Re: Is Discussion of Justices' Religion "Off Limits"?

2014-07-11 Thread Renee L. Cyr, Esq.
Rich wrote:


> If it is to any degree, is it because we're less concerned about 
> under-representation of Protestants than we are about 
> under-representation of women?


Am I the only one who's noticed that the only religions even being discussed 
are Abrahamic?  If under-representation is on the table, how about 
under-representation of the groups that are probably the most affected by City 
of Greece:  atheists, Hindus, Buddhists, Muslims, Pagans/Neo-Pagans and other 
non-Judeo-Christians?


- Renee


Renee L. Cyr, Esq.
Office of Steve S. Efron
237 West 35th Street, Suite 1502
New York, NY  10001
(212) 867-1067



-Original Message-
From: Richard Friedman 
To: Law & Religion issues for Law Academics 
Cc: Patrick Wiseman ; conlawp...@lists.ucla.edu 

Sent: Fri, Jul 11, 2014 3:04 pm
Subject: Re: Is Discussion of Justices' Religion "Off Limits"?



Well, certainly recent Presidents have made some appointments of women in large 
part because they were women.  I don't think anybody is denying the 
appropriateness of doing so.  Is religion different in this respect?  I wonder. 
 If it is to any degree, is it because we're less concerned about 
under-representation of Protestants than we are about under-representation of 
women?  Is it because we think that religion is less likely than gender to 
shape attitudes on matters of significance for a Supreme Court justice? 


Rich





On Fri, Jul 11, 2014 at 2:34 PM, Marty Lederman  
wrote:



Sandy's very provocative post is here:

http://balkin.blogspot.com/2014/07/the-elephant-in-room.html


As to which I would ask Sandy this:


As I read your post, the "elephant in the middle of the room" is that there is 
an elephant in the middle of the room, and that the elephant makes decisions on 
how to act, in part, based upon its history and perspective as an elephant.


OK, but what follows from that?  Surely not that Presidents should appoint 
fewer elephants.  If it's that Presidents should be indifferent as to nominees' 
religion, I wholly concur.  (Indeed, Article VI virtually requires such 
indifference.)  But that's not much of an issue these days, is it?  Bush 43 did 
not appoint Roberts and Alito, for instance, because they were Catholic.  He 
appointed them because he approved of their foreseeable legal views -- views 
that were in part shaped by their Catholicism, to be sure, but surely Bush was 
indifferent to the question of what the various sources of their jurisprudence 
might be.




On Fri, Jul 11, 2014 at 2:19 PM, Levinson, Sanford V  
wrote:


For what it is worth, I have an extended posting on this on Balkinization, 
balkin.blogspot.com  


I strongly disagree with Larry Tribe on this issue.


Sandy

Sent from my iPhone


On Jul 11, 2014, at 1:10 PM, "Patrick Wiseman"  wrote:



It's my guess that it is exactly that kind of reductionism to which Prof. Tribe 
was originally objecting.
Cheers
Patrick


What might follow is a serious discussion of whether, given life tenure and no 
appellate review of their decisions, ever, the relationship between values and 
law at SCOTUS is and always has been so egregiously out of whack that we should 
recognize as Posner says the Court is a unique "political court," or as I have 
written, it is not really a court at all.


Best,


Eric

Sent from my iPhone

On Jul 11, 2014, at 1:31 PM, "Marty Lederman"  wrote:




If I might be so presumptuous as to shift the question somewhat:


Of course Justices' religion, and their experiences and learnings as adherents 
of particular religions, affects their perspectives when they decide cases, 
especially (but not limited to) cases involving religion (e.g., Town of Greece; 
Hobby Lobby).  If a religion had no such effect on its adherents, it would 
hardly be worthy of the name, right?


So I don't think discussions of this question are or should be "off limits," 
yet I wonder . . . to what end?  If we were all to agree that the Catholic and 
Jewish Justices on the Court have very different perspectives on these 
questions, in part (but not entirely) owing to their experiences and 
understandings as Catholics and Jews, what, exactly, follows from that?





On Fri, Jul 11, 2014 at 1:17 PM, John Bickers  wrote:


When a Justice notes in oral argument (Salazar v. Buono) that the Cross is not 
limited to Christianity but is simply the default memorial because it is "the 
most common symbol" of the dead, how can it not be the case that the justices' 
life experiences--jobs, schools, politics, faith--are playing a role in how 
they decide cases?


John Bickers
Salmon P. Chase College of Law
Northern Kentucky University


From: conlawprof-boun...@lists.ucla.edu [conlawprof-boun...@lists.ucla.edu] on 
behalf of Myron Moskovitz [mmoskov...@ggu.edu]
Sent: Friday, July 11, 2014 1:04 PM
To: CONLAWPROF
Subject: Is Discussion of 

Re: New Twist On Challenge to ACA Contraceptive Mandate

2013-08-15 Thread Renee L. Cyr, Esq.

>Does anyone have a problem with a father, on religious freedom grounds, being 
>able to deny his 18 and 19 year old daughters
>on his insurance policy coverage for contraception that the government has 
>mandated generally?  Those are the facts in this
>case.


I think that's part of the point that Marci was making -- and not only for an 
18 or 19 year old.


The father wasn't just saying he didn't want his girls to practice 
contraception; he said he wanted them to not have access to contraception.  The 
former would be a particular medication used for a particular purpose; the 
latter, as I see it, is access to the particular medication, period.  I can't 
imagine an insurer writing a policy, today, that makes a distinction between 
birth control pills that are prescribed as birth control and those prescribed 
for another stated purpose (in which case the doctor would need to call the 
insurer to get the prescription approved in advance, as is the case today for 
some specialty drugs).  Yet it would seem to me that writing a policy that 
fails to provide for a woman's reproductive health needs -- such as in the case 
of someone needing hormonal "birth control" to control cyst formation, 
excessive bleeding or whatever other symptom -- would violate the law.


And unlike having the power to say "I choose not to use birth control," one 
can't demand that one's body function correctly.  One can't say, "I choose not 
to have cysts" or "bleed excessively during menstruation."  Those conditions 
arise on their own, without warning, and need to be treated when they occur -- 
whether or not the insured expected to ever need hormonal "birth control" for a 
non-contraceptive purpose.  Waiving one's potential access to hormonal 
treatments for these conditions would be, at best, ill advised, though I 
suppose that's not a constitutional issue.


The other issue I see in the previous post is perhaps more relevant (and it 
might be the only one he intended to address) -- how can someone demand that 
mandated health coverage *not* be provided for someone else?  It would seem to 
me that he can't -- any such waiver would need to be signed by the daughters 
themselves.  The father would, of course, have the right to not carry his 
daughters on his policy if they refused to sign the waiver.  (I'm not going to 
address the issues regarding coercion that may be ethically compelling but not 
directly relevant to this discussion.)


- Renee


Renee L. Cyr, Esq.
Office of Steve S. Efron
237 West 35th Street, Suite 1502
New York, NY  10001
(212) 867-1067



-Original Message-
From: Friedman, Howard M. 
To: Law & Religion issues for Law Academics 
Sent: Thu, Aug 15, 2013 10:48 pm
Subject: RE: New Twist On Challenge to ACA Contraceptive Mandate



Does anyone have a problem with a father, on religious freedom grounds, being 
able to deny his 18 and 19 year old daughters on his insurance policy coverage 
for contraception that the government has mandated generally?  Those are the 
facts in this case.


From: religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu [religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu] 
on behalf of Len [campquest...@comcast.net]
Sent: Thursday, August 15, 2013 6:59 PM
To: Ed Darrell; Law & Religion issues for Law Academics
Subject: Re: New Twist On Challenge to ACA Contraceptive Mandate




>> As far as I understand the situation, no one legally objects to the health 
>> (unrelated to reproduction) use of the pill.<<

If an employer objects to coverage for contraceptives, how is he to tell the 
difference without prying into his employee's medical condition?  Isn't there a 
potential HIPAA violation in there somewhere?




From: "Ed Darrell" 
To: "Law & Religion issues for Law Academics" 
Sent: Thursday, August 15, 2013 3:16:01 PM
Subject: Re: New Twist On Challenge to ACA Contraceptive Mandate


A good, too-often, too-badly needed reality check, Marci.  Thanks.

I still wonder whether there is any controversy here to adjudicate.  Why cannot 
the plaintiff simply refuse the coverage?  Or refuse contraception?

I'm partly reminded by my 7th-Day Adventist end of the family, and my Uncle 
Roland Christian.  He was a bit up in the hierarchy of the church, and as some 
Adventists do, he and his wife abstained from coffee.

So, we were surprised at one visit when, at a restaurant, he made a relatively 
big deal about ordering a "therapeutic" cup of coffee after dinner.  Eventually 
he explained that both of them had been diagnosed with low blood pressure at 
Loma Linda Hospital.  Their Adventist physician gave them a choice of a pill, 
at about $1 a day each, or taking a cup of coffee in the morning, and one in 
the evening.  Back then you could still get a decent cup at most restaurants 
for less than 50 cents.  They chose the cof