardo wants to continue off-list, that's fine with me. I agree, but there are too many disingenuous remarks on your part to let then go. The problem with this whole debate, I have gradually come to realize, is that you have very little understanding of what "immanent critique" means. Marx's early immanent critique was that the world had not become rational in the way Hegel had argued. He saw no reconciliation between reality and the idealist assumptions of hegelian philosophy. Devine: Right. But his early writings were still mechanical in many ways. His 1844 manuscripts are very much in the same league as Feuerbach, who he criticized in his 11 Theses and in the GERMAN IDEOLOGY (with Engels). Feuerbach's materialism was pretty mechanical (at least as I understand it) and Marx was right to reject it. Mechanical?? The young Marx used Feuerbach to critize Hegel but was never a follower of his mechanical materialism. As I've said before, I don't see him as "drop[ping] the philosophical critique." Rather, he drops the _purely_ philosophical critique. As Karl Korsch notes, Marx tried to abolish the artificial _division_ between philosophy and political economy. I've already noted how Marx's anti-alienation theme continues in CAPITAL. But he _adds_ "crisis theory" and the critique of political economy. The latter is an extension of his analysis of alienation, since the political economists of his day by and large suffered from commodity fetishism, which is one kind of alienation. Since he never repudiated the content of his early work on alienation, the new emphasis on crisis does not involve an subtraction of the old themes. (Similarly, he never repudiated his early editorials defending press freedom, as Hal Draper argues.) Reading this, one would think the evolution of Marx's ideas were merely a question of adding one concept on top of another without any regard for systematic thinking. Marx always remained a "Germanic" thinker in that, for him, knowledge, if it is to be knowledge at all, must be systematic. I know this is difficult for you to understand, since pilling one idea (or thinker) on top of another is your trademark. Concerning economic crises, Ricardo had writtten: The problem with crisis-theory is that it cannot set the boundaries of capitalism beyond which it will no longer be able to function. Why couldn't capitalism function with 40% unemployment? Now he clarifies what he meant: My point is that a purely objective critique of capitalism, based on its tendencies for crises, is impossible: a critique of unemployment presupposes certain normative standards. Can anyone specify the objective boundaries of the capitalist system beyond which it will collapse? Your point is that you keep on changing the terms of the discussion. But no matter. Look who's talking about changing?! I merely added to my initial point. First, Marx's critique was NOT "purely objective," since he was talking about human beings who are inherently subjective. Part of "crisis theory" is that people's subjective aims are _alienated_, taking the form of an "Invisible Hand" independent of any individual's conscious aims. Unlike Adam Smith's conception, Marx argues that the IH causes people to get bad results (crises, etc.), contrary to their intentions. Never said Marx had a "purely objective" theory of crises; I said that any attempt at a purely objective theory is impossible, THEREFORE, a subjective element will come in, as it does in Marx. The point is, as I keep repeating, Marx does not have ethical theory in Capital. Second, though Marx had his own normative standards for criticizing unemployment, he also pointed to the objective results of that unemployment. How revealing. Third, Marx never purported to posit a theory of collapse, though he sometimes uses the word "collapse" to refer to what we now call a "recession" (e.g., in the GRUNDRISSE). A full-scale theory of collapse cannot be based solely on the objective tendencies of capitalism's laws of motion -- and I don't think Marx _ever_ said that "crisis tendencies" were the whole story of capitalism's abolition, even though it is part of the folklore of crude Marxism and crude anti-Marxism that he did so. Read my response to your first point again. But you'll notice that even in the MANIFESTO,
Re: immanent critique (was: dialectics)
At 14:10 4/12/97 -0800, Jim Devine wrote: The basis for Marx's critique is expressed pretty clearly in the 1844 MANUSCRIPTS, which Marx never repudiated. But Jim, Marx never needed to repudiate it because he never even tried to publish it. After Marx's death, Kautsky was aware of the existence of EPM, and he approached Engels so that they could publish it. Engels responded that when Marx was young he wrote a lot of things including love poems to Jenny, and he is sure that Marx wouldn't want them to be published. I, however, personally think that EPM is a great piece of work--the only true Hegelian work Marx has written. But i agree with Ricardo that there is a great shift in Marx's approach in CAPITAL from EPM. I think my papers in RESEARCH IN POLITICAL ECONOMY, vols 12 and 15, 1990, 1996, throws some light on such issues. Cheers, ajit sinha
re: immanent critique
The following continuation of my discussion with Ricardo is becoming extremely boring and repetitive -- not to mention long. Feel free to hit "delete" at this point. It is my last contribution on pen-l -- unless people really want it. If Ricardo wants to continue off-list, that's fine with me. I had written: rather than [Ricardo's] current emphasis on Marx's relative degree of emphasis, [Ricardo's] earlier missive seemed to totally dismiss any kind of study of the laws of motion of capitalism as somehow being anathema ... while criticizing Marx for no longer confront[ing] capitalism in terms of the universal ideals of justice, equality, and freedom... But as we agreed, Marx still criticized capitalism for failing to live up to its own ideals. Ricardo now writes: No, we don't agree. Marx's early immanent critique was that the world had not become rational in the way Hegel had argued. He saw no reconciliation between reality and the idealist assumptions of hegelian philosophy. Right. But his early writings were still mechanical in many ways. His 1844 manuscripts are very much in the same league as Feuerbach, who he criticized in his 11 Theses and in the GERMAN IDEOLOGY (with Engels). Feuerbach's materialism was pretty mechanical (at least as I understand it) and Marx was right to reject it. The world was not philosophical and philosophy was not worldly. Later he drops this philosophical critique and moves to a critique of political economy. His critique is now about the objective tendencies of capitalism itself; it becomes a theory of crisis. As I've said before, I don't see him as "drop[ping] the philosophical critique." Rather, he drops the _purely_ philosophical critique. As Karl Korsch notes, Marx tried to abolish the artificial _division_ between philosophy and political economy. I've already noted how Marx's anti-alienation theme continues in CAPITAL. But he _adds_ "crisis theory" and the critique of political economy. The latter is an extension of his analysis of alienation, since the political economists of his day by and large suffered from commodity fetishism, which is one kind of alienation. Since he never repudiated the content of his early work on alienation, the new emphasis on crisis does not involve an subtraction of the old themes. (Similarly, he never repudiated his early editorials defending press freedom, as Hal Draper argues.) I had written: I don't know how theories of crisis could ever be "based in" ethics. But what I said was that Marx's immanent critique of capitalism (the contradiction between pretensions of democracy, etc. and practice) was _intimately tied to_ the idea of laws of motion: ... an immanent critique, e.g., of the contradiction between pretensions of equal exchange of commodities and the actuality of surplus-value extraction is linked to class antagonism and Marx's crisis theories. What Marx does is to refuse to leave the issue of exploitation at the utterly abstract level of Kantian ethics and the like. It's not just "wrong" ... but has a concrete impact on society. Ricardo now writes: Yes, but the point is the later Marx dismisses "equal exchange" as an *ideological* pretension of bourgeois society. As often noted, Marx's mature conception of ideology does not lambaste the bourgeois types for "false consciousness." Their ideology has a material basis, in capitalist society. There actually is a tendency toward equal exchange in capitalist society, though it's seldom realized outside simple commodity relations. This tendency is the real-world basis for the ideology. He criticizes the real world of capitalism _in tandem with_ its ideological spawn. Concerning economic crises, Ricardo had writtten: The problem with crisis-theory is that it cannot set the boundaries of capitalism beyond which it will no longer be able to function. Why couldn't capitalism function with 40% unemployment? Now he clarifies what he meant: My point is that a purely objective critique of capitalism, based on its tendencies for crises, is impossible: a critique of unemployment presupposes certain normative standards. Can anyone specify the objective boundaries of the capitalist system beyond which it will collapse? Your point is that you keep on changing the terms of the discussion. But no matter. First, Marx's critique was NOT "purely objective," since he was talking about human beings who are inherently subjective. Part of "crisis theory" is that people's subjective aims are _alienated_, taking the form of an "Invisible Hand" independent of any individual's conscious aims. Unlike Adam Smith's conception, Marx argues that the IH causes people to get bad results (crises, etc.), contrary to their intentions. Second, though Marx had his own normative standards for criticizing unemployment, he also pointed to the objective results of that unemployment. Third, Marx never purported to posit a theory of collapse, though he sometimes uses the word "collapse" to refer to what
Re: immanent critique
Date sent: Thu, 4 Dec 1997 14:10:06 -0800
Send reply to: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
From: James Devine [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject:immanent critique (was: dialectics)
Concerning Marx's work after the 1844 manuscripts, Ricardo writes: My
point is the very simple one that the late Marx gives _greater emphasis_ to
the structural tendencies of capitalism than he does to the values and
norms of that society. He seeks to show there are certain crises that
emerge out of necessity from the "laws of motion" of capitalism, which
explains why his analysis of those crises is based in economics, not
ethics. (emphasis added by JD)
Devine:
Here we agree: rather than your current emphasis on Marx's relative degree
of emphasis, your earlier missive seemed to totally dismiss any kind of
study of the laws of motion of capitalism as somehow being anathema (a
petty "obsession" of the pen-lites), while criticizing Marx for no
longer confront[ing] capitalism in terms of the universal ideals of
justice, equality, and freedom... But as we agreed, Marx still
criticized capitalism for failing to live up to its own ideals.
No, we don't agree. Marx's early immanent critique was that the world
had not become rational in the way Hegel had argued. He saw no
reconciliation between reality and the idealist assumptions of
hegelian philosophy. The world was not philosophical and philosophy
was not worldly. Later he drops this philosophical critique and moves
to a critique of political economy. His critique is now about
the objective tendencies of capitalism itself; it becomes
a theory of crisis.
I don't know how theories of crisis could ever be "based in" ethics. But
what I said was that Marx's immanent critique of capitalism (the
contradiction between pretensions of democracy, etc. and practice) was
_intimately tied to_ the idea of laws of motion: an actual, real-world,
contraction between democratic pretensions and dictatorial practice causes
all sorts of social problems, i.e., a societal crisis. More specifically to
Marx's CAPITAL, an immanent critique, e.g., of the contradiction between
pretensions of equal exchange of commodities and the actuality of
surplus-value extraction is linked to class antagonism and Marx's crisis
theories. What Marx does is to refuse to leave the issue of exploitation at
the utterly abstract level of Kantian ethics and the like. It's not just
"wrong" (as John Roemer will tell you) but has a concrete impact on society.
Yes, but the point is the later Marx dismisses "equal exchange" as
an *ideological* pretension of bourgeois society.
Concerning economic crises, Ricardo writes: The problem with crisis-theory
is that it cannot set the boundaries of capitalism beyond which it will no
longer be able to function. Why couldn't capitalism function with 40%
unemployment?
I don't understand the first sentence, so focus on the second: of course it
could function that way (at least in the crisis theory I've seen). But
social unrest and/or crime would continuously increase, causing obvious
problems for the system. Capitalists would also suffer from incomplete use
of their capacity, which would depress their profit rates. If the problems
of disorder, revolt, and crime don't depress the capitalists' "animal
spirits," the destruction of capitals would allow the competition among
capitalists to move away _from_ competitive efforts to cut wages, increase
the intensity of work, and the like (allowed and encouraged by high
unemployment and low capacity utilization) _toward_ pushing accumulation
forward. The latter eventually causes unemployment to fall. It's hard to
predict exactly what would happen, but I think it's very clear that things
would _change_ in some way rather than seeing persistent 40% unemployment.
My point is that a purely objective critique of capitalism, based on
its tendencies for crises, is impossible: a critique of unemployment
presupposes certain normative standards. Can anyone specify the
objective boundaries of the capitalist system beyond which it will
collapse?
Concerning Marx's adherence to and/or support for "bourgeois values" such
as freedom, Ricardo writes: So, I guess you now agree with me: the late
Marx had a more cynical view of bourgeois values ("he viewed them as
hypocritical"). If so, where those his critique of capitalism come from?
Of course, I think that you disagree with me in agreeing with Marx's
cynicism concerning bourgeois sloganeering. You seem to take the slogans at
face value, at least more than I do.
The basis for Marx's critique is expressed pretty clearly in the 1844
MANUSCRIPTS, which Marx never repudiated. If you read CAPITAL vol. 1
carefully (especially chs. 7, 10, 13, 14, and 15), you'll see that his
writing there is largely consistent with the MANUSCRIPTS. He still talks
about workers being worn out physically and
Re: immanent critique (was: dialectics)
Date sent: Tue, 25 Nov 1997 13:34:24 -0800 Send reply to: [EMAIL PROTECTED] From: James Devine [EMAIL PROTECTED] To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Subject:immanent critique (was: dialectics) Ricardo writes: ... I would argue there is a difference between the early and late Marx on the question of liberal rights, and the difference is simply the late Marx is a lot more cynical about them (approximating Lenin). Consequently, his immanent approach takes on a different character. As you yourself say: "Much of that critique [of capitalism] is `immanent', though Marx _also_ tries to understand and sketch the laws of motion of capitalism". "Laws of motion of capitalism" - that's the difference. Marx no longer confronts capitalism in terms of the universal ideals of justice, equality, and freedom, but sees capitalism as having certain "objective" tendencies toward crises, crises which arise of necessity from capitalism; and are grounded in economics. Devine responds: So Marx was so stupid and ignorant that he couldn't walk and chew gum at the same time? he couldn't simultaneously pose an "immanent critique" of capitalism (of how capitalism contracts its own official preachings of freedom, etc.) and try to figure out how the system works? I think we should avoid the silly assumption (that is, alas, very common in academia) that EITHER school X (here, the one that emphasizes Marx's immanent critique) is right OR school Y (here the one that emphasizes laws of motion) is right -- but NOT BOTH. My perspective is that Marx hoped that his theories would (1) successfully criticize the system, (2) help us explain its laws of motion, _and_ (3) give us some guide to political practice (a kind of activity he participated in quite a lot, to the dismay of liberals). Now it's difficult _in practice_ to get all three of these in sync, but we have to give Marx credit for trying. My point is the very simple one that the late Marx gives greater emphasis to the structural tendencies of capitalism than he does to the values and norms of that society. He seeks to show there are certain crises that emerge out of necessity from the "laws of motion" of capitalism, which explains why his analysis of those crises is based in economics, not ethics. Ricardo continues: How else do you explain the obsession pen-l has with crises? Is it not because they are still abiding by Marx's claim that the critique of capitalism must be a critique of political economy and the rest is ideology? Devine: I don't understand the second question, so focus on the first: pen-l is by no means a Marxist list, having quite a variety of non-Marxist perspectives represented, while the Marxists on it often disagree with each other, so we can't blame Marx for the list's failings and foibles or give him credit for our successes. But Marx and pen-l have good reasons to be "obsessed" with crises (even though pen-l discusses a lot of other things, apparently not on Ricardo's list of his obsessions). Crises indicate one the failings of capitalism, one we can criticize it for. They also indicate pretty clearly the socialized nature of production, e.g., the interdependence of East Asia and the US. In some cases, they represent political openings. Note that all three of the parts of Marx's hoped-for synthesis (see above) play a role here. (BTW, Ricardo, didn't you cite Habermas? he talks about crisis theory.) The problem with crisis-theory is that it cannot set the boundaries of capitalism beyond which it will no longer be able to function. Why couldn't capitalism function with 40% unemployment? Ricardo seems to want Marx to stick to the example of his utopian teachers (Saint-Simon, Owen, Fourier), to preach "the universal ideals of justice, equality, and freedom" to the people, hoping that they'll meekly follow their "enlightened" leadership and install these ideals in practice. Marx lived at the end of a long period when a lot of people -- e.g., Robespierre -- yelled similar slogans but then turned around and violated their own slogans in practice. Thus, I can understand Marx's own reluctance to engage in sloganeering about "universal ideals." Instead of such universal ideals, Marx's ethical thought centered on the immanent critique, the contradiction between bougeois theory and practice (again, see Cornell West's book). Marx's attitude, if I understand it correctly, was that his "immanent critique" of capital corresponded to _real contradictions_ within its operations. He argued that the normal operations of capitalism -- partly via crises, but also via the concentration and centralization of capital and more -- would create its own grave-diggers, a proletariat that would develop the capacity to liberate itself from capitalism's shackles. He saw the potential for the workers to successfully fight for "justice, equality, and freedom" -- but
