Re: [SC-L] Bugs and flaws
Thanks for the very detailed and informative explanation. However, I still think it sounds like IE has too large of an attack surface :) It still seems to be the case that IE can be persuaded to execute any of a large amount of code based on its raw (web) input, with (fairly) arbitrary parameters, and this large attack surface allows attackers to find vulnerabilities in any of the code that IE calls out to. Crispin Dana Epp wrote: I think I would word that differently. The design defect was when Microsoft decided to allow meta data to call GDI functions. Around 1990 when this was introduced the threat profile was entirely different; the operating system could trust the metadata. Well, actually I would argue that they couldn't, but no one knew any better yet. At the time SetAbortProc() was an important function to allow for print cancellation in the co-operative multitasking environment that was Windows 3.0. To be clear, IE was NOT DIRECTLY vulnerable to the WMF attack vector everyone likes to use as a test case for this discussion. IE actually refuses to process any type of metadata that supported META_ESCAPE records (which SetAbortProc relies on). Hence why its not possible to exploit the vulnerability by simply calling a WMF image via HTML. So how is IE vulnerable then? It's not actually. The attack vector uses IE as a conduit to actually call out to secondary library code that will process it. In the case of the exploits that hit the Net, attackers used an IFRAME hack to call out to the shell to process it. The shell would look up the handler for WMF, which was the Windows Picture Viewer that did the processing in shimgvw.dll. When the dll processed the WMF, it would convert it to a printable EMF format, and bam... we ran into problems. With the design defect being the fact metadata can call arbitrary GDI code, the implementation flaw is the fact applications like IE rely so heavily on calling out to secondary libraries that just can't be trusted. Even if IE has had a strong code review, it is extremely probable that most of the secondary library code has not had the same audit scrutiny. This is a weakness to all applications, not just IE. When you call out to untrusted code that you don't control, you put the application at risk. No different than any other operating system. Only problem is Windows is riddled with these potential holes because its sharing so much of the same codebase. And in the past the teams rarely talk to each other to figure this out. Code reuse is one thing, but some of the components in Windows are carry over from 15 years ago, and will continue to put us at risk due to the implementation flaws that haven't yet been found. But with such a huge master sources to begin with, its not something that will be fixed over night. --- Regards, Dana Epp [Microsoft Security MVP] Blog: http://silverstr.ufies.org/blog/ *From:* [EMAIL PROTECTED] on behalf of Crispin Cowan *Sent:* Fri 2/3/2006 12:12 PM *To:* Gary McGraw *Cc:* Kenneth R. van Wyk; Secure Coding Mailing List *Subject:* Re: [SC-L] Bugs and flaws Gary McGraw wrote: To cycle this all back around to the original posting, lets talk about the WMF flaw in particular. Do we believe that the best way for Microsoft to find similar design problems is to do code review? Or should they use a higher level approach? Were they correct in saying (officially) that flaws such as WMF are hard to anticipate? I have heard some very insightful security researchers from Microsoft pushing an abstract notion of attack surface, which is the amount of code/data/API/whatever that is exposed to the attacker. To design for security, among other things, reduce your attack surface. The WMF design defect seems to be that IE has too large of an attack surface. There are way too many ways for unauthenticated remote web servers to induce the client to run way too much code with parameters provided by the attacker. The implementation flaw is that the WMF API in particular is vulnerable to malicious content. None of which strikes me as surprising, but maybe that's just me :) Crispin -- Crispin Cowan, Ph.D. http://crispincowan.com/~crispin/ http://crispincowan.com/%7Ecrispin/ Director of Software Engineering, Novell http://novell.com Olympic Games: The Bi-Annual Festival of Corruption ___ Secure Coding mailing list (SC-L) SC-L@securecoding.org List information, subscriptions, etc - http://krvw.com/mailman/listinfo/sc-l List charter available at - http://www.securecoding.org/list/charter.php -- Crispin Cowan, Ph.D. http://crispincowan.com/~crispin/ Director of Software Engineering, Novell http://novell.com Olympic Games: The Bi-Annual Festival of Corruption
RE: [SC-L] Bugs and flaws
I'm not sure which of the three definitions in Brian's message you're not concurring with, but I think he was only listing them as strawmen anyway. In any case, there's no reason that static analysis tools shouldn't be able to find errors of omission. We use our tools to find these 'dogs that didn't bark' every day. The tools can identify, for example, places where logging, input validation, and error handling should have been done. With a little work teaching the tool about your application, assets, and libraries, it's easy to find places where encryption, access control, and authentication should have been done but haven't. In your hypothetical, if the API isn't ever invoked with an identity and a secret, there can't be authentication. If there's no call to an access control component, we know at least that there's no centralized mechanism. In this case, the tool could check whether the code follows the project's standard access control pattern. If not, it's an error of omission. If I remember correctly, Saltzer and Schroeder only suggested 8 principles. Your hypo is closest to complete mediation, but touches on several others. But, in theory, there's no reason that static analysis can't help verify all of them in an application. --Jeff -Original Message- From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] On Behalf Of Gary McGraw Sent: Monday, February 06, 2006 11:13 PM To: Brian Chess; sc-l@securecoding.org Subject: RE: [SC-L] Bugs and flaws Hi all, I'm afraid I don't concur with this definition. Here's a (rather vague) flaw example that may help clarify what I mean. Think about an error of omission where an API is exposed with no AA protection whatsoever. This API may have been designed not to have been exposed originally, but somehow became exposed only over time. How do you find errors of omission with a static analysis tool? This is only one of salzer and schroeder's principles in action. What of the other 9? gem P.s. Five points to whoever names the principle in question. P.p.s. The book is out www.swsec.com -Original Message- From: Brian Chess [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] Sent: Sat Feb 04 00:56:16 2006 To: sc-l@securecoding.org Subject:RE: [SC-L] Bugs and flaws The best definition for flaw and bug I've heard so far is that a flaw is a successful implementation of your intent, while a bug is unintentional. I think I've also heard a bug is small, a flaw is big, but that definition is awfully squishy. If the difference between a bug and a flaw is indeed one of intent, then I don't think it's a useful distinction. Intent rarely brings with it other dependable characteristics. I've also heard bugs are things that a static analysis tool can find, but I don't think that really captures it either. For example, it's easy for a static analysis tool to point out that the following Java statement implies that the program is using weak cryptography: SecretKey key = KeyGenerator.getInstance(DES).generateKey(); Brian ___ Secure Coding mailing list (SC-L) SC-L@securecoding.org List information, subscriptions, etc - http://krvw.com/mailman/listinfo/sc-l List charter available at - http://www.securecoding.org/list/charter.php This electronic message transmission contains information that may be confidential or privileged. The information contained herein is intended solely for the recipient and use by any other party is not authorized. If you are not the intended recipient (or otherwise authorized to receive this message by the intended recipient), any disclosure, copying, distribution or use of the contents of the information is prohibited. If you have received this electronic message transmission in error, please contact the sender by reply email and delete all copies of this message. Cigital, Inc. accepts no responsibility for any loss or damage resulting directly or indirectly from the use of this email or its contents. Thank You. ___ Secure Coding mailing list (SC-L) SC-L@securecoding.org List information, subscriptions, etc - http://krvw.com/mailman/listinfo/sc-l List charter available at - http://www.securecoding.org/list/charter.php ___ Secure Coding mailing list (SC-L) SC-L@securecoding.org List information, subscriptions, etc - http://krvw.com/mailman/listinfo/sc-l List charter available at - http://www.securecoding.org/list/charter.php
Re: [SC-L] Bugs and flaws
8 principles with 2 more from physical security that apply only imperfectly to computer systems http://www.cap-lore.com/CapTheory/ProtInf/Basic.html On Feb 7, 2006, at 9:59 AM, Jeff Williams wrote: I'm not sure which of the three definitions in Brian's message you're not concurring with, but I think he was only listing them as strawmen anyway. In any case, there's no reason that static analysis tools shouldn't be able to find errors of omission. We use our tools to find these 'dogs that didn't bark' every day. The tools can identify, for example, places where logging, input validation, and error handling should have been done. With a little work teaching the tool about your application, assets, and libraries, it's easy to find places where encryption, access control, and authentication should have been done but haven't. In your hypothetical, if the API isn't ever invoked with an identity and a secret, there can't be authentication. If there's no call to an access control component, we know at least that there's no centralized mechanism. In this case, the tool could check whether the code follows the project's standard access control pattern. If not, it's an error of omission. If I remember correctly, Saltzer and Schroeder only suggested 8 principles. Your hypo is closest to complete mediation, but touches on several others. But, in theory, there's no reason that static analysis can't help verify all of them in an application. --Jeff -Original Message- From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] On Behalf Of Gary McGraw Sent: Monday, February 06, 2006 11:13 PM To: Brian Chess; sc-l@securecoding.org Subject: RE: [SC-L] Bugs and flaws Hi all, I'm afraid I don't concur with this definition. Here's a (rather vague) flaw example that may help clarify what I mean. Think about an error of omission where an API is exposed with no AA protection whatsoever. This API may have been designed not to have been exposed originally, but somehow became exposed only over time. How do you find errors of omission with a static analysis tool? This is only one of salzer and schroeder's principles in action. What of the other 9? gem P.s. Five points to whoever names the principle in question. P.p.s. The book is out www.swsec.com -Original Message- From: Brian Chess [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] Sent: Sat Feb 04 00:56:16 2006 To: sc-l@securecoding.org Subject:RE: [SC-L] Bugs and flaws The best definition for flaw and bug I've heard so far is that a flaw is a successful implementation of your intent, while a bug is unintentional. I think I've also heard a bug is small, a flaw is big, but that definition is awfully squishy. If the difference between a bug and a flaw is indeed one of intent, then I don't think it's a useful distinction. Intent rarely brings with it other dependable characteristics. I've also heard bugs are things that a static analysis tool can find, but I don't think that really captures it either. For example, it's easy for a static analysis tool to point out that the following Java statement implies that the program is using weak cryptography: SecretKey key = KeyGenerator.getInstance(DES).generateKey(); Brian ___ Secure Coding mailing list (SC-L) SC-L@securecoding.org List information, subscriptions, etc - http://krvw.com/mailman/listinfo/sc-l List charter available at - http://www.securecoding.org/list/charter.php --- - This electronic message transmission contains information that may be confidential or privileged. The information contained herein is intended solely for the recipient and use by any other party is not authorized. If you are not the intended recipient (or otherwise authorized to receive this message by the intended recipient), any disclosure, copying, distribution or use of the contents of the information is prohibited. If you have received this electronic message transmission in error, please contact the sender by reply email and delete all copies of this message. Cigital, Inc. accepts no responsibility for any loss or damage resulting directly or indirectly from the use of this email or its contents. Thank You. --- - ___ Secure Coding mailing list (SC-L) SC-L@securecoding.org List information, subscriptions, etc - http://krvw.com/mailman/listinfo/sc-l List charter available at - http://www.securecoding.org/list/charter.php ___ Secure Coding mailing list (SC-L) SC-L@securecoding.org List information, subscriptions, etc - http://krvw.com/mailman/listinfo/sc-l List charter available at - http://www.securecoding.org/list/charter.php Julie J.C.H
RE: [SC-L] Bugs and flaws
Original message bounced due to address; I chopped to remove WMF and rambling to focus on the subject of language standardization: [...wmf...] fyi// on attack surface: http://www-2.cs.cmu.edu/~wing/ Attack surface concepts fit hand-in-glove with threat modeling concepts, which fit hand in glove with this equivocal design/implementation dialogue. [...] Q. What does the bug/flaw dialogue demonstrate the need for? There's plenty of folks on this list smarter than I am, so it is nice to see a majority agree on what I think the key issues are: communicating (a) accurate and (b) actionable data; expanded: 1. Defect Definition 2. Defect Classification 3. Defect Identification 4. Defect Implication (effectively communicating defect implication) By example I mean (number corresponds to above): 1. Format String, weak crypto use, define what why are these security defects? 2. Implementation Defect, Design Defect, bug, flaw 3. How do we identify these defects in software? 4. Implication: RTAWV (Risk, Threat, Attack, Weakness, Vuln) communication to both technical and non-technical audience is the goal. I added Weakness at the TRIKE group's suggestion, and it has significantly helped in classification instead of using two confusing vuln categories. There is obviously a many-to-one mapping between threat-attack-weakness and even from vuln to weakness, depending on how we define vuln. (I have defined vuln as a particular instance or attackable instance of a weakness). This is *valuable* information to the person trying to solve issues in this problem domain, but I rarely find it well understood by *non-appsec* folks. (Valuable in the sense that it is easier for non-appsec folks to act on a weakness, like insufficient output encoding standards/implementation, than a list of 10,000 exploitable URLs in a large templated site representing 4 XSS variants.) [...] I continue to encounter equivocal uses of the words Threat, Attack, Vulnerability, Flaw, Defect, Artifact (and associated phrases like security-artifact), Fault, Bug, Error, Failure, Mistake, MFV (multi-factor vulnerability) in our collective software security dialogue and literature. What is the best way to work on establishing a common language? Is it reasonable or realistic to expect such standardization? OWASP and WASC have made strides in the webified space on defining attack classes, and some weak patterns; Mitre has worked terminology in the unmanaged code space. Where to go from here? Arian J. Evans FishNet Security 816.421.6611 [fns office] 816.701.2045 [direct] --limited access 888.732.9406 [fns toll-free] 816.421.6677 [fns general fax] 913.710.7045 [mobile] --best bet [EMAIL PROTECTED] [email] http://www.fishnetsecurity.com -Original Message- From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] On Behalf Of Crispin Cowan Sent: Friday, February 03, 2006 2:12 PM To: Gary McGraw Cc: Kenneth R. van Wyk; Secure Coding Mailing List Subject: Re: [SC-L] Bugs and flaws Gary McGraw wrote: To cycle this all back around to the original posting, lets talk about the WMF flaw in particular. Do we believe that the best way for Microsoft to find similar design problems is to do code review? Or should they use a higher level approach? Were they correct in saying (officially) that flaws such as WMF are hard to anticipate? I have heard some very insightful security researchers from Microsoft pushing an abstract notion of attack surface, which is the amount of code/data/API/whatever that is exposed to the attacker. To design for security, among other things, reduce your attack surface. The WMF design defect seems to be that IE has too large of an attack surface. There are way too many ways for unauthenticated remote web servers to induce the client to run way too much code with parameters provided by the attacker. The implementation flaw is that the WMF API in particular is vulnerable to malicious content. None of which strikes me as surprising, but maybe that's just me :) Crispin -- Crispin Cowan, Ph.D. http://crispincowan.com/~crispin/ Director of Software Engineering, Novell http://novell.com Olympic Games: The Bi-Annual Festival of Corruption ___ Secure Coding mailing list (SC-L) SC-L@securecoding.org List information, subscriptions, etc - http://krvw.com/mailman/listinfo/sc-l List charter available at - http://www.securecoding.org/list/charter.php ___ Secure Coding mailing list (SC-L) SC-L@securecoding.org List information, subscriptions, etc - http://krvw.com/mailman/listinfo/sc-l List charter available at - http://www.securecoding.org/list/charter.php
RE: [SC-L] Bugs and flaws
Hi all, I'm afraid I don't concur with this definition. Here's a (rather vague) flaw example that may help clarify what I mean. Think about an error of omission where an API is exposed with no AA protection whatsoever. This API may have been designed not to have been exposed originally, but somehow became exposed only over time. How do you find errors of omission with a static analysis tool? This is only one of salzer and schroeder's principles in action. What of the other 9? gem P.s. Five points to whoever names the principle in question. P.p.s. The book is out www.swsec.com -Original Message- From: Brian Chess [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] Sent: Sat Feb 04 00:56:16 2006 To: sc-l@securecoding.org Subject:RE: [SC-L] Bugs and flaws The best definition for flaw and bug I've heard so far is that a flaw is a successful implementation of your intent, while a bug is unintentional. I think I've also heard a bug is small, a flaw is big, but that definition is awfully squishy. If the difference between a bug and a flaw is indeed one of intent, then I don't think it's a useful distinction. Intent rarely brings with it other dependable characteristics. I've also heard bugs are things that a static analysis tool can find, but I don't think that really captures it either. For example, it's easy for a static analysis tool to point out that the following Java statement implies that the program is using weak cryptography: SecretKey key = KeyGenerator.getInstance(DES).generateKey(); Brian ___ Secure Coding mailing list (SC-L) SC-L@securecoding.org List information, subscriptions, etc - http://krvw.com/mailman/listinfo/sc-l List charter available at - http://www.securecoding.org/list/charter.php This electronic message transmission contains information that may be confidential or privileged. The information contained herein is intended solely for the recipient and use by any other party is not authorized. If you are not the intended recipient (or otherwise authorized to receive this message by the intended recipient), any disclosure, copying, distribution or use of the contents of the information is prohibited. If you have received this electronic message transmission in error, please contact the sender by reply email and delete all copies of this message. Cigital, Inc. accepts no responsibility for any loss or damage resulting directly or indirectly from the use of this email or its contents. Thank You. ___ Secure Coding mailing list (SC-L) SC-L@securecoding.org List information, subscriptions, etc - http://krvw.com/mailman/listinfo/sc-l List charter available at - http://www.securecoding.org/list/charter.php
RE: [SC-L] Bugs and flaws
I'm with you on this threat modeling thing...which is the process meant to lay flaws bare. I like to call it risk analysis of course (using american war nomenclature instead of british/australian). STRIDE is an important step in the right direction, but a checklist approach has essential creativity constraints worth pondering. My only point in making the distinction clear (bugs vs flaws) is to make sure that we don't forget design, requirements, and early lifecycle artifacts in our rush to analyze code. Please do both (touchpoints 1 and 2 in Software Security). gem -Original Message- From: Evans, Arian [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] Sent: Fri Feb 03 18:29:29 2006 To: Crispin Cowan; Gary McGraw; Secure Coding Mailing List; Kenneth R. van Wyk Subject:RE: [SC-L] Bugs and flaws per WMF// Let's face it, this was legacy, possibly deprecated code that was likely low on the security things-to-do list. I suspect MS, like the rest of the world, has resource limitations regarding analyzing all their various product/api entry points for security implications. Which is one of the reasons I think threat modeling came in vogue, and I think a threat model would flag this in bright red for review, but you need resources with quite a bit of knowledge and time to build that model, and again, since this was legacy functionality... fyi// on attack surface: http://www-2.cs.cmu.edu/~wing/ There are several ppls that have done nice work here; it fits hand-in-glove with threat modeling concepts, which fits hand in glove with this whole equivocal dialogue about design/implementation verbiage. This whole discussion underscores the real issue we have, which is a common language. So how to fix it? A taxonomy and terminology guide; simple, concise. There's plenty of folks on this list a lot smarter than I am, so it is nice to see that a majority agree on what I think the key issues are: communicating (a) accurate and (b) actionable data, or expanded: 1. Defect Definition 2. Defect Classification 3. Defect Identification 4. Defect Implication (communicating defect implication as goal) By example I mean: 1. Format String, weak crypto use, define what why are these security defects? 2. Implementation Defect, Design Defect, bug, flaw, blah 3. How do we identify these defects in software? 4. Implication: RTAWV (Risk, Threat, Attack, Weakness, Vuln) communication to both technical, and non-technical audience. I added Weakness at the TRIKE group's suggestion, and it has significantly helped in classification instead of using two confusing vuln categories. There is obviously a many-to-one mapping between threat-attack-weakness and even from vuln to weakness, depending on how we define vuln. (I have defined vuln as a particular instance or attackable instance of a weakness). This is *valuable* information to the person trying to solve issues in this problem domain, but I rarely find it well understood by non-appsec folks. I have attempted to address and communicate this in a short paper titled: ::Taxonomy of Software Security Analysis Types:: (Software Security Analysis == defined as == Software Analysis for Defects with Security Implications, implications being contextual.) Is significantly weakened if at the end of the day no one knows what I mean by design weakness, implementation defect, goblins, etc. So I will need all your help in shoring up the language. My reason for distinction of security as a defect implication is that defects are sometimes clear; the implications are not always clear and do not always follow from the defects. Defects are neither a necessary nor sufficient condition for security implications (obviously), but it the implications most people solving problems care about, not defect language. Much of this is underscored in the IEEE software defect terminology, but look at our current industry ambiguity between attacks and vulnerabilities! I continue to encounter wildly equivocal uses of the words Threat, Attack, Vulnerability, Flaw, Defect, Artifact (and associated phrases like security- artifact), Fault, Bug, Error, Failure, Mistake, MFV (multi-factor vulnerability) in our collective software security dialogue and literature. I am *not* *married* to any particular verbiage; my goal is a common language so we can have more effective dialogue, Arian J. Evans FishNet Security 816.421.6611 [fns office] 816.701.2045 [direct] --limited access 888.732.9406 [fns toll-free] 816.421.6677 [fns general fax] 913.710.7045 [mobile] --best bet [EMAIL PROTECTED] [email] http://www.fishnetsecurity.com -Original Message- From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] On Behalf Of Crispin Cowan Sent: Friday, February 03, 2006 2:12 PM To: Gary McGraw Cc: Kenneth R. van Wyk; Secure Coding Mailing List Subject: Re: [SC-L] Bugs and flaws Gary McGraw wrote: To cycle this all back around to the original posting, lets talk about the WMF flaw
Re: [SC-L] Bugs and flaws
David Crocker wrote: I don't think this analogy between software development and manufacturing holds. There are no manufacturing defects in software construction For software: A design defect is when you correctly implement what you wanted, and you wanted the wrong thing. A manufacturing defect is when you incorrectly implement what you wanted. BB ___ Secure Coding mailing list (SC-L) SC-L@securecoding.org List information, subscriptions, etc - http://krvw.com/mailman/listinfo/sc-l List charter available at - http://www.securecoding.org/list/charter.php
Re: [SC-L] Bugs and flaws
Ah, The age-old Gary vs. jOHN debate. I do believe along the continuum of architecture--design--impl. that I've shown the ability to discern flawed design from source code in source code reviews. Cigital guys reading this thread have an advantage in that they know both the shared and exclusive activities defined as part of our architectural and code review processes. The bottom line is this: as you look at source code, given enough gift for architecture, you can identify _some_ of the design (whether intended or implemented) from the implementation, and find _some_ flaws. Before you get wound up and say, Maybe you jOHN tongue fully in-cheek, the Struts example I gave is one case. Looking at a single class file (the privileged Servlet definition), you can determine that the Lead Developer/Architect has not paid enough attention to authorization when he/she designed how the application's functionality was organized. Admittedly, _some_ (other) architectural flaws do demand attention paid only through activities confined to architectural analysis--not code review. Think back again to my original email. The situations I present (both with the physical table and Struts) present a 'mistake' (IEEE parlance) that can manifest itself in terms of both an architectural flaw and implementation bug (Cigital parlance). I believe that the concept that Jeff (Payne), Cowan, Wysopal, and even Peterson (if you bend it correctly) present is that the 'mistake' may cross-cut the SDLC--manifesting itself in each of the phases' artifacts. IE: If the mistake was in requirements, it will manifest itself in design deficiency (flaw), as well as in the implementation (bug). Jeff (Williams) indicates that, since progress roles downstream in the SDLC, you _could_ fix the 'mistake' in any of the phases it manifests itself, but that an efficiency argument demands you look in the code. I implore the reader recall my original email. I mention that when characterized as a bug, the level of effort required to fix the 'mistake' is probably less than if it's characterized as a flaw. However, in doing so, you may miss other instances of the mistake throughout the code. I whole-heartedly agree with Jeff (Williams) that: 1) Look to the docs. for the 'right' answer. 2) Look to the code for the 'truth'. 3) Look to the deployed bins. for 'God's Truth'. The variance in these artifacts is a key element in Cigital's architectural analysis. Second, (a point I made in my original email) the objective is to give the most practical advise as possible to developers for fixing the problem. I'll just copy-paste it from the original: - Summarizing, my characterization of a vulnerability as a bug or a flaw has important implications towards how it's mitigated. In the case of the Struts example, the bug-based fix is easiest--but in so characterizing the problem I may (or may not) miss other instances of this vulnerability within the application's code base. How do I know how to characterize a vulnerability along the continuum of bugs--flaws? I don't know for sure, but I've taken to using my experience over a number of assessments to upcast typically endemic problems as flaws (and solve them in the design or architecture) and downcast those problems that have glaring quick-fixes. In circumstances where both those heuristics apply, I suggest a tactical fix to the bug, while prescribing that further analysis take the tack of further fleshing out the flaw. - Where my opinion differs from the other posters is this: I believe: Where a 'mistake' manifests itself in multiple phases of the software development lifecycle, you're most apt to completely MITIGATE its effects by characterizing it as early in the lifecycle as possible, as design or even requirements. As Williams indicates, to the contrary, you may FIND the problem most easily later in the lifecycle. Perhaps in the code itself. Look, McGraw put forth the 'bug' and 'flaw' nomenclature. It's useful because there is value in explicitly pinning the vulnerability in architecture, design, or code if it helps the dev. org. get things sorted out securely and throughout their application. My experience is that this value is real. The message of the 'defect'/'mistake' purist resonates with me as well: it's all simply a mistake some human made along the path of developing the application. But! I can assure you, to the extent that root-cause analysis is valuable, telling a dev. team where to most effectively contend with a vulnerability is also valuable. In other words, smart guys will always find the problems--by hook, or by crook--but it takes classification to aid in efficient and thorough mitigation. - John Steven Principal, Software Security Group Technical Director, Office of the CTO 703 404 5726 - Direct | 703 727 4034 - Cell Cigital Inc. | [EMAIL PROTECTED] 4772 F7F3 1019 4668 62AD 94B0 AE7F EEF4 62D5 F908 From: Gary McGraw [EMAIL PROTECTED] I'm sorry, but it
RE: [SC-L] Bugs and flaws
Hi Gary, In one of your prior posts you mentioned documentation. I believe that the problem with WMF was that someone had not examined WMF as a postential source of vulnerabilities, since the embedded code was an legacy capability. My belief is that one of the keys to finding flaws lies in the proper capture of the requirements/contract of a software component, and then examining and testing against that. Without the proper requirements that speak clearly to security, we can inspect and examine, but we won't know what we're measuring against. That doesn't solve the problem of knowing when we're done, I realize. See you at SSS. - James -Original Message- From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] On Behalf Of Gary McGraw Sent: Friday, February 03, 2006 11:13 AM To: Kenneth R. van Wyk; Secure Coding Mailing List Subject: RE: [SC-L] Bugs and flaws To cycle this all back around to the original posting, lets talk about the WMF flaw in particular. Do we believe that the best way for Microsoft to find similar design problems is to do code review? Or should they use a higher level approach? Were they correct in saying (officially) that flaws such as WMF are hard to anticipate? gem This electronic message transmission contains information that may be confidential or privileged. The information contained herein is intended solely for the recipient and use by any other party is not authorized. If you are not the intended recipient (or otherwise authorized to receive this message by the intended recipient), any disclosure, copying, distribution or use of the contents of the information is prohibited. If you have received this electronic message transmission in error, please contact the sender by reply email and delete all copies of this message. Cigital, Inc. accepts no responsibility for any loss or damage resulting directly or indirectly from the use of this email or its contents. Thank You. ___ Secure Coding mailing list (SC-L) SC-L@securecoding.org List information, subscriptions, etc - http://krvw.com/mailman/listinfo/sc-l List charter available at - http://www.securecoding.org/list/charter.php ___ Secure Coding mailing list (SC-L) SC-L@securecoding.org List information, subscriptions, etc - http://krvw.com/mailman/listinfo/sc-l List charter available at - http://www.securecoding.org/list/charter.php
Re: [SC-L] Bugs and flaws
Gary McGraw wrote: To cycle this all back around to the original posting, lets talk about the WMF flaw in particular. Do we believe that the best way for Microsoft to find similar design problems is to do code review? Or should they use a higher level approach? Were they correct in saying (officially) that flaws such as WMF are hard to anticipate? I have heard some very insightful security researchers from Microsoft pushing an abstract notion of attack surface, which is the amount of code/data/API/whatever that is exposed to the attacker. To design for security, among other things, reduce your attack surface. The WMF design defect seems to be that IE has too large of an attack surface. There are way too many ways for unauthenticated remote web servers to induce the client to run way too much code with parameters provided by the attacker. The implementation flaw is that the WMF API in particular is vulnerable to malicious content. None of which strikes me as surprising, but maybe that's just me :) Crispin -- Crispin Cowan, Ph.D. http://crispincowan.com/~crispin/ Director of Software Engineering, Novell http://novell.com Olympic Games: The Bi-Annual Festival of Corruption ___ Secure Coding mailing list (SC-L) SC-L@securecoding.org List information, subscriptions, etc - http://krvw.com/mailman/listinfo/sc-l List charter available at - http://www.securecoding.org/list/charter.php
RE: [SC-L] Bugs and flaws
Title: Re: [SC-L] Bugs and flaws I think I would word that differently. The design defect was when Microsoft decided to allow meta data to call GDI functions. Around 1990 when this was introduced the threat profile was entirely different; the operating system could trust the metadata. Well, actually I would argue that they couldn't, but no one knew any better yet. At the time SetAbortProc() was an important function to allow for print cancellation in the co-operative multitasking environment that was Windows 3.0. To be clear, IE was NOT DIRECTLY vulnerable to the WMF attack vector everyone likes to use as a test case for this discussion. IE actually refuses to process any type of metadata that supported META_ESCAPE records (which SetAbortProc relies on). Hence why its not possible to exploit the vulnerability by simply calling a WMF image via HTML. So how is IE vulnerable then? It's not actually. The attack vector uses IE as a conduit to actually call out to secondary library code that will process it. In the case of the exploits that hit the Net, attackers used an IFRAME hack to call out to the shell to process it. The shell would look up the handler for WMF, which was the Windows Picture Viewer that did the processing in shimgvw.dll. When the dll processed the WMF, it would convert it to a printable EMF format, and bam... we ran into problems. With the design defect being the fact metadata can call arbitrary GDI code, the implementation flaw is the fact applications like IE rely so heavily on calling out to secondary libraries that just can't be trusted. Even if IE has had a strong code review, it is extremely probable that most of the secondary library code has not had the same audit scrutiny. This is a weakness to all applications, not just IE. When you call out to untrusted code that you don't control, you put theapplication at risk. No different than any other operating system. Only problem is Windows is riddled with these potential holes because its sharing so much of the same codebase. And in the past the teams rarely talk to each other to figure this out. Code reuse is one thing, but some of the components in Windows are carry over from 15 years ago, and will continue to put us at risk due to the implementation flaws that haven't yet been found. But with such a huge master sources to begin with, its not something that will be fixed over night. --- Regards, Dana Epp[Microsoft Security MVP] Blog: http://silverstr.ufies.org/blog/ From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] on behalf of Crispin CowanSent: Fri 2/3/2006 12:12 PMTo: Gary McGrawCc: Kenneth R. van Wyk; Secure Coding Mailing ListSubject: Re: [SC-L] Bugs and flaws Gary McGraw wrote: To cycle this all back around to the original posting, lets talk about the WMF flaw in particular. Do we believe that the best way for Microsoft to find similar design problems is to do code review? Or should they use a higher level approach? Were they correct in saying (officially) that flaws such as WMF are hard to anticipate?I have heard some very insightful security researchers from Microsoftpushing an abstract notion of "attack surface", which is the amount ofcode/data/API/whatever that is exposed to the attacker. To design forsecurity, among other things, reduce your attack surface.The WMF design defect seems to be that IE has too large of an attacksurface. There are way too many ways for unauthenticated remote webservers to induce the client to run way too much code with parametersprovided by the attacker. The implementation flaw is that the WMF API inparticular is vulnerable to malicious content.None of which strikes me as surprising, but maybe that's just me :)Crispin--Crispin Cowan, Ph.D. http://crispincowan.com/~crispin/Director of Software Engineering, Novell http://novell.com Olympic Games: The Bi-Annual Festival of Corruption___Secure Coding mailing list (SC-L)SC-L@securecoding.orgList information, subscriptions, etc - http://krvw.com/mailman/listinfo/sc-lList charter available at - http://www.securecoding.org/list/charter.php ___ Secure Coding mailing list (SC-L) SC-L@securecoding.org List information, subscriptions, etc - http://krvw.com/mailman/listinfo/sc-l List charter available at - http://www.securecoding.org/list/charter.php
RE: [SC-L] Bugs and flaws
Gary McGraw [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: To cycle this all back around to the original posting, lets talk about the WMF flaw in particular. Do we believe that the best way for Microsoft to find similar design problems is to do code review? Or should they use a higher level approach? I'll leave that to those with relevant specification/design/ implementation/review experiences... Were they correct in saying (officially) that flaws such as WMF are hard to anticipate? No. That claim is totally bogus on its face. It is an very well-established rule that you commingle code and data _at extreme risk_. We have also known for a very long time that our historically preferred use of (simple) von Neumann architectures make maintaining that distinction rather tricky. However, neither absolves us of the duty of care to be aware of these issues and to take suitable measures to ensure we don't design systems apparently intent on shooting themselves in the feet. I'd wager that even way back then, some designer and/or developer at MS, when doing the WMF design/implementation back in Win16 days (Win 3.0, no?) experienced one of those We really shouldn't be doing that like this... moments, but then dismissed it as an unnecessary concern because it's only for a personal computer (or some other cosmically shallow reason -- if I get this done by Friday I'll have a weekend for a change, if I get this done by Friday I'll make a nice bonus, usability is more important than anything else, performance is more important than anything else, etc, etc, etc). Given the intended userbase and extant computing environment at that time, the design probably was quite acceptable. The real fault is that it was then, repeatedly and apparently largely unquestioningly, ported into new implementations (Win 3.1, NT3x, Win9x, NT4, ME, Win2K, XP, XPSP2, W2K3) _including_ the ones done after Billy Boy's security is now more important than anything memo. At some point in that evolution, several someone's should have been raising their hands and saying, You know, now is the time we should fix this Someone on one of the the IE teams obviously noticed and flagged the issue, but why didn't that flag get raised bigger, higher, brighter? ... It is bogus for another reason too -- some of the people at MS making that official claim also said this is the first such flaw of this kind, and that's just BS. Long before WM/Concept.A (or its forerunner, the oft-forgotten WM/DMV.A) many security and antivirus folk were warning that embedding the more powerful, complex programming language and architecture macros (such as WordBasic, VBA and AccessBasic) into their associated document files was an inherently flawed design and would only lead to trouble. So, not only have we long-understood the theoretical reasons for why the underlying causes of WMF are inherently bad design and best avoided if at all possible, BUT MS has had its own, self-inflicted stupidities of exactly the same kind. If MS truly could not anticipate, at some point along the Win3x to W2K3 development timeline earlier than 28 Dec 2005, that this WMF design feature would cause trouble, one has to ask if MS should be allowed to make software for general consumption... Regards, Nick FitzGerald ___ Secure Coding mailing list (SC-L) SC-L@securecoding.org List information, subscriptions, etc - http://krvw.com/mailman/listinfo/sc-l List charter available at - http://www.securecoding.org/list/charter.php
Re: [SC-L] Bugs and flaws
Al Eridani [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: If the design says For each fund that the user owns, do X and my code does X for all the funds but it skips the most recently acquired fund, I see it as a manufacturing error. On the other hand, if a user sells all of her funds and the design does not properly contemplate the situation where no funds are owned and therefore the software misbehaves, I see it as a design error. Maybe I'm confused, but... If the design in your second case is still the same one -- For each fund that the user owns, do X -- then this second example, like your first, is NOT a design error but an implementation (or manufacturing if you prefer) error. (Both are (probably) due to some or other form of improper bounds checking, and probably due to naïve use of zero- based counters controlling a loop... 8-) ) The design For each fund that the user owns, do X clearly (well, to me -- am I odd in this?) says that NOTHING be done if the number of funds is zero, hence the second result is an implemention error. Regards, Nick FitzGerald ___ Secure Coding mailing list (SC-L) SC-L@securecoding.org List information, subscriptions, etc - http://krvw.com/mailman/listinfo/sc-l List charter available at - http://www.securecoding.org/list/charter.php
Re: [SC-L] Bugs and flaws
Kevin, Jeff Payne and I were talking about this last night. Jeff's position was, ...Or, you could just use the existing quality assurance terminology and avoid the problem altogether. I agree with you and him; standardizing terminology is a great start to obviating confusing discussions about what type of problem the software faces. Re-reading my post, I realize that it came off as heavy support for additional terminology. Truth is, we've found that the easiest way to communicate this concept to our Consultants and Clients here at Cigital has been to build the two buckets (flaws and bugs). What I was really trying to present was that Security people could stand to be a bit more thorough about how they synthesize the results of their analysis before they communicate the vulnerabilities they've found, and what mitigating strategies they suggest. I guess, in my mind, the most important things with regard to classifying the mistakes software people make that lead to vulnerability (the piety of vulnerability taxonomies aside) is to support: 1) Selection of the most effective mitigating strategy -and- 2) Root cause analysis that will result in changes in software development that prevent software folk from making the same mistake again. - John Steven Principal, Software Security Group Technical Director, Office of the CTO 703 404 5726 - Direct | 703 727 4034 - Cell Cigital Inc. | [EMAIL PROTECTED] 4772 F7F3 1019 4668 62AD 94B0 AE7F EEF4 62D5 F908 From: Wall, Kevin [EMAIL PROTECTED] John Steven wrote: ... 2) Flaws are different in important ways bugs when it comes to presentation, prioritization, and mitigation. Let's explore by physical analog first. Crispin Cowan responded: I disagree with the word usage. To me, bug and flaw are exactly synonyms. The distinction being drawn here is between implementation flaws vs. design flaws. You are just creating confusing jargon to claim that flaw is somehow more abstract than bug. Flaw ::= defect ::= bug. A vulnerability is a special subset of flaws/defects/bugs that has the property of being exploitable. I'm not sure if this will clarify things or further muddy the waters, but... partial definitions taken SWEBOK (http://www.swebok.org/ironman/pdf/Swebok_Ironman_June_23_%202004.pdf) which in turn were taken from the IEEE standard glossary (IEEE610.12-90) are: + Error: A difference.between a computed result and the correct result + Fault: An incorrect step, process, or data definition in a computer program + Failure: The [incorrect] result of a fault + Mistake: A human action that produces an incorrect result Not all faults are manifested as errors. I can't find an online version of the glossary anywhere, and the one I have is about 15-20 years old and buried somewhere deep under a score of other rarely used books. My point is though, until we start with some standard terminology this field of information security is never going to mature. I propose that we build on the foundational definitions of the IEEE-CS (unless there definitions have bugs ;-). -kevin --- Kevin W. Wall Qwest Information Technology, Inc. [EMAIL PROTECTED] Phone: 614.215.4788 The reason you have people breaking into your software all over the place is because your software sucks... -- Former whitehouse cybersecurity advisor, Richard Clarke, at eWeek Security Summit This electronic message transmission contains information that may be confidential or privileged. The information contained herein is intended solely for the recipient and use by any other party is not authorized. If you are not the intended recipient (or otherwise authorized to receive this message by the intended recipient), any disclosure, copying, distribution or use of the contents of the information is prohibited. If you have received this electronic message transmission in error, please contact the sender by reply email and delete all copies of this message. Cigital, Inc. accepts no responsibility for any loss or damage resulting directly or indirectly from the use of this email or its contents. Thank You. ___ Secure Coding mailing list (SC-L) SC-L@securecoding.org List information, subscriptions, etc - http://krvw.com/mailman/listinfo/sc-l List charter available at - http://www.securecoding.org/list/charter.php
RE: [SC-L] Bugs and flaws
Hi all, When I introduced the bugs and flaws nomenclature into the literature, I did so in an article about the software security workshop I chaired in 2003 (see http://www.cigital.com/ssw/). This was ultimately written up in an On the Horizon paper published by IEEE Security Privacy. Nancy Mead and I queried the SWEBOK and looked around to see if the new usage caused collision. It did not. The reason I think it is important to distinguish the two ends of the rather slippery range (crispy is right about that) is that software security as a field is not paying enough attention to architecture. By identifying flaws as a subcategory of defects (according the the SWEBOK), we can focus some attention on the problem. From the small glossary in Software Security (my new book out tomorrow): Bug-A bug is an implementation-level software problem. Bugs may exist in code but never be executed. Though the term bug is applied quite generally by many software practitioners, I reserve use of the term to encompass fairly simple implementation errors. Bugs are implementation-level problems that can be easily discovered and remedied. See Chapter 1. Flaw-A design-level or architectural software defect. High-level defects cause 50% of software security problems. See Chapter 1. In any case, I intend to still use these terms like this, and I would be very pleased if you would all join me. gem This electronic message transmission contains information that may be confidential or privileged. The information contained herein is intended solely for the recipient and use by any other party is not authorized. If you are not the intended recipient (or otherwise authorized to receive this message by the intended recipient), any disclosure, copying, distribution or use of the contents of the information is prohibited. If you have received this electronic message transmission in error, please contact the sender by reply email and delete all copies of this message. Cigital, Inc. accepts no responsibility for any loss or damage resulting directly or indirectly from the use of this email or its contents. Thank You. ___ Secure Coding mailing list (SC-L) SC-L@securecoding.org List information, subscriptions, etc - http://krvw.com/mailman/listinfo/sc-l List charter available at - http://www.securecoding.org/list/charter.php
RE: [SC-L] Bugs and flaws
In the manufacturing world, which is far more mature than the software development world, they use the terminology of design defect and manufacturing defect. So this distinction is useful and has stood the test of time. Flaw and defect are synonymous. We should just pick one. You could say that the term for manufacturing software is implementation. So why do we need to change the terms for the software world? Wouldn't design defect and implementation defect be clearer and more in line with the manufacturing quality discipline, which the software quality discipline should be working towards emulating. (When do we get to Six Sigma?) I just don't see the usefulness of calling a design defect a flaw. Flaw by itself is overloaded. And in the software world, bug can mean an implementation or design problem, so bug alone is overloaded for describing an implementation defect. At @stake the Application Center of Excellence used the terminology design flaw and implementation flaw. It well understood by our customers. As Crispin said in an earlier post on the subject, the line is sometimes blurry. I am sure this is the case in manufacturing too. Architecture flaws can be folded into the design flaw category for simplicity. My vote is for a less overloaded and clearer terminology. -Chris P.S. My father managed a non-destructive test lab at a jet engine manufacturer. They had about the highest quality requirements in the world. So for many hours I was regaled with tales about the benefits of performing static analysis on individual components early in the manufacturing cycle. They would dip cast parts in a fluorescent liquid and look at them under ultraviolet light to illuminate cracks caused during casting process. For critical parts which would receive more stress, such as the fan blades, they would x-ray each part to inspect for internal cracks. A more expensive process but warranted due to the increased risk of total system failure for a defect in those parts. The static testing was obviously much cheaper and delivered better quality than just bolting the parts together and doing dynamic testing in a test cell. It's a wonder that it has taken the software security world so long to catch onto the benefits of static testing of implementation. I think we can learn a lot more from the manufacturing world. On Thu, 2 Feb 2006, Gary McGraw wrote: Hi all, When I introduced the bugs and flaws nomenclature into the literature, I did so in an article about the software security workshop I chaired in 2003 (see http://www.cigital.com/ssw/). This was ultimately written up in an On the Horizon paper published by IEEE Security Privacy. Nancy Mead and I queried the SWEBOK and looked around to see if the new usage caused collision. It did not. The reason I think it is important to distinguish the two ends of the rather slippery range (crispy is right about that) is that software security as a field is not paying enough attention to architecture. By identifying flaws as a subcategory of defects (according the the SWEBOK), we can focus some attention on the problem. From the small glossary in Software Security (my new book out tomorrow): Bug-A bug is an implementation-level software problem. Bugs may exist in code but never be executed. Though the term bug is applied quite generally by many software practitioners, I reserve use of the term to encompass fairly simple implementation errors. Bugs are implementation-level problems that can be easily discovered and remedied. See Chapter 1. Flaw-A design-level or architectural software defect. High-level defects cause 50% of software security problems. See Chapter 1. In any case, I intend to still use these terms like this, and I would be very pleased if you would all join me. gem This electronic message transmission contains information that may be confidential or privileged. The information contained herein is intended solely for the recipient and use by any other party is not authorized. If you are not the intended recipient (or otherwise authorized to receive this message by the intended recipient), any disclosure, copying, distribution or use of the contents of the information is prohibited. If you have received this electronic message transmission in error, please contact the sender by reply email and delete all copies of this message. Cigital, Inc. accepts no responsibility for any loss or damage resulting directly or indirectly from the use of this email or its contents. Thank You. ___ Secure Coding mailing list (SC-L) SC-L@securecoding.org List information, subscriptions, etc - http://krvw.com/mailman/listinfo/sc-l List charter available at - http://www.securecoding.org/list/charter.php
RE: [SC-L] Bugs and flaws
Hi Weld, You make a very good point. I think we have lots to learn from manufacturing. As a matter of practice, I usually use the terms that you suggested as modifiers and say: implementation bug design flaw software defect As long as there is a clear way to separate the two ends of the slippery spectrum, I will be happy. But I'm still gonna say bug and flaw for short even when I mean the really long involved things above! Simplify. gem This electronic message transmission contains information that may be confidential or privileged. The information contained herein is intended solely for the recipient and use by any other party is not authorized. If you are not the intended recipient (or otherwise authorized to receive this message by the intended recipient), any disclosure, copying, distribution or use of the contents of the information is prohibited. If you have received this electronic message transmission in error, please contact the sender by reply email and delete all copies of this message. Cigital, Inc. accepts no responsibility for any loss or damage resulting directly or indirectly from the use of this email or its contents. Thank You. ___ Secure Coding mailing list (SC-L) SC-L@securecoding.org List information, subscriptions, etc - http://krvw.com/mailman/listinfo/sc-l List charter available at - http://www.securecoding.org/list/charter.php
RE: [SC-L] Bugs and flaws
Architecture is also an overloaded term, often meaning either a design (the output of architects) or the implementation of certain types of design (the output of engineers). Hoping to clarify Chris's comment on architecture flaws: architecture defects as in the defects in the output produced by architects are design flaws; architecture defects as in the defects in the output of programmers/coders/engineers are implementation flaws. FWIW, I agree with Chris, design flaw and implementation flaw seem better/more descriptive/less confusing than revised definitions for flaw and bug. (Then again, I once worked at @stake..., on the other hand, IIRC this terminology is more consistent with what you find in Ross Anderson's classic Security Engineering.) Michael -Original Message- From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] On Behalf Of Chris Wysopal Sent: Thursday, February 02, 2006 4:35 PM To: Gary McGraw Cc: William Kruse; Wall, Kevin; Secure Coding Mailing List Subject: RE: [SC-L] Bugs and flaws In the manufacturing world, which is far more mature than the software development world, they use the terminology of design defect and manufacturing defect. So this distinction is useful and has stood the test of time. Flaw and defect are synonymous. We should just pick one. You could say that the term for manufacturing software is implementation. So why do we need to change the terms for the software world? Wouldn't design defect and implementation defect be clearer and more in line with the manufacturing quality discipline, which the software quality discipline should be working towards emulating. (When do we get to Six Sigma?) I just don't see the usefulness of calling a design defect a flaw. Flaw by itself is overloaded. And in the software world, bug can mean an implementation or design problem, so bug alone is overloaded for describing an implementation defect. At @stake the Application Center of Excellence used the terminology design flaw and implementation flaw. It well understood by our customers. As Crispin said in an earlier post on the subject, the line is sometimes blurry. I am sure this is the case in manufacturing too. Architecture flaws can be folded into the design flaw category for simplicity. My vote is for a less overloaded and clearer terminology. -Chris P.S. My father managed a non-destructive test lab at a jet engine manufacturer. They had about the highest quality requirements in the world. So for many hours I was regaled with tales about the benefits of performing static analysis on individual components early in the manufacturing cycle. They would dip cast parts in a fluorescent liquid and look at them under ultraviolet light to illuminate cracks caused during casting process. For critical parts which would receive more stress, such as the fan blades, they would x-ray each part to inspect for internal cracks. A more expensive process but warranted due to the increased risk of total system failure for a defect in those parts. The static testing was obviously much cheaper and delivered better quality than just bolting the parts together and doing dynamic testing in a test cell. It's a wonder that it has taken the software security world so long to catch onto the benefits of static testing of implementation. I think we can learn a lot more from the manufacturing world. On Thu, 2 Feb 2006, Gary McGraw wrote: Hi all, When I introduced the bugs and flaws nomenclature into the literature, I did so in an article about the software security workshop I chaired in 2003 (see http://www.cigital.com/ssw/). This was ultimately written up in an On the Horizon paper published by IEEE Security Privacy. Nancy Mead and I queried the SWEBOK and looked around to see if the new usage caused collision. It did not. The reason I think it is important to distinguish the two ends of the rather slippery range (crispy is right about that) is that software security as a field is not paying enough attention to architecture. By identifying flaws as a subcategory of defects (according the the SWEBOK), we can focus some attention on the problem. From the small glossary in Software Security (my new book out tomorrow): Bug-A bug is an implementation-level software problem. Bugs may exist in code but never be executed. Though the term bug is applied quite generally by many software practitioners, I reserve use of the term to encompass fairly simple implementation errors. Bugs are implementation-level problems that can be easily discovered and remedied. See Chapter 1. Flaw-A design-level or architectural software defect. High-level defects cause 50% of software security problems. See Chapter 1. In any case, I intend to still use these terms like this, and I would be very pleased if you would all join me. gem This electronic message transmission contains information
Re: [SC-L] Bugs and flaws
John Steven wrote: Re-reading my post, I realize that it came off as heavy support for additional terminology. Truth is, we've found that the easiest way to communicate this concept to our Consultants and Clients here at Cigital has been to build the two buckets (flaws and bugs). My main problem with this terminology is that I have only ever seen it coming from Cigital people. The rest of the world seems to treat flaw and bug as synonyms. The distinction here is between design flaw and implementation flaw. There doesn't seem to be anything in these words that suggest one is larger scale than the other. From dictionary.com we have: flaw^1 http://www.answers.com/flawr=67(flô) pronunciation /n./ 1. An imperfection, often concealed, that impairs soundness: /a flaw in the crystal that caused it to shatter./ See synonyms at blemish http://www.answers.com/main/ntquery;jsessionid=75e32c5vb2csr?method=4dsid=1555dekey=B0319900gwp=8curtab=1555_1sbid=lc04b. 2. A defect or shortcoming in something intangible: /They share the character flaw of arrogance./ 3. A defect in a legal document that can render it invalid. Bug http://www.answers.com/bugr=67 is a little more arcane, and the only relevant part is far down the document where it discusses the history with Grace Hopper: bug An unwanted and unintended property of a program or piece of hardware, esp. one that causes it to malfunction. Antonym of /feature/ http://www.answers.com/main/ntquery?method=4dsid=2291dekey=%2FF%2Ffeature.htmlgwp=8curtab=2291_1. Examples: “There's a bug in the editor: it writes things out backwards.” “The system crashed because of a hardware bug.” “Fred is a winner, but he has a few bugs” (i.e., Fred is a good guy, but he has a few personality problems). Historical note: Admiral Grace Hopper (an early computing pioneer better known for inventing /COBOL/ http://www.answers.com/main/ntquery?method=4dsid=2291dekey=%2FC%2FCOBOL.htmlgwp=8curtab=2291_1) liked to tell a story in which a technician solved a /glitch/ http://www.answers.com/main/ntquery?method=4dsid=2291dekey=%2FG%2Fglitch.htmlgwp=8curtab=2291_1 in the Harvard Mark II machine by pulling an actual insect out from between the contacts of one of its relays, and she subsequently promulgated /bug/ http://www.answers.com/main/ntquery?method=4dsid=2291dekey=%2FB%2Fbug.htmlgwp=8curtab=2291_1 in its hackish sense as a joke about the incident (though, as she was careful to admit, she was not there when it happened). For many years the logbook associated with the incident and the actual bug in question (a moth) sat in a display case at the Naval Surface Warfare Center (NSWC). The entire story, with a picture of the logbook and the moth taped into it, is recorded in the /Annals of the History of Computing/, Vol. 3, No. 3 (July 1981), pp. 285--286. What I was really trying to present was that Security people could stand to be a bit more thorough about how they synthesize the results of their analysis before they communicate the vulnerabilities they've found, and what mitigating strategies they suggest. Definitely. I think there is a deep cultural problem that people who fix bugs or flaws tend to over-focus on the micro issue, fixing the specific coding vulnerability, and ignore the larger architectural error that allows the coding defect to be exploitable and cause damage. In the case at hand, the WMF bug would be much less dangerous if there were not so many ways to induce IE to invoke WMF decoding without asking the user. Crispin -- Crispin Cowan, Ph.D. http://crispincowan.com/~crispin/ Director of Software Engineering, Novell http://novell.com Olympic Games: The Bi-Annual Festival of Corruption ___ Secure Coding mailing list (SC-L) SC-L@securecoding.org List information, subscriptions, etc - http://krvw.com/mailman/listinfo/sc-l List charter available at - http://www.securecoding.org/list/charter.php
RE: [SC-L] Bugs and flaws
At the risk of piling on here, there's no question that it's critical to consider security problems across the continuum. While we're at it, the analysis should start back even further with the requirements or even the whole system concept. All of the representations across the continuum (rqmts, arch, design, code) are just models of the same thing. They start more abstract and end up as code. A *single* problem could exist in all these models at the same time. Higher-level representations of systems are generally eclipsed by lower level ones fairly rapidly. For example, it's a rare group that updates their design docs as implementation progresses. So once you've got code, the architecture-flaws don't come from architecture documents (which lie). The best place to look for them (if you want truth) is to look in the code. To me, the important thing here is to give software teams good advice about the level of effort they're going to have to put into fixing a problem. If it helps to give a security problem a label to let them know they're going to have to go back to the drawing board, I think saying 'architecture-flaw' or 'design-flaw' is fine. But I agree with others that saying 'flaw' alone doesn't help distinguish it from 'bug' in the minds of most developers or architects. --Jeff Jeff Williams, CEO Aspect Security http://www.aspectsecurity.com -Original Message- From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] On Behalf Of Crispin Cowan Sent: Wednesday, February 01, 2006 5:07 PM To: John Steven Cc: Will Kruse; Secure Coding Mailing List Subject: Re: [SC-L] Bugs and flaws John Steven wrote: I'm not sure there's any value in discussing this minutia further, but here goes: We'll let the moderator decide that :) 1) Crispin, I think you've nailed one thing. The continuum from: Architecture -- Design -- Low-level Design -- (to) Implementation is a blurry one, and certainly slippery as you move from 'left' to 'right'. Cool. But, we all should understand that there's commensurate blur in our analysis techniques (aka architecture and code review) to assure that as we sweep over software that we uncover both bugs and architectural flaws. Also agreed. 2) Flaws are different in important ways bugs when it comes to presentation, prioritization, and mitigation. Let's explore by physical analog first. I disagree with the word usage. To me, bug and flaw are exactly synonyms. The distinction being drawn here is between implementation flaws vs. design flaws. You are just creating confusing jargon to claim that flaw is somehow more abstract than bug. Flaw ::= defect ::= bug. A vulnerability is a special subset of flaws/defects/bugs that has the property of being exploitable. I nearly fell through one of my consultant's tables as I leaned on it this morning. We explored: Bug or flaw?. The wording issue aside, at the implementation level you try to code/implement to prevent flaws, by doing things such as using higher quality steel (for bolts) and good coding practices (for software). At the design level, you try to design so as to *mask* flaws by avoiding single points of failure, doing things such as using 2 bolts (for tables) and using access controls to limit privilege escalation (for software). Crispin -- Crispin Cowan, Ph.D. http://crispincowan.com/~crispin/ Director of Software Engineering, Novell http://novell.com Olympic Games: The Bi-Annual Festival of Corruption ___ Secure Coding mailing list (SC-L) SC-L@securecoding.org List information, subscriptions, etc - http://krvw.com/mailman/listinfo/sc-l List charter available at - http://www.securecoding.org/list/charter.php ___ Secure Coding mailing list (SC-L) SC-L@securecoding.org List information, subscriptions, etc - http://krvw.com/mailman/listinfo/sc-l List charter available at - http://www.securecoding.org/list/charter.php
RE: [SC-L] Bugs and flaws
I spent Phase One of both my academic and professional careers working on hardware fault models and design for testability. In fact, the first static analysis tool I wrote was for hardware: it analyzed Verilog looking for design mistakes that would make it difficult or impossible to perform design verification or to apply adequate manufacturing tests. Some observations: - The hardware guys are indeed ahead. Chip designers budget for test and verification from day one. They also do a fair amount of thinking about what's going to go wrong. Somebody's going to give you 5 volts instead of 3.3 volts. What's going to happen? The transistors are going to switch at a different rate when the chip is cold. What's going to happen? A speck of dust is going to fall on the wafer between the time the metal 2 layer goes down and the time the metal 3 layer goes down. What's going to happen? - The difference between a manufacturing defect and a design defect is not always immediately obvious. Maybe two wires got bridged because a piece of dust fell in exactly the right spot. Maybe two wires got bridged because you made a mistake in your process physics and you need 50 nm of tolerance instead of 0.5 nm. You'd better figure it out before you go into full-swing manufacturing, or big batches of defective chips could kill your profit margins and drive your customers away at the same time. For that reason, diagnosing the cause of failure is an important topic. Brian -Original Message- From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] On Behalf Of Chris Wysopal Sent: 02 February 2006 21:35 To: Gary McGraw Cc: William Kruse; Wall, Kevin; Secure Coding Mailing List Subject: RE: [SC-L] Bugs and flaws In the manufacturing world, which is far more mature than the software development world, they use the terminology of design defect and manufacturing defect. So this distinction is useful and has stood the test of time. Flaw and defect are synonymous. We should just pick one. You could say that the term for manufacturing software is implementation. So why do we need to change the terms for the software world? Wouldn't design defect and implementation defect be clearer and more in line with the manufacturing quality discipline, which the software quality discipline should be working towards emulating. (When do we get to Six Sigma?) I just don't see the usefulness of calling a design defect a flaw. Flaw by itself is overloaded. And in the software world, bug can mean an implementation or design problem, so bug alone is overloaded for describing an implementation defect. At @stake the Application Center of Excellence used the terminology design flaw and implementation flaw. It well understood by our customers. As Crispin said in an earlier post on the subject, the line is sometimes blurry. I am sure this is the case in manufacturing too. Architecture flaws can be folded into the design flaw category for simplicity. My vote is for a less overloaded and clearer terminology. -Chris P.S. My father managed a non-destructive test lab at a jet engine manufacturer. They had about the highest quality requirements in the world. So for many hours I was regaled with tales about the benefits of performing static analysis on individual components early in the manufacturing cycle. They would dip cast parts in a fluorescent liquid and look at them under ultraviolet light to illuminate cracks caused during casting process. For critical parts which would receive more stress, such as the fan blades, they would x-ray each part to inspect for internal cracks. A more expensive process but warranted due to the increased risk of total system failure for a defect in those parts. The static testing was obviously much cheaper and delivered better quality than just bolting the parts together and doing dynamic testing in a test cell. It's a wonder that it has taken the software security world so long to catch onto the benefits of static testing of implementation. I think we can learn a lot more from the manufacturing world. On Thu, 2 Feb 2006, Gary McGraw wrote: Hi all, When I introduced the bugs and flaws nomenclature into the literature, I did so in an article about the software security workshop I chaired in 2003 (see http://www.cigital.com/ssw/). This was ultimately written up in an On the Horizon paper published by IEEE Security Privacy. Nancy Mead and I queried the SWEBOK and looked around to see if the new usage caused collision. It did not. The reason I think it is important to distinguish the two ends of the rather slippery range (crispy is right about that) is that software security as a field is not paying enough attention to architecture. By identifying flaws as a subcategory of defects (according the the SWEBOK), we can focus some attention on the problem. From the small glossary in Software Security (my new book out tomorrow): Bug-A bug is an implementation-level software problem. Bugs
RE: [SC-L] Bugs and flaws
I'm sorry, but it is just not possible to find design flaws by staring at code. gem -Original Message- From: Jeff Williams [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] Sent: Thu Feb 02 20:32:29 2006 To: 'Secure Coding Mailing List' Subject:RE: [SC-L] Bugs and flaws At the risk of piling on here, there's no question that it's critical to consider security problems across the continuum. While we're at it, the analysis should start back even further with the requirements or even the whole system concept. All of the representations across the continuum (rqmts, arch, design, code) are just models of the same thing. They start more abstract and end up as code. A *single* problem could exist in all these models at the same time. Higher-level representations of systems are generally eclipsed by lower level ones fairly rapidly. For example, it's a rare group that updates their design docs as implementation progresses. So once you've got code, the architecture-flaws don't come from architecture documents (which lie). The best place to look for them (if you want truth) is to look in the code. To me, the important thing here is to give software teams good advice about the level of effort they're going to have to put into fixing a problem. If it helps to give a security problem a label to let them know they're going to have to go back to the drawing board, I think saying 'architecture-flaw' or 'design-flaw' is fine. But I agree with others that saying 'flaw' alone doesn't help distinguish it from 'bug' in the minds of most developers or architects. --Jeff Jeff Williams, CEO Aspect Security http://www.aspectsecurity.com -Original Message- From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] On Behalf Of Crispin Cowan Sent: Wednesday, February 01, 2006 5:07 PM To: John Steven Cc: Will Kruse; Secure Coding Mailing List Subject: Re: [SC-L] Bugs and flaws John Steven wrote: I'm not sure there's any value in discussing this minutia further, but here goes: We'll let the moderator decide that :) 1) Crispin, I think you've nailed one thing. The continuum from: Architecture -- Design -- Low-level Design -- (to) Implementation is a blurry one, and certainly slippery as you move from 'left' to 'right'. Cool. But, we all should understand that there's commensurate blur in our analysis techniques (aka architecture and code review) to assure that as we sweep over software that we uncover both bugs and architectural flaws. Also agreed. 2) Flaws are different in important ways bugs when it comes to presentation, prioritization, and mitigation. Let's explore by physical analog first. I disagree with the word usage. To me, bug and flaw are exactly synonyms. The distinction being drawn here is between implementation flaws vs. design flaws. You are just creating confusing jargon to claim that flaw is somehow more abstract than bug. Flaw ::= defect ::= bug. A vulnerability is a special subset of flaws/defects/bugs that has the property of being exploitable. I nearly fell through one of my consultant's tables as I leaned on it this morning. We explored: Bug or flaw?. The wording issue aside, at the implementation level you try to code/implement to prevent flaws, by doing things such as using higher quality steel (for bolts) and good coding practices (for software). At the design level, you try to design so as to *mask* flaws by avoiding single points of failure, doing things such as using 2 bolts (for tables) and using access controls to limit privilege escalation (for software). Crispin -- Crispin Cowan, Ph.D. http://crispincowan.com/~crispin/ Director of Software Engineering, Novell http://novell.com Olympic Games: The Bi-Annual Festival of Corruption ___ Secure Coding mailing list (SC-L) SC-L@securecoding.org List information, subscriptions, etc - http://krvw.com/mailman/listinfo/sc-l List charter available at - http://www.securecoding.org/list/charter.php ___ Secure Coding mailing list (SC-L) SC-L@securecoding.org List information, subscriptions, etc - http://krvw.com/mailman/listinfo/sc-l List charter available at - http://www.securecoding.org/list/charter.php This electronic message transmission contains information that may be confidential or privileged. The information contained herein is intended solely for the recipient and use by any other party is not authorized. If you are not the intended recipient (or otherwise authorized to receive this message by the intended recipient), any disclosure, copying, distribution or use of the contents of the information is prohibited. If you have received this electronic message transmission in error, please contact the sender by reply email and delete all copies of this message. Cigital, Inc. accepts no responsibility for any
RE: [SC-L] Bugs and flaws
Um, so if there is no documentation you can't find design flaws? --Jeff -Original Message- From: Gary McGraw [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] Sent: Thursday, February 02, 2006 8:50 PM To: Jeff Williams; Secure Coding Mailing List Subject: RE: [SC-L] Bugs and flaws I'm sorry, but it is just not possible to find design flaws by staring at code. gem -Original Message- From: Jeff Williams [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] Sent: Thu Feb 02 20:32:29 2006 To: 'Secure Coding Mailing List' Subject:RE: [SC-L] Bugs and flaws At the risk of piling on here, there's no question that it's critical to consider security problems across the continuum. While we're at it, the analysis should start back even further with the requirements or even the whole system concept. All of the representations across the continuum (rqmts, arch, design, code) are just models of the same thing. They start more abstract and end up as code. A *single* problem could exist in all these models at the same time. Higher-level representations of systems are generally eclipsed by lower level ones fairly rapidly. For example, it's a rare group that updates their design docs as implementation progresses. So once you've got code, the architecture-flaws don't come from architecture documents (which lie). The best place to look for them (if you want truth) is to look in the code. To me, the important thing here is to give software teams good advice about the level of effort they're going to have to put into fixing a problem. If it helps to give a security problem a label to let them know they're going to have to go back to the drawing board, I think saying 'architecture-flaw' or 'design-flaw' is fine. But I agree with others that saying 'flaw' alone doesn't help distinguish it from 'bug' in the minds of most developers or architects. --Jeff Jeff Williams, CEO Aspect Security http://www.aspectsecurity.com -Original Message- From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] On Behalf Of Crispin Cowan Sent: Wednesday, February 01, 2006 5:07 PM To: John Steven Cc: Will Kruse; Secure Coding Mailing List Subject: Re: [SC-L] Bugs and flaws John Steven wrote: I'm not sure there's any value in discussing this minutia further, but here goes: We'll let the moderator decide that :) 1) Crispin, I think you've nailed one thing. The continuum from: Architecture -- Design -- Low-level Design -- (to) Implementation is a blurry one, and certainly slippery as you move from 'left' to 'right'. Cool. But, we all should understand that there's commensurate blur in our analysis techniques (aka architecture and code review) to assure that as we sweep over software that we uncover both bugs and architectural flaws. Also agreed. 2) Flaws are different in important ways bugs when it comes to presentation, prioritization, and mitigation. Let's explore by physical analog first. I disagree with the word usage. To me, bug and flaw are exactly synonyms. The distinction being drawn here is between implementation flaws vs. design flaws. You are just creating confusing jargon to claim that flaw is somehow more abstract than bug. Flaw ::= defect ::= bug. A vulnerability is a special subset of flaws/defects/bugs that has the property of being exploitable. I nearly fell through one of my consultant's tables as I leaned on it this morning. We explored: Bug or flaw?. The wording issue aside, at the implementation level you try to code/implement to prevent flaws, by doing things such as using higher quality steel (for bolts) and good coding practices (for software). At the design level, you try to design so as to *mask* flaws by avoiding single points of failure, doing things such as using 2 bolts (for tables) and using access controls to limit privilege escalation (for software). Crispin -- Crispin Cowan, Ph.D. http://crispincowan.com/~crispin/ Director of Software Engineering, Novell http://novell.com Olympic Games: The Bi-Annual Festival of Corruption ___ Secure Coding mailing list (SC-L) SC-L@securecoding.org List information, subscriptions, etc - http://krvw.com/mailman/listinfo/sc-l List charter available at - http://www.securecoding.org/list/charter.php ___ Secure Coding mailing list (SC-L) SC-L@securecoding.org List information, subscriptions, etc - http://krvw.com/mailman/listinfo/sc-l List charter available at - http://www.securecoding.org/list/charter.php This electronic message transmission contains information that may be confidential or privileged. The information contained herein is intended solely for the recipient and use by any other party is not authorized. If you are not the intended recipient (or otherwise authorized to receive this message by the intended recipient), any disclosure, copying
RE: [SC-L] Bugs and flaws
Not unless you talk to the designer. You might get lucky and find a design problem or two by looking at code, but that usually doesn't work. That's not to say that all systems have adequate documentation about design (not to mention requirements that you correctly cited before)! They don't. When they don't, you have to try to construct them. Doing them from code is very difficult at best. gem -Original Message- From: Jeff Williams [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] Sent: Thu Feb 02 20:59:14 2006 To: Gary McGraw; 'Secure Coding Mailing List' Subject:RE: [SC-L] Bugs and flaws Um, so if there is no documentation you can't find design flaws? --Jeff -Original Message- From: Gary McGraw [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] Sent: Thursday, February 02, 2006 8:50 PM To: Jeff Williams; Secure Coding Mailing List Subject: RE: [SC-L] Bugs and flaws I'm sorry, but it is just not possible to find design flaws by staring at code. gem -Original Message- From: Jeff Williams [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] Sent: Thu Feb 02 20:32:29 2006 To: 'Secure Coding Mailing List' Subject:RE: [SC-L] Bugs and flaws At the risk of piling on here, there's no question that it's critical to consider security problems across the continuum. While we're at it, the analysis should start back even further with the requirements or even the whole system concept. All of the representations across the continuum (rqmts, arch, design, code) are just models of the same thing. They start more abstract and end up as code. A *single* problem could exist in all these models at the same time. Higher-level representations of systems are generally eclipsed by lower level ones fairly rapidly. For example, it's a rare group that updates their design docs as implementation progresses. So once you've got code, the architecture-flaws don't come from architecture documents (which lie). The best place to look for them (if you want truth) is to look in the code. To me, the important thing here is to give software teams good advice about the level of effort they're going to have to put into fixing a problem. If it helps to give a security problem a label to let them know they're going to have to go back to the drawing board, I think saying 'architecture-flaw' or 'design-flaw' is fine. But I agree with others that saying 'flaw' alone doesn't help distinguish it from 'bug' in the minds of most developers or architects. --Jeff Jeff Williams, CEO Aspect Security http://www.aspectsecurity.com -Original Message- From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] On Behalf Of Crispin Cowan Sent: Wednesday, February 01, 2006 5:07 PM To: John Steven Cc: Will Kruse; Secure Coding Mailing List Subject: Re: [SC-L] Bugs and flaws John Steven wrote: I'm not sure there's any value in discussing this minutia further, but here goes: We'll let the moderator decide that :) 1) Crispin, I think you've nailed one thing. The continuum from: Architecture -- Design -- Low-level Design -- (to) Implementation is a blurry one, and certainly slippery as you move from 'left' to 'right'. Cool. But, we all should understand that there's commensurate blur in our analysis techniques (aka architecture and code review) to assure that as we sweep over software that we uncover both bugs and architectural flaws. Also agreed. 2) Flaws are different in important ways bugs when it comes to presentation, prioritization, and mitigation. Let's explore by physical analog first. I disagree with the word usage. To me, bug and flaw are exactly synonyms. The distinction being drawn here is between implementation flaws vs. design flaws. You are just creating confusing jargon to claim that flaw is somehow more abstract than bug. Flaw ::= defect ::= bug. A vulnerability is a special subset of flaws/defects/bugs that has the property of being exploitable. I nearly fell through one of my consultant's tables as I leaned on it this morning. We explored: Bug or flaw?. The wording issue aside, at the implementation level you try to code/implement to prevent flaws, by doing things such as using higher quality steel (for bolts) and good coding practices (for software). At the design level, you try to design so as to *mask* flaws by avoiding single points of failure, doing things such as using 2 bolts (for tables) and using access controls to limit privilege escalation (for software). Crispin -- Crispin Cowan, Ph.D. http://crispincowan.com/~crispin/ Director of Software Engineering, Novell http://novell.com Olympic Games: The Bi-Annual Festival of Corruption ___ Secure Coding mailing list (SC-L) SC-L@securecoding.org List information, subscriptions, etc - http://krvw.com/mailman/listinfo/sc-l List charter available at - http://www.securecoding.org/list/charter.php ___ Secure Coding mailing list (SC-L
RE: [SC-L] Bugs and flaws
That's not my experience. I believe there are many design problems you can find more quickly and, more importantly, accurately by using the code. I find this to be true even when there is a documented design -- but there's no question in the case where all you have is code. In fact, if the design isn't fairly obvious in the code, then that's a security problem in itself. Unless it's clear, developers won't understand it and will make more mistakes. Static analysis tools can help a lot here. Used properly, they can provide design-level insight into a software baseline. The huge advantage is that it's correct. --Jeff -Original Message- From: Gary McGraw [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] Sent: Thursday, February 02, 2006 9:06 PM To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]; Secure Coding Mailing List Subject: RE: [SC-L] Bugs and flaws Not unless you talk to the designer. You might get lucky and find a design problem or two by looking at code, but that usually doesn't work. That's not to say that all systems have adequate documentation about design (not to mention requirements that you correctly cited before)! They don't. When they don't, you have to try to construct them. Doing them from code is very difficult at best. gem -Original Message- From: Jeff Williams [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] Sent: Thu Feb 02 20:59:14 2006 To: Gary McGraw; 'Secure Coding Mailing List' Subject:RE: [SC-L] Bugs and flaws Um, so if there is no documentation you can't find design flaws? --Jeff -Original Message- From: Gary McGraw [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] Sent: Thursday, February 02, 2006 8:50 PM To: Jeff Williams; Secure Coding Mailing List Subject: RE: [SC-L] Bugs and flaws I'm sorry, but it is just not possible to find design flaws by staring at code. gem -Original Message- From: Jeff Williams [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] Sent: Thu Feb 02 20:32:29 2006 To: 'Secure Coding Mailing List' Subject:RE: [SC-L] Bugs and flaws At the risk of piling on here, there's no question that it's critical to consider security problems across the continuum. While we're at it, the analysis should start back even further with the requirements or even the whole system concept. All of the representations across the continuum (rqmts, arch, design, code) are just models of the same thing. They start more abstract and end up as code. A *single* problem could exist in all these models at the same time. Higher-level representations of systems are generally eclipsed by lower level ones fairly rapidly. For example, it's a rare group that updates their design docs as implementation progresses. So once you've got code, the architecture-flaws don't come from architecture documents (which lie). The best place to look for them (if you want truth) is to look in the code. To me, the important thing here is to give software teams good advice about the level of effort they're going to have to put into fixing a problem. If it helps to give a security problem a label to let them know they're going to have to go back to the drawing board, I think saying 'architecture-flaw' or 'design-flaw' is fine. But I agree with others that saying 'flaw' alone doesn't help distinguish it from 'bug' in the minds of most developers or architects. --Jeff Jeff Williams, CEO Aspect Security http://www.aspectsecurity.com -Original Message- From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] On Behalf Of Crispin Cowan Sent: Wednesday, February 01, 2006 5:07 PM To: John Steven Cc: Will Kruse; Secure Coding Mailing List Subject: Re: [SC-L] Bugs and flaws John Steven wrote: I'm not sure there's any value in discussing this minutia further, but here goes: We'll let the moderator decide that :) 1) Crispin, I think you've nailed one thing. The continuum from: Architecture -- Design -- Low-level Design -- (to) Implementation is a blurry one, and certainly slippery as you move from 'left' to 'right'. Cool. But, we all should understand that there's commensurate blur in our analysis techniques (aka architecture and code review) to assure that as we sweep over software that we uncover both bugs and architectural flaws. Also agreed. 2) Flaws are different in important ways bugs when it comes to presentation, prioritization, and mitigation. Let's explore by physical analog first. I disagree with the word usage. To me, bug and flaw are exactly synonyms. The distinction being drawn here is between implementation flaws vs. design flaws. You are just creating confusing jargon to claim that flaw is somehow more abstract than bug. Flaw ::= defect ::= bug. A vulnerability is a special subset of flaws/defects/bugs that has the property of being exploitable. I nearly fell through one of my consultant's tables as I leaned on it this morning. We explored: Bug or flaw?. The wording issue aside, at the implementation level you try to code/implement to prevent flaws, by doing things such as using higher quality
RE: [SC-L] Bugs and flaws
In the manufacturing world, manufacturing defects are defects that were not intended by the design. With software, an implementation defect is a defect that is not indended by the design. That is where I see the analogy. A factory worker forgetting to put on a washer or installing a polarized capacitor backwards is similar to a programmer neglecting to check a return code or being off by one in a length calculation. In both disciplines, to increase quality you could say don't do that, you could add a quality process that tests for the correct implementation, or best, you could make it impossible for the mistake to happen. So I guess I see a lot of similarities between the manufacturing process and the software implementation process. Sure its not a perfect analogy. Nothing seems to be between the physical and digital worlds. As you say, many of the flaws created during what is traditionally known as implementation are low-level design errors but at the very end of the continuum they are simply mistakes. -Chris On Thu, 2 Feb 2006, David Crocker wrote: I don't think this analogy between software development and manufacturing holds. There are no manufacturing defects in software construction, unless one counts a buggy chip (e.g. Pentium FPU or similar) or perhaps a buggy compiler. Software instructions execute predictably and are not subject to the problems of defective materials, difficulties in keeping dimensions within a precise tolerance, or wear and tear. If some small bolt in my car fails because the bolt met its manufacturer's specification but was not strong enough to withstand the loads it was subjected to, that is a low-level design error, not a manufacturing error. Similarly, I view coding errors as low-level design errors. David Crocker, Escher Technologies Ltd. Consultancy, contracting and tools for dependable software development www.eschertech.com -Original Message- From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] On Behalf Of Chris Wysopal Sent: 02 February 2006 21:35 To: Gary McGraw Cc: William Kruse; Wall, Kevin; Secure Coding Mailing List Subject: RE: [SC-L] Bugs and flaws In the manufacturing world, which is far more mature than the software development world, they use the terminology of design defect and manufacturing defect. So this distinction is useful and has stood the test of time. Flaw and defect are synonymous. We should just pick one. You could say that the term for manufacturing software is implementation. So why do we need to change the terms for the software world? Wouldn't design defect and implementation defect be clearer and more in line with the manufacturing quality discipline, which the software quality discipline should be working towards emulating. (When do we get to Six Sigma?) I just don't see the usefulness of calling a design defect a flaw. Flaw by itself is overloaded. And in the software world, bug can mean an implementation or design problem, so bug alone is overloaded for describing an implementation defect. At @stake the Application Center of Excellence used the terminology design flaw and implementation flaw. It well understood by our customers. As Crispin said in an earlier post on the subject, the line is sometimes blurry. I am sure this is the case in manufacturing too. Architecture flaws can be folded into the design flaw category for simplicity. My vote is for a less overloaded and clearer terminology. -Chris P.S. My father managed a non-destructive test lab at a jet engine manufacturer. They had about the highest quality requirements in the world. So for many hours I was regaled with tales about the benefits of performing static analysis on individual components early in the manufacturing cycle. They would dip cast parts in a fluorescent liquid and look at them under ultraviolet light to illuminate cracks caused during casting process. For critical parts which would receive more stress, such as the fan blades, they would x-ray each part to inspect for internal cracks. A more expensive process but warranted due to the increased risk of total system failure for a defect in those parts. The static testing was obviously much cheaper and delivered better quality than just bolting the parts together and doing dynamic testing in a test cell. It's a wonder that it has taken the software security world so long to catch onto the benefits of static testing of implementation. I think we can learn a lot more from the manufacturing world. On Thu, 2 Feb 2006, Gary McGraw wrote: Hi all, When I introduced the bugs and flaws nomenclature into the literature, I did so in an article about the software security workshop I chaired in 2003 (see http://www.cigital.com/ssw/). This was ultimately written up in an On the Horizon paper published by IEEE Security Privacy. Nancy Mead and I queried the SWEBOK and looked around to see
Re: [SC-L] Bugs and flaws
Gary McGraw wrote: If the WMF vulnerability teaches us anything, it teaches us that we need to pay more attention to flaws. The flaw in question seems to be validate inputs, i.e. don't just trust network input (esp. from an untrusted source) to be well-formed. Of special importance to the Windows family of platforms seems to be the propensity to do security controls based on the file type extension (the letters after the dot in the file name, such as .wmf) but to choose the application to interpret the data based on some magic file typing based on looking at the content. My favorite ancient form of this flaw: .rtf files are much safer than doc files, because the RTF standard does not allow you to attach VBscript (where VB stands for Virus Broadcast :) while .doc files do. Unfortunately, this safety feature is nearly useless, because if you take an infected whatever.doc file, and just *rename* it to whatever.rtf and send it, then MS Word will cheerfully open the file for you when you double click on the attachment, ignore the mismatch between the file extension and the actual file type, and run the fscking VB embedded within. I am less familiar with the WMF flaw, but it smells like the same thing. Validate your inputs. There are automatic tools (taint and equivalent) that will check whether you have validated your inputs. But they do *not* check the *quality* of your validation of the input. Doing a consistency check on the file name extension and the data interpreter type for the file is beyond (most?) such checkers. We spend lots of time talking about bugs in software security (witness the perpetual flogging of the buffer overflow), but architectural problems are just as important and deserve just as much airplay. IMHO the difference between bugs and architecture is just a continuous grey scale of degree. Crispin -- Crispin Cowan, Ph.D. http://crispincowan.com/~crispin/ Director of Software Engineering, Novell http://novell.com Olympic Games: The Bi-Annual Festival of Corruption ___ Secure Coding mailing list (SC-L) SC-L@securecoding.org List information, subscriptions, etc - http://krvw.com/mailman/listinfo/sc-l List charter available at - http://www.securecoding.org/list/charter.php
Re: [SC-L] Bugs and flaws
In message [EMAIL PROTECTED], Crispin Cowan writes: Unfortunately, this safety feature is nearly useless, because if you take an infected whatever.doc file, and just *rename* it to whatever.rtf and send it, then MS Word will cheerfully open the file for you when you double click on the attachment, ignore the mismatch between the file extension and the actual file type, and run the fscking VB embedded within. That actually illustrates a different principle: don't have two different ways of checking for the same thing. --Steve Bellovin, http://www.stevebellovin.com ___ Secure Coding mailing list (SC-L) SC-L@securecoding.org List information, subscriptions, etc - http://krvw.com/mailman/listinfo/sc-l List charter available at - http://www.securecoding.org/list/charter.php
Re: [SC-L] Bugs and flaws
I'm not sure there's any value in discussing this minutia further, but here goes: 1) Crispin, I think you've nailed one thing. The continuum from: Architecture -- Design -- Low-level Design -- (to) Implementation is a blurry one, and certainly slippery as you move from 'left' to 'right'. But, we all should understand that there's commensurate blur in our analysis techniques (aka architecture and code review) to assure that as we sweep over software that we uncover both bugs and architectural flaws. 2) Flaws are different in important ways bugs when it comes to presentation, prioritization, and mitigation. Let's explore by physical analog first. I nearly fell through one of my consultant's tables as I leaned on it this morning. We explored: Bug or flaw?. A bolt's head had been sheered. The sheer had allowed the bolt to wiggle loose and made the table top wobble. IMPL. BUG: The bolt's head was weak-enough to sheer* * Some readers will complain that the bolt manufacturer should have made the bolt stronger. Don't get bogged down, we're building a table 'system' here, and we can't control the bolt any more than we can control IBM's implementation of Websphere. With respect to this table 'system', we have a bug. Was there a masked bug? Was the truss' metal cut but not buffed in a way that caused an otherwise strong-enough bolt to score over time and eventually sheer under normal load? ARCH. FLAW: [Some aspect of the table's design] caused the bolt to sheer. ARCH. FLAW: The table's design is not resilient to a sheered bolt. As Crispin, Steve, and myself would likely agree... Good application of techniques involved in common architectural and code-based analyses would have likely found all of these problems. Remember, my thesis is that the real difference is what we do w/ the vulns., not now they're identified. In my experience, where overlap between bugs and flaws exist, mitigating the flaw is almost always warranted. As a table architect, I could have calculated the forces the table would face (through misuse case def.) and realized that my requirements warranted a stronger bolt. I can't control the strength of the bolt, but I could pick a stronger one (Maybe Jboss resists an attack that Websphere doesn't). Alternatively, I could have designed my system so that the bolt's relative weakness wasn't exposed. Specifically, I could have introduced more support trusses into the legs, used additional bolts, pegs, or [whatever] at the same interface, or scrapped my table design, and started over in an attempt to avoid that weakness. 'Wondering why a Cigitalite is spending so much time on a table? I'm beginning to as well; onto Struts: A valid user accesses a web-app, recognizes that the URLs are predictable, and tries out www.victim.com/this/that/admin ... It works! He uses the available interface to change another user's password, then impersonates the other user's identity. Regardless of how we unravel this, we know that there was a failure in authorization of authenticated users. Which of the following more aptly characterizes the problem?: IMPL. BUG: Insufficient security-constraint existed on the admin Servlet in the app's deployment descriptor. ARCH. FLAW: No façade component gated privileged functionality -alternatively- ARCH. FLAW: Privileged functionality incapable of judging Principal's entitlement (both fine, one user changing another's password, or coarse, application functionality improperly accessed) All of the above statements are ostensibly true... The difference in the characterization is bias--each implying a different fix. At a workflow level, I always verify that applications I'm reviewing do, in-fact, possess the abilities to evaluate Principal identity, and authorize their access to functionality and data. So, I might be prone to reporting the problem as the last flaw. In the case of this example, the bigot in me might get wound up with labeling the problem as the first architectural flaw. Does the façade pattern (for security purposes or not) break the Struts pattern of parameterized dispatch of ActionController Servlets? shrug I can't say conclusively at THIS level of analysis. Certainly, the implied fix is easiest if I'd characterized the problem as the security-constraint bug. Summarizing, my characterization of a vulnerability as a bug or a flaw has important implications towards how it's mitigated. In the case of the Struts example, the bug-based fix is easiest--but in so characterizing the problem I may (or may not) miss other instances of this vulnerability within the application's code base. How do I know how to characterize a vulnerability along the continuum of bugs--flaws? I don't know for sure, but I've taken to using my experience over a number of assessments to upcast typically endemic problems as flaws (and solve them in the design or architecture) and downcast those problems that have glaring quick-fixes. In circumstances where both those heuristics
Re: [SC-L] Bugs and flaws
John Steven wrote: I'm not sure there's any value in discussing this minutia further, but here goes: We'll let the moderator decide that :) 1) Crispin, I think you've nailed one thing. The continuum from: Architecture -- Design -- Low-level Design -- (to) Implementation is a blurry one, and certainly slippery as you move from 'left' to 'right'. Cool. But, we all should understand that there's commensurate blur in our analysis techniques (aka architecture and code review) to assure that as we sweep over software that we uncover both bugs and architectural flaws. Also agreed. 2) Flaws are different in important ways bugs when it comes to presentation, prioritization, and mitigation. Let's explore by physical analog first. I disagree with the word usage. To me, bug and flaw are exactly synonyms. The distinction being drawn here is between implementation flaws vs. design flaws. You are just creating confusing jargon to claim that flaw is somehow more abstract than bug. Flaw ::= defect ::= bug. A vulnerability is a special subset of flaws/defects/bugs that has the property of being exploitable. I nearly fell through one of my consultant's tables as I leaned on it this morning. We explored: Bug or flaw?. The wording issue aside, at the implementation level you try to code/implement to prevent flaws, by doing things such as using higher quality steel (for bolts) and good coding practices (for software). At the design level, you try to design so as to *mask* flaws by avoiding single points of failure, doing things such as using 2 bolts (for tables) and using access controls to limit privilege escalation (for software). Crispin -- Crispin Cowan, Ph.D. http://crispincowan.com/~crispin/ Director of Software Engineering, Novell http://novell.com Olympic Games: The Bi-Annual Festival of Corruption ___ Secure Coding mailing list (SC-L) SC-L@securecoding.org List information, subscriptions, etc - http://krvw.com/mailman/listinfo/sc-l List charter available at - http://www.securecoding.org/list/charter.php
Re: [SC-L] Bugs and flaws
Hi John, Which of the following more aptly characterizes the problem?: IMPL. BUG: Insufficient security-constraint existed on the admin Servlet in the app's deployment descriptor. ARCH. FLAW: No façade component gated privileged functionality -alternatively- ARCH. FLAW: Privileged functionality incapable of judging Principal's entitlement (both fine, one user changing another's password, or coarse, application functionality improperly accessed) Clausewitz said to be strong, first in general, and then at the decisive point. Assuming you consider authentication and authorization on admin functions a decisive point, then this scenario is a failure in both instances. The question you raise is locating the responsibility to deal with this problem. In a distributed system, there are many potential areas to locate those controls. Problems do not necessarily have to be solved (and in some cases cannot be) at the same logical layer they were created (http:// 1raindrop.typepad.com/1_raindrop/2005/11/thinking_in_lay.html). Would an authenticating reverse proxy have prevented this problem? How about stronger identity protocols? -gp ___ Secure Coding mailing list (SC-L) SC-L@securecoding.org List information, subscriptions, etc - http://krvw.com/mailman/listinfo/sc-l List charter available at - http://www.securecoding.org/list/charter.php
[SC-L] Bugs and flaws
Hi all, If the WMF vulnerability teaches us anything, it teaches us that we need to pay more attention to flaws. We spend lots of time talking about bugs in software security (witness the perpetual flogging of the buffer overflow), but architectural problems are just as important and deserve just as much airplay. My IT Architect column slated to appear in March makes this point a bit more forcefully: http://www.cigital.com/papers/download/3sec.ita.pdf BTW, the final countdown for the release of my new book Software Security has begun (I have yet to see an actual copy). I'll keep you posted. gem p.s. Hope to see many of you in person at the Software Security Summit in La Jolla next week. This electronic message transmission contains information that may be confidential or privileged. The information contained herein is intended solely for the recipient and use by any other party is not authorized. If you are not the intended recipient (or otherwise authorized to receive this message by the intended recipient), any disclosure, copying, distribution or use of the contents of the information is prohibited. If you have received this electronic message transmission in error, please contact the sender by reply email and delete all copies of this message. Cigital, Inc. accepts no responsibility for any loss or damage resulting directly or indirectly from the use of this email or its contents. Thank You. ___ Secure Coding mailing list (SC-L) SC-L@securecoding.org List information, subscriptions, etc - http://krvw.com/mailman/listinfo/sc-l List charter available at - http://www.securecoding.org/list/charter.php
