Re: [qubes-users] The PGP Encryption Problem
On 7/17/19 1:11 PM, Chris Laprise wrote: > On 7/17/19 5:40 AM, ronpunz wrote: >> Reading this article, >> https://latacora.micro.blog/2019/07/16/the-pgp-problem.html, it's clear >> the authors have little to no confidence in the security or capabilities >> of PGP encryption. >> >> Is this article a scare mongering propaganda exercise or do they have >> valid concerns about why we should not be using PGP? The seem to >> advocate using OPENBSD's Signify - do we move to this? > > I worry when I read articles like this, because they make some good > points (along with some bad ones) against PGP but their recommendations > often demonstrate a blindness to the things they're criticizing. > > Case in point: 'Use Signal.' While Signal is a pleasure to use for many > people, its tied to identities in the telephone system, which is a > problem from the 1890s not 1990s. When I see this slip up, I start > worrying about the soundness of their other recommendations. > > I also don't necessarily agree with the idea that many different > encryption tools should be used for many different purposes. This is > another red flag for me, because it hides deeper UX and compatibility > issues behind a veneer of simplistic apps. > > Yet another red flag is the way the author treats some of PGP's problems > as specific to an old design, when really the problem is more > fundamental. Leaking metadata, for example, is a common problem that > bedevils even programs like Tor. > > And yet another is arguing from the assumption that Web Of Trust is a > necessary ingredient in PGP usage. It isn't, and that fact dispels many > claims that PGP is too complex to use. > > IMO, the reason we're having this bout of "don't use PGP" is the > keyserver vulnerability that enables the recent spate of DoS attacks. > This problem is rooted in design, but luckily doesn't run deep and is > therefore solvable. That's not to say I think PGP is just fine, but if > we're going to move beyond it and its (admittedly crummy) formats then > we should have something else to manage identity across a broad range of > use cases – we should have a proper replacement. Otherwise, I fear that > information security as a field will have failed. > I think I agree with most of your criticism of the critique... And to me, I have long felt that PGP is problematic, and not always the best to use, and should probably be replaced. But I do not believe that the replacement has arrived yet. And this article points out, in a lot of places, that to benefit from security systems, you have to use them correctly. And I think I know my way around PGP fairly well. I've used it in a few different ways for quite some years now. If I'm going to learn a new system, I'll mess up, a lot. And it's likely I'll find myself the only user of this new, shiny system. I do test a lot of new systems. But I'm not in any way ready to leave GPG behind just yet. It's so deeply ingrained in our ecosystem that it'd be hard to navigate without it. Whatever we replace it with doesn't just have to be better, or more usable. It has to be used. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "qubes-users" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to qubes-users+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/qubes-users/96606060-89a9-6c45-1eba-3f500667abe6%40nonbinary.me. 0x6648B5C5E394CC24.asc Description: application/pgp-keys signature.asc Description: OpenPGP digital signature
Re: [qubes-users] The PGP Encryption Problem
I agree with everything that Chris said. A few more thoughts: First, I think the article is probably right that PGP is not the right solution for most problems for most users, mainly because of inertia against integrating subkeys into your workflow. But qubes-gpg-split makes many features of PGP work very well for Qubes users. Second, the issue of complexity. The "Answers" section seems to suggest using seven different tools to replace PGP. And consider some of the complaints about complexity in PGP: The actual system doesn’t get simpler. There are keys and subkeys. Key IDs > and key servers and key signatures. Sign-only and encrypt-only. Multiple > “key rings”. Revocation certificates. Three different compression formats. > This is all before we get to smartcard support. > This is complexity, but complexity I use. I use keys, subkeys, sign-only and encrypt-only keys, revocation certificates, etc. In fact, it is the very complexity that lets PGP get around some of the complaints in the article. Third, the recommendation to use Signal. One complaint about encrypted PGP email is that the recipient can forward your unencrypted message to someone else. Exactly the same thing is possible in Signal! In fact, it's not trivial to construct a protocol that avoids this problem while still allowing ease of use. Fourth, the recommendation to use signify. It's definitely a well-implemented tool. But I do miss the web of trust when it comes to verifying keys. Consider this quote from the original paper: (http://www.openbsd.org/papers/bsdcan-signify.html) There are no key servers for signify. No web of trust. Just keys. The good > news is the keys are pretty small. As demonstrated. We can stick them just > about everywhere, and we do. They're on the web site, they're on twitter, > they're on the top side of CD. 56 base64 characters. You can read it out > loud over the phone in under a minute. > The newest keys are not on Twitter, as far as I can see. OpenBSD doesn't sell CDs anymore. I'd much rather read a fingerprint over the phone than 56 base64 characters. The main keys are hosted on all the mirrors, but the firmware keys are, to my knowledge, only verifiable by going to the release page: https://www.openbsd.org/65.html, or by downloading base.tgz and extracting it yourself. Of course, you can use signify and provide more ways to verify keys. But note that the simplicity of signify means this requires each user to set up their own infrastructure to do so, rather than relying on the (admittedly flawed) way that PGP provides. By the way, if people want to play with signify in Qubes, I've refreshed my copr packages of a Linux port: https://copr.fedorainfracloud.org/coprs/dmoerner/outils/ Best, Daniel -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "qubes-users" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to qubes-users+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/qubes-users/c7aa95de-8cf1-4241-ba25-6e6b30dc7965%40googlegroups.com.
Re: [qubes-users] The PGP Encryption Problem
On 7/17/19 11:11 AM, Chris Laprise wrote: > On 7/17/19 5:40 AM, ronpunz wrote: >> Reading this article, >> https://latacora.micro.blog/2019/07/16/the-pgp-problem.html, it's clear >> the authors have little to no confidence in the security or capabilities >> of PGP encryption. >> >> Is this article a scare mongering propaganda exercise or do they have >> valid concerns about why we should not be using PGP? The seem to >> advocate using OPENBSD's Signify - do we move to this? > > I worry when I read articles like this, because they make some good > points (along with some bad ones) against PGP but their > recommendations often demonstrate a blindness to the things they're > criticizing. > > Case in point: 'Use Signal.' While Signal is a pleasure to use for > many people, its tied to identities in the telephone system, which is > a problem from the 1890s not 1990s. When I see this slip up, I start > worrying about the soundness of their other recommendations. > > I also don't necessarily agree with the idea that many different > encryption tools should be used for many different purposes. This is > another red flag for me, because it hides deeper UX and compatibility > issues behind a veneer of simplistic apps. > > Yet another red flag is the way the author treats some of PGP's > problems as specific to an old design, when really the problem is more > fundamental. Leaking metadata, for example, is a common problem that > bedevils even programs like Tor. > > And yet another is arguing from the assumption that Web Of Trust is a > necessary ingredient in PGP usage. It isn't, and that fact dispels > many claims that PGP is too complex to use. > > IMO, the reason we're having this bout of "don't use PGP" is the > keyserver vulnerability that enables the recent spate of DoS attacks. > This problem is rooted in design, but luckily doesn't run deep and is > therefore solvable. That's not to say I think PGP is just fine, but if > we're going to move beyond it and its (admittedly crummy) formats then > we should have something else to manage identity across a broad range > of use cases – we should have a proper replacement. Otherwise, I fear > that information security as a field will have failed. > Sorry about top posting my earlier reply - here it is again Thanks for your comprehensive reply. I think you're right, Signal isn't the be all and end all that some people think it is. Here's a comprehensive pro-PGP piece https://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2016/12/signal-does-not-replace-pgp/ Thanks for your comprehensive reply. I think you're right, Signal isn't the be all and end all that some people think it is. Here's a comprehensive pro-PGP piece https://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2016/12/signal-does-not-replace-pgp/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "qubes-users" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to qubes-users+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/qubes-users/cba25ec0-26f8-9548-d7a2-ab027db296a6%40riseup.net. pEpkey.asc Description: application/pgp-keys
Re: [qubes-users] The PGP Encryption Problem
Thanks for your comprehensive reply. I think you're right, Signal isn't the be all and end all that some people think it is. Here's a comprehensive pro-PGP piece https://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2016/12/signal-does-not-replace-pgp/ On 7/17/19 11:11 AM, Chris Laprise wrote: > On 7/17/19 5:40 AM, ronpunz wrote: >> Reading this article, >> https://latacora.micro.blog/2019/07/16/the-pgp-problem.html, it's clear >> the authors have little to no confidence in the security or capabilities >> of PGP encryption. >> >> Is this article a scare mongering propaganda exercise or do they have >> valid concerns about why we should not be using PGP? The seem to >> advocate using OPENBSD's Signify - do we move to this? > > I worry when I read articles like this, because they make some good > points (along with some bad ones) against PGP but their > recommendations often demonstrate a blindness to the things they're > criticizing. > > Case in point: 'Use Signal.' While Signal is a pleasure to use for > many people, its tied to identities in the telephone system, which is > a problem from the 1890s not 1990s. When I see this slip up, I start > worrying about the soundness of their other recommendations. > > I also don't necessarily agree with the idea that many different > encryption tools should be used for many different purposes. This is > another red flag for me, because it hides deeper UX and compatibility > issues behind a veneer of simplistic apps. > > Yet another red flag is the way the author treats some of PGP's > problems as specific to an old design, when really the problem is more > fundamental. Leaking metadata, for example, is a common problem that > bedevils even programs like Tor. > > And yet another is arguing from the assumption that Web Of Trust is a > necessary ingredient in PGP usage. It isn't, and that fact dispels > many claims that PGP is too complex to use. > > IMO, the reason we're having this bout of "don't use PGP" is the > keyserver vulnerability that enables the recent spate of DoS attacks. > This problem is rooted in design, but luckily doesn't run deep and is > therefore solvable. That's not to say I think PGP is just fine, but if > we're going to move beyond it and its (admittedly crummy) formats then > we should have something else to manage identity across a broad range > of use cases – we should have a proper replacement. Otherwise, I fear > that information security as a field will have failed. > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "qubes-users" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to qubes-users+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/qubes-users/8fe7e79e-ba82-c0f0-5948-5dd7ea76e725%40riseup.net. pEpkey.asc Description: application/pgp-keys
Re: [qubes-users] The PGP Encryption Problem
On 7/17/19 5:40 AM, ronpunz wrote: Reading this article, https://latacora.micro.blog/2019/07/16/the-pgp-problem.html, it's clear the authors have little to no confidence in the security or capabilities of PGP encryption. Is this article a scare mongering propaganda exercise or do they have valid concerns about why we should not be using PGP? The seem to advocate using OPENBSD's Signify - do we move to this? I worry when I read articles like this, because they make some good points (along with some bad ones) against PGP but their recommendations often demonstrate a blindness to the things they're criticizing. Case in point: 'Use Signal.' While Signal is a pleasure to use for many people, its tied to identities in the telephone system, which is a problem from the 1890s not 1990s. When I see this slip up, I start worrying about the soundness of their other recommendations. I also don't necessarily agree with the idea that many different encryption tools should be used for many different purposes. This is another red flag for me, because it hides deeper UX and compatibility issues behind a veneer of simplistic apps. Yet another red flag is the way the author treats some of PGP's problems as specific to an old design, when really the problem is more fundamental. Leaking metadata, for example, is a common problem that bedevils even programs like Tor. And yet another is arguing from the assumption that Web Of Trust is a necessary ingredient in PGP usage. It isn't, and that fact dispels many claims that PGP is too complex to use. IMO, the reason we're having this bout of "don't use PGP" is the keyserver vulnerability that enables the recent spate of DoS attacks. This problem is rooted in design, but luckily doesn't run deep and is therefore solvable. That's not to say I think PGP is just fine, but if we're going to move beyond it and its (admittedly crummy) formats then we should have something else to manage identity across a broad range of use cases – we should have a proper replacement. Otherwise, I fear that information security as a field will have failed. -- Chris Laprise, tas...@posteo.net https://github.com/tasket https://twitter.com/ttaskett PGP: BEE2 20C5 356E 764A 73EB 4AB3 1DC4 D106 F07F 1886 -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "qubes-users" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to qubes-users+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to qubes-users@googlegroups.com. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/qubes-users/de86c214-a496-aa2d-dd61-e1620302ca27%40posteo.net. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
[qubes-users] The PGP Encryption Problem
Reading this article, https://latacora.micro.blog/2019/07/16/the-pgp-problem.html, it's clear the authors have little to no confidence in the security or capabilities of PGP encryption. Is this article a scare mongering propaganda exercise or do they have valid concerns about why we should not be using PGP? The seem to advocate using OPENBSD's Signify - do we move to this? -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "qubes-users" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to qubes-users+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to qubes-users@googlegroups.com. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/qubes-users/5f161fd0-fad8-b202-e323-e1e27e050d72%40riseup.net. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. pEpkey.asc Description: application/pgp-keys
