And an indispensible text discussing this distinction in the context of the
Free Speech Clause is Kent Greenawalt's Speech, Crime, and the Uses of
Language.
- Original Message -
From: Berg, Thomas C. [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: Law Religion issues for Law Academics [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Sent: Thursday, March 18, 2004 10:14 AM
Subject: RE: Perlocutionary and Illocutionary Speech Acts
Without remembering much more, I remember that a classic text on this is
J.L. Austin's How To Do Things With Words.
Tom Berg
University of St. Thomas School of Law (Minnesota)
_
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]
Sent: Thu 3/18/2004 4:46 AM
To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: Perlocutionary and Illocutionary Speech Acts
From a former life, I recall that a perlocutionary act is a
meaningful speech act designed to have particular effects on people who
hear
them. For example, telling the story of the little engine that could has
the perlocutionary force of encouraging a child to try to master some
task.
Illocutionary acts are meaningful speech acts which function as
performative
speech acts the utterance of which is an action of a particular kind. For
example, the meaningful statement, All hands on deck is the
illlocutionary
speech act of ordering sailors to appear on deck. An observer who
replied,
No that's false, no one is on deck. would fail to appreciate the
illocutionary (performative) force of the speech act. The utterance I do
in a marriage ceremony is an illocutionary speech act. I think this is
the
nature of the distinction.
Bobby
Robert Justin Lipkin
Professor of Law
Widener University School of Law
Delaware
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