[qubes-users] XSAs released on 2021-03-04

2021-03-04 Thread Andrew David Wong

Dear Qubes Community,

The Xen Project released one or more new Xen Security Advisories (XSAs) 
on 2021-03-04.

The security of Qubes OS *is not affected* by these XSAs.
Therefore, *no user action is required*.


XSAs that affect the security of Qubes OS (user action required)


The following XSAs *do affect* the security of Qubes OS:

 - (None)


XSAs that do not affect the security of Qubes OS (no user action required)
--

The following XSAs *do not affect* the security of Qubes OS, and no user 
action is necessary:


 - XSA-367 (not affected; Qubes uses PVH/HVM)
 - XSA-369 (DoS only)


Related links
-


 - Qubes Security Pack (qubes-secpack): 
https://www.qubes-os.org/security/pack/
 - Qubes Security Bulletins (QSBs): 
https://www.qubes-os.org/security/bulletins/

 - XSA Tracker: https://www.qubes-os.org/security/xsa/


This announcement is also available on the Qubes website:
https://www.qubes-os.org/news/2021/03/04/xsas-released-on-2021-03-04/

--
Andrew David Wong (Axon)
Community Manager, Qubes OS
https://www.qubes-os.org

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Re: [qubes-users] Dom0 kernel panic

2021-03-04 Thread haaber

On 3/4/21 9:16 PM, frag face wrote:

Thanks for your answer Bernhard,

I wonder if I could make a  Qube-style backup of the qubes in my
hardrive instead of a rsync to restore/add them directly in the new
installed Qube system, kind of  lazy way ;)

BR


You can, with some extra work: The complete qubes-backup procdure is
explained online. It is, roughly speaking, a tar archive with special
checksum files to ensure pwds are correct.

I always to these backups by hand, to keep myself trained.

My method "sous-entend" that you "safe backup": in your life system
generate a container file (truncate -s 200G
/externalstorage/backup.luks), then losetup: (first losetup -f to get a
free slot, then bind it with losetup /dev/loopX
/externalstorage/backup.luks ), and cryptsetup luksFormat /dev/loopX
;cryptsetup luksOpen /dev/loopX BACKUP; mkfs.ext2 /dev/mapper/BACKUP ;
mount /dev/mapper/BACKUP /somemountpoint

For rsync'ing back inside qubes from subfolders you
- attach usb to dispVM1 (widget)
- lopsetup the container
- attach container mapper to dispVM2 (widget)
- there start same procedure as above at "luksOpen" step and then attach
the full decrypted backup to each VM with the widget, and rsync back the
correct subfolder in your home. You can use --exclude to avoid
"dot"-files ...   best, Bernhard

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Re: [qubes-users] Dom0 kernel panic

2021-03-04 Thread frag face
Thanks for your answer Bernhard,

I wonder if I could make a  Qube-style backup of the qubes in my hardrive
instead of a rsync to restore/add them directly in the new installed Qube
system, kind of  lazy way ;)

BR

Le jeu. 4 mars 2021 à 16:34, Bernhard  a écrit :

> On 3/3/21 3:29 PM, frag face wrote:
> > Hi all,
> >
> > I'm running Qubes 4.0
> > My dom0 doesn't boot anymore (following an aborted Fedora update it
> > seems...).
> > Boot runs to kernel panic, see attached image.
> >
> >  From a newly installed Qubes on a different disk, I can mount my
> > crashed disk, decrypt it and access all my Qubes, DOM0...
> >
> > I see two options to recover my environment (and would prefer the first):
> > 1- Fix my Dom0 environment on my crashed hard drive (I have another
> > drive with a newly installed Qubes 4.0-rc3)
> > 2- Save my qubes from my crashed disk, and restore them on my new
> > 4.0-rc3 install.
> >
> > Any advise to perform a rescue for option 1 or 2 is welcomed !
>
> 1) try to boot from a life system. Mount /boot and, in case of UEFI,
> have a look in efi/qubes/xen.cfg  or efi/BOOT/xen.cfg   you should be
> able to select a older kernel. Maybe that allows to reboot.
>
> 2) emergency backup is a good idea in any case. Open the encrypted
> volume (using luks)then runvgchange -ayto activate all
> logical volumes. With lvscan you should be able to see the names
> (something like  qubes-...-work-private
>  qubes-...-work-root
>  etc
> It is the "private" one that you want. Mount them (they are all in
> /dev/mapper/ ) and "rsync -auv"  your data to a harddrive in
> respective subdirs. That is less safe than the paranoid version
> of qubes-backup since its grasps all  ".config" files, but at least
> you have a full take.
>
> Good luck!
>
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>

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Re: [qubes-users] Open sourcing my salt configs

2021-03-04 Thread unman
On Wed, Mar 03, 2021 at 11:58:41AM +, 'keyandthegate' via qubes-users wrote:
> I've been developing a lot of salt config for myself and I want to start open 
> sourcing it so that I can:
> 
> - Ask for public security review
> - Accept patches
> - Help people use Qubes a little better, when I think Qubes supports 
> anarchistic praxis and is a force of good in the world
> 
> I'm worried about the following things:
> 
> - I lose my security through obscurity, which I don't want to do without the 
> help of at least one non-amateur code reviewer for anything I publish
> 
> - (and I'm not sure if the economics/incentives work out here such that I 
> should be paying someone to help me with this or not)
> - I don't want to publish anything security sensitive without code review 
> because I don't want to harm people
> 
> Additionally, I'm not sure how to package salt config via a .deb package. Are 
> there any existing examples of this?
> 
> As an example of what I want to publish, I've written some config to create a 
> private debian package repo vm powered by a YAML file that lets you specify 
> sources to download packages (e.g. that are hosted as github releases) and 
> verify them via gpg, then provide them to vms. My motivation is towards the 
> goal of being able to destroy and recreate my templates from salt at any 
> time, because salt is not stateless (unlike e.g. nix or bazel), e.g. if you 
> decide to no longer add a package repo, you have to manually remove it from 
> the domain in addition to updating the salt config, and you may forget; being 
> able to recreate templates solves the otherwise almost intractable problem of 
> knowing your templates aren't out of sync; it also means you can exclude 
> templates from backups if you're brave, which can save a lot of space.
> 
> Another example of some code I may want to publish:
> (WARNING: I think this may have a critical security issue of exposing config 
> files to domains they don't belong to, but I'm not sure. Would need to 
> investigate before publishing)
> This fixes TemplateNotFound errors when you try to jinja-include another file 
> within a `file.managed` `template.jinja` file.
> 
> > # MAINTAIN: Removed when fixed: 
> > https://github.com/saltstack/salt/issues/31531
> > 'patch salt issue 31531':
> > cmd.run:
> > - name: |
> > if [[ ! -f "$XDG_DATA_HOME"/patched-salt-31531 ]]; then
> > cat < > sudo sed -i'' "s#if fn_.strip() and fn_.startswith(path):#if fn_.strip() 
> > and (fn_.startswith(path) or path == '/'):#" 
> > /usr/lib/python3/dist-packages/salt/fileclient.py && \
> > if ! grep extra-filerefs /etc/qubes-rpc/qubes.SaltLinuxVM >/dev/null; then 
> > sudo sed -i'' "s#salt-ssh#salt-ssh --extra-filerefs salt:///#" 
> > /etc/qubes-rpc/qubes.SaltLinuxVM; fi
> > CMD
> > fi
> > sudo mkdir -p "$XDG_DATA_HOME" || exit 1
> > sudo touch "$XDG_DATA_HOME"/patched-salt-31531 || exit 1
> 

Great - I love salting Qubes.
There *is* a problem in posting configs unless you are careful, but
generally this can be mitigated by making them as general as possible.
I'd be happy to take a look over what you have: you can get my email
and PGP key from the team page at Qubes.

Packaging - you need to package in an rpm because it will be handled in
dom0 (generally). I generally just package the files, and *not*
automatic execution. This is because I want people to review the files,
and possibly edit them, before executing in dom0.
If you want automatic execution, then it's simply a matter of using a
"post install" execution in the rpm. I don't like this, as stated, but
it's straightforward.

As to publishing, I have some salt on GitHub
(https://www.github.com/unman/shaker) 
Most of the states I publish are simple, in execution if not effect,
because they are teaching aids.
I have been thinking of publishing packages at https://qubes.3isec.org,
alongside the templates and Ubuntu packages that I already offer.
This could be done as an unofficial Qubes salt archive, possibly as a step
toward inclusion of packages in the official Qubes repositories.
If you'd like to take this further, drop me a line.
For general issues, reply to the list.

unman

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Re: [qubes-users] Dom0 kernel panic

2021-03-04 Thread Bernhard

On 3/3/21 3:29 PM, frag face wrote:

Hi all,

I'm running Qubes 4.0
My dom0 doesn't boot anymore (following an aborted Fedora update it
seems...).
Boot runs to kernel panic, see attached image.

 From a newly installed Qubes on a different disk, I can mount my
crashed disk, decrypt it and access all my Qubes, DOM0...

I see two options to recover my environment (and would prefer the first):
1- Fix my Dom0 environment on my crashed hard drive (I have another
drive with a newly installed Qubes 4.0-rc3)
2- Save my qubes from my crashed disk, and restore them on my new
4.0-rc3 install.

Any advise to perform a rescue for option 1 or 2 is welcomed !


1) try to boot from a life system. Mount /boot and, in case of UEFI,
have a look in efi/qubes/xen.cfg  or efi/BOOT/xen.cfg   you should be
able to select a older kernel. Maybe that allows to reboot.

2) emergency backup is a good idea in any case. Open the encrypted
   volume (using luks)then runvgchange -ayto activate all
   logical volumes. With lvscan you should be able to see the names
   (something like  qubes-...-work-private
qubes-...-work-root
etc
   It is the "private" one that you want. Mount them (they are all in
   /dev/mapper/ ) and "rsync -auv"  your data to a harddrive in
   respective subdirs. That is less safe than the paranoid version
   of qubes-backup since its grasps all  ".config" files, but at least
   you have a full take.

Good luck!

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