Re: [Sks-devel] Heartbleed ans HKPS pool

2014-05-28 Thread dirk astrath

Hello Kristian,


The CRL is published on [0] as stated on [1]. You are correct that for
a few of the later certs no CRL has been published along the cert (mea
cupla - I made in my config file). However if you see e.g [2] the CRL
distribution point is back in the certs.
References:
[0] https://sks-keyservers.net/ca/crl.pem
[1] https://sks-keyservers.net/overview-of-pools.php
[2] https://keys.digitalis.org/


ah ... perfect ... thank you for bringing light to this issue.

you will get new CSRs for my servers within the next days ... ;-)

have a nice day ...


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Re: [Sks-devel] Heartbleed ans HKPS pool

2014-05-28 Thread Kristian Fiskerstrand
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On 05/28/2014 01:05 PM, dirk astrath wrote:
> Hello Kristian,
> 
>>> I hardly think that *any* client has the CA of sks installed
>>> per default (nor would an average client care to).
>> it is part of gnupg 2.1 [0]
> 
> hm ... even if gnugpg 2.1 will check the CRL (i assume, you don't
> (plan to) run an OCSP-server) ...
> 
> when i access the keyserver-pool using my browser to have an
> encrypted channel to search/upload/... keys, the revocation-status
> of a certificate should be checked.
> 
> currently (without the CRL) the expiration date is the only way my 
> browser knows, that the certficate is no longer valid.
> 
> ... and ... yes ... gnug 2.1 is not "every client" ... ;-)
> 
> have a nice day ...
> 

The CRL is published on [0] as stated on [1]. You are correct that for
a few of the later certs no CRL has been published along the cert (mea
cupla - I made in my config file). However if you see e.g [2] the CRL
distribution point is back in the certs.

References:
[0] https://sks-keyservers.net/ca/crl.pem
[1] https://sks-keyservers.net/overview-of-pools.php
[2] https://keys.digitalis.org/

- -- 
- 
Kristian Fiskerstrand
Blog: http://blog.sumptuouscapital.com
Twitter: @krifisk
- 
Public PGP key 0xE3EDFAE3 at hkp://pool.sks-keyservers.net
fpr:94CB AFDD 3034 5109 5618 35AA 0B7F 8B60 E3ED FAE3
- 
Testis unus, testis nullus
A single witness is no witness
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Re: [Sks-devel] Heartbleed ans HKPS pool

2014-05-28 Thread dirk astrath

Hello Kristian,


I hardly think that *any* client has the CA of sks installed per
default (nor would an average client care to).

it is part of gnupg 2.1 [0]


hm ... even if gnugpg 2.1 will check the CRL (i assume, you don't (plan 
to) run an OCSP-server) ...


when i access the keyserver-pool using my browser to have an encrypted 
channel to search/upload/... keys, the revocation-status of a 
certificate should be checked.


currently (without the CRL) the expiration date is the only way my 
browser knows, that the certficate is no longer valid.


... and ... yes ... gnug 2.1 is not "every client" ... ;-)

have a nice day ...


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Re: [Sks-devel] Heartbleed ans HKPS pool

2014-05-28 Thread Kristian Fiskerstrand
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On 05/27/2014 11:41 PM, Andrew Alderwick wrote:
> Dear Rolf,
> 
> On Tue, May 27, 2014 at 10:18:31PM +0200, Rolf Wuerdemann wrote:
>> Am 27.05.2014 17:41, schrieb Kristian Fiskerstrand:
>>> On 05/27/2014 05:00 PM, Daniel Kahn Gillmor wrote:
 To check the inclusion of your server in the hkps pool, look
 at the HKPS column of:
 
 https://sks-keyservers.net/status/
>> 
>> Could you please explain the color-codes (on the page?). 
>> Red/green is obvious, but I don't know where this "orange" color
>> for hkps sites comes from (SNI?)
> 
> Orange under the hkps column means that the server is vulnerable
> to CVE-2014-3207, which has been patched in SKS 1.1.5 [1,2].
> 
> The vulnerability isn't limited to hkps, but Kristian will at some
> point make 1.1.5 a requirement for being part of the hkps pool [3].
> So the orange is left undocumented as it's intended as a temporary
> warning to admins (such as me!) who are yet to update their
> servers.
> 

To clarify, I updated the statement a bit on [0,1] so that servers on
older versions with backported security patch or behind a mitigating
reverse proxy configuration will still be included, this is handled by
the pool software and why some HKPS are flagged green despite being <1.1.5

References:
[0] http://lists.nongnu.org/archive/html/sks-devel/2014-05/msg00056.html
[1] http://lists.nongnu.org/archive/html/sks-devel/2014-05/msg00057.html



- -- 
- 
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Blog: http://blog.sumptuouscapital.com
Twitter: @krifisk
- 
Public PGP key 0xE3EDFAE3 at hkp://pool.sks-keyservers.net
fpr:94CB AFDD 3034 5109 5618 35AA 0B7F 8B60 E3ED FAE3
- 
"Great things are not accomplished by those who yield to trends and
fads and popular opinion."
(Jack Kerouac)
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Re: [Sks-devel] Heartbleed ans HKPS pool

2014-05-28 Thread Christian Reiß


On 28/05/14 12:11, Kristian Fiskerstrand wrote:

> They will not be able to issue a certificate related to
> hkps.pool.sks-keyservers.net as CN or subjectAltName, i.e. the
> validation on a pool would fail.

It was too early in the morning, even pre-coffee.
I honestly didn't see that coming and retract my statement :)

-Christian.

-- 

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Re: [Sks-devel] Heartbleed ans HKPS pool

2014-05-28 Thread Kristian Fiskerstrand
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On 05/28/2014 08:30 AM, Christian wrote:
> Hey,
> 
> and while we are on the subject: If I install my Class 2 (!) OV 
> Certificate from startssl the hkps button changes red. A valid 
> certificte is not valid. I can understand that self-signed 
> certificates will turn the hkps indicator red, but why don't we
> accept OV certificates that every client will accept in the first
> place?

They will not be able to issue a certificate related to
hkps.pool.sks-keyservers.net as CN or subjectAltName, i.e. the
validation on a pool would fail.

> 
> I hardly think that *any* client has the CA of sks installed per 
> default (nor would an average client care to).

it is part of gnupg 2.1 [0]
> 
> And the validation von sks CA is the save as a Class 1 DV
> certificate.
> 
> 
> tl;dr: We should allow valid signed certificates by default,
> alongside of the SKS Ca and only turn the button red on self-signed
> (or invalids).
> 

Users are free to choose any server they want.

References
[0]
http://git.gnupg.org/cgi-bin/gitweb.cgi?p=gnupg.git;a=blob;f=dirmngr/sks-keyservers.netCA.pem;h=24a2ad2e8e39498b4842bd31689f230148d08693;hb=refs/heads/master


- -- 
- 
Kristian Fiskerstrand
Blog: http://blog.sumptuouscapital.com
Twitter: @krifisk
- 
Public PGP key 0xE3EDFAE3 at hkp://pool.sks-keyservers.net
fpr:94CB AFDD 3034 5109 5618 35AA 0B7F 8B60 E3ED FAE3
- 
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Re: [Sks-devel] Heartbleed ans HKPS pool

2014-05-28 Thread Gabor Kiss
> Could you please explain the color-codes (on the page?).
> Red/green is obvious, but I don't know where this "orange"
> color for hkps sites comes from (SNI?)
> > Indeed, or the meta page for the server in question.

By the way. Kristian!

May I suggest you to use title="explanation" attributes within  tags?
At least in non green status cells.
It would produce nice bubble help as one moves the pointer over the table.

Regards

Gabor
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Re: [Sks-devel] Heartbleed ans HKPS pool

2014-05-27 Thread Christian
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Hash: SHA1

Hey,

and while we are on the subject: If I install my Class 2 (!) OV
Certificate from startssl the hkps button changes red. A valid
certificte is not valid. I can understand that self-signed
certificates will turn the hkps indicator red, but why don't we accept
OV certificates that every client will accept in the first place?

I hardly think that *any* client has the CA of sks installed per
default (nor would an average client care to).

And the validation von sks CA is the save as a Class 1 DV certificate.


tl;dr: We should allow valid signed certificates by default, alongside
of the SKS Ca and only turn the button red on self-signed (or invalids).

- -Christian.

On 27.05.2014 23:21, dirk astrath wrote:
> Hello Kristian
> 
 You are quite correct, and I will revoke and issue new 
 certificates as I get CSRs signed with the same openpgp keys 
 that I originally got requests from.
>>> Please consider to remove vulnerable servers from HKPS pool. 
>>> This is not a cosmetic problem like SKS version number but
>>> much serious. Some guys promise secure channel for
>>> communication but this is everything but secure.
>> I'll consider this once we reach the grace-period timeout (i.e. 
>> revoking any certs that haven't been updated that seems 
>> vulnerable)
> 
> Currently i'm waiting for a change (or announcement) from your
> site.
> 
> While installing "OCSP Stapling" on one of my servers some weeks
> ago I detected, that there is no entry for an OCSP or CRL-Server in
> the certificates. At the beginning of this month I ran out of time
> and therefore had a talk to Benny Baumann, who made some
> investigations and sent you an email around two weeks ago.
> 
> To sum up, why I didn't sent you a new CSR up to now:
> 
> If you now revoke a certificate, nobody will know this (since there
> is no source for the revocation).
> 
> This means, that a new certficate doesn't make it more secure than
> it is now:
> 
> If i install a new certificate based on a new private key, you (and
> I) think, that this one is secure. If there is now a 
> "man-in-the-middle"-attack, he may present the old certificate.
> The browser on the client site now thinks, that the correct
> certificate is used because the revocation status cannot be checked
> ... ;-(
> 
> Can you please update your CA (or at least inform us about
> possible changes or your investigation in this case?
> 
> Thank you.
> 
> Have a nice day ...
> 
> ___ Sks-devel mailing
> list Sks-devel@nongnu.org 
> https://lists.nongnu.org/mailman/listinfo/sks-devel
> 

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Re: [Sks-devel] Heartbleed ans HKPS pool

2014-05-27 Thread Andrew Alderwick

Dear Rolf,

On Tue, May 27, 2014 at 10:18:31PM +0200, Rolf Wuerdemann wrote:

Am 27.05.2014 17:41, schrieb Kristian Fiskerstrand:

On 05/27/2014 05:00 PM, Daniel Kahn Gillmor wrote:

To check the inclusion of your server in the hkps pool, look at the
HKPS column of:

https://sks-keyservers.net/status/


Could you please explain the color-codes (on the page?).
Red/green is obvious, but I don't know where this "orange"
color for hkps sites comes from (SNI?)


Orange under the hkps column means that the server is vulnerable to 
CVE-2014-3207, which has been patched in SKS 1.1.5 [1,2].


The vulnerability isn't limited to hkps, but Kristian will at some point 
make 1.1.5 a requirement for being part of the hkps pool [3]. So the 
orange is left undocumented as it's intended as a temporary warning to 
admins (such as me!) who are yet to update their servers.


Thanks,
Andy

[1] http://lists.nongnu.org/archive/html/sks-devel/2014-05/msg0.html
[2] http://lists.nongnu.org/archive/html/sks-devel/2014-05/msg00026.html
[3] http://lists.nongnu.org/archive/html/sks-devel/2014-05/msg00033.html


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Re: [Sks-devel] Heartbleed ans HKPS pool

2014-05-27 Thread dirk astrath
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
Hash: SHA1

Hello Kristian

>>> You are quite correct, and I will revoke and issue new 
>>> certificates as I get CSRs signed with the same openpgp keys
>>> that I originally got requests from.
>> Please consider to remove vulnerable servers from HKPS pool.
>> This is not a cosmetic problem like SKS version number but much 
>> serious. Some guys promise secure channel for communication but 
>> this is everything but secure.
> I'll consider this once we reach the grace-period timeout (i.e. 
> revoking any certs that haven't been updated that seems
> vulnerable)

Currently i'm waiting for a change (or announcement) from your site.

While installing "OCSP Stapling" on one of my servers some weeks ago I
detected, that there is no entry for an OCSP or CRL-Server in the
certificates. At the beginning of this month I ran out of time and
therefore had a talk to Benny Baumann, who made some investigations
and sent you an email around two weeks ago.

To sum up, why I didn't sent you a new CSR up to now:

If you now revoke a certificate, nobody will know this (since there is
no source for the revocation).

This means, that a new certficate doesn't make it more secure than it
is now:

If i install a new certificate based on a new private key, you (and I)
think, that this one is secure. If there is now a
"man-in-the-middle"-attack, he may present the old certificate. The
browser on the client site now thinks, that the correct certificate is
used because the revocation status cannot be checked ... ;-(

Can you please update your CA (or at least inform us about possible
changes or your investigation in this case?

Thank you.

Have a nice day ...
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Re: [Sks-devel] Heartbleed ans HKPS pool

2014-05-27 Thread Rolf Wuerdemann


Am 27.05.2014 17:41, schrieb Kristian Fiskerstrand:
> On 05/27/2014 05:00 PM, Daniel Kahn Gillmor wrote:
>> On 05/27/2014 09:27 AM, Dmitry Yu Okunev (pks.mephi.ru) wrote:
>>> BTW, is it right that our server is not in the HKPS pool 
>>> [pools and zone-entries]
> 
>> To check the inclusion of your server in the hkps pool, look at the
>> HKPS column of:
> 
>> https://sks-keyservers.net/status/
> 

Could you please explain the color-codes (on the page?).
Red/green is obvious, but I don't know where this "orange"
color for hkps sites comes from (SNI?)
> Indeed, or the meta page for the server in question.
> 

Best,

   rowue
> [...]

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Re: [Sks-devel] Heartbleed ans HKPS pool

2014-05-27 Thread Kristian Fiskerstrand
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
Hash: SHA512

On 05/27/2014 05:00 PM, Daniel Kahn Gillmor wrote:
> On 05/27/2014 09:27 AM, Dmitry Yu Okunev (pks.mephi.ru) wrote:
>> BTW, is it right that our server is not in the HKPS pool 
>> "hkps.pool.sks-keyservers.net".
>> 


..


> 
> the "host" command just looks things up in the DNS.  the DNS
> round-robin arrangement only publishes a limited number of records
> of any given time (10, maybe?) -- if there are more, they will be
> served randomly on future requests.

Correct, but it is even more complicated than that. The authoritative
DNS server refreshes based on a random 10 servers every 15 minutes.
Which servers are included then depends on any caching in the
downstream DNS servers, so it is quite likely different users will see
a different selection of the enabled servers.

> 
> To check the inclusion of your server in the hkps pool, look at the
> HKPS column of:
> 
> https://sks-keyservers.net/status/

Indeed, or the meta page for the server in question.

- -- 
- 
Kristian Fiskerstrand
Blog: http://blog.sumptuouscapital.com
Twitter: @krifisk
- 
Public PGP key 0xE3EDFAE3 at hkp://pool.sks-keyservers.net
fpr:94CB AFDD 3034 5109 5618 35AA 0B7F 8B60 E3ED FAE3
- 
Fabricando fit faber
Practice makes perfect
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-END PGP SIGNATURE-

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Re: [Sks-devel] Heartbleed ans HKPS pool

2014-05-27 Thread Daniel Kahn Gillmor
On 05/27/2014 09:27 AM, Dmitry Yu Okunev (pks.mephi.ru) wrote:
> BTW, is it right that our server is not in the HKPS pool
> "hkps.pool.sks-keyservers.net".
> 
> Server: keyserver.ut.mephi.ru (85.143.112.59)
> 
> $ host hkps.pool.sks-keyservers.net
> hkps.pool.sks-keyservers.net has address 162.243.102.241
> hkps.pool.sks-keyservers.net has address 176.9.51.79
> hkps.pool.sks-keyservers.net has address 192.71.151.126
> hkps.pool.sks-keyservers.net has address 192.146.137.11
> hkps.pool.sks-keyservers.net has address 212.12.48.27
> hkps.pool.sks-keyservers.net has address 216.66.15.2
> hkps.pool.sks-keyservers.net has address 46.4.212.178
> hkps.pool.sks-keyservers.net has address 46.229.47.140
> hkps.pool.sks-keyservers.net has address 85.10.205.199
> hkps.pool.sks-keyservers.net has address 89.68.150.88
> hkps.pool.sks-keyservers.net has IPv6 address 2001:6f8:124e::1
> hkps.pool.sks-keyservers.net has IPv6 address 2a01:4f8:a0:4024::2:0
> hkps.pool.sks-keyservers.net has IPv6 address 2a01:4f8:131:149::f2
> hkps.pool.sks-keyservers.net has IPv6 address 2a01:4f8:150:7142::2
> hkps.pool.sks-keyservers.net has IPv6 address 2001:470:1:116::6
> hkps.pool.sks-keyservers.net has IPv6 address 2001:470:1f09:325::94
> hkps.pool.sks-keyservers.net has IPv6 address 2001:67c:26b4::2c6b


the "host" command just looks things up in the DNS.  the DNS round-robin
arrangement only publishes a limited number of records of any given time
(10, maybe?) -- if there are more, they will be served randomly on
future requests.

To check the inclusion of your server in the hkps pool, look at the HKPS
column of:

 https://sks-keyservers.net/status/

--dkg



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Re: [Sks-devel] Heartbleed ans HKPS pool

2014-05-27 Thread Dmitry Yu Okunev (pks.mephi.ru)
Hello.

On 05/25/2014 12:00 AM, Kristian Fiskerstrand wrote:
> On 05/24/2014 08:32 AM, Gabor Kiss wrote:
>> On Wed, 9 Apr 2014, kristian.fiskerstr...@sumptuouscapital.com
>> wrote:
> 
>>> You are quite correct, and I will revoke and issue new
>>> certificates as I get CSRs signed with the same openpgp keys that
>>> I originally got requests from.
> 
>> Dear Kristian,
> 
>> Please consider to remove vulnerable servers from HKPS pool. This
>> is not a cosmetic problem like SKS version number but much
>> serious. Some guys promise secure channel for communication but 
>> this is everything but secure.
> 
> 
> I'll consider this once we reach the grace-period timeout (i.e.
> revoking any certs that haven't been updated that seems vulnerable)

BTW, is it right that our server is not in the HKPS pool
"hkps.pool.sks-keyservers.net".

Server: keyserver.ut.mephi.ru (85.143.112.59)

$ host hkps.pool.sks-keyservers.net
hkps.pool.sks-keyservers.net has address 162.243.102.241
hkps.pool.sks-keyservers.net has address 176.9.51.79
hkps.pool.sks-keyservers.net has address 192.71.151.126
hkps.pool.sks-keyservers.net has address 192.146.137.11
hkps.pool.sks-keyservers.net has address 212.12.48.27
hkps.pool.sks-keyservers.net has address 216.66.15.2
hkps.pool.sks-keyservers.net has address 46.4.212.178
hkps.pool.sks-keyservers.net has address 46.229.47.140
hkps.pool.sks-keyservers.net has address 85.10.205.199
hkps.pool.sks-keyservers.net has address 89.68.150.88
hkps.pool.sks-keyservers.net has IPv6 address 2001:6f8:124e::1
hkps.pool.sks-keyservers.net has IPv6 address 2a01:4f8:a0:4024::2:0
hkps.pool.sks-keyservers.net has IPv6 address 2a01:4f8:131:149::f2
hkps.pool.sks-keyservers.net has IPv6 address 2a01:4f8:150:7142::2
hkps.pool.sks-keyservers.net has IPv6 address 2001:470:1:116::6
hkps.pool.sks-keyservers.net has IPv6 address 2001:470:1f09:325::94
hkps.pool.sks-keyservers.net has IPv6 address 2001:67c:26b4::2c6b


-- 
Best regards, Dmitry,
head of UNIX-tech department NRNU MEPhI,
tel. 8 (495) 788-56-99, add. 8255



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Re: [Sks-devel] Heartbleed ans HKPS pool

2014-05-24 Thread Kristian Fiskerstrand
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
Hash: SHA512

On 05/24/2014 08:32 AM, Gabor Kiss wrote:
> On Wed, 9 Apr 2014, kristian.fiskerstr...@sumptuouscapital.com
> wrote:
> 
>> You are quite correct, and I will revoke and issue new
>> certificates as I get CSRs signed with the same openpgp keys that
>> I originally got requests from.
> 
> Dear Kristian,
> 
> Please consider to remove vulnerable servers from HKPS pool. This
> is not a cosmetic problem like SKS version number but much
> serious. Some guys promise secure channel for communication but 
> this is everything but secure.
> 

I'll consider this once we reach the grace-period timeout (i.e.
revoking any certs that haven't been updated that seems vulnerable)


- -- 
- 
Kristian Fiskerstrand
Blog: http://blog.sumptuouscapital.com
Twitter: @krifisk
- 
Public PGP key 0xE3EDFAE3 at hkp://pool.sks-keyservers.net
fpr:94CB AFDD 3034 5109 5618 35AA 0B7F 8B60 E3ED FAE3
- 
"Great things are not accomplished by those who yield to trends and
fads and popular opinion."
(Jack Kerouac)
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Re: [Sks-devel] Heartbleed ans HKPS pool

2014-05-23 Thread Gabor Kiss
On Wed, 9 Apr 2014, kristian.fiskerstr...@sumptuouscapital.com wrote:

> You are quite correct, and I will revoke and issue new certificates as I get
> CSRs signed with the same openpgp keys that I originally got requests from.

Dear Kristian,

Please consider to remove vulnerable servers from HKPS pool.
This is not a cosmetic problem like SKS version number but much serious.
Some guys promise secure channel for communication but
this is everything but secure.

Gabor
-- 
A mug of beer, please. Shaken, not stirred.

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Re: [Sks-devel] Heartbleed ans HKPS pool

2014-04-10 Thread Benny Baumann

-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
Hash: SHA512

Hi Folks,

Am 09.04.2014 17:38, schrieb Kiss Gabor (Bitman):
> Folks,
>
> Do not forget that all hkps.pool.sks-keyservers.net certificates
> should be revoked and replaced after fixing openssl Heartbleed Bug
> on vulnerable key servers. (Including mine.)
My keyserver at pgp.benny-baumann was NOT affected, because:
- - I don't use OpenSSL, but GnuTLS 3.2

>
>
> Gabor
Regards,
BenBE.
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Re: [Sks-devel] Heartbleed ans HKPS pool

2014-04-09 Thread Gabor Kiss
> > You are quite correct, and I will revoke and issue new certificates as I
> > get CSRs signed with the same openpgp keys that I originally got
> > requests from. 
> 
> So we should just wait for new certificates. Right? :)

All of us have to generate new secret key key and signing request first.

Gabor
-- 
Spider-Pig, Spider-Pig
Does whatever a Spider-Pig does.
Can he swing from a web?
No, he can't, he's a pig.
Look out! He is a Spider-Pig.

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Re: [Sks-devel] Heartbleed ans HKPS pool

2014-04-09 Thread Dmitry Yu Okunev (pks.mephi.ru)
Hello

On 04/09/2014 10:51 PM, kristian.fiskerstr...@sumptuouscapital.com wrote:
> You are quite correct, and I will revoke and issue new certificates as I
> get CSRs signed with the same openpgp keys that I originally got
> requests from. 

So we should just wait for new certificates. Right? :)

-- 
Best regards, Dmitry,
head of UNIX-tech department NRNU MEPhI,
tel. 8 (495) 788-56-99, add. 8255



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Re: [Sks-devel] Heartbleed ans HKPS pool

2014-04-09 Thread kristian.fiskerstr...@sumptuouscapital.com
You are quite correct, and I will revoke and issue new certificates as I get 
CSRs signed with the same openpgp keys that I originally got requests from. 
HOWEVER please excuse some tardiness on my part for the next week as I'll be 
off on holiday and won't have access to my offline keys 

Sent from my HTC

- Reply message -
From: "Kiss Gabor (Bitman)" 
To: 
Subject: [Sks-devel] Heartbleed ans HKPS pool
Date: Wed, Apr 9, 2014 17:38

Folks,

Do not forget that all hkps.pool.sks-keyservers.net certificates
should be revoked and replaced after fixing openssl Heartbleed Bug
on vulnerable key servers. (Including mine.)

Gabor

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[Sks-devel] Heartbleed ans HKPS pool

2014-04-09 Thread Kiss Gabor (Bitman)
Folks,

Do not forget that all hkps.pool.sks-keyservers.net certificates
should be revoked and replaced after fixing openssl Heartbleed Bug
on vulnerable key servers. (Including mine.)

Gabor

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