RE: Minister convicted for teaching parishioners to punish children byhitting them on the bare buttocks with wooden dowels
Here's another story from last year stating that the pastor and others had been charged with multiple counts of actual child abuse: http://www.aolnews.com/2011/03/26/members-of-aleitheia-bible-church-in-wisco nsin-charged-with-abus/ _ From: religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu [mailto:religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu] On Behalf Of Volokh, Eugene Sent: Sunday, May 13, 2012 4:10 PM To: Law Religion issues for Law Academics Subject: Minister convicted for teaching parishioners to punish children byhitting them on the bare buttocks with wooden dowels I would think that such a conviction would likely be unconstitutional under the Free Speech Clause, given Brandenburg v. Ohio, even without regard to any special religious freedom claim (note that Wisconsin courts read the Wisconsin Constitution following Sherbert/Yoder). It seems to me that teaching parishioners the propriety of such conduct - even illegal conduct - doesn't fit within the Brandenburg exception, because it isn't intended to yield imminent lawless conduct; and I don't think the general teachings would fit within the United States v. Williams solicitation exception, since no specific act is being discussed. On the other hand, it's possible that pastoral counseling of a specific parent, telling the parent to engage in illegal child abuse (assuming the discipline is indeed illegal) might qualify as solicitation of crime and not just abstract advocacy. Or is this analysis mistaken? Relatedly, could ministers of churches that teach that marijuana is a sacrament be prosecuted for conspiracy to engage in criminal possession or receipt of marijuana? Could imams who preach the propriety of jihad be prosecuted for conspiracy to engage in jihad, just based on the teaching alone? Eugene http://host.madison.com/wsj/news/local/crime_and_courts/motion-to-dismiss-ch arges-against-black-earth-pastor-denied/article_3c17db6a-9b01-11e1-967a-001a 4bcf887a.html A Dane County judge on Thursday denied a motion to dismiss charges against a Black Earth pastor convicted of conspiracy to commit child abuse for advocating the use of wooden rods to spank children as young as 2 months old. Philip Caminiti, 55, pastor of the Aleitheia Bible Church, was convicted in March of eight counts of conspiracy to commit child abuse for instructing church members to punish children by hitting them on the bare buttocks with wooden dowels to teach them to behave correctly, in keeping with the church's literal interpretation of the Bible. The motion to dismiss the charges alleged Caminiti had been deprived of his constitutional right to religious freedom. Circuit Judge Maryann Sumi found that Caminiti had a sincerely held religious belief as a Christian fundamentalist that requires using a rod to discipline children beginning at a young age. But Sumi said Caminiti failed to show the state's child abuse statute places a burden on his sincerely held religious belief. Scripture doesn't specify how and when the rod should be used, Sumi said, adding that Caminiti also was willing to modify the church's practices to comply with the law ___ To post, send message to Religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu To subscribe, unsubscribe, change options, or get password, see http://lists.ucla.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/religionlaw Please note that messages sent to this large list cannot be viewed as private. Anyone can subscribe to the list and read messages that are posted; people can read the Web archives; and list members can (rightly or wrongly) forward the messages to others.
RE: Contraceptives and gender discrimination
Alan, I'm not denying the sincerity of those who truly see this as a religious liberty issue. I'm just saying that there are also many people in the political arena on this issue who are just crying crocodile tears. My concern is with the consistency of logic behind the argument from religious liberty. How do you feel about my hypo? Can the government demand certain standards of accepted medical practice in exchange for a flow of funds to a religiously affiliated hospital? If so, is that a more acceptable infringement? _ From: religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu [mailto:religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu] On Behalf Of Alan Brownstein Sent: Monday, February 13, 2012 11:25 AM To: Law Religion issues for Law Academics Subject: RE: Contraceptives and gender discrimination Any legitimate issue can be manipulated politically. That doesn't stop it from being a legitimate issue. There is a religious left in this country. It frequently takes liberal positions on culture war issues. Many of its members believe the contraceptive services mandate raises a serious religious liberty issue. Those of us who take this position certainly should be prepared to have our views challenged on the merits. But it is more than a bit disconcerting to be lumped together with Obama's opponents as painting this as an assault on religious liberty. This issue has been litigated in state courts a decade ago. It was a religious liberty issue than and it is a religious liberty issue now. Alan Brownstein From: religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu [mailto:religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu] On Behalf Of Steve Sanders Sent: Monday, February 13, 2012 12:51 PM To: 'Law Religion issues for Law Academics' Subject: RE: Contraceptives and gender discrimination What if a hospital is run by a religious group that believes doctrinally and sincerely in not using advanced technology or extraordinary interventions to prolong human life. In response, the government says, no, if you want to receive federal funds, you'll employ conventional medical standards and treatments. This burdens the institution's religious liberty by requiring it to use resources in a way that violates its religious principles, doesn't it? Yet in this case, it's highly doubtful that there would be any hew and cry about the sect's religious liberty. Obama's opponents and the Catholic hierarchy have done an effective job painting this as an assult on religious liberty. But let's be honest, this is really about controversial (i.e., those that remain part of the culture wars) v. non-controversial government mandates. If a religious group chooses to operate in the public sphere by running hospitals and universities, it gives up some of its claim to be free of generally applicable government policies and regulation. I had thought that principle was reasonably well settled. Some might say, well yes, if the religious group is running a McDonald's franchise, that's different. But why should profit or tax status be the relevant consideration? Steve Sanders _ From: religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu [mailto:religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu] On Behalf Of Alan Brownstein Sent: Monday, February 13, 2012 10:27 AM To: Law Religion issues for Law Academics Subject: RE: Contraceptives and gender discrimination I have to admit that as long as we are talking about private resources, I have a hard time understanding the argument that there is no burden on religious institutions here. The private resources of religious institutions are dedicated to conduct obligated by or at least consistent with religious beliefs and doctrine. How can it not be a burden on the institution's religious liberty for the state to require those resources to be used in a way that violates the religious principles to which the institution is committed. As for the analogy to taxes, I have always though there was a burden here -although it is attenuated, difficult to mitigate, and probably overridden by important state interests. But wouldn't a tax imposed on a class including religious institutions that was earmarked for a specific purpose -such as providing contraceptive services-raise a more difficult question? Alan Brownstein ___ To post, send message to Religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu To subscribe, unsubscribe, change options, or get password, see http://lists.ucla.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/religionlaw Please note that messages sent to this large list cannot be viewed as private. Anyone can subscribe to the list and read messages that are posted; people can read the Web archives; and list members can (rightly or wrongly) forward the messages to others.
RE: Contraceptives and gender discrimination
What if a hospital is run by a religious group that believes doctrinally and sincerely in not using advanced technology or extraordinary interventions to prolong human life. In response, the government says, no, if you want to receive federal funds, you'll employ conventional medical standards and treatments. This burdens the institution's religious liberty by requiring it to use resources in a way that violates its religious principles, doesn't it? Yet in this case, it's highly doubtful that there would be any hew and cry about the sect's religious liberty. Obama's opponents and the Catholic hierarchy have done an effective job painting this as an assult on religious liberty. But let's be honest, this is really about controversial (i.e., those that remain part of the culture wars) v. non-controversial government mandates. If a religious group chooses to operate in the public sphere by running hospitals and universities, it gives up some of its claim to be free of generally applicable government policies and regulation. I had thought that principle was reasonably well settled. Some might say, well yes, if the religious group is running a McDonald's franchise, that's different. But why should profit or tax status be the relevant consideration? Steve Sanders _ From: religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu [mailto:religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu] On Behalf Of Alan Brownstein Sent: Monday, February 13, 2012 10:27 AM To: Law Religion issues for Law Academics Subject: RE: Contraceptives and gender discrimination I have to admit that as long as we are talking about private resources, I have a hard time understanding the argument that there is no burden on religious institutions here. The private resources of religious institutions are dedicated to conduct obligated by or at least consistent with religious beliefs and doctrine. How can it not be a burden on the institution's religious liberty for the state to require those resources to be used in a way that violates the religious principles to which the institution is committed. As for the analogy to taxes, I have always though there was a burden here -although it is attenuated, difficult to mitigate, and probably overridden by important state interests. But wouldn't a tax imposed on a class including religious institutions that was earmarked for a specific purpose -such as providing contraceptive services-raise a more difficult question? Alan Brownstein From: religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu [mailto:religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu] On Behalf Of Ira Lupu Sent: Monday, February 13, 2012 5:50 AM To: Marc DeGirolami Cc: Zietlow, Rebecca E.; Walsh, Kevin; Law Religion issues for Law Academics; Con Law Prof list Subject: Re: Contraceptives and gender discrimination On the burden question -- Religious entities may limit hiring to co-religionists, and then make their best efforts to enforce religious norms against employees. Doesn't that option make the burden of the HHS policy far less substantial? I think a common reaction to the religious liberty claim being advanced here is its leveraging effect on employees who are not of the faith. So even if some faiths have a religious mission to serve others, do they similarly have a religious mission to employ others? Or is it their religious mission to impede access to contraception by all, whether or not of the faith? If it's the latter, I don't know why their position is any different from or stronger than taxpayers who don't want to to support what they see as immoral activity by their government. ___ To post, send message to Religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu To subscribe, unsubscribe, change options, or get password, see http://lists.ucla.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/religionlaw Please note that messages sent to this large list cannot be viewed as private. Anyone can subscribe to the list and read messages that are posted; people can read the Web archives; and list members can (rightly or wrongly) forward the messages to others.
RE: Contraceptives and gender discrimination
I'm not talking about a Rust v. Sullivan type government program that mandates or prohibits specific speech, I'm thinking of the spending clause power to attach conditions to government money. See, e.g., Grove City College. Hospitals get all manner of govt funds through Medicare and Medicaid, research grants, etc. So Eugene, would religious liberty be just as improperly infringed if the govt required specific standards of medical care (my hypo) in exchange for acceptance of government funding? Another question: assuming that religious liberty and free speech/association are on equal par as constitutional rights, isn't this really like FAIR v. Rumsfeld? How is it different, other than the relative popularity (or political exploitability) of the constitutional rights involved? Isn't the burden here just as incidental and necessary as the burden on law schools was in FAIR? If not, why not? _ From: religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu [mailto:religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu] On Behalf Of Volokh, Eugene Sent: Monday, February 13, 2012 11:04 AM To: Law Religion issues for Law Academics Subject: RE: Contraceptives and gender discrimination Isn't there a difference here between (1) accepting specific subsidies (federal funds) that the government insists be used for behavior that furthers specific government goals, and (2) operat[ing] in the public sphere by running hospitals and universities? By way of analogy, consider the Free Speech Clause. Rust v. Sullivan says that the government may insist that certain funds be used to promote prenatal care and not abortion; and though the holding is controversial as to that particular fact pattern, I assume it would be uncontroversial as to most other funding programs. But it hardly follows, I take it, that anyone running a hospital could be ordered not to speak out in favor of abortion, or even some medical procedure that is not constitutionally protected. Eugene From: religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu [mailto:religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu] On Behalf Of Steve Sanders Sent: Monday, February 13, 2012 12:51 PM To: 'Law Religion issues for Law Academics' Subject: RE: Contraceptives and gender discrimination What if a hospital is run by a religious group that believes doctrinally and sincerely in not using advanced technology or extraordinary interventions to prolong human life. In response, the government says, no, if you want to receive federal funds, you'll employ conventional medical standards and treatments. This burdens the institution's religious liberty by requiring it to use resources in a way that violates its religious principles, doesn't it? Yet in this case, it's highly doubtful that there would be any hew and cry about the sect's religious liberty. Obama's opponents and the Catholic hierarchy have done an effective job painting this as an assult on religious liberty. But let's be honest, this is really about controversial (i.e., those that remain part of the culture wars) v. non-controversial government mandates. If a religious group chooses to operate in the public sphere by running hospitals and universities, it gives up some of its claim to be free of generally applicable government policies and regulation. I had thought that principle was reasonably well settled. Some might say, well yes, if the religious group is running a McDonald's franchise, that's different. But why should profit or tax status be the relevant consideration? Steve Sanders _ From: religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu [mailto:religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu] On Behalf Of Alan Brownstein Sent: Monday, February 13, 2012 10:27 AM To: Law Religion issues for Law Academics Subject: RE: Contraceptives and gender discrimination I have to admit that as long as we are talking about private resources, I have a hard time understanding the argument that there is no burden on religious institutions here. The private resources of religious institutions are dedicated to conduct obligated by or at least consistent with religious beliefs and doctrine. How can it not be a burden on the institution's religious liberty for the state to require those resources to be used in a way that violates the religious principles to which the institution is committed. As for the analogy to taxes, I have always though there was a burden here -although it is attenuated, difficult to mitigate, and probably overridden by important state interests. But wouldn't a tax imposed on a class including religious institutions that was earmarked for a specific purpose -such as providing contraceptive services-raise a more difficult question? Alan Brownstein From: religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu [mailto:religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu] On Behalf Of Ira Lupu Sent: Monday, February 13, 2012 5:50 AM To: Marc DeGirolami Cc: Zietlow, Rebecca E.; Walsh, Kevin; Law Religion issues for Law Academics; Con
RE: Go to Church or Go to Jail?
I suspect the response from the Alabama legislators would actually be more truculent! _ From: religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu [mailto:religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu] On Behalf Of hamilto...@aol.com Sent: Monday, September 26, 2011 3:58 PM To: religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu; conlawp...@lists.ucla.edu Subject: Re: Go to Church or Go to Jail? First, this is hilarious. Second, it reminds me of my cousin, who is a principal at a public high school in Kentucky. When we were visiting several years ago, he left dinner early to draft the school prayer to be read over the PA for the next day. When I joked that that might be a problem for the Supreme Court, he just smiled. I would imagine that would be the response from the Alabama lawmakers on this issue. Marci A. Hamilton Paul R. Verkuil Chair in Public Law Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law Yeshiva University 55 Fifth Avenue New York, NY 10003 215-353-8984 In a message dated 9/26/2011 5:41:16 P.M. Eastern Daylight Time, ma...@law.villanova.edu writes: That's what it appears to be (sorry for cross-posting but this should be useful to subscribers on both lists looking for an exam question, to say nothing of the expected discussion). http://news.blogs.cnn.com/2011/09/26/jesus-or-jail-alabama-town-offers-optio ns-for-serving-time/?hpt=hp_t2 Headline and first paragraph: Jesus http://news.blogs.cnn.com/2011/09/26/jesus-or-jail-alabama-town-offers-opti ons-for-serving-time/ or jail? Alabama town offers options for serving time If you're charged with a nonviolent crime in one Alabama town, you might just have the chance to pray it all away. Starting this week, under a new program called Operation ROC (Restore Our Community), local judges in Bay Minette, Alabama, will give those found guilty of misdemeanors the choice of serving out their time in jail, paying a fine or attending church each Sunday for a year. James Edward Maule Professor of Law Villanova University School of Law ma...@law.villanova.edu http://vls.law.villanova.edu/prof/maule = ___ To post, send message to Religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu To subscribe, unsubscribe, change options, or get password, see http://lists.ucla.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/religionlaw Please note that messages sent to this large list cannot be viewed as private. Anyone can subscribe to the list and read messages that are posted; people can read the Web archives; and list members can (rightly or wrongly) forward the messages to others. marci%20hamilton%20signature%20cropped.jpg___ To post, send message to Religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu To subscribe, unsubscribe, change options, or get password, see http://lists.ucla.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/religionlaw Please note that messages sent to this large list cannot be viewed as private. Anyone can subscribe to the list and read messages that are posted; people can read the Web archives; and list members can (rightly or wrongly) forward the messages to others.
RE: Teacher suspended for anti-same-sex-marraige Facebook post
I wasn't meaning to imply that the analysis was easy, just that familiar doctrinal machinery exists in the form of the public employee speech doctrine. If the teacher where to sue alleging violation of his First Amendment rights, are you implying that he would/could/should make some argument other than under Pickering? Same-sex marriage is surely one of the most prominent public controversies, but are you suggesting that somehow takes it out of the usual public employee speech framework? (You posted this on a religion list, but is there any indication that the teacher was speaking in any religious context or that some question of religious liberty is implicated? Other than a generic reference to sin, the comments reported appear to be rather crude garden-variety bigotry, not religious speech.) I am sympathetic to the teacher and his speech rights and, based only on the reported facts, I think the school's action is open to serious question. The difficulties Eugene describes seem to be inherent in the doctrine the Court has provided, not unique to this particular problem. And I believe there is particular danger or impropriety in government practices that essentially pressure government employees to shut ... at least if they are speaking on one particular side when we're talking about any topic of public concern, not just this one. Steve _ From: religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu [mailto:religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu] On Behalf Of Volokh, Eugene Sent: Friday, August 19, 2011 8:43 AM To: Law Religion issues for Law Academics Subject: RE: Teacher suspended for anti-same-sex-marraige Facebook post I'm not sure that there is such a thing as a straightforward Pickering ... analysis. Balanc[ing] the interests of the teacher, as a citizen, in commenting upon matters of public concern with the interest of the State, as an employer, in promoting the efficiency of the public services it performs through its employees strikes me as generally far from straightforward: It requires balancing two hard-to-quantify things that, on top of the difficulty of quantification, are different enough to be largely incommensurable. But beyond this, it seems to me that the particular problem here is: How do we evaluate the interests of citizens in commenting upon matters of public concern in a situation like this, where the issue - same-sex marriage - is one of the most prominent social, religious, and political topics of our time? Is there particular danger or impropriety in government practices that essentially pressure government employees to shut up on this sort of topic, at least if they are speaking on one particular side of the topic? Eugene From: religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu [mailto:religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu] On Behalf Of Steve Sanders Sent: Friday, August 19, 2011 5:41 AM To: Law Religion issues for Law Academics Cc: Law Religion issues for Law Academics Subject: Re: Teacher suspended for anti-same-sex-marraige Facebook post Doesn't this call for a straightforward Pickering/Connick analysis? I'm assuming Garcetti wouldn't apply, unless the teacher used Facebook to communicate officially with students. I lean strongly in favor of protecting the teacher's speech which, crude as it was, was clearly on a matter of public concern. So isn't the key inquiry whether the employer can demonstrate that this particular speech was harmful to the good order and discipline of the school? Seems to me there would be lots of facts we'd need to know. Was the post readable by anyone or just the teacher's Facebook friends? What's the climate for gay students at the school? Could it be argued that this post realistically (without the fuss caused by the suspension itself) would have caused harm to gay students or disrupted the school generally? Steve Sanders University of Michigan Law School On Aug 18, 2011, at 6:56 PM, Volokh, Eugene vol...@law.ucla.edu wrote: Any thoughts on this? http://www.cnn.com/2011/US/08/18/florida.teacher.facebook/ Lake County Schools Communications Officer Chris Patton said school officials received a complaint Tuesday about the content on Mount Dora High School teacher Jerry Buell's personal Facebook page CNN affiliate Central Florida News 13 reported that a status post on it said, I'm watching the news, eating dinner, when the story about the New York okaying same sex unions came on and I almost threw up. Patton would not confirm the content of the post, but he said Lake County officials are taking the matter very seriously. We began to review the code of ethics violations immediately and yesterday afternoon temporarily reassigned the teacher pending the outcome of the investigation, Patton told CNN Thursday The newspaper said that in the same July 25 post, Buell said same-sex marriages were part of a cesspool and were a sin. ... Buell, a teacher for more than 26
RE: Teacher suspended for anti-same-sex-marraige Facebook post
Mark, I appreciate your counterexample. As may have been clarified by my response to Eugene, it's not an on other other hand sort of thing -- I think you and I actually are in agreement. I too worry that it's too easy to stifle public employee speech rights. All I'm saying is, we're stuck with the current doctrine. The question is, how should we make it better? Interesting question about academic freedom if the teacher were a professor. Courts have generally viewed college campuses as more robust speech environments than K-12 settings, on the principles that uninhibited debate is critical to academic life and that college students are not (or at least should not be) the kind of sensitive plants that younger students can be. As a Garcetti matter, this particular speech would seem to have absolutely nothing to do with a teacher's official responsibilities, and as a Pickering matter I would hope no public university would argue that it somehow interfered with its operations and good order. Thus, the speech should simply receive the same protection as that of any other citizen. One problem we're seeing is that courts seem willing to sweep a lot of faculty speech under the heading of official duties and thereby make it subject to employer discipline. I'm co-counsel for the AAUP as amicus in a pending 7th Circuit case that illustrates the problem. (The brief is at http://www-personal.umich.edu/~stevesan/CapeheartAAUPBrief.pdf http://www-personal.umich.edu/~stevesan/CapeheartAAUPBrief.pdf). The professor here engaged in a campus protest, something we might assume is core First Amendment speech, yet the district court construed it has part of her professorial duties. Steve _ From: religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu [mailto:religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu] On Behalf Of Scarberry, Mark Sent: Friday, August 19, 2011 9:31 AM To: Law Religion issues for Law Academics Subject: RE: Teacher suspended for anti-same-sex-marraige Facebook post There is much to be said for Steve's point of view. On the other hand, consider the implications. What about a teacher whose blog severely criticizes creationists (I want to puke when I hear that Gov. Perry wants to have schools teach creationism) or who says that religion sickens him or who says that anyone who supports the Iraq war or that 911 was a US plot to justify invading Afghanistan and Iraq etc.? Doesn't this also lead to a heckler's veto, in which students who don't like the teacher's point of view will protest and then it will be claimed that the Pickering/Connick analysis justifies taking action against the teacher? How would this work in the context of academic freedom in a university? Mark S. Scarberry Professor of Law Pepperdine Univ. School of Law Malibu, CA 90263 (310) 506-4667 From: religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu [mailto:religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu] On Behalf Of Steve Sanders Sent: Friday, August 19, 2011 5:41 AM To: Law Religion issues for Law Academics Cc: Law Religion issues for Law Academics Subject: Re: Teacher suspended for anti-same-sex-marraige Facebook post Doesn't this call for a straightforward Pickering/Connick analysis? I'm assuming Garcetti wouldn't apply, unless the teacher used Facebook to communicate officially with students. I lean strongly in favor of protecting the teacher's speech which, crude as it was, was clearly on a matter of public concern. So isn't the key inquiry whether the employer can demonstrate that this particular speech was harmful to the good order and discipline of the school? Seems to me there would be lots of facts we'd need to know. Was the post readable by anyone or just the teacher's Facebook friends? What's the climate for gay students at the school? Could it be argued that this post realistically (without the fuss caused by the suspension itself) would have caused harm to gay students or disrupted the school generally? Steve Sanders University of Michigan Law School On Aug 18, 2011, at 6:56 PM, Volokh, Eugene vol...@law.ucla.edu wrote: Any thoughts on this? http://www.cnn.com/2011/US/08/18/florida.teacher.facebook/ Lake County Schools Communications Officer Chris Patton said school officials received a complaint Tuesday about the content on Mount Dora High School teacher Jerry Buell's personal Facebook page CNN affiliate Central Florida News 13 reported that a status post on it said, I'm watching the news, eating dinner, when the story about the New York okaying same sex unions came on and I almost threw up. Patton would not confirm the content of the post, but he said Lake County officials are taking the matter very seriously. We began to review the code of ethics violations immediately and yesterday afternoon temporarily reassigned the teacher pending the outcome of the investigation, Patton told CNN Thursday The newspaper said that in the same July 25 post, Buell said same-sex marriages were part of a cesspool
RE: Teacher suspended for anti-same-sex-marraige Facebook post
This is essentially a chilling-effect argument. Eugene, is your position simply that Pickering analysis should look beyond the individual interests of the speaker and consider such potential chilling effects on others who hold similar views? Or are you arguing that there may be some reason to think that religiously motivated anti-gay speakers are inherently more likely to be chilled, and thus deserve more solicitude, than others who speak on prominent public controversies? It should be noted that, P.C. school administrators aside (and cf. the 7th Circuit Nuxoll case, which upheld the in-school right to wear gratuitous anti-gay slogans on t-shirts) religiously motivated opponents of gay rights on the whole exercise their speech and political rights quite robustly and effectively. Are you suggesting that, all other things being equal, we should nonetheless give special solicitude to the chilling effects on their speech? Should we be equally concerned about chilling effects on the vocal gay-rights Unitarians in a rural Indiana community, or anyone else who risks employer retaliation for speaking out in a way that's unpopular or socially disapproved in their particular local context? Steve _ From: religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu [mailto:religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu] On Behalf Of Volokh, Eugene Sent: Friday, August 19, 2011 9:37 AM To: Law Religion issues for Law Academics Subject: RE: Teacher suspended for anti-same-sex-marraige Facebook post I agree that as a doctrinal matter Pickering is the rule, for speech about same-sex marriage as well as for speech about other topics. But Pickering's usual public employee speech framework requires an inquiry into the magnitude of the the interests of the teacher, as a citizen, in commenting upon matters of public concern - and, I take it, the interests of society more broadly in allowing such speech (cf. United States v. National Treasure Employees Union). The question is how we should evaluate this interest when it comes to speech on such prominent public controversies. As to the link to religion: One question in the debate about gay rights is the degree to which gays and lesbians will be free to build their families, and have access to government-provided benefits connected to marriage. (I actually support such claims.) But another is the degree to which those who belong to religious groups that oppose same-sex marriage and oppose homosexuality will find that their expression of their religious beliefs - whether cast in expressly religious terms or not -- is not only seen by others as rather crude garden-variety bigotry but is also used as a basis for being fired from government jobs, being disciplined by their K-12 schools or colleges, being subjected to potential civil liability for hostile work environment harassment. After all, I take it that a public schoolteacher who sees Buell disciplined or fired for his speech would likewise be reasonably worried that he might be fired even for more expressly religious expressions of his anti-same-sex-marriage views, no? Such religious expression may be no less potentially disruptive than Buell's expression, and in some situations may be more potentially disruptive, for instance if the teacher says this in a medium that is intentionally opened to all potential listeners (e.g., a rally, a letter to the editor, etc.). To be sure, many of the people who oppose same-sex marriage do so for nonreligious reasons. (Opposition to same-sex marriage is more prevalent among religious people, but even some nonreligious people take that view.) But the law-of-government-and-religion link, it seems to me, is the risk that particular religious groups will find their expression of their religiously motivated views (again, whether expressly cast in terms of religion or not) will lead to firings and more. Eugene From: religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu [mailto:religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu] On Behalf Of Steve Sanders Sent: Friday, August 19, 2011 11:25 AM To: 'Law Religion issues for Law Academics' Subject: RE: Teacher suspended for anti-same-sex-marraige Facebook post I wasn't meaning to imply that the analysis was easy, just that familiar doctrinal machinery exists in the form of the public employee speech doctrine. If the teacher where to sue alleging violation of his First Amendment rights, are you implying that he would/could/should make some argument other than under Pickering? Same-sex marriage is surely one of the most prominent public controversies, but are you suggesting that somehow takes it out of the usual public employee speech framework? (You posted this on a religion list, but is there any indication that the teacher was speaking in any religious context or that some question of religious liberty is implicated? Other than a generic reference to sin, the comments reported appear to be rather crude garden-variety
RE: May American court appoint only Muslim arbitrators, pursuant to an arbitration agreement?
I recognize this isn't an employment discrimination case, but is the constitutional problem eased if the religion of the arbitrators could be considered a bona fide occupational qualification? We recognize constitutional exceptions for those, right? Per Marc's question, presuming the contract was otherwise valid under state law, it's not clear to me that merely appointing arbitrators who are qualified according to the terms of a contract amounts to a court applying sharia law. Evidently it's the arbitration panel, not the court, that is called on to apply sharia law in the course of interpreting the contract. Generally, the whole point of arbitration is to avoid the courts as much as possible through a private, extrajudicial mechanism for settling disputes. Parties typically agree on arbitrators without the involvement of a court. Thus, it seems to me that if an arbitration agreement is properly drafted, the constitutional issue of a court's discriminatory appointment process shouldn't arise as a matter of design. Steve Sanders Quoting Marc Stern ste...@ajc.org: But would this agreement be enforceable in Oklahoma ,with its ban on courts applying sharia law? Marc D. Stern Associate General Counsel 165 East 56th Street NY NY 10022 ste...@ajc.org 212.891.1480 646.287.2606 (cell) -Original Message- From: religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu [mailto:religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu] On Behalf Of Douglas Laycock Sent: Monday, January 03, 2011 02:33 To: Law Religion issues for Law Academics; Eric Rassbach Subject: Re: May American court appoint only Muslim arbitrators,pursuant to an arbitration agreement? The court could apparently comply with the contract, and avoid all entanglement iwth religion, by appointing three Saudis. Does anybody see a problem with that? I assume that all Saudis are Muslim, or at least that the percentage is so high that the odds of appointing a non-Muslim Saudi are negligible. On Mon, 3 Jan 2011 12:34:05 -0500 Eric Rassbach erassb...@becketfund.org wrote: Here is the relevant provision (in translation) from the case-link Eugene sent around: The Arbitrator must be a Saudi national or a Moslem foreigner chosen amongst the members of the liberal professions or other persons. He may also be chosen amongst state officials after agreement of the authority on which he depends. Should there be several arbitrators, the Chairman must know the Shari'a, commercial laws and the customs in force in the Kingdom. From: religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu [religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu] On Behalf Of Volokh, Eugene [vol...@law.ucla.edu] Sent: Monday, January 03, 2011 11:46 AM To: Law Religion issues for Law Academics Subject: RE: May American court appoint only Muslim arbitrators, pursuant toan arbitration agreement? I agree with Nate's neutral principles / entanglement argument. But I wonder whether one can so easily dismiss the equal protection argument from the enforcement of the contract. The court, after all, would have to decide who gets to perform an important and lucrative task based on that person's religion, whether or not it's merely enforcing a private contract. Of course the judge won't be acting based on religious animus, but he will be deliberately treating people differently based on religion. Also, is the Batson / J.E.B. line of cases relevant here, assuming that it can be expanded to peremptories based on religion and not just race or sex? (As I recall, most lower court cases that have considered the issue have indeed expanded Batson and J.E.B. to religion.) If a court may not allow a private party to challenge a juror based on religion, even when the judge wouldn't himself be discriminating based on religion, may a court allow private party agreement to provide for selection - by the judge - of an arbitrator based on religion? Eugene From: religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu [mailto:religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu] On Behalf Of Nathan Oman Sent: Monday, January 03, 2011 7:28 AM To: Law Religion issues for Law Academics Subject: Re: May American court appoint only Muslim arbitrators, pursuant to an arbitration agreement? It seems difficult to find an equal protection violation if the Court is merely enforcing the contract. It seems to me that a more likely constitutional objection would be that the contract cannot be enforced without running afoul of the neutral principles doctrine. Can a court make a decision about who is or is not a Muslim without making theological choices? Would a shia muslim be acceptable? A member of the nation of Islam? Nathan B. Oman Associate Professor William Mary Law School P.O. Box 8795 Williamsburg, VA 23187 (757) 221-3919 I beseech you, in the bowels of Christ, think it possible you may be mistaken. -Oliver Cromwell On Mon, Jan 3
Re: May American court appoint only Muslim arbitrators, pursuant to an arbitration agreement?
Is someone applying for a military chaplaincy required or expected to have some religious qualification or membership in a religious order? Could a nonbeliever who nonetheless has an extensive academic knowledge of religion sue for discrimination if she's denied such employment? On Jan 3, 2011, at 1:11 PM, Volokh, Eugene vol...@law.ucla.edu wrote: I'm not sure whether BFOQ doctrine as to religion helps us much as to the First Amendment analysis. That private entities aren't barred from discriminating based on religion in some contexts doesn't necessarily tell us, I think, that the government has an equally free hand. Eugene -Original Message- From: religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu [mailto:religionlaw- boun...@lists.ucla.edu] On Behalf Of Steve Sanders Sent: Monday, January 03, 2011 12:53 PM To: religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu Subject: RE: May American court appoint only Muslim arbitrators, pursuant to an arbitration agreement? I recognize this isn't an employment discrimination case, but is the constitutional problem eased if the religion of the arbitrators could be considered a bona fide occupational qualification? We recognize constitutional exceptions for those, right? Per Marc's question, presuming the contract was otherwise valid under state law, it's not clear to me that merely appointing arbitrators who are qualified according to the terms of a contract amounts to a court applying sharia law. Evidently it's the arbitration panel, not the court, that is called on to apply sharia law in the course of interpreting the contract. Generally, the whole point of arbitration is to avoid the courts as much as possible through a private, extrajudicial mechanism for settling disputes. Parties typically agree on arbitrators without the involvement of a court. Thus, it seems to me that if an arbitration agreement is properly drafted, the constitutional issue of a court's discriminatory appointment process shouldn't arise as a matter of design. Steve Sanders Quoting Marc Stern ste...@ajc.org: But would this agreement be enforceable in Oklahoma ,with its ban on courts applying sharia law? Marc D. Stern Associate General Counsel 165 East 56th Street NY NY 10022 ste...@ajc.org 212.891.1480 646.287.2606 (cell) -Original Message- From: religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu [mailto:religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu] On Behalf Of Douglas Laycock Sent: Monday, January 03, 2011 02:33 To: Law Religion issues for Law Academics; Eric Rassbach Subject: Re: May American court appoint only Muslim arbitrators,pursuant to an arbitration agreement? The court could apparently comply with the contract, and avoid all entanglement iwth religion, by appointing three Saudis. Does anybody see a problem with that? I assume that all Saudis are Muslim, or at least that the percentage is so high that the odds of appointing a non-Muslim Saudi are negligible. On Mon, 3 Jan 2011 12:34:05 -0500 Eric Rassbach erassb...@becketfund.org wrote: Here is the relevant provision (in translation) from the case-link Eugene sent around: The Arbitrator must be a Saudi national or a Moslem foreigner chosen amongst the members of the liberal professions or other persons. He may also be chosen amongst state officials after agreement of the authority on which he depends. Should there be several arbitrators, the Chairman must know the Shari'a, commercial laws and the customs in force in the Kingdom. From: religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu [religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu] On Behalf Of Volokh, Eugene [vol...@law.ucla.edu] Sent: Monday, January 03, 2011 11:46 AM To: Law Religion issues for Law Academics Subject: RE: May American court appoint only Muslim arbitrators, pursuant toan arbitration agreement? I agree with Nate's neutral principles / entanglement argument. But I wonder whether one can so easily dismiss the equal protection argument from the enforcement of the contract. The court, after all, would have to decide who gets to perform an important and lucrative task based on that person's religion, whether or not it's merely enforcing a private contract. Of course the judge won't be acting based on religious animus, but he will be deliberately treating people differently based on religion. Also, is the Batson / J.E.B. line of cases relevant here, assuming that it can be expanded to peremptories based on religion and not just race or sex? (As I recall, most lower court cases that have considered the issue have indeed expanded Batson and J.E.B. to religion.) If a court may not allow a private party to challenge a juror based on religion, even when the judge wouldn't himself be discriminating based on religion, may a court allow private party agreement to provide for selection - by the judge
Re: May American court appoint only Muslim arbitrators, pursuant to an arbitration agreement?
To say that military and prison chaplains get special treatment under First Amendment law isn't to explain why that should be so or why it should be restricted to that context. With chaplains, the govt appoints people based on specific religious qualifications to attend to the specific needs of an identifiable group. Under the hypo we're dealing with here it seems to me that's all the court is being asked to do. If it isn't objectionable in one context, why is it in another? On Jan 3, 2011, at 1:31 PM, Volokh, Eugene vol...@law.ucla.edu wrote: One difficulty is that we don't have much law on what constitutes a BFOQ where religion is concerned. But I think military (and prison) chaplaincy cases are generally treated very differently under the First Amendment than other kinds of cases, as to a wide range of First Amendment doctrines -- the ban on religious discrimination, the ban on religious decisions by the government, the ban on government funding of religious practice, and more. So I'm not sure the BFOQ analysis would be that helpful here, or that those cases are generalizable outside the military/prison context. Eugene -Original Message- From: religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu [mailto:religionlaw- boun...@lists.ucla.edu] On Behalf Of Steve Sanders Sent: Monday, January 03, 2011 3:28 PM To: Law Religion issues for Law Academics Cc: Law Religion issues for Law Academics Subject: Re: May American court appoint only Muslim arbitrators, pursuant to an arbitration agreement? Is someone applying for a military chaplaincy required or expected to have some religious qualification or membership in a religious order? Could a nonbeliever who nonetheless has an extensive academic knowledge of religion sue for discrimination if she's denied such employment? On Jan 3, 2011, at 1:11 PM, Volokh, Eugene vol...@law.ucla.edu wrote: I'm not sure whether BFOQ doctrine as to religion helps us much as to the First Amendment analysis. That private entities aren't barred from discriminating based on religion in some contexts doesn't necessarily tell us, I think, that the government has an equally free hand. Eugene -Original Message- From: religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu [mailto:religionlaw- boun...@lists.ucla.edu] On Behalf Of Steve Sanders Sent: Monday, January 03, 2011 12:53 PM To: religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu Subject: RE: May American court appoint only Muslim arbitrators, pursuant to an arbitration agreement? I recognize this isn't an employment discrimination case, but is the constitutional problem eased if the religion of the arbitrators could be considered a bona fide occupational qualification? We recognize constitutional exceptions for those, right? Per Marc's question, presuming the contract was otherwise valid under state law, it's not clear to me that merely appointing arbitrators who are qualified according to the terms of a contract amounts to a court applying sharia law. Evidently it's the arbitration panel, not the court, that is called on to apply sharia law in the course of interpreting the contract. Generally, the whole point of arbitration is to avoid the courts as much as possible through a private, extrajudicial mechanism for settling disputes. Parties typically agree on arbitrators without the involvement of a court. Thus, it seems to me that if an arbitration agreement is properly drafted, the constitutional issue of a court's discriminatory appointment process shouldn't arise as a matter of design. Steve Sanders Quoting Marc Stern ste...@ajc.org: But would this agreement be enforceable in Oklahoma ,with its ban on courts applying sharia law? Marc D. Stern Associate General Counsel 165 East 56th Street NY NY 10022 ste...@ajc.org 212.891.1480 646.287.2606 (cell) -Original Message- From: religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu [mailto:religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu] On Behalf Of Douglas Laycock Sent: Monday, January 03, 2011 02:33 To: Law Religion issues for Law Academics; Eric Rassbach Subject: Re: May American court appoint only Muslim arbitrators,pursuant to an arbitration agreement? The court could apparently comply with the contract, and avoid all entanglement iwth religion, by appointing three Saudis. Does anybody see a problem with that? I assume that all Saudis are Muslim, or at least that the percentage is so high that the odds of appointing a non-Muslim Saudi are negligible. On Mon, 3 Jan 2011 12:34:05 -0500 Eric Rassbach erassb...@becketfund.org wrote: Here is the relevant provision (in translation) from the case-link Eugene sent around: The Arbitrator must be a Saudi national or a Moslem foreigner chosen amongst the members of the liberal professions or other persons. He may also be chosen amongst state officials after agreement of the authority on which he depends. Should
RE: Perry v. Schwarzenegger - Effect of Religious Beliefs
Well, it was a finding of fact (suppored by evidence) in this particular case, not a legal holding. Moreover, the context is the plaintiffs' arguments that Prop 8 was inappropriately enacted in part on the basis of religious beliefs; not that religious beliefs were part of the debate, which is of course acceptable, but rather that Prop 8 effectively enacts religious doctrine in order to abridge 14th Amendment rights. No one familiar with Prop 8 -- least of all its proponents -- thought it was merely about some sort of secularly motivated discrimination. So I don't see that the judge could or should have simply avoided the question. Even if such a finding of fact were problematic for free exercise, as Will suggests, the enactment of religiously motivated discrimination seems to me more problematic from the standpoint of establishment. Steve Sanders _ From: religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu [mailto:religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu] On Behalf Of Will Esser Sent: Friday, August 06, 2010 4:05 PM To: Religion Law Subject: Perry v. Schwarzenegger - Effect of Religious Beliefs In the district court's recent opinion regarding the constitutionality of Proposition 8, Judge Walker included the following as Finding of Fact #77 (page 103 of the opinion): Religious beliefs that gay and lesbian relationships are sinful or inferior to heterosexual relationships harm gays and lesbians. I am troubled by the fact that Judge Walker's finding is tied to religious beliefs rather than simply talking about discriminatoryactions (which can presumably be dealt with by appropriately drafted non-discrimination laws and which may be caused by either religious or non-religious beliefs). A finding that religious beliefs themselves harm other people (particularly a particular class of people which Judge Walker concludes are entitled to strict scrutiny review as the type of minority strict scrutiny was designed to protect) strikes me as a conclusion that could lead to problematic First Amendment issues related to both freedom of religion and speech. Others thoughts on this particular finding? Will Will Esser --- Ad Majorem Dei Gloriam Charlotte, North Carolina We can easily forgive a child who is afraid of the dark; the real tragedy is when men are afraid of the light. (Attributed to Plato, 428-345 B.C.) ___ To post, send message to Religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu To subscribe, unsubscribe, change options, or get password, see http://lists.ucla.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/religionlaw Please note that messages sent to this large list cannot be viewed as private. Anyone can subscribe to the list and read messages that are posted; people can read the Web archives; and list members can (rightly or wrongly) forward the messages to others.
City rejects atheist bus ad as too controversial
The Indiana Atheist Bus Campaign is seeking to buy advertising on municipal buses with the slogans In the beginning, man created God and You can be good without God. The group explains on its web site ( http://inatheistbus.org/ http://inatheistbus.org/), We want to let everyone know that it's all right not to believe in a deity, that you do not need to be 'saved,' and that you can be a good person without religion. We hope that everyone will look at the facts and evidence before making life decisions, including religion. The bus operator in Bloomington, IN (my old stomping grounds) refused to accept the You can be good without God ads because they were too controversial. The Indiana Civil Liberties Union has sued on behalf of the campaign. See http://inatheistbus.org/2009/05/05/bloomington-rejects-you-can-be-good-with out-god-lawsuit-underway/ http://inatheistbus.org/2009/05/05/bloomington-rejects-you-can-be-good-witho ut-god-lawsuit-underway/ for links to the complaint and press release. Bloomington Mayor Mark Kruzan (disclosure: one of my undergrad classmates and old friends) says the city legal department won't represent Bloomington Transit, which is a separate municipal corporation which contracts with the city legal department. According to the Bloomington Herald-Times, Kruzan said having city legal defend BT in court would amount to 'promoting government sanctioned censorship' because the bus service gets city legal's services at an hourly rate less than that of a private law firm, which is in essence a partial taxpayer subsidy. _ Steve Sanders http://www.mayerbrown.com/lawyers/profile.asp?hubbardid=S597744167 Attorney, Supreme Court and appellate litigation practice group, Mayer Brown LLP, Chicago Co-editor, http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/lgbtlaw/ Sexual Orientation and the Law Blog Adjunct faculty, University of Michigan Law School (Winter term 2010) Email: mailto:steve...@umich.edu steve...@umich.edu Personal home page: http://www.stevesanders.net/ www.stevesanders.net ___ To post, send message to Religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu To subscribe, unsubscribe, change options, or get password, see http://lists.ucla.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/religionlaw Please note that messages sent to this large list cannot be viewed as private. Anyone can subscribe to the list and read messages that are posted; people can read the Web archives; and list members can (rightly or wrongly) forward the messages to others.
Fish on Hobbes on religious exemptions
Apropos of recent discussions on this list, Stanley Fish as a worthwhile commentary on the NYT web site: http://fish.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/04/12/conscience-vs-conscience/. Among other things, he grounds the discussion in some classical political philosophy: Hobbes's larger point - the point he is always making - is that if one gets to prefer one's own internal judgments to the judgments of authorized external bodies (legislatures, courts, professional associations), the result will be the undermining of public order and the substitution of personal whim for general decorums: . . . because the Law is the public Conscience . . . in such diversity as there is of private Consciences, which are but private opinions, the Commonwealth must needs be distracted, and no man dare to obey the Sovereign Power farther than it shall seem good in his own eyes. _ Steve Sanders http://www.mayerbrown.com/lawyers/profile.asp?hubbardid=S597744167 Attorney, Supreme Court and appellate litigation practice group, Mayer Brown LLP, Chicago Co-editor, http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/lgbtlaw/ Sexual Orientation and the Law Blog Adjunct faculty, University of Michigan Law School (Winter term 2010) Email: mailto:steve...@umich.edu steve...@umich.edu Personal home page: http://www.stevesanders.net/ www.stevesanders.net ___ To post, send message to Religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu To subscribe, unsubscribe, change options, or get password, see http://lists.ucla.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/religionlaw Please note that messages sent to this large list cannot be viewed as private. Anyone can subscribe to the list and read messages that are posted; people can read the Web archives; and list members can (rightly or wrongly) forward the messages to others.
RE: Impact of same-sex marriage rulings on strict scrutinyinreligious exemption cases
The protected sphere for religion should involve that which is actually religious. Thus, churches should not be compelled to dispense sacraments to those of whom they disapprove. But when churches step outside that sphere in order to play (as Roger puts it) a robust role in public life, as they have a right to do, aren't they necessarily expected to honor the public laws? Roger seems to be arguing for special privileges -- freedom not only to dispense sacraments in the religious sphere, but also freedom to serve as arbiter of whose marriages may be solemnized in the public sphere. But the freedom to practice religion cannot mean that, when it enters the public square, a religious institution gets to remain a law unto itself. For purposes of civil marriage, solemnization is not an inherently religious activity. Thus, why should a church be allowed to pick and choose which marriages it will solemnize in the state's name? Isn't the power to perform solemnizations a privilege, not a right? Imagine we're in a state that doesn't allow same-sex marriage, but a house of worship insists that it be allowed to create such marriages (and have them fully recognized by the state) because failure to do so would violate its freedom of conscience? How is that different from letting churches turn away those whom the law deems entitled to solemnization? In both cases, religious freedom is being used to demand a special niche where civil rules are bent in order to conform to religious doctrines. Steve Sanders _ From: religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu [mailto:religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu] On Behalf Of Roger Severino Sent: Wednesday, April 08, 2009 9:28 PM To: religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu Subject: RE: Impact of same-sex marriage rulings on strict scrutinyinreligious exemption cases Art, I am curious to know why you think same-sex marriage states will not (ever?) impose new regulations on the power of clergy to solemnize civil marriages. As for the religious liberty interests at stake, it is again, not a question of direct coercion, but of whether religious institutions that remain true to their religious identity will be allowed to retain a robust role in public life when that identity conflicts with the priorities or preferences of the state. Religious solemnization of civil marriage is just one manifestation of this issue--partnerships with religious institutions and government in the provision of social services (like adoption or marriage counseling) is another, and the list goes on. Another concern I had in mind was the fact that if the state does move to strip clergy of their solemnization power, it may do so selectively. That is, only certain houses of worship would literally get the state seal of approval to solemnize marriages while others would not and the state's choice of winners and losers will turn precisely on each religious institutions' theology of marriage. -Roger Severino (Disclaimer: all opinions expressed are mine alone) In a message dated 4/7/09 11:11:32 PM, rseveri...@hotmail.com writes: what is to stop Iowa from stripping dissenting religious institutions, and only such institutions, of the power to solemnize *civil* marriages? That seems unlikely to me, but what if it does -- how does that deprive a religious institution of its *religious* liberty? http://windowslive.com/explore?ocid=TXT_TAGLM_WL_allup_1a_explore_042009 _ Rediscover HotmailR: Get e-mail storage that grows with you. Check it out. http://windowslive.com/RediscoverHotmail?ocid=TXT_TAGLM_WL_HM_Rediscover_St orage1_042009 ___ To post, send message to Religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu To subscribe, unsubscribe, change options, or get password, see http://lists.ucla.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/religionlaw Please note that messages sent to this large list cannot be viewed as private. Anyone can subscribe to the list and read messages that are posted; people can read the Web archives; and list members can (rightly or wrongly) forward the messages to others.
RE: Impact of same-sex marriage rulings on strictscrutinyinreligious exemption cases
Thanks, Tom, I appreciate these good and valid points. If a state gives heightened scrutiny to sexual orientation, I suppose there would be an argument that blanket discrimination against gays and lesians might be different than the sorts of discretionary decisions churches already make as you describe, but that's another can of worms. I don't necessarily think we should radically alter the exisiting state of affairs. Mostly my goal was to get us to acknowledge the privileged (perhaps uniquely so) role that churches already enjoy vis-a-vis civil marriage, at a time when we're considering whether they should get even larger freedoms to use their authority over civil marriage in ways that implement religious dictates. Steve Sanders _ From: religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu [mailto:religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu] On Behalf Of Berg, Thomas C. Sent: Thursday, April 09, 2009 11:29 AM To: 'Law Religion issues for Law Academics' Subject: RE: Impact of same-sex marriage rulings on strictscrutinyinreligious exemption cases Churches can and do refuse to perform the marriages of those who the clergyman thinks are not ready, or who don't have some connection to the church, or who don't go through a religious counseling class, etc., although all those people are entitled to civil marriage. So far as I can see, almost no clergy other than the marriage-mill ministers adopt the virtually no questions asked rule that is the baseline eligibility for civil marriage. But the church's decision not to solemnize has no effect on the state's rule, because the couple can typically go to any one of a number of public officials with ease. By contrast, in Steve's hypo, a church's claim to be able to perform a marriage with civil effect when the state's laws don't recognize it would clearly affect the state's policy. It seems to me that's a significant difference. Steve's argument therefore would logically exclude virtually all churches from performing marriages with civil effect. Perhaps that's where we will or should go; a complete separation of civil and religious marriage has a logical consistency. But it's not obvious that we should take that step - eliminating the state message of the solemnity of civil marriage that is sent by including clergy among those who can perform marriages, and telling all religiously oriented couples they should get married twice - in the name of avoiding church refusals to marry that don't burden anyone's access to civil marriage. If other on the hand, only some churches end up being excluded, as Roger Severino suggests may happen, that in my view would indicate that the exclusion was not based on which churches caused more harm to the state's policies - for again, couples have easy alternative means. It would indicate the exclusion was based on the state's disagreement with the group's theology. - Thomas C. Berg St. Ives Professor of Law Co-Director, Murphy Institute for Catholic Thought, Law, and Public Policy University of St. Thomas School of Law MSL 400, 1000 LaSalle Avenue Minneapolis, MN 55403-2015 Phone: (651) 962-4918 Fax: (651) 962-4996 E-mail: tcb...@stthomas.edu SSRN: http://ssrn.com/author='261564 Weblog: http://www.mirrorofjustice.blogs.com/mirrorofjustice _ From: religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu [mailto:religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu] On Behalf Of Steve Sanders Sent: Thursday, April 09, 2009 1:06 AM To: 'Law Religion issues for Law Academics' Subject: RE: Impact of same-sex marriage rulings on strict scrutinyinreligious exemption cases The protected sphere for religion should involve that which is actually religious. Thus, churches should not be compelled to dispense sacraments to those of whom they disapprove. But when churches step outside that sphere in order to play (as Roger puts it) a robust role in public life, as they have a right to do, aren't they necessarily expected to honor the public laws? Roger seems to be arguing for special privileges -- freedom not only to dispense sacraments in the religious sphere, but also freedom to serve as arbiter of whose marriages may be solemnized in the public sphere. But the freedom to practice religion cannot mean that, when it enters the public square, a religious institution gets to remain a law unto itself. For purposes of civil marriage, solemnization is not an inherently religious activity. Thus, why should a church be allowed to pick and choose which marriages it will solemnize in the state's name? Isn't the power to perform solemnizations a privilege, not a right? Imagine we're in a state that doesn't allow same-sex marriage, but a house of worship insists that it be allowed to create such marriages (and have them fully recognized by the state) because failure to do so would violate its freedom of conscience? How
RE: Americans United: Iowa SupremeCourtRulingOnMarriageUpholdsReligious Liberty, Says Americans United
Thanks, Doug. Me too. I may have made the hypo too easy, though. Let's say no other counselor is available in the university-based program (budget cuts, everyone else is also an atheist, or whatever). The religious student needs to go outside the university program and seek help from a private practitioner. Same outcome, i.e., no suit against the university for religious discrimination or establishment of a particular perspective on religion? _ From: religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu [mailto:religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu] On Behalf Of Douglas Laycock Sent: Tuesday, April 07, 2009 10:39 AM To: religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu Subject: RE: Americans United: Iowa SupremeCourtRulingOnMarriageUpholdsReligious Liberty, Says Americans United I do. Referring him to another counselor is clearly the best solution in terms of policy, and legally, the atheist should have the same protection as the believer. They are both acting on a matter of conscience arising out of their views about religion. Quoting Steve Sanders steve...@umich.edu: Let's say a student comes to a counselor in the same university clinical program and wants help understanding how religion might him better deal with his personal problems. The counselor is an atheist and believes as a matter of conscience that religion does not play a valid role in helping people deal with their problems. The counselor refers the student to another counselor. I predict that the Alliance Defense Fund would sue the school claiming that its counseling program was attempting to impose a certain (derogatory) view about religion, much as ADF recently (successfully) sued a university based on commentary about religious views toward homosexuality that appeared in student-created literature in the school's Safe Zone program. Do Rick and Doug agree that such a suit would be silly and that the common-sense, live-and-let-live ethic also ought to prevail in such a case? _ Steve Sanders http://www.mayerbrown.com/lawyers/profile.asp?hubbardid=S597744167 Attorney, Supreme Court and appellate litigation practice group, Mayer Brown LLP, Chicago Co-editor, http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/lgbtlaw/ Sexual Orientation and the Law Blog Adjunct faculty, University of Michigan Law School (Winter term 2010) Email: mailto:steve...@umich.edu steve...@umich.edu Personal home page: http://www.stevesanders.net/ www.stevesanders.net _ From: religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu [mailto:religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu] On Behalf Of Douglas Laycock Sent: Tuesday, April 07, 2009 9:24 AM To: religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu Subject: RE: Americans United: Iowa Supreme CourtRulingOnMarriageUpholdsReligious Liberty, Says Americans United Clarification: This was a student at Eastern Michigan University. Michigan State University had a rough night last night against Carolina, but it had nothing to do with discriminating against Ms. Ward. This issue was litigated a few years ago in the Social Work Department at Southwest Missouri State, and if I recall, ended in a big settlement for the student. These cases are clear examples where live and let live yields an obvious solution -- refer the gay counselee to a counselor who can actually help him and will have no conflict with conscience -- and ideologues on one side or the other reject live and let live and seek either coercively imposed thought reform or explusion from the program. Quoting Rick Duncan nebraskalawp...@yahoo.com: Here is another example--from the Religion Clause blog-- of the inevitable conflict between gay rights and religious liberty: Former Student Challenges University's Requirements for Counseling Practicum Last week, a former graduate student at Michigan State University filed suit in a Michigan federal district court alleging that she was unconstitutionally dismissed from the University's graduate Counselling Program solely because her religious beliefs and expression regarding homosexual behavior contradicted those of the University's counseling department. Ward believes that homosexual behavior is immoral and can be changed. In Ward v. Members of the Board of Control of Eastern Michigan University, (ED MI, filed 4/2/2009) (full text of complaint), Julea Ward alleged that disciplinary proceedings were brought against her because in her Counseling Practicum course she referred a homosexual client to another counsellor rather than affirm and validate the client's homosexual conduct. She was told that to remain in the program she would need to undergo a remediation program to see the error of her ways and change her belief system on homosexual conduct. Alliance Defense Fund issued a release announcing the filing of the lawsuit. The University today refused specific comment, but said that it is a diverse campus with a strong commitment not to discriminate on the basis of gender
RE: Americans United: Iowa Supreme CourtRulingOnMarriageUpholdsReligious Liberty, Says Americans United
Professor Berg writes: Without significant exemptions, the advent of same-sex marriage in a state increases the prospect that non-profit religious schools and social services, even those with religious content throughout their programs, will be punished if they refuse to hire openly gay people as teachers or counselors or to pay benefits to their partners. Up until the phrase or to pay benefits to their partners, I'm afraid I can't follow the logic. A single gay person could already attempt to pitch a fuss about being refused employment by a non-profit religious school or social service. How does the advent of same-sex marriage increase the likelihood that such challenges will succeed? If a gay person is denied a job on the basis of sexual orientation, what difference does it make whether he's single or married? Benefits to spouses may be a different issue. If a religious school or social service employs a gay person, that person is legally married, and the relevant state recognizes the marriage, then can someone suggest a legal argument under which the employer could legitimately refuse to subsidize health insurance for the gay spouse while doing so for a heterosexual spouse? If not, what's the best argument for an exemption? What if a heterosexual spouse who was seeking benefits subscribed to religious doctrines that were incompatible with those of the religious employer. Would an exemption be justified under those circumstances? Why is that different than they gay spouse? _ Steve Sanders Attorney, Supreme Court and appellate litigation practice group, Mayer Brown LLP, Chicago Co-editor, Sexual Orientation and the Law Blog Adjunct faculty, University of Michigan Law School (Winter term 2010) Email: steve...@umich.edu Personal home page: www.stevesanders.net -Original Message- From: religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu [mailto:religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu] On Behalf Of Berg, Thomas C. Sent: Monday, April 06, 2009 7:45 PM To: Law Religion issues for Law Academics Subject: RE: Americans United: Iowa Supreme CourtRulingOnMarriageUpholdsReligious Liberty, Says Americans United I agree that it is extremely unlikely that an objecting church or clergyperson will be forced to host or perform a same-sex marriage. But I wouldn't rest this on the argument that no couple would seek to be married by someone who doesn't want to marry them. After all, it's a good question why any couple would want, from all the wedding photographers available, one who [in Alan's terms] thinks their relationship is sinful and is only [conceiving and shooting the pictures] under threat of legal sanction. To subject Elaine Huguenin, the photographer, to a legal sanction of $6,600-plus, all Vanessa Willcock and her partner had to do was complain to the New Mexico Human Rights Commission on the ground that they felt shocked, angered, saddened, and fearful when Elaine told them she didn't do same-sex ceremonies. It is hard to deny that some gay-rights proponents want to get antidiscrimination sanctions against conscientious objectors whose services they wouldn't actually! want, or need, to use. That may not extend to forcing houses of worship to marry people, but not because of a general live and let live attitude. I applaud Alan's proposal for an exemption in the next California proposal, but why shouldn't the exemption be broader? The hypothetical church pressured to perform a ceremony hardly exhausts the range of religious liberty issues raised by same-sex marriage. Without significant exemptions, the advent of same-sex marriage in a state increases the prospect that non-profit religious schools and social services, even those with religious content throughout their programs, will be punished if they refuse to hire openly gay people as teachers or counselors or to pay benefits to their partners. It may do this by directly triggering the obligation to pay spousal benefits, by changing the legal characterization of a hiring decision from marital-status discrimination to sexual-orientation discrimination, or by strengthening the claim that -- like race in Bob Jones -- there is a firm [governmental] policy against sexual-orientation discrimination in virtually every context. - Thomas C. Berg St. Ives Professor of Law Co-Director, Murphy Institute for Catholic Thought, Law, and Public Policy University of St. Thomas School of Law MSL 400, 1000 LaSalle Avenue Minneapolis, MN 55403-2015 Phone: (651) 962-4918 Fax: (651) 962-4996 E-mail: tcb...@stthomas.edu SSRN: http://ssrn.com/author='261564 Weblog: http://www.mirrorofjustice.blogs.com/mirrorofjustice -- -- From: religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu
RE: Americans United: Iowa Supreme Court RulingOn MarriageUpholdsReligious Liberty, Says Americans United
I think Brad's fears are unfounded because they are based on implausible speculation. I would note one point, though. For such fears to come true, it would seem that courts and the rest of society would need to lose sight of the critical distinctions between religious marriage and civil marriage. Ironically, it is the forces opposed to same-sex marriage that have done the most to seek to elide, if not erase, that distinction. _ Steve Sanders Attorney http://www.mayerbrown.com/lawyers/profile.asp?hubbardid=S597744167 , Supreme Court and appellate litigation practice group, Mayer Brown LLP, Chicago Co-editor, Sexual Orientation and the Law Blog http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/lgbtlaw/ Adjunct faculty, University of Michigan Law School (Winter term 2010) Email: steve...@umich.edu Personal home page: www.stevesanders.net -Original Message- From: religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu [mailto:religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu] On Behalf Of Ed Brayton Sent: Saturday, April 04, 2009 9:38 AM To: 'Law Religion issues for Law Academics' Subject: RE: Americans United: Iowa Supreme Court RulingOn MarriageUpholdsReligious Liberty, Says Americans United I think Brad's comparison to interracial marriage in the context of churches being forced to perform gay marriages cuts against his argument. There are certainly churches that do refuse to perform interracial marriages in this country, probably a whole lot of them. Do you know of any case in which anyone has even suggested, much less been successful in arguing, that they be forced to do so? To say that it's not a stretch to say that there are those who would support saying a church can't refuse to perform marriages of African-Americans is a far cry from showing that there is even the most remote chance of success if anyone actually tried to force them to do so. There simply is no constituency with any influence that would push such an idea, either with regard to interracial marriage or same-sex marriage. The vast majority of people who support same-sex marriage (like me) reject the idea of forcing churches to perform them and would strongly support the inclusion of explicit exemptions in any law establishing such unions. It seems to me that this is most obviously covered under the ministerial exception and I find it almost inconceivable that any court would rule otherwise. It has now been 42 years since Loving v Virginia and no one has ever attempted to do what you use as evidence of the slippery slope here. I think that tends to show just how unlikely your imagined future is. Ed Brayton -Original Message- From: religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu [mailto:religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu] On Behalf Of Brad Pardee Sent: Friday, April 03, 2009 9:54 PM To: Law Religion issues for Law Academics Subject: Re: Americans United: Iowa Supreme Court Ruling On MarriageUpholdsReligious Liberty, Says Americans United You're talking about different religions, though, Steve. The standard model that we see in the debate over gay rights is to compare it to the civil rights movement in the 60s. People who don't support gay marriage are characterized as being no different than people who didn't support interracial marriage. Do you think it is a stretch to say that there are those who would support saying a church can't refuse to perform marriages of African-Americans? Using the way the debate is waged as a measuring stick, it seems safe to say that it's only a matter of time before there will be those who also support saying a church can't refuse to perform commitment ceremonies of homosexuals. And fear-mongering? I can accept that we disagree on the possibility of this line of argument coming to fruition. I fully believe that your views are based on an honest assessment of what you believe to be true. But I don't think I've EVER heard the term fear-mongering used where it wasn't inferring some manner of dishonest manipulation, propagandizing, and pandering. Is that a fair assumption to make about what I wrote? I might be wrong. I hope I'm wrong. But I'm honestly speaking what I believe to be true. Disagree with me if you believe I'm wrong. I wouldn't want you to pretend to agree if you don't. But it's not fear-mongering just because we disagree on whether there is something to legitimately be afraid of. Brad - Original Message - From: Steven Jamar stevenja...@gmail.com To: Law Religion issues for Law Academics religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu Sent: Friday, April 03, 2009 8:05 PM Subject: Re: Americans United: Iowa Supreme Court Ruling On MarriageUpholdsReligious Liberty, Says Americans United It is quite a stretch to say someone must not discriminate in renting property or providing secular services to say that religious organizations and their officiants
2 CT lawmakers target Catholic church for opposition to marriage equality
I've posted a link to the bill and to a related commentary at http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/lgbtlaw/2009/03/two-ct-lawmaker.html. _ Steve Sanders http://www.mayerbrown.com/lawyers/profile.asp?hubbardid=S597744167 Attorney, Supreme Court and appellate litigation practice group, Mayer Brown LLP, Chicago Co-editor, http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/lgbtlaw/ Sexual Orientation and the Law Blog Email: mailto:steve...@umich.edu steve...@umich.edu Personal home page: http://www.stevesanders.net/ www.stevesanders.net ___ To post, send message to Religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu To subscribe, unsubscribe, change options, or get password, see http://lists.ucla.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/religionlaw Please note that messages sent to this large list cannot be viewed as private. Anyone can subscribe to the list and read messages that are posted; people can read the Web archives; and list members can (rightly or wrongly) forward the messages to others.
FW: A Constitutional Framework for Addressing Religious Viewpoints in Public School Classrooms an Issue Brief by Anthony F. Renzo
Thought members of the list might be interested in this issue brief from ACS. Please see below. _ Steve Sanders stevesan mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] @ umich.edu www.stevesanders.net _ From: American Constitution Society [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] Sent: Tuesday, April 29, 2008 8:19 AM To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Subject: A Constitutional Framework for Addressing Religious Viewpoints in Public School Classrooms an Issue Brief by Anthony F. Renzo http://rs6.net/on.jsp?t=1102067784462.0.108412099.1863ts=S0328o=http: //ui.constantcontact.com/images/p1x1.gif http://img.constantcontact.com/letters/images/round_corner_tl.gif http://img.constantcontact.com/letters/images/spacer.gif http://www.acslaw.org/photos/logo2.jpg http://img.constantcontact.com/letters/images/spacer.gif http://img.constantcontact.com/letters/images/spacer.gif The American Constitution Society's Constitution in the 21st Century project invites you to read: A http://rs6.net/tn.jsp?e=001ef9_Hu6pRsTx_WwnPMDnqTcKEgrWVXWtrhrdZOv4O2i9oQBV miQ6mXlMIMueyljYvTY025K_AF5-7WpHm0bvWGyMfH1DTJPfiOpOX2XJgBbBugmdn-8Zz_Npn2CA BZx7 Constitutional Framework for Addressing Religious Viewpoints in Public School Classrooms An Issue Brief by: Edward Correia ACS is pleased to distribute an Issue Brief by Edward Correia, Washington, D.C. attorney and adjunct professor at American University's Washington College of Law, entitled, A Constitutional Framework for Addressing Religious Viewpoints in Public School Classrooms. In the debate over the constitutional separation of church and state in the U.S., one ongoing issue is how religious viewpoints may be addressed in our nation's public schools. In this paper, the author takes on this sometimes controversial subject by reviewing various possible approaches and examining those approaches in light of the legal precedent in this area of the law. Throughout the paper, the author uses the specific examples of the teaching of creationism, intelligent design, and evolution in science class to illustrate community tensions over these issues and to convey his views on what is constitutionally permissible and what is not. Corriea concludes by arguing that it is possible to distinguish among three distinct classroom approaches in specific course contexts: acknowledging religious beliefs, explaining religious beliefs and endorsing religious beliefs. Under his approach, the first is always constitutionally permissible, the second may be permissible depending upon the context, and the third fails to pass constitutional muster. He advocates a thoughtful, nuanced approach that respects religious freedom, diversity and tolerance while advocating compliance with the Constitution's prohibition on the State establishment of religion. The American Constitution Society for Law and Policy (ACS) is one of the nation's leading progressive legal organizations. Founded in 2001, ACS is a rapidly growing network of lawyers, law students, scholars, judges, policymakers and other concerned individuals. Our mission is to ensure that fundamental principles of human dignity, individual rights and liberties, genuine equality, and access to justice enjoy their rightful, central place in American law. For more information about the organization, which has established student chapters at over 157 law schools around the country and lawyer chapters in over 25 cities, www.ACSLaw.org http://rs6.net/tn.jsp?e=001ef9_Hu6pRsRqq17LC1lfELZDHPobYRFml_8Aq8xlo2U1qE5j 6c9dsOcntDL1ZDESZhVLtS9J9MR1exBYFiCaUn75j9i392wVkoDovoRf_-U= . The views of the authors are their own and should not be attributed to ACS. This issue http://rs6.net/tn.jsp?e=001ef9_Hu6pRsTx_WwnPMDnqTcKEgrWVXWtrhrdZOv4O2i9oQBV miQ6mXlMIMueyljYvTY025K_AF5-7WpHm0bvWGyMfH1DTJPfiOpOX2XJgBbBugmdn-8Zz_Npn2CA BZx7 brief is available online at http://www.acslaw.org/node/6581 http://rs6.net/tn.jsp?e=001ef9_Hu6pRsTx_WwnPMDnqTcKEgrWVXWtrhrdZOv4O2i9oQBV miQ6mXlMIMueyljYvTY025K_AF5-7WpHm0bvWGyMfH1DTJPfiOpOX2XJgBbBugmdn-8Zz_Npn2CA BZx7 . American Constitution Society _ email: mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] [EMAIL PROTECTED] phone: 202-393-6181 web: http://rs6.net/tn.jsp?e=001ef9_Hu6pRsSNS_5jTxeyCCfxkuKbP3wqU6st4URxMMGkS2Xo ha59tEe3IHhVn-rTt6l2HgseGCot3Aj9b2pMJjXLCP-Mu22DfNVwk7KoAK4= http://www.ACSLaw.org http://img.constantcontact.com/letters/images/round_corner_br.gif Forward email http://ui.constantcontact.com/sa/fwtf.jsp?m=108412099ea=stevesan%40umi ch.edua=1102067784462 http://visitor.constantcontact.com/d.jsp?p=unv=001Q67vUTZtLmz6hs-ECrKA8hNj ksv-Ce0zwKuDNagzF2BSn-iI4iF_Zt8EQT72NZ6mnVtGgIVxVls4vvNsqGYenw%3D%3D Safe Unsubscribe This email was sent to [EMAIL PROTECTED], by [EMAIL PROTECTED] Update Profile/Email Address http://visitor.constantcontact.com/d.jsp?p=oov=001Q67vUTZtLmz6hs-ECrKA8hNj ksv-Ce0zwKuDNagzF2BSn-iI4iF_Zt8EQT72NZ6mnVtGgIVxVls4vvNsqGYenw%3D%3D | Instant removal
RE: And God files a response? (Was: Suing God (honest, it's a lawsuit that has really been filed))
This hints that God may be not only a deity but a Deist. _ Steve Sanders stevesan @ umich.edu www.stevesanders.net -Original Message- From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] [mailto:religionlaw- [EMAIL PROTECTED] On Behalf Of Brad Pardee Sent: Thursday, September 20, 2007 9:15 PM To: Law Religion issues for Law Academics Subject: And God files a response? (Was: Suing God (honest,it's a lawsuit that has really been filed)) http://www.cnn.com/2007/US/law/09/20/suing.god.ap/index.html LINCOLN, Nebraska (AP) -- A legislator who filed a lawsuit against God has gotten something he might not have expected: a response. ... Chambers ... said he's trying to make the point that anybody can sue anybody. Not so, says God. His response argues that the defendant is immune from some earthly laws and the court lacks jurisdiction. It adds that blaming God for human oppression and suffering misses an important point. I created man and woman with free will and next to the promise of immortal life, free will is my greatest gift to you, according to the response, as read by Friend. There was no contact information on the filing, although St. Michael the Archangel is listed as a witness, Friend said. ___ To post, send message to Religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu To subscribe, unsubscribe, change options, or get password, see http://lists.ucla.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/religionlaw Please note that messages sent to this large list cannot be viewed as private. Anyone can subscribe to the list and read messages that are posted; people can read the Web archives; and list members can (rightly or wrongly) forward the messages to others. ___ To post, send message to Religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu To subscribe, unsubscribe, change options, or get password, see http://lists.ucla.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/religionlaw Please note that messages sent to this large list cannot be viewed as private. Anyone can subscribe to the list and read messages that are posted; people can read the Web archives; and list members can (rightly or wrongly) forward the messages to others.
RE: Indiana License Plates
Were Indiana to put this same motto on all standard license plates, and not offer its citizens any choice in the matter, I think the analogy to the currency would be perfectly apt. But this seems different. In Indiana, there's a standard plate and various optional plates. If you choose an optional plate to express your support for your university, or veterans, or the national guard, or DARE, or even our troops, you pay an extra fee. But choose the optional plate on which you display the government's endorsement of God, and the government in effect gives you a subsidy for agreeing to propagate that particular religious message. Quoting Volokh, Eugene [EMAIL PROTECTED]: Well, to the same extent that the motto on currency is establishment, or the phrase Let this be our motto, In God Is Our Trust in our national anthem is establishment -- which is to say, given the courts' caselaw on this, not establishment. -Original Message- From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] On Behalf Of Jean Dudley Sent: Thursday, March 22, 2007 10:10 PM To: Law Religion issues for Law Academics Subject: Indiana License Plates Specialty plates cost money; But not if you want to proclaim your religiosity on the rear bumper of your car in Indiana. http://fauxrealtho.com/2007/03/22/in-god-indiana-trusts/ The author brings up a very good point: Indiana has a number of specialty license plates available, but the In God We Trust plates don't carry the extra fees that all the others do. Why should those who identify with religion do so at taxpayer's expense? It smacks of establishment of religion, to me. Jean Dudley ___ To post, send message to Religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu To subscribe, unsubscribe, change options, or get password, see http://lists.ucla.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/religionlaw Please note that messages sent to this large list cannot be viewed as private. Anyone can subscribe to the list and read messages that are posted; people can read the Web archives; and list members can (rightly or wrongly) forward the messages to others. ___ To post, send message to Religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu To subscribe, unsubscribe, change options, or get password, see http://lists.ucla.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/religionlaw Please note that messages sent to this large list cannot be viewed as private. Anyone can subscribe to the list and read messages that are posted; people can read the Web archives; and list members can (rightly or wrongly) forward the messages to others. _ Steve Sanders E-mail: [EMAIL PROTECTED] ___ To post, send message to Religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu To subscribe, unsubscribe, change options, or get password, see http://lists.ucla.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/religionlaw Please note that messages sent to this large list cannot be viewed as private. Anyone can subscribe to the list and read messages that are posted; people can read the Web archives; and list members can (rightly or wrongly) forward the messages to others.
RE: Indiana License Plates
I agree with Dan that it's not clear this is establishment, though for analytical purposes, I'm wondering what the best analogy might be. Given the aspect of choice, it seems a bit like school vouchers, though with religious schools getting an extra measure of subsidy. In response to Mark's point, is it significant that in this case there is an opt-in scheme for various messages, but religion still gets a special (financial) preference within that opt-in scheme? Quoting Scarberry, Mark [EMAIL PROTECTED]: Perhaps this should be seen as a response to Wooley v. Maynard. The state could not require motorists to display In God We Trust. Instead of instituting an opt out scheme, it instituted an opt in scheme. Mark S. Scarberry Pepperdine University School of Law -Original Message- From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] On Behalf Of Conkle, Daniel O. Sent: Friday, March 23, 2007 10:15 AM To: Law Religion issues for Law Academics Subject: RE: Indiana License Plates I see Steve's point, but I'm not sure I agree. Other things equal, I would think that the existence of choice (even if skewed to a degree) would make the establishment clause claim weaker, not stronger. Likewise, the existence of choice suggests that there is an element of personal speech here, which likewise might tend to counteract an establishment clause argument. I wonder if the problem--if there is one--is the prominence and the novelty of the license plate displays, which are partly personal but largely governmental speech and which arguably go beyond the bounds of the tradition that supports the national motto in other contexts. Dan Conkle *** Daniel O. Conkle Robert H. McKinney Professor of Law Indiana University School of Law Bloomington, Indiana 47405 (812) 855-4331 fax (812) 855-0555 e-mail [EMAIL PROTECTED] *** -Original Message- From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] On Behalf Of Steve Sanders Sent: Friday, March 23, 2007 12:48 PM To: religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu Subject: RE: Indiana License Plates Were Indiana to put this same motto on all standard license plates, and not offer its citizens any choice in the matter, I think the analogy to the currency would be perfectly apt. But this seems different. In Indiana, there's a standard plate and various optional plates. If you choose an optional plate to express your support for your university, or veterans, or the national guard, or DARE, or even our troops, you pay an extra fee. But choose the optional plate on which you display the government's endorsement of God, and the government in effect gives you a subsidy for agreeing to propagate that particular religious message. Quoting Volokh, Eugene [EMAIL PROTECTED]: Well, to the same extent that the motto on currency is establishment, or the phrase Let this be our motto, In God Is Our Trust in our national anthem is establishment -- which is to say, given the courts' caselaw on this, not establishment. -Original Message- From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] On Behalf Of Jean Dudley Sent: Thursday, March 22, 2007 10:10 PM To: Law Religion issues for Law Academics Subject: Indiana License Plates Specialty plates cost money; But not if you want to proclaim your religiosity on the rear bumper of your car in Indiana. http://fauxrealtho.com/2007/03/22/in-god-indiana-trusts/ The author brings up a very good point: Indiana has a number of specialty license plates available, but the In God We Trust plates don't carry the extra fees that all the others do. Why should those who identify with religion do so at taxpayer's expense? It smacks of establishment of religion, to me. Jean Dudley ___ To post, send message to Religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu To subscribe, unsubscribe, change options, or get password, see http://lists.ucla.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/religionlaw Please note that messages sent to this large list cannot be viewed as private. Anyone can subscribe to the list and read messages that are posted; people can read the Web archives; and list members can (rightly or wrongly) forward the messages to others. ___ To post, send message to Religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu To subscribe, unsubscribe, change options, or get password, see http://lists.ucla.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/religionlaw Please note that messages sent to this large list cannot be viewed as private. Anyone can subscribe to the list and read messages that are posted; people can read the Web archives; and list members can (rightly or wrongly) forward the messages to others. _ Steve Sanders E-mail: [EMAIL PROTECTED] ___ To post, send message to Religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu To subscribe, unsubscribe, change options
Church and state on campus
An article in today's edition of Inside Higher Ed argues that, post-Rosenberger, the wall of separation on college campuses is becoming more porous: http://insidehighered.com/news/2007/03/14/religion __ Steve Sanders Mayer Brown Rowe Maw LLP 71 S. Wacker Dr. Chicago, IL 60606 V: 312.701.8464 F: 312.706.8459 Email: [EMAIL PROTECTED] http://www.appellate.net/sanders ___ To post, send message to Religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu To subscribe, unsubscribe, change options, or get password, see http://lists.ucla.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/religionlaw Please note that messages sent to this large list cannot be viewed as private. Anyone can subscribe to the list and read messages that are posted; people can read the Web archives; and list members can (rightly or wrongly) forward the messages to others.
RE: Dent Link Again
Sure thing, David. The Dent paper looks to me like crap, not a piece of scholarship. Wasn't sure if you remembered, but we've met a couple of times at conferences and such. I competed in the Williams Project moot court two years ago, and I saw you at Lav Law this past fall. Thanks for the note, Steve -Original Message- From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] [mailto:religionlaw- [EMAIL PROTECTED] On Behalf Of David Cruz Sent: Wednesday, October 25, 2006 1:01 PM To: Law Religion issues for Law Academics Subject: RE: Dent Link Again Dear Mr. Sanders: Thank you for calling Dent out on this. Let us hope he corrects his falsehoods before hard copy publication somewhere. (Professor now Judge Michael McConnell failed to do so even after I had immediately cited him to Badgett when he circulated a draft chapter for an anthology.) Sincerely yours, David B. Cruz Professor of Law University of Southern California Gould School of Law Los Angeles, CA 90089-0071 U.S.A. -Original Message- From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] On Behalf Of Steve Sanders Sent: Wednesday, October 25, 2006 12:44 PM To: religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu Subject: Re: Dent Link Again Two pages into this obviously tendentious piece of research, one spots a tellingly flawed premise: The goal of the gay movement are [sic] not primarily economic; most gays already have above-average incomes. The cite for this old canard is a 12-year-old article in the Notre Dame Law Review. Much more recent and readily accessible work would have saved Dent from such carelessness. See, e.g., M. Lee Badgett, Money, Myths, and Change: The Economic Lives of Lesbians and Gay Men (University of Chicago Press, 2001). Steve Sanders Mayer Brown Rowe Maw LLP Chicago ___ To post, send message to Religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu To subscribe, unsubscribe, change options, or get password, see http://lists.ucla.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/religionlaw Please note that messages sent to this large list cannot be viewed as private. Anyone can subscribe to the list and read messages that are posted; people can read the Web archives; and list members can (rightly or wrongly) forward the messages to others. ___ To post, send message to Religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu To subscribe, unsubscribe, change options, or get password, see http://lists.ucla.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/religionlaw Please note that messages sent to this large list cannot be viewed as private. Anyone can subscribe to the list and read messages that are posted; people can read the Web archives; and list members can (rightly or wrongly) forward the messages to others. ___ To post, send message to Religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu To subscribe, unsubscribe, change options, or get password, see http://lists.ucla.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/religionlaw Please note that messages sent to this large list cannot be viewed as private. Anyone can subscribe to the list and read messages that are posted; people can read the Web archives; and list members can (rightly or wrongly) forward the messages to others.
Apologies
The last message was intended as a personal note to David, not to the list. Please accept my apologies for the error I made in replying. ___ To post, send message to Religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu To subscribe, unsubscribe, change options, or get password, see http://lists.ucla.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/religionlaw Please note that messages sent to this large list cannot be viewed as private. Anyone can subscribe to the list and read messages that are posted; people can read the Web archives; and list members can (rightly or wrongly) forward the messages to others.
Re: Dent Link Again
Two pages into this obviously tendentious piece of research, one spots a tellingly flawed premise: The goal of the gay movement are [sic] not primarily economic; most gays already have above-average incomes. The cite for this old canard is a 12-year-old article in the Notre Dame Law Review. Much more recent and readily accessible work would have saved Dent from such carelessness. See, e.g., M. Lee Badgett, Money, Myths, and Change: The Economic Lives of Lesbians and Gay Men (University of Chicago Press, 2001). Steve Sanders Mayer Brown Rowe Maw LLP Chicago ___ To post, send message to Religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu To subscribe, unsubscribe, change options, or get password, see http://lists.ucla.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/religionlaw Please note that messages sent to this large list cannot be viewed as private. Anyone can subscribe to the list and read messages that are posted; people can read the Web archives; and list members can (rightly or wrongly) forward the messages to others.
RE: Christian Skating Time
Had the NY Human Rights Division been in charge in Chicago during the 1970s, would it have meant that Bill Veeck's Comiskey Park (see http://whitesoxinteractive.com/HistoryGlory/FalstaffHarry.htm) couldn't have hosted Polish Night, Italian Night, etc., for fear that persons of other national origins would have felt that their attendance was denied or discouraged? Steve Sanders 7th Circuit US Court of Appeals ___ To post, send message to Religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu To subscribe, unsubscribe, change options, or get password, see http://lists.ucla.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/religionlaw Please note that messages sent to this large list cannot be viewed as private. Anyone can subscribe to the list and read messages that are posted; people can read the Web archives; and list members can (rightly or wrongly) forward the messages to others.
Re: Christian Skating Time
Quoting Paul Finkelman [EMAIL PROTECTED]: Isn't there a difference between holding an ethnic theme -- food, music, etc.at the ball park -- and having an event that implies people of only one religion are welcome? Hard to imagine what the food and music would be of a Christian Theme night at the ball park or the skating rink? Amy Grant and tuna casserole, perhaps? Seriously, Paul, I'm not sure I really see the difference. Both are designed to celebrate the identities and cultures of particular groups. If someone not in that group wants to feel it excludes them, it's hard to know what to do, assuming that there is no actual effort by the private entity to exclude in violation of the civil rights law. While I suspect that the Christian Skating Time crowd would not be my idea of a fun time, I'm hard pressed to understand why the rink management isn't within its rights to offer it -- again, providing they are not actually excluding non-Christians. I wouldn't feel particularly welcome shopping Hollister, Victoria's Secret, or Hip Hop Closet, but that standing alone doesn't mean I could accuse them of age, gender, or race discrimination. It doesn't take much of an imagination to understand that the ball park theme is about celebrating and ethnic culture, and the Christian skate is about creating a climate of exclusivity based on belief. By this logic, wouldn't it be illegal to run a Christian book store? I doubt anyone at Comisky Park was asked about their Polish beliefs or anyone tried to convert them to become Polish. True, the worst they would have faced was being accosted by drunks wearing Kiss Me, I'm Polish t-shirts. Steve Sanders 7th Circuit US Court of Appeals ___ To post, send message to Religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu To subscribe, unsubscribe, change options, or get password, see http://lists.ucla.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/religionlaw Please note that messages sent to this large list cannot be viewed as private. Anyone can subscribe to the list and read messages that are posted; people can read the Web archives; and list members can (rightly or wrongly) forward the messages to others.
Re: Pink Triangles and Religious Liberty
Does someone think there is a (serious) religious liberty argument available to the teachers here? From what we have here, there appears to be nothing at all religious about the message and policy the school board has decided to pursue; it is a secular message about diversity. There is nothing inherently religious about homosexuality per se (just as there is nothing inherently religious about pork -- would an orthodox Jew who refused to post the school lunchroom menu in her classroom because it included pork products have a valid religious liberty claim?). It is only a religious issue to the extent that teachers who object to gay people based on their personal religious beliefs choose to characterize it as one. Cf. a PR campaign to embrace religious diversity among students, something that sent the message that all student religious backgrounds are viewed by the school as equal and accepted. Would the teachers have an argument against that as well? Steve Sanders Quoting Rick Duncan [EMAIL PROTECTED]: I don't know if this report is accurate or not, but here is an excerpt: A holy war over homosexuality has erupted on the campus of a San Francisco Bay area high school, as five teachers are refusing orders to display a pro-gay banner because of their religious beliefs. The rainbow-flag poster with pink triangles and other symbols of homosexual pride carries the message, This is a safe place to be who you are. This sign affirms that support and resources are available for you in this school. The banner, designed by the Gay-Straight Alliance at San Leandro High School south of Oakland, Calif., was ordered by the school board in December to be posted in all classrooms. This is not about religion, sex or a belief system,'' district Superintendent Christine Lim, who initiated the policy, told the San Francisco Chronicle. This is about educators making sure our schools are safe for our children, regardless of their sexual orientation. Rick Duncan Welpton Professor of Law University of Nebraska College of Law Lincoln, NE 68583-0902 When the Round Table is broken every man must follow either Galahad or Mordred: middle things are gone. C.S.Lewis, Grand Miracle I will not be pushed, filed, stamped, indexed, briefed, debriefed, or numbered. --The Prisoner - Do you Yahoo!? With a free 1 GB, there's more in store with Yahoo! Mail. _ Steve Sanders E-mail: [EMAIL PROTECTED] ___ To post, send message to Religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu To subscribe, unsubscribe, change options, or get password, see http://lists.ucla.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/religionlaw Please note that messages sent to this large list cannot be viewed as private. Anyone can subscribe to the list and read messages that are posted; people can read the Web archives; and list members can (rightly or wrongly) forward the messages to others.
Re: Pink Triangles and Religious Liberty
Quoting Rick Duncan [EMAIL PROTECTED]: What if a teacher walks into class, sees the display, and states that he does not agree with its posting in his classroom. May the school discipline him for merely making it clear that the display is the message of the school board as opposed to that of the teacher himself? It be interesting to speculate, too, whether gay students would then have some sort of disparate-impact and/or harassment claim (against the teachers individually? the school board?) under the state or local non-discrimination ordinances (there is no federal gay rights law, of course). I also think there is a non-constitutional religious liberty policy issue when teachers are required to teach under a banner that violates their sincerely held religious beliefs? Rick, the problem with this, is seems to me (and like yours, this isn't a legal argument, but a practical one), is that the vast majority of religious believers (of all types) probably encounter, in their daily work lives, any number of policies, things they are expected to do, colleagues they are expected to put up with, etc., that they could claim violate some sincerely held religious belief of theirs, if they insisted on being strict and literal about it. But most people do what they need to do to get by each day, if for no other reason than they've absorbed the American ethos of live-and-let-live pluralism. Not long ago, civic-republican oriented conservatives wrote books with titles like The Culture of Complaint, about how too many Americans had become whiny, oversensitive rights-claimers to the exclusion of larger notions of duty and citizenship. I confess, the idea of teachers taking offense and asserting rights against policies that are intended to help their own students learn in safer and more effective environments strikes me as being just as regrettable. Steve Sanders ___ To post, send message to Religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu To subscribe, unsubscribe, change options, or get password, see http://lists.ucla.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/religionlaw Please note that messages sent to this large list cannot be viewed as private. Anyone can subscribe to the list and read messages that are posted; people can read the Web archives; and list members can (rightly or wrongly) forward the messages to others.
Re: Pink Triangles and Religious Liberty
Rick, I'll ask you to stipulate that there probably have been incidents of student-on-student harassment (verbal insults, perhaps physical threats and actual violence) directed at the gay students. This is certainly a common phenomenon at other schools, and so let's assume that this is what the school board is responding to. If we're then essentially balancing the equities, it doesn't seem to me a close call. This does not appear to be merely about dueling identity politics, though I recognize it is in the teachers' interest to make it seem so. First, we don't know that the gay students even asked for the posters. All we know is that the school board -- which, of course, has the right to make these policy judgments -- has apparently decided to address an actual, tangible problem (harassment, perhaps violence -- again, I'm making a highly plausible assumption), and determined that a campaign of this sort would be helpful in providing a safer and more effective environment for the education of students On the other side of the scale, we have no reason to believe that the teachers who object to this campaign have suffered comparable insults, harassment, or violence during the school day. Their equity in this situation is their desire to express their subjective dislike or religious disapproval of gay people. Moreover, while juveniles will behave like juveniles, the teachers are adult professionals who are supposed to be concerned with the ability of all their students to learn in a safe and effective environment. No one is requiring them to swear allegiance to a religious creed, march in a parade, or even teach Rubyfruit Jungle. So attempting to characterize this as something being shoved down their throat is quite an exaggeration, I'd suggest. If someone provided evidence that the teachers were suffering harassment that was qualitatively comparable to that being suffered by the gay kids, I'd support an appropriate tolerance campaign for the teachers. But being forced to accept their employer's decision to post a message aimed at improving the environment for students whose educational wellbeing the teachers are supposed to be concerned about anyway is not, to me, qualitatively similar to having your books dumped in the trash and being called a dirty name. Steve Sanders Quoting Rick Duncan [EMAIL PROTECTED]: Steve: I agree with your point about whiny victims and the culture of complaint. But here is the problem. One group of whiny complainers asks for a Pink Triangle to make them feel more welcome. This causes another group of whiny complainers to complain about having the Pink Triangles shoved down their throats. Which group of whiny complainers should be appeased? What would be the more neutral way of resolving this dispute between the dueling whiners? Rick Duncan Steve Sanders [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Quoting Rick Duncan : What if a teacher walks into class, sees the display, and states that he does not agree with its posting in his classroom. May the school discipline him for merely making it clear that the display is the message of the school board as opposed to that of the teacher himself? It be interesting to speculate, too, whether gay students would then have some sort of disparate-impact and/or harassment claim (against the teachers individually? the school board?) under the state or local non-discrimination ordinances (there is no federal gay rights law, of course). I also think there is a non-constitutional religious liberty policy issue when teachers are required to teach under a banner that violates their sincerely held religious beliefs? Rick, the problem with this, is seems to me (and like yours, this isn't a legal argument, but a practical one), is that the vast majority of religious believers (of all types) probably encounter, in their daily work lives, any number of policies, things they are expected to do, colleagues they are expected to put up with, etc., that they could claim violate some sincerely held religious belief of theirs, if they insisted on being strict and literal about it. But most people do what they need to do to get by each day, if for no other reason than they've absorbed the American ethos of live-and-let-live pluralism. Not long ago, civic-republican oriented conservatives wrote books with titles like The Culture of Complaint, about how too many Americans had become whiny, oversensitive rights-claimers to the exclusion of larger notions of duty and citizenship. I confess, the idea of teachers taking offense and asserting rights against policies that are intended to help their own students learn in safer and more effective environments strikes me as being just as regrettable. Steve Sanders ___ To post, send message to Religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu To subscribe, unsubscribe, change options, or get password, see http://lists.ucla.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo
Thomas More Center's spin and distortion
Last night on the PBS Newshour, the head of the Thomas More Law Center said this: RICHARD THOMPSON: Well, first of all [ID is] a scientific theory and therefore it's proper to be in the science class. After all, all the Dover area school board did was make students aware that there is a controversy in this area and that there is an alternative theory, and that's the theory of intelligent design. This judge should not place himself in the position of determining which scientific theory is valid and which is not. A thousand decisions is not going to change the law of gravity, nor is a thousand judicial decisions going to determine whether intelligent design is a valid theory. That should be left up to the scientists. It should be left up to the debate that the scientific community was involved with. http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/law/july-dec05/design_12-20.html Doesn't this go beyond spin and amount to blatant misrepresentation? After all, Judge Jones did not find that ID is not a valid scientific theory, he found it is not science, period. (I reproduce the judge's summary of this finding below.) This may seem a picky semantic distinction, but I don't think it is, and I don't believe Thompson thinks it is either. If Thompson wanted to explain to his viewers why ID *is* science -- i.e., on what basis he disagrees with the judge's analysis regarding scientific method, logic, testing, and peer review -- that would have been one thing. And it would have been a much steeper challenge. Instead, by inserting an illegitimate premise and telling viewers (the vast majority of whom will not read any part of the opinion) that the decision was about a judge arbitrarily choosing between theories that are actively competing within the marketplace of legitimate science, rather than about science vs. non-science, it seems to me the defendant's counsel deftly undermines the credibility of the judge and the decision in the public mind. And such attacks from the right, aimed at distorting and oversimplifying judicial work, are part of a pattern with which we've all become familiar. Steve Sanders From the opinion at 64: After a searching review of the record and applicable caselaw, we find that while ID arguments may be true, a proposition on which the Court takes no position, ID is not science. We find that ID fails on three different levels, any one of which is sufficient to preclude a determination that ID is science. They are: (1) ID violates the centuries-old ground rules of science by invoking and permitting supernatural causation; (2) the argument of irreducible complexity, central to ID, employs the same flawed and illogical contrived dualism that doomed creation science in the 1980's; and (3) ID's negative attacks on evolution have been refuted by the scientific community. As we will discuss in more detail below, it is additionally important to note that ID has failed to gain acceptance in the scientific community, it has not generated peer-reviewed publications, nor has it been the subject of testing and research. ___ To post, send message to Religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu To subscribe, unsubscribe, change options, or get password, see http://lists.ucla.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/religionlaw Please note that messages sent to this large list cannot be viewed as private. Anyone can subscribe to the list and read messages that are posted; people can read the Web archives; and list members can (rightly or wrongly) forward the messages to others.
Re: Dover Intelligent-Design Case
Paul, I wouldn't blame religious activists for the state of the law in the creche cases. It's the Supreme Court that created the Santa-and-his-reindeer loophole. Surely the preference of activists would be to simply place religious icons on public property without added secular clutter. But given the law, some will do what they must. I guess that's the point you're making. Where the creche situation has been top-down, promoting intelligent design as a legal alternative to evolution, while obviouly a response to the Court's cases, seems to have been more of a bottom-up innovation by legal and political strategists, no? I suspect that you overestimate the interest these strategists have in theological subtlety and logical rigor. Thus, perhaps I would rephrase your question as: are sincere religious believers well-served by those who subscribe to a by any means necessary approach to the legal and political project of officializing Christianity? Steve Sanders Quoting Paul Finkelman [EMAIL PROTECTED]: Perhaps it is a holiday gift for those who celebrate the anniversary of the birth of the son of the intelligent designer but don't think that the intelligent design plan was really a science project? Which leads me to the quesiton, isn't the whole concept of intelligent design ultimately blasphemous, and shouldn't people who are biblical literalists be more offended by intelligent design than evolution? After all, evolution simply says ignore (or believe in) scripture as you choose, but here is the science. But, advocates of intelligent design argue for a religious basis for change and the development of the earth that is clearly at odds with scripture. Is the push for intelligent design sort of like the outcome in Lynch v,. Donnelly -- that in order to get religion on the public square you have to mock it by cluttering the nativity scene with clowns candy canes and Santa Claus? Thus, in oder to get religion into the science class you hae to reject the scriptural account of creation and offer some sort of faux theory of religion that is neither religious nor scientific. Paul Finkelman Ed Brayton wrote: If you can't get the decision from the court's website, it is available at: http://www.stcynic.com/kitzmiller_342.pdf It's a big, big win for the plaintiffs. A very broad ruling, exactly what the plaintiffs wanted. Ed Brayton ___ To post, send message to Religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu To subscribe, unsubscribe, change options, or get password, see http://lists.ucla.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/religionlaw Please note that messages sent to this large list cannot be viewed as private. Anyone can subscribe to the list and read messages that are posted; people can read the Web archives; and list members can (rightly or wrongly) forward the messages to others. -- Paul Finkelman Chapman Distinguished Professor University of Tulsa College of Law 3120 East 4th Place Tulsa, Oklahoma 74104-2499 918-631-3706 (office) 918-631-2194 (fax) [EMAIL PROTECTED] ___ To post, send message to Religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu To subscribe, unsubscribe, change options, or get password, see http://lists.ucla.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/religionlaw Please note that messages sent to this large list cannot be viewed as private. Anyone can subscribe to the list and read messages that are posted; people can read the Web archives; and list members can (rightly or wrongly) forward the messages to others. _ Steve Sanders E-mail: [EMAIL PROTECTED] ___ To post, send message to Religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu To subscribe, unsubscribe, change options, or get password, see http://lists.ucla.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/religionlaw Please note that messages sent to this large list cannot be viewed as private. Anyone can subscribe to the list and read messages that are posted; people can read the Web archives; and list members can (rightly or wrongly) forward the messages to others.
Re: New Jersey Lawsuit
I haven't seen the suit (does anyone have a copy?), but I could guess the theory is either that 1) the policy infringes free exercise of students and/or teachers, with a supporting argument that the music at issue is not being officially sponsored by the school, or 2) it's a Rosenberger-type challenge to the school's policy that programs prepared or presented by student groups as an outcome of the curriculum shall not have a religious orientation or focus on religious holidays. Absent that restriction, a concert or performance could become an opportunity not to learn about a religious holiday or tradition, but to celebrate it. (See http://www.somsd.k12.nj.us/BFOLStatementrePolicy2270.htm.) Steve Sanders Quoting Ed Brayton [EMAIL PROTECTED]: I want to get everyone's thoughts on the appeals court case against South Orange-Maplewood School District in New Jersey. The school has a policy not to have religious music performed by the choir or band and that policy is being challenged as unconstitutional. Now, I think the policy is a bad one for several reasons. But unconstitutional? On what grounds? Are there any precedents that apply in this area? It seems to me that saying it's not unconstitutional for public schools to perform religious music (which I agree with) is quite different from saying it's unconstitutional NOT to perform religious music. It seems to me that if not playing Christian music amounts to unconstitutional hostility toward Christianity, then not performing Muslim music must also be unconstitutional hostility toward Islam, and also true for Hindu music, Jewish music, and so forth. Ed Brayton ___ To post, send message to Religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu To subscribe, unsubscribe, change options, or get password, see http://lists.ucla.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/religionlaw Please note that messages sent to this large list cannot be viewed as private. Anyone can subscribe to the list and read messages that are posted; people can read the Web archives; and list members can (rightly or wrongly) forward the messages to others. _ Steve Sanders E-mail: [EMAIL PROTECTED] ___ To post, send message to Religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu To subscribe, unsubscribe, change options, or get password, see http://lists.ucla.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/religionlaw Please note that messages sent to this large list cannot be viewed as private. Anyone can subscribe to the list and read messages that are posted; people can read the Web archives; and list members can (rightly or wrongly) forward the messages to others.
RE: Bible study ban for RA's in UW-Eau Claire dorms
We surely would oppose a judge's wearing a robe with the Ten Commandments written on it, but we'd say the same to a robe that had political or ideological slogans written on it. Is that exactly right, though? A courtroom could not post a crucifix, but it could post the Declaration of Independence. The Declaration is not positive law, but it surely expounds a political ideology. A school district probably shouldn't name a public school for Jesus or Buddha, but it could name one for Martin Luther King. When it does, it does so, it seems to me, because King is an icon of particular ideologies (racial equality, non-violent social change) that government is free to endorse. A public university cannot have an official religion. Yet there are all sorts of ideologies it may codify without running afoul of the Constitution: diversity, pluralism, critical thinking, holistic wellness. (I'm leaving aside arguments here about secular humanism.) Maybe Eugene would say those aren't what he means by ideologies. But isn't that the problem? Most of us at least recognize partisan political activity when we see it; ideology seems impossibly vague. On a different note, since the UW case seems an establishment/free exercise hybrid, isn't Locke v. Davey relevant? (I can't recall if someone has already mentioned this.) For the same reasons Washington's desire to avoid perceived establishment did not infringe Davey's free exercise, I'd say it doesn't violate the RA's free exercise for UW to discourage employees from conducting devotional exercises in the space where they carry out state university business. The RA *could*, it seems to me, organize a screening and discussion of The Passion of the Christ, even though religious speech obviously would occur, so long as it were conducted in a way that advanced a legitimate educational purpose. I think that's actually the apposite comparison to the RA who staged Vagina Monologues. But screening Passion of the Christ for (secular) educational purposes seems different than running Bible study under the banner of Campus Crusade for Christ. Steve ___ To post, send message to Religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu To subscribe, unsubscribe, change options, or get password, see http://lists.ucla.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/religionlaw Please note that messages sent to this large list cannot be viewed as private. Anyone can subscribe to the list and read messages that are posted; people can read the Web archives; and list members can (rightly or wrongly) forward the messages to others.
RE: Bible study ban for RA's in UW-Eau Claire dorms
The point is, though, that this persons home is also state property, making it akin to professors classroom. If it were a different arrangement he came to the dorm for an 8-hour shift advising students, then went back to his own off-campus apartment obviously the university could not dictate what he did in his home during his off-time. An RA at a public institution is a rather unique status: a state actor whose job requires that he live onsite, who is essentially on duty 24 hours a day (at least when hes on the premises), and who is compensated in the form of free housing for making this sacrifice of freedom and privacy. We know from free-exercise doctrine that a university could decline to accommodate an RA whose religion required him to attend services or observe sabbath on a schedule that would impose unreasonable demands on fellow employees. And I imagine that under public employee speech doctrine, the university also could prohibit the RA from posting certain discriminatory social or political messages on his door messages that ordinary dorm residents would be more free to post. There is, of course, no entitlement to a job as an RA; its usually at least somewhat selective. If an RA feels a clash of conscience between his special and demanding role and his desire to spend time spreading religious or other messages, he is free not to accept this particular employment. Steve Sanders From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] On Behalf Of Brad M Pardee Sent: Tuesday, November 08, 2005 8:53 AM To: religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu Subject: Bible study ban for RA's in UW-Eau Claire dorms To me, this ban seems rather difficult to justify. To say that an RA can't host a bible study in his home on campus is absurd. They try to say that the RA could host it off-campus, but that if the studies continued, students might not find them 'approachable' or might fear they'd be 'judged or pushed in a direction that does not work for them.' That's not a question of where the Bible study is held but rather whether the RA is hosting it. If a student is honestly going to feel an RA is unapproachable because they lead a Bible study in their dorm room, are they going to automatically view the RA as approachable if the RA leads the exact same study but in a different location? It strikes me as an illogical argument. I know that there are those here who have proposed that some of the excesses of educational institutions in limiting religious speech are grounded in either the fear of costly litigation or a mistaken believe that the limitations are required. I don't see either of those benign errors here, though. http://www.jsonline.com/news/state/nov05/368030.asp http://www.gazetteextra.com/bibleban110405.asp Brad ___ To post, send message to Religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu To subscribe, unsubscribe, change options, or get password, see http://lists.ucla.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/religionlaw Please note that messages sent to this large list cannot be viewed as private. Anyone can subscribe to the list and read messages that are posted; people can read the Web archives; and list members can (rightly or wrongly) forward the messages to others.
RE: Bible study ban for RA's in UW-Eau Claire dorms
Title: Message I dont believe that labeling this as a religious-discrimination claim is accurate. As one of the newspaper accounts says: UW-Eau Claire spokesman Mike Rindo said Thursday the university prohibits resident assistants from leading Bible studies or other activities like partisan political events (emphasis added) in the dorms. It doesn't prohibit them from attending them. So, no, RAs also could not organize meetings of the Bush=Hitler Club of the Socialist Youth League. Non-RA living in the dorms could do either of these, as well as lead Bible studies. I think Eugene is right that the issue here is employment, not the state as landlord. The universitys casting this as an approachability issue makes matters somewhat tricky. I assume that, less euphemistically stated, the policy is aimed at discouraging proselytizing by a state employee on state property during working hours something thats even more incompatible with an RAs role than with the jobs of most state actors (because among other things, RA duties usually include promoting tolerance, diversity, etc.). If its simply a matter of the RAs personal identity, I of course agree that discrimination would be inappropriate. The issue here would seem to turn on the nature of the Bible study meetings (are they advertised, with residents invited/encouraged to attend? held in his room or a public lounge? etc.), and Im not sure the newspaper accounts give us enough facts to draw reliable legal conclusions. Steve From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] On Behalf Of Volokh, Eugene Sent: Tuesday, November 08, 2005 10:06 AM To: Law Religion issues for Law Academics Subject: RE: Bible study ban for RA's in UW-Eau Claire dorms Hmm -- as I understand it, this isn't a simple religious accommodation claim, in which an RA claims an exemption from a generally applicable rule (no meetings of ideological groups in your dorm rooms). This is a claim that the government is discriminating against religious groups; you can organize meetings of the Bush=Hitler Club or the Socialist Youth League in your dormroom, regardless of whether this causes some students to feel that you're unapproachable, but you can't organize Bible Study meetings. Incidentally, to the extent that the state is resting its argument on its power as landlord, that argument is likely to lose under Rosenberger and Lamb's Chapel. The state must instead, I take it, rest its argument on its power as employer. And when one sees the state as employer, it seems hard to distinguish the approachability effects of a student's being widely known as a Christian because of his outside-the-dorm-room activities (for instance, his being known to be the leader of a Christian student group that meets in a classroom after hours, or even his being known to be an ordained minister) from the approachability effects of a student's being known as a Christian because of his in-dorm-room activity. If the government-as-employer's concerns about approachability justify discriminating against religious practices of students in dorm rooms, would they equally allow the government to, for instance, refuse to hire as RAs people who are known to be active in their religious groups outside the dorm or off-campus? Eugene -Original Message- From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] On Behalf Of Steve Sanders Sent: Tuesday, November 08, 2005 11:37 AM To: 'Law Religion issues for Law Academics' Subject: RE: Bible study ban for RA's in UW-Eau Claire dorms The point is, though, that this persons home is also state property, making it akin to professors classroom. If it were a different arrangement he came to the dorm for an 8-hour shift advising students, then went back to his own off-campus apartment obviously the university could not dictate what he did in his home during his off-time. An RA at a public institution is a rather unique status: a state actor whose job requires that he live onsite, who is essentially on duty 24 hours a day (at least when hes on the premises), and who is compensated in the form of free housing for making this sacrifice of freedom and privacy. We know from free-exercise doctrine that a university could decline to accommodate an RA whose religion required him to attend services or observe sabbath on a schedule that would impose unreasonable demands on fellow employees. And I imagine that under public employee speech doctrine, the university also could prohibit the RA from posting certain discriminatory social or political messages on his door messages that ordinary dorm residents would be more free to post. There is, of course, no entitlement to a job as an RA; its usually at least somewhat selective. If an RA feels a clash of conscience between his special and demanding role and his desire to spend time spreading religious or other messages, he is free not to accept this particular employment
RE: Bible study ban for RA's in UW-Eau Claire dorms
Title: Message All good points. But if this is properly framed as a case about the religious activities of a public employee in the workplace, Im unclear how Rosenberger is relevant. The policy apparently says nothing about the freedom of ordinary students living in the dorms to apply for university funds to organize Bible studies on equal terms with other activities. If were analogizing non-employment lines of First Amendment doctrine, this seems closer to Rust v. Sullivan: the university is paying you to be someplace and to perform specific tasks, and certain things you may want to do during that university-paid time, whether religious or political, may be incompatible with the purpose of the role youve contracted to fill. I appreciate Steve Prescotts post. But since we dont have information on how the university enforces the policy with regard to political ideology or other religions, Id suggest its not productive to let such speculation convince us that this must be religious discrimination against Christians. (He may well be right, and if he is, then the university should be faulted.) As to Eugenes diversity point, I certainly agree in the abstract. Whether the university is being hypocritical depends on whether theyre trying to suppress the RAs personal identity as an open Christian (which they clearly cant and shouldnt do) or his proselytizing (if indeed thats whats happening here, then its a more legitimate concern). Its not the RA whos the issue, its his in-the-workplace activities. The legal question here turns, I think, on the nature of the Bible study sessions whether theyre within the legitimate bounds of personal free exercise, or more akin to what was happening at the Air Force Academy. Steve From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] On Behalf Of Volokh, Eugene Sent: Tuesday, November 08, 2005 10:52 AM To: Law Religion issues for Law Academics Subject: RE: Bible study ban for RA's in UW-Eau Claire dorms Hmm --I had read a different account, but I'm happy to accept this one (at least for the purposes of our discussion, and possibly as the accurate one). In any case, though, exclusion of partisan events doesn't seem to me enough to eliminate the religious discrimination problem, just as it wasn't in Rosenberger. The Socialist Youth League might well be not partisan, in the sense that it promotes socialism as an ideal rather than as a party; try a Spartacus Youth League or an International A.N.S.W.E.R. chapter. So it seems to me that if religious groups are restricted but other ideological groups (except for partisan political events), we have religious discrimination; as I mentioned, Rosenberger so holds. More broadly, it seems to me that tolerance and diversity would include tolerance for a diversity of religious beliefs of the RAs as well as the students. If a student concludes that an RA is unapproachable because of his religion -- not because he's personally insulted you, or has told you that your religion is inferior (where government as employer is concerned, restrictions on rude advocacy of religion or ideology, or even advocacy that harshly criticizes other religions or ideologies,may well be proper), but simply because he's running a Bible study group -- is the student really showing a tolerance for diversity? If the school caters to the preferences of those students who feel uncomfortable talking to out-of-the-closet Christians, is the school really showing a tolerance for diversity? Eugene -Original Message- From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] On Behalf Of Steve Sanders Sent: Tuesday, November 08, 2005 12:42 PM To: 'Law Religion issues for Law Academics' Subject: RE: Bible study ban for RA's in UW-Eau Claire dorms I dont believe that labeling this as a religious-discrimination claim is accurate. As one of the newspaper accounts says: UW-Eau Claire spokesman Mike Rindo said Thursday the university prohibits resident assistants from leading Bible studies or other activities like partisan political events (emphasis added) in the dorms. It doesn't prohibit them from attending them. So, no, RAs also could not organize meetings of the Bush=Hitler Club of the Socialist Youth League. Non-RA living in the dorms could do either of these, as well as lead Bible studies. I think Eugene is right that the issue here is employment, not the state as landlord. The universitys casting this as an approachability issue makes matters somewhat tricky. I assume that, less euphemistically stated, the policy is aimed at discouraging proselytizing by a state employee on state property during working hours something thats even more incompatible with an RAs role than with the jobs of most state actors (because among other things, RA duties usually include promoting tolerance, diversity, etc.). If its simply a matter of the RAs personal identity, I of course agree that discrimination would
RE: Bible study ban for RA's in UW-Eau Claire dorms
I recognize that it makes this case seem much more troubling to characterize the university policy as a blanket ban on all religious speech in a person's private room. But I'm afraid we're beginning to argue scenarios somewhat different from what's been presented. Eugene characterizes this as allowing the RA to engage in a wide range of speech in his dorm room -- just not religious speech and the university ... trying to govern what RAs say to their friends and classmates -- even ones who aren't coming in for counseling -- at any time during the day in their dorm rooms. It would be helpful to know the source for these categorical characterizations, which seem to me to go beyond the facts in evidence. My own reading of whats happening -- based, I admit, on only a sketchy newspaper story combined with my own experience on a campus -- is that the RA makes it public knowledge that he hosts Bible study in his room or some common area of the dorm (it's unclear which), and probably extends an invitation to those whod like to participate. (If these were not openly advertised events, its doubtful they would have come to the Universitys attention as a matter of concern.) So what we have is not just any religious speech exchanged among students in the privacy of someones room, but rather, more precisely, an educational program, if not a devotional exercise, being run by the RA and (probably) advertised within the workplace. The universitys fear, as I understand it, is that students who don't share the RA's perspectives will feel less able to come to him, *not* because of his personal identity, beliefs, or the religious viewpoints he might express in his dorm room, but because his public profile as an organizer of on-site religious activities raises a concern that he may bring perspectives to their problems that would be inappropriate for a state actor. Steve -Original Message- From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] [mailto:religionlaw- [EMAIL PROTECTED] On Behalf Of Volokh, Eugene Sent: Tuesday, November 08, 2005 12:02 PM To: Volokh, Eugene; Law Religion issues for Law Academics Subject: RE: Bible study ban for RA's in UW-Eau Claire dorms Sorry if I was opaque: Rosenberger is relevant because it held that exclusion of religious speech was viewpoint discrimination even when partisan political speech was also excluded (since the U Va policy was no religious speech or partisan political speech). The proper comparison for determining whether the policy discriminates against religion is thus whether other ideological speech is allowed, not whether partisan political speech is allowed. Nor do I think that Rust v. Sullivan is quite apt here, for reasons that Rosenberger pointed to. The school isn't trying to convey some programmatic message here; it's not setting up a forum for the _expression_ of some particular government viewpoint. Rather, it's allowing the RA to engage in a wide range of speech in his dorm room -- just not religious speech (and political partisan speech). And it seems to me that this is especially so when the workplace is necessarily the person's home as well. If Rust applied, then the university could ban pro-choice speech by RAs in their dorm rooms, unpatriotic speech, antiwar speech, and whatever else; can that possibly be right? Now if the university were to set up rules for what RAs say to students who come to their room for counseling, that might be a different story. (There they might even be able to say that the RAs can't counsel students to get abortions, for instance.) But when the university is trying to govern what RAs say to their friends and classmates -- even ones who aren't coming in for counseling -- at any time during the day in their dorm rooms, that seems to me pretty far from Rust. Eugene -Original Message- From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] On Behalf Of Steve Sanders Sent: Tuesday, November 08, 2005 1:52 PM To: 'Law Religion issues for Law Academics' Subject: RE: Bible study ban for RA's in UW-Eau Claire dorms All good points. But if this is properly framed as a case about the religious activities of a public employee in the workplace, I'm unclear how Rosenberger is relevant. The policy apparently says nothing about the freedom of ordinary students living in the dorms to apply for university funds to organize Bible studies on equal terms with other activities. If we're analogizing non-employment lines of First Amendment doctrine, this seems closer to Rust v. Sullivan: the university is paying you to be someplace and to perform specific tasks, and certain things you may want to do during that university-paid time, whether religious or political, may be incompatible with the purpose of the role you've contracted to fill. I appreciate Steve Prescott's post. But since we don't have information on how the university
RE: Bible study ban for RA's in UW-Eau Claire dorms
UW isn't banning a particular kind of speech ... defined by its religiosity for all students, only for employees in a particular working/educational context. That's an important distinction we should not elide. It's perhaps sloppy for the university to characterize its concern as approachability. It raises all the questions Eugene rightly suggests. But at the same time, I take it that we all appreciate the difference between a judge who is publicly known as a conservative Christian, and a judge who sits on the bench wearing his Ten Commandments robe. As a matter of law, one could legitimately object to the approachability of the latter but not the former (unless perhaps you have Tom Delay's attorney working for you...). The distinction between personal conduct/belief and perceived state action is not always an easy one, but it is not an unfamiliar one. A student may decide not to discuss a problem with an RA for a host of reasons -- religion, politics, personality -- that we can't and shouldn't elevate to legal concerns. But a student at a public university has the right to expect that someone who is a cross between an advisor and a 24-hour cop will not apply his religious perspectives to his official duties. If the facts here (many of which we don't know) would lead a reasonable student to the conclusion that the RA would do so, the university has not overstepped its bounds. While I respect those who would characterize this as a free-exercise claim, I think it's properly analyzed under Pickering and public employee speech doctrine, which courts regularly apply to religious speech. See, e.g., Marchi v. Bd. of Coop. Educ. Servs. of Albany, 173 F.3d 469, 476 (2d Cir. 1999) ([W]hen government endeavors to police itself and its employees in an effort to avoid transgressing Establishment Clause limits, it must be accorded some leeway, even though the conduct it forbids might not inevitably be determined to violate the Establishment Clause and the limitations it imposes might restrict an individual's conduct that might well be protected by the Free Exercise Clause if the individual were not acting as an agent of government.). Steve Quoting Volokh, Eugene [EMAIL PROTECTED]: I may have been imprecise; my point is not that UW was trying to ban all religious speech, only that it was expressly banning a particular kind of speech (Bible study groups, or perhaps more generally religious study meetings) defined by its religiosity. Such discrimination against subcategories of religious speech is presu mptively unconstitutional, it seems to me, even if it doesn't discriminate against all religious speech. But as to the university's fear about the student's fear, I'm not sure I quite understand Steve's argument. I agree that a student won't be influenced by religious views that he never hears about. But say that a student hears that the RA is a minister in Church X, or is prominently involved in Church X, or conducts a student group outside his dorm room that relates to Church X. Why would the student distinguish that from the RA's conducting Church X Bible study in his dorm room? In either case, a student might equally say I think enthusiastic members of Church X have certain biases, and that makes me reluctant to ask those members for advice. If the student, for instance, is gay, and thinks that members of Church X strongly disapprove of homosexuality, I take it that it's the RA's publicly known membership in Church X that would make the student uncomfortable about coming to the RA, regardless of how this membership becomes known. Eugene Steve Sanders writes: I recognize that it makes this case seem much more troubling to characterize the university policy as a blanket ban on all religious speech in a person's private room. But I'm afraid we're beginning to argue scenarios somewhat different from what's been presented. Eugene characterizes this as allowing the RA to engage in a wide range of speech in his dorm room -- just not religious speech and the university ... trying to govern what RAs say to their friends and classmates -- even ones who aren't coming in for counseling -- at any time during the day in their dorm rooms. It would be helpful to know the source for these categorical characterizations, which seem to me to go beyond the facts in evidence. My own reading of what's happening -- based, I admit, on only a sketchy newspaper story combined with my own experience on a campus -- is that the RA makes it public knowledge that he hosts Bible study in his room or some common area of the dorm (it's unclear which), and probably extends an invitation to those who'd like to participate. (If these were not openly advertised events, it's doubtful they would have come to the University's attention as a matter of concern.) So what we have is not just any religious speech exchanged among students in the privacy of someone's room, but rather, more precisely
what does the right REALLY think of Roberts?
Despite the rally-the-troops messages on websites like the ACLJ and Concerned Women for America, no one can seriously believe John Roberts makes the hearts of religious conservatives beat faster. Social conservative groups are falling into line behind Bush and going through the motions of the battle they spent years preparing for. But as everyone now knows, Roberts is a conventional, buttoned-down, Catholic Republican Boy Scout type of guy who may or may not have once been a member of the Federalist Society -- but is anything but a true-believer or ideologue (and left wing groups look silly attempting to label him as such). Most people profess not to have a clue about any actual convictions he might hold, and he has in the past disclaimed any theory of constitutional interpretation. He seems in many ways like the person that movement conservatives urged Bush *not* to nominate -- someone with a thin record who might be insufficiently committed to the right's activist jurisprudential agenda. So, who's willing to fess up? What do social and religious conservatives *really* think of John Roberts, and how long before doubts or misgivings start leaking out? ___ To post, send message to Religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu To subscribe, unsubscribe, change options, or get password, see http://lists.ucla.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/religionlaw Please note that messages sent to this large list cannot be viewed as private. Anyone can subscribe to the list and read messages that are posted; people can read the Web archives; and list members can (rightly or wrongly) forward the messages to others.
Re: Free speech for chaplains
The military is funded by citizens for the business of fighting wars, not going about proactively searching for souls that need to be saved. Any soldier who feels the need may, of course, seek out a chaplain, and if one thing leads to another, fine. But if a chaplain's initial approaches are rebuffed, the chaplain must cease and desist. Of course, the soldier who becomes, so to speak, a satisfied customer is unlikely to complain. But if a soldier lodges a valid complaint that he has been harassed or demeaned, the chaplain should be subjected to appropriate discipline. The dictates of chaplain's conscience are not a higher calling than military duty. For any chaplain that finds them so, there is civilian life. Quoting [EMAIL PROTECTED]: Suppose you were religiously as you are, and in the service today. What standard of conduct should there be for a chaplin of another denomination who sincerely believed you were utterly lost without conversion to his religious view? -Original Message- From: Rick Duncan [EMAIL PROTECTED] To: Law Religion issues for Law Academics religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu Sent: Tue, 12 Jul 2005 16:37:07 -0700 (PDT) Subject: RE: Free speech for chaplains Sandy helps illustrate my point. There are some soldiers, like Sandy, who do not wish chaplains to try to save them. They believe they are just fine the way they are thanks. But there are other soldiers, perhaps like I once was, who are searching for God and for salvation and want chaplains to show them the way. Perhaps we need both kinds of chaplains in the armed services, but we should not allow one kind of soldier to have a heckler's veto over chaplains who might be meeting the needs of other kinds of soldiers. Nor should the EC be interpreted to allow the military to serve as a board of acceptable theology for chaplains. There are literally millions of Christians, like me, who bless the day some one--often a stranger--explained the doctrine of salvation by faith to them. Thank God for all the busybodies who took the time to throw a lifeline to wretches like me! If I were a soldier whisked away from my home town and perhaps facing death beyond the next turn in the road, I would want a chaplain who would not hesitate to preach Christ and salvation to me. Rick Sanford Levinson [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Rick writes: If I were on a road heading for a cliff, I would want to be told that the road I was on was bad and that another road was good. The same is true of the spiritual roads I travel. If I were heading for Hell, I would not want a chaplain to comfort me and tell me that everything was fine and dandy. I would want him to help me get off the wrong road and on the right road. * I confess that I think that Rick is right. In an essay published in Wrestling With Diversity, I note my own childhood in Hendersonville, NC, where some of my friends did indeed try to help me in the way that Rick suggests. I obviously didn't accept the help, but I did not in fact resent the effort, since I had no doubt about its motivation (and, as a matter of fact, they didn't press the point once it was clear that I was not going to convert). That being said, I still resent similar efforts coming from those who are not my friends, especially when if they occur in official settings. sandy ___ To post, send message to Religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu To subscribe, unsubscribe, change options, or get password, see http://lists.ucla.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/religionlaw Please note that messages sent to this large list cannot be viewed as private. Anyone can subscribe to the list and read messages that are posted; people can read the Web archives; and list members can (rightly or wrongly) forward the messages to others. Rick Duncan Welpton Professor of Law University of Nebraska College of Law Lincoln, NE 68583-0902 Red State Lawblog: www.redstatelaw.blogspot.com When the Round Table is broken every man must follow either Galahad or Mordred: middle things are gone. C.S.Lewis, Grand Miracle I will not be pushed, filed, stamped, indexed, briefed, debriefed, or nu! mbered. --The Prisoner Sell on Yahoo! Auctions - No fees. Bid on great items. ___ To post, send message to Religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu To subscribe, unsubscribe, change options, or get password, see http://lists.ucla.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/religionlaw Please note that messages sent to this large list cannot be viewed as private. Anyone can subscribe to the list and read messages that are posted; people can read the Web archives; and list members can (rightly or wrongly) forward the messages to others. ___ To post, send message to Religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu To subscribe, unsubscribe, change options, or get password, see
RE: Free speech for chaplains
A larger problem is that while people like us fret about the chaplains' free-speech rights, at least some evangelical chaplains care little about the letter or spirit of the rules within which their position is intended to operate. Some, it is becoming clear, have their own agenda, and, when confronted with concerns, respond indignantly that they answer to a higher authority. The same chaplain who made the offensive comments at the Catholic sailor's funeral went on the tell the Times: The Navy wants to impose its religion on me. Religious pluralism is a religion. It's a theology all by itself. The reality is that many in this debate will play dishonest semantic games -- twisting the issues, claiming victim status, and propounding non-sequitors that will be loudly repeated from pulpits, on cable shoutfests, and no doubt sooner or later from the floor of Congress. So, setting aside my conviction that this sort of thing is exactly why it's ill-advised to fund religious ministry with public funds, I would add to the agenda for discussion: how do we talk to the public and relevant decisionmakers about the delicate balances that are necessary if a program like this is to have constitutional integrity? _ Steve Sanders University of Michigan Law School Email: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Wed: http://www.stevesanders.net ___ To post, send message to Religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu To subscribe, unsubscribe, change options, or get password, see http://lists.ucla.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/religionlaw Please note that messages sent to this large list cannot be viewed as private. Anyone can subscribe to the list and read messages that are posted; people can read the Web archives; and list members can (rightly or wrongly) forward the messages to others.
RE: Are the Ten Commandments the foundation of the Anglo-American legal system?
For all the broad assertions we'll be hearing in the coming months in the media and from amici about the profound influence of the Decalogue on law generally and American law in particular, it's surprising how few serious scholarly sources there appear to be out there to back them up. The petitioner's brief in McCreary County v. ACLU is full of these sorts of sweeping statements, yet it's very thin on any actual support -- mostly the conclusory pronouncements of various jurists (including the Chief Justice) and the portentous dicta of various state courts. At one point there's a footnote to an out of print 1999 book that appears to have been self-published (at least it's the only work ever produced by the obscure Christian publisher). Something I did find in a Westlaw search is Steven K. Greene, The Fount of Everything Just and Right? The Ten Commandments as a Source of American Law, 14 J.L. RELIGION 525 (1999-2000). He concludes, At best, the most that could be said about the relationship of the Ten Commandments to the law is that the former has influenced legal notions of right and wrong. (I recognize that Prof Greene used to work for Americans United, so may not be disinerested.) See also KERMIT L. HALL, ET AL., EDS., THE OXFORD COMPANION TO AMERICAN LAW 507 (2002) (noting that [a]nthropologists report that in every known culture there are rules forbidding some forms of the moral offenses proscribed by the last five of the Ten Commandments). This is the only reference to the Ten Commandments in that tome of more than 800 pp. Note that this is not the same as the argument its partisans make, which is that the Ten Commandments *influenced* almost all legal structures, or that the ideas the 10C expressed were so unique and original that the Decalogue must be regarded as their very wellspring. The most sensible thing I've ever read on this subject is a Findlaw column by Marci Hamilton, available at http://writ.news.findlaw.com/hamilton/20030911.html Steve Sanders University of Michigan Law School Blog: http://reasonandliberty.blogspot.com/ ___ To post, send message to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To subscribe, unsubscribe, change options, or get password, see http://lists.ucla.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/religionlaw Please note that messages sent to this large list cannot be viewed as private. Anyone can subscribe to the list and read messages that are posted; people can read the Web archives; and list members can (rightly or wrongly) forward the messages to others.
