Re: FW: Interesting question: Portland Archdiocese Filing Chapter 11
Tom Berg's prior post is correct. Alleged fraud claims against a Chapter 11 bankruptcy estateare dischargeable in bankruptcy under 11 U.S.C. 1141(d), provided the diocese is reorganizing and not liquidating. The exceptions to dischargein 11 U.S.C. 523(a) apply only to "an individual debtor", and the diocese is most likely organized as a corporate sole or unincorporated entity. However, even if the fraud claims were not dischargeable, what are the fraudulent representations which are being made? The common law elements of a fraud claim as I understand them are (1) arepresentation (2) which is false (3) made with the intent to deceive (4) which in fact does deceive (5) which is justifiably relied upon and (6) which causes damage.Does the common law "imply"a representation on the part of the diocese that a priest has never engaged incertain past activities, such as pedophilia? And in the case of fraudulent concealment (which requires a duty to reveal information),is there a state law duty to inform parishioners about either alleged or actual wrongdoing by a priest in the past, when the diocese firmly believes that the priest is repentant and will not do such acts again? I'm with Jim on this one . . . having a hard time seeing how a fraud claim applies in this situation. All the best from Charlotte, NC, Will [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: And the standard of goodmoral character is supplied by cannon law? State law? Common law fiduciaryresponsibilities?Marc Stern Actually, in these cases, the standard is more concrete than moral character. The question in every one of these cases is whether the archdiocese knew of the criminal character of the perpetrator priest. We are dealing with rape, statutory rape, and childhood sexual abuse. Typically, thebishop transferring a priest within the archdiocese knew about his criminal activity (whether or not they ever contacted the civil authorities). When one sees transfers between archdioceses, one can assumethat not only is the fellow a criminal, but hemay well have beencaught by civil authorities in the formerdiocese The fraud in these cases is far more serious than financial fraud--it's fraud that leads parents and other priests who never would have done it had they knownto give pedophiles easy access to children. Marci___To post, send message to [EMAIL PROTECTED]To subscribe, unsubscribe, change options, or get password, see http://lists.ucla.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/religionlawWill Esser --- Ad Majorem Dei GloriamWe can easily forgive a child who is afraid of the dark;the real tragedy is when men are afraid of the light.Plato (428-345 B.C.) Do you Yahoo!? Yahoo! Mail is new and improved - Check it out!___ To post, send message to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To subscribe, unsubscribe, change options, or get password, see http://lists.ucla.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/religionlaw
Re: FW: Interesting question: Portland Archdiocese Filing Chapter 11
Steve, I don't disagree with your analysis of the law on fraud and fraudulent concealment. (My practice is in commercial litigation and bankruptcy, so I'm dealing with fraud claimsand Chapter 11 debtorson aregular basis - one of the reasons I find this thread of interest). The problem I'm having is the application of fraud and fraudulent concealment to the diocese (a religious organization), particularly with provingthe elements of representation and concealment. I assume that virtually none of these fraud claims are based on an alleged "explicit" representation by the Diocese (i.e. "As the bishop, I certify that this priest has never been involved in pedophilic activity"). That leaves us with potential "implied" representations by the Diocese (i.e. when you send a priest to a parish, you impliedly represent that he has never been involved in pedophile activity). Would such an "implied" representation be supportable under the First Amendment (i.e. is it permissible for the law to imply representations by a religious organization about the qualities or qualifications of its religious ministers)? I guess it would be possible to construct a facially neutral secular law on this point (i.e. any organization which knows that its representatives / employees will work with children, impliedly represents that said employee is not a pedophile), but it strikes me as a question which would fall within the ministerial exception. With regard to fraudulent concealment claims, I also have concerns about how the imposition of a legal "duty" on the diocese with respect to itspriests avoids the ministerial exception. If you get past that concern, then I agree with you that this is solely a fact-based inquiry which usually will not be resolved on the summary judgment stage (unless the court determines as a matter of law that there is no duty). Regards, Will Steven Jamar [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Will Jim,Is the problem that you think it will be hard to prove fraud? (It usually is.) Or that you don't even see a possible fraud cause of action? Are you saying that making a fraud claim would violate Rule 11? Or that it would not survive a 12(b)(6) (is that still the right number?) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim?States vary on what is required to prove fraud, especially with respect to the level of knowledge of the falseness required. Some states even recognize innocent misrepresentation as a claim. Some states will use a knew-or-should-have-known standard.Fraudulent concealment is generally a fact issue -- including deciding whether under the facts as presented the duty arose. In some cases as a matter of law there is no duty. In others as a matter of law there is a duty.A defen! se based on the repentant priest theory would be a fact-based defense and for the finder of fact to decide, it seems to me. The church can't simply say "I thought he was repentant" and require the court to accept that without challenge. The court may choose to believe it and decide (a) that it is a defense or (b) that it is not a defense (i.e., there is still a duty to disclose even if the church believed the genuineness of the repentance).Failure to speak when one has a duty to allows an inference of representation of the facts being other than they are.None of this is easy to prove in court, of course. Indeed, fraud must even be plead with particularity.But proof problems are quite different from the possibility of such a claim being asserted lawfully.Steve-- Prof. Steven D. Jamar vox: 202-806-8017Howard University School of Law fax: 202-806-84282900 Van Ness Street NW mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]Washington, DC 20008 http://www.law.howard.edu/faculty/pages/jamar"I am in Birmingham because injustice is here. . . . Injustice anywhere is a threat to justice everywhere."Martin Luther King, Jr., (1963)___To post, send message to [EMAIL PROTECTED]To subscribe, unsubscribe, change options, or get password, see http://lists.ucla.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/religionlawWill Esser --- Ad Majorem Dei GloriamWe can easily forgive a child who is afraid of the dark;the real tragedy is when men are afraid of the light.Plato (428-345 B.C.) Do you Yahoo!? Yahoo! Mail - 50x more storage than other providers!___ To post, send message to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To subscribe, unsubscribe, change options, or get password, see http://lists.ucla.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/religionlaw
Re: FW: Interesting question: Portland Archdiocese Filing Chapter 11
On Friday, July 9, 2004, at 12:03 PM, Will Esser wrote: I assume that virtually none of these fraud claims are based on an alleged explicit representation by the Diocese (i.e. As the bishop, I certify that this priest has never been involved in pedophilic activity). That leaves us with potential implied representations by the Diocese (i.e. when you send a priest to a parish, you impliedly represent that he has never been involved in pedophile activity). Would such an implied representation be supportable under the First Amendment (i.e. is it permissible for the law to imply representations by a religious organization about the qualities or qualifications of its religious ministers)? While in the ordinary case I would agree that the court would not be able to entertain a claim about the general fitness of a priest or minister ordained by the pertinent religious organization, in this case it seems to stretch the privilege to its breaking point to say that putting a known, active pedophile in charge of children is something the church can avoid responsibility for to the child and the parents of the child. The ordination must mean something -- and even if it does not, any organization that would put the active pedophile together with kids (soccer clubs, schools, dance studios, etc.) would be liable. In this case why would the church get treated differently? Isn't this one instance where the equal treatment aspect of establishment would cut against the church? (I do not mean by this to endorse the stronger forms of equal treatment or neutrality sometimes urged by some on this list -- just that it is one factor that in particular cases may in fact determine the result.) Isn't this just the Smith case? No special exemption for the church? I don't see dismissing the claim as a matter of law -- I think the implied theory works as it should here. Indeed, can one ever imagine a church advertising a negative like this -- Join us! Our ministers are not pedophiles! -- Not overly likely or certainly not likely to become common. This is exactly the sort of thing that the implied misrep theory is aimed at redressing. Steve -- Prof. Steven D. Jamar vox: 202-806-8017 Howard University School of Law fax: 202-806-8428 2900 Van Ness Street NW mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] Washington, DC 20008 http://www.law.howard.edu/faculty/pages/jamar I am in Birmingham because injustice is here. . . . Injustice anywhere is a threat to justice everywhere. Martin Luther King, Jr., (1963) ___ To post, send message to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To subscribe, unsubscribe, change options, or get password, see http://lists.ucla.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/religionlaw
Re: FW: Interesting question: Portland Archdiocese Filing Chapter 11
In a message dated 7/9/2004 12:04:44 PM Eastern Daylight Time, [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes: I guess it would be possible to construct a facially neutral secular law on this point (i.e. any organization which knows that its representatives / employees will work with children, impliedly represents that said employee is not a pedophile), but it strikes me as a question which would fall within the ministerial exception. Churches find it difficult, if not impossible, to obtain liability insurance covering these kinds of acts unless they have fairly rigorous policies and practices in place to prevent and interdict paedophile and abuse activities. Typical are flat requirements of a background criminal check on everyone that works with, or contacts minors, for the church. Should an implied representation be charged to a church that complies with such a rigorous program? Jim Henderson Senior Counsel ACLJ ___ To post, send message to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To subscribe, unsubscribe, change options, or get password, see http://lists.ucla.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/religionlaw
Re: FW: Interesting question: Portland Archdiocese Filing Chapter 11
Granting of insurance by an insurance company has never been relevant in any case I ever heard of -- car, house, commercial, specialty lines, etc. And insurance doesn't normally protect against fraud does it? On Friday, July 9, 2004, at 12:54 PM, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Churches find it difficult, if not impossible, to obtain liability insurance covering these kinds of acts unless they have fairly rigorous policies and practices in place to prevent and interdict paedophile and abuse activities. Typical are flat requirements of a background criminal check on everyone that works with, or contacts minors, for the church. Should an implied representation be charged to a church that complies with such a rigorous program? Jim Henderson Senior Counsel ACLJ -- Prof. Steven D. Jamar vox: 202-806-8017 Howard University School of Law fax: 202-806-8428 2900 Van Ness Street NW mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] Washington, DC 20008 http://www.law.howard.edu/faculty/pages/jamar Face violence if necesssary, but refuse to return violence. If we respect those who oppose us, they may achieve a new understanding of the human relations involved. Martin Luther King, Jr. ___ To post, send message to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To subscribe, unsubscribe, change options, or get password, see http://lists.ucla.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/religionlaw
Re: FW: Interesting question: Portland Archdiocese Filing Chapter 11
Steven, I didn't mean for the insurance consideration to be a dodge to fraud. The question is I am raising has to do with whether an implied misrepresentation could fairly be charged to a church in today's litigation-heady clime, in which insurance is conditioned on such programs of serious self-policiing. I mean, if fraud is premised upon guilty knowledge, then a church's good faith execution of a plan under which anyone contacting minors is subjected to a criminal background check would seem to be doing what it should and what it can to insure that no one that it knows of is an abuser. Jim Henderson Senior Counsel ACLJ ___ To post, send message to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To subscribe, unsubscribe, change options, or get password, see http://lists.ucla.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/religionlaw
Re: FW: Interesting question: Portland Archdiocese Filing Chapter 11
Steve, But what then is the implied representation that the diocese is making? That the priest will not perform pedophilic acts in the future? Such an alleged representation wouldfail as a matter of lawsince representations which are promises, or deal with future events, are not misrepresented "facts" which can serve as the basis for a fraud claim. Or is the implied representation that the priest, at the time of assignment to a parish, is not an active pedophile? __ "While in the ordinary case I would agree that the court would not be able to entertain a claim about the general fitness of a priest or minister ordained by the pertinent religious organization, in this case it seems to stretch the privilege to its breaking point to say that putting a known, active pedophile in charge of children is something the church can avoid responsibility for to the child and the parents of the child." Iwasn't arguing that some form of liability is not appropriate under certain circumstances. My problem is mostly with trying to fitthe square peg of fraud (and resulting punitive damages)intoa round hole whichis better fit bya claim for respondeat superior / agency / vicarious liability. I think there are some distinctions between your comparison of a priestto a day care counselor or person in charge of a kids' soccer club. The latter's job is, by definition, to work with children. A priest may not work with children at all, depending upon the parish he is assigned to, or his position (e.g. a priest assigned to administration for the diocese). It seems inappropriate to imply a duty to the diocese simply because the individual committing the offense is a priest. Will Steven Jamar [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: On Friday, July 9, 2004, at 12:03 PM, Will Esser wrote: I assume that virtually none of these fraud claims are based on an alleged "explicit" representation by the Diocese (i.e. "As the bishop, I certify that this priest has never been involved in pedophilic activity"). That leaves us with potential "implied" representations by the Diocese (i.e. when you send a priest to a parish, you impliedly represent that he has never been involved in pedophile activity). Would such an "implied" representation be supportable under the First Amendment (i.e. is it permissible for the law to imply representations by a religious organization about the qualities or qualifications of its religious ministers)?While in the ordinary case I would agree that the court would not ! be able to entertain a claim about the general fitness of a priest or minister ordained by the pertinent religious organization, in this case it seems to stretch the privilege to its breaking point to say that putting a known, active pedophile in charge of children is something the church can avoid responsibility for to the child and the parents of the child. The ordination must mean something -- and even if it does not, any organization that would put the active pedophile together with kids (soccer clubs, schools, dance studios, etc.) would be liable. In this case why would the church get treated differently? Isn't this one instance where the equal treatment aspect of establishment would cut against the church? (I do not mean by this to endorse the stronger forms of equal treatment or neutrality sometimes urged by some on this list -- just that it is one factor that in particular cases may in fact determine the result.) ! Isn't this just the Smith case? No special exemption for the church?I don't see dismissing the claim as a matter of law -- I think the implied theory works as it should here. Indeed, can one ever imagine a church advertising a negative like this -- "Join us! Our ministers are not pedophiles!" -- Not overly likely or certainly not likely to become common. This is exactly the sort of thing that the implied misrep theory is aimed at redressing.Steve-- Prof. Steven D. Jamar vox: 202-806-8017Howard University School of Law fax: 202-806-84282900 Van Ness Street NW mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]Washington, DC 20008 http://www.law.howard.edu/faculty/pages/jamar"I am in Birmingham because injustice is here. . . . Injustice anywhere is a threat to justice everywhere."Martin Luther King, Jr., (1963)___To post, send message to [EMAIL PROTECTED]To subscribe, unsubscribe, change options, or get password, see http://lists.ucla.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/religionlawWill Esser --- Ad Majorem Dei GloriamWe can easily forgive a child who is afraid of the dark;the real tragedy is when men are afraid of the light.Plato (428-345 B.C.) Do you Yahoo!? New and Improved Yahoo! Mail - 100MB free storage!___ To post, send message to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To subscribe, unsubscribe, change options, or get password, see http://lists.ucla.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/religionlaw
Re: FW: Interesting question: Portland Archdiocese Filing Chapter 11
In a message dated 7/9/2004 12:04:44 PM Eastern Standard Time, [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes: I assume that virtually none of these fraud claims are based on an alleged "explicit" representation by the Diocese (i.e. "As the bishop, I certify that this priest has never been involved in pedophilic activity"). That leaves us with potential "implied" representations by the Diocese (i.e. when you send a priest to a parish, you impliedly represent that he has never been involved in pedophile activity). One does not need such an unclear implication. The typical modus operandi is for the Diocese to certify the "good character" of the priest coming in and to give a "health" reason for the need for the transfer. Surely, that is fraud, when they know full well the man is a pedophile. On the point Will made earlier that there is some kind of immunity for the church if the "priest is repentant and will not do such acts again", I'm going to assume that was tongue in cheek, right? Do you know what the average number of victims are for an active pedophile? There is never just one. Marci ___ To post, send message to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To subscribe, unsubscribe, change options, or get password, see http://lists.ucla.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/religionlaw
Re: FW: Interesting question: Portland Archdiocese Filing Chapter 11
As many of you already know, Bob Tuttle and I have written a paper about entity liability and supervisory liability in cases of clergy sexual abuse. The paper (entitled Sexual Misconduct and ecclesiastical Immunity) is forthcoming in a Symposium on Church Autonomy in the BYU Law Review, and can be located on-line at: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=510424 I don't want to get into the details of the debate about bankruptcy law or the obligations of insurance companies, but I do want to note that Bob and I have looked at all of the decided cases concerning clergy sexual abuse, and they never focus on claims of fraud. Much more typical are claims of negliegent assignment or negligent supervision of clergy, or claims of breach of fiduciary duty toward victims of such abuse. The latter (which tend to involve church leaders promising but failing to help victims, or failing to reach out to known victims and offer them assisatnce) may be intentional torts, and may fall outside of insurance coverage, but they do not sound in fraud and typically do not arise from failure to disclose a clergyman's prior record at the time of reassignment. Cases involving such failures to disclose are far more typically argued as cases of negligent assignment of clergy. (This includes the case of the Archdiocese of Boston, which was argued exactly this way.) Plaintiffs (and defendant religious entities) of course want insurance coverage to continue; it's the insurance companies that have the financial incentive to recast these cases as some form of intentional tort, and therefore outside the policy. Chip Lupu On 9 Jul 2004 at 10:50, Ross S. Heckmann wrote: - Original Message - [Excerpted] From: Will Esser [My response is in bold in between square brackets--Ross Heckmann] That leaves us with potential implied representations by the Diocese (i.e. when you send a priest to a parish, you impliedly represent that he has never been involved in pedophile activity). [The authority I alluded to earlier in this thread is that which states that for purposes of liability for fradulent misrepresentation, a person makes an implied representation that he is complying with the law in connection with what he has undertaken to do. If he is performing services as a contractor, he impliedly represents that he has obtained a contractor's license as required by law. If he is selling securities, he impliedly represents that those securities have been registered and/or qualified as required by law (or that there are exceptions applicable to such requirements). In this case, the religious body would be making an implied representation that it has screened its priests, religious officials, or other employees, in whatever way that has been required by law. I doubt that liability for fraudulent misrepresentations should be extended further.] Would such an implied representation be supportable under the First Amendment (i.e. is it permissible for the law to imply representations by a religious organization about the qualities or qualifications of its religious ministers)? . . . . it strikes me as a question which would fall within the ministerial exception. [I suppose we could ask more broadly, can the government require a religious body to screen its religious officials in any way whatsoever before they are permitted to have any private contact with a young person (e.g., counseling)? Or does the First Amendment bar the imposition of such a requirement, and a religious body may, if it chooses, free from all government-imposed liability, hire a known,serial pedophile to have private contact with a young person? Surely this is one case where the ministerial exception should not be absolute. Please correct me if I am wrong, because I am not trying to put words into your mouth, butI believe you have acknowledged that some form of liability is appropriate under certain circumstances (albeit not necessarily for fraud).] Regards, Will [Very truly yours, Ross S. Heckmann Attorney at Law Arcadia, California] Ira C. (Chip) Lupu F. Elwood Eleanor Davis Professor of Law The George Washington University Law School 2000 H St., NW Washington D.C 20052 (202) 994-7053 [EMAIL PROTECTED] [EMAIL PROTECTED] ___ To post, send message to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To subscribe, unsubscribe, change options, or get password, see http://lists.ucla.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/religionlaw
Re: Choper's Synthesis of Religion Clauses Tests?
Maybe no one has had that influence in the in the religion area of con law. Frank Michelman's early article on the Takings Clause is generally regarded as having steered the Court and everyone else in the direction of disappointed expectations (Michelman's term is demoralization costs) as a key factor in any analysis of regulatory takings claims. The details remain ad hoc (and in my view always will) but there's one clear counterexample. Marc R. Poirier Professor of Law Seton Hall University School of Law One Newark Center Newark, NJ 07102 973-642-8478 Steven Jamar [EMAIL PROTECTED]To: Law Religion issues for Law Academics [EMAIL PROTECTED] Sent by: cc: [EMAIL PROTECTED]Subject: Re: Choper's Synthesis of Religion Clauses Tests? ts.ucla.edu 07/08/04 03:18 PM Please respond to Law Religion issues for Law Academics I've not studied the effect of anyone's scholarship on the jurisprudence of the Supreme Court, so my comments are merely impressionistic. I think very few of us ever have an effect that can be seen directly. Even if we write something that is persuasive to some members of the Court, it may well have the opposite effect on others. I suspect attorneys sometimes read what we write and make arguments inspired by it. I know many of the attorneys on this list represent clients and write briefs and cite to each other in briefs from time to time. But I don't know of an instance when the Court has adopted any particular paradigm proposed by a scholar and followed it in any formal sense. Or at least not completely. I've not seen Choper's paradigm followed explicitly. Since his work is based in part on describing previous court decisions, one can certainly see these principles being applied in varying degrees in opinions. Steve -- Prof. Steven D. Jamar vox: 202-806-8017 Howard University School of Law fax: 202-806-8428 2900 Van Ness Street NW mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] Washington, DC 20008 http://www.law.howard.edu/faculty/pages/jamar God, give us grace to accept with serenity the things that cannot be changed, courage to change the things which should be changed, and the wisdom to distinguish the one from the other. Reinhold Neibuhr 1943 ___ To post, send message to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To subscribe, unsubscribe, change options, or get password, see http://lists.ucla.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/religionlaw ___ To post, send message to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To subscribe, unsubscribe, change options, or get password, see http://lists.ucla.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/religionlaw
Re: FW: Interesting question: Portland Archdiocese Filing Chapter 11
Marci, To the contrary. In the context of an alleged fraud claim, one of the elements which the plaintiff must prove is the intent to deceive. If the diocese firmly believes that the priest is repentant and will not do such acts again (as I understand was the case with many dioceses who believed that after psychological counseling, the pedophile priests would not repeat their conduct), then such a belief should insulate the diocese from claims of fraud (based upon a lack of intent to deceive). Whether such abeliefwould beplausible today, givenall that has happened, is a different storyentirely. That is not to say that the diocese would be immune from other tort actions (i.e. see Chip's recent paper, which I look forward to reading with interest). Will[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: In a message dated 7/9/2004 12:04:44 PM Eastern Standard Time, [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes: I assume that virtually none of these fraud claims are based on an alleged "explicit" representation by the Diocese (i.e. "As the bishop, I certify that this priest has never been involved in pedophilic activity"). That leaves us with potential "implied" representations by the Diocese (i.e. when you send a priest to a parish, you impliedly represent that he has never been involved in pedophile activity). One does not need such an unclear implication. The typical modus operandi is for the Diocese to certify the "good character" of the priest coming in and to give a "health" reason for the need for the transfer. Surely, that is fraud, when they know full well the man is a pedophile. On the point Will made earlier that there is some kind of immunity for the church if the "priest is repentant and will not do such acts again", I'm going to assume that was tongue in cheek, right? Do you know what the average number of victims are for an active pedophile? There is never just one. Marci___To post, send message to [EMAIL PROTECTED]To subscribe, unsubscribe, change options, or get password, see http://lists.ucla.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/religionlawWill Esser --- Ad Majorem Dei GloriamWe can easily forgive a child who is afraid of the dark;the real tragedy is when men are afraid of the light.Plato (428-345 B.C.) Do you Yahoo!? New and Improved Yahoo! Mail - Send 10MB messages!___ To post, send message to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To subscribe, unsubscribe, change options, or get password, see http://lists.ucla.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/religionlaw
North Carolina Supreme Court Orders Judge Not to Remove God from Courtroom
I thought this would be of interest to list members. I have been unable to find a copy of the State court's order, but will post it if it becomes available. Will CLA Helps Put God Back in North Carolina CourtroomThe North Carolina Supreme Court ruled this week that a state trial judge may not remove references to God in his courtroom. On June 23rd, attorneys for Christian Law Association helped three elected officials file a judicial misconduct complaint with the North Carolina Judicial Standards Commission for Judge James Honeycutt's actions of removing "so help me God" from the statutory oaths given to witnesses and dropping the statutory requirement that witnesses swear or affirm on the Bible. The judge had also warned the courtroom bailiffs that they could no longer invoke the traditional proclamation "God save the state and this honorable court" before the beginning of each court session. Last week, he threatened to hold the bailiffs in contempt if they did not follow his orders by Tuesday, June 29. Because of the judge's looming deadline, the bailiffs could not wait for the Commission's investigation. Therefore, CLA attorneys quickly prepared another petition, which was filed directly with the Chief Justice of the North Carolina Supreme Court two days later, asking the Court to order Judge Honeycutt to comply with state law and tradition. On Monday, June 28, 2004, only one business day after the petition had been filed, the state supreme court ordered Judge Honeycutt to follow the state's oath procedures and to allow the bailiffs to invoke God's protection on the state and the court. Attorney David Gibbs of the Christian Law Association said: "This is a victory over activist judges who are trying to make their own laws, enforce the laws they make up, and then judge the validity of the law in violation of the constitutional separation of powers doctrine. The North Carolina Supreme Court should be applauded for its quick action and for upholding North Carolina's two-hundred-year-old laws and traditions."Will Esser --- Ad Majorem Dei GloriamParker Poe Adams BernsteinCharlotte, North CarolinaWe can easily forgive a child who is afraid of the dark;the real tragedy is when men are afraid of the light.Plato (428-345 B.C.) Do you Yahoo!? New and Improved Yahoo! Mail - Send 10MB messages!___ To post, send message to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To subscribe, unsubscribe, change options, or get password, see http://lists.ucla.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/religionlaw
Re: FW: Interesting question: Portland Archdiocese Filing Chapter 11
Chip, of course, is right about this, but not because the fraud theory has no teeth. There has never been a known organization that did what the Catholic Church has done here--a pattern of coverup, obstruction, and lies to members of their own churches. The claims Chip refers to involve arguments that a single bishop or archdiocese, a la employer, was liable for the particular victim's rape/sexual abuse. Now, there is a pattern of fraudulent and deceptive behavior that is becoming increasingly clear. The fraud claims are starting to roll in now across the country. Ultimately, the CC need not be singled out, because there are other faiths that have similar skeletons. So I think it very likely that we will see these claims increase into the foreseeable future. Marci Bob and I have looked at all of the decided cases concerning clergy sexual abuse, and they never focus on claims of fraud. Much more typical are claims of negliegent assignment or negligent supervision of clergy, or claims of breach of fiduciary duty toward victims of such abuse. ___ To post, send message to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To subscribe, unsubscribe, change options, or get password, see http://lists.ucla.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/religionlaw
