RE: Making identities persistent?

[Recordon, David]

Pete,
While the transaction with the IdP is about the derived identifier (sort
of like that term actually), the RP uses the delegated identifier when
referencing the user.

--David 

-Original Message-
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] On
Behalf Of Pete Rowley
Sent: Wednesday, November 01, 2006 10:53 AM
To: Rowan Kerr
Cc: specs@openid.net
Subject: Re: Making identities persistent?

Rowan Kerr wrote:
> On Wed, 2006-11-01 at 11:33 -0500, John Kemp wrote:
>   
>> I think you need the ability for a user to change his identifier at 
>> the RP (as George notes below) and also at the IdP.
>> 
>
> Isn't this was already covered in the spec? You accomplish this by 
> creating an HTML page on some website you control with a http-equiv 
> meta tag in it that points to your IdP. Then you use your own url as 
> your Identity, even though ultimately the data is pulled from the IdP.
>
> So if you ever want to change IdP's you simply update your html page 
> with the new server. And your Identifier never needs to change.
>
>
>   
Except that the spec specifies that it is the derived identifier of the
IdP that is used at the RP - which means a delegated identifier actually
isn't used as an identifier. That is not quite the same thing.

--
Pete

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Re: "Editors" Conference Call

[Dick Hardt]

On 1-Nov-06, at 12:28 PM, John Kemp wrote:
> OK. Just checking. So an IdP/OP can choose whether or not to trust a
> particular RP, based on some out-of-ban criteria. And an RP can choose
> whether or not to trust the assertions of a particular IdP/OP? OK  
> good.

Technically possible, yes for the RP to decide on an IdP/OP.
Currently, there is no verified RP identity, so the IdP/OP cannot  
make that decision.

>> I have not had a chance to wade into that discussion.
>
> I'd highly recommend it when you get the chance.

in my queue :)

>
>>
>>> I suspect the latter case will be unlikely, if OpenID
>>> is to be successful.
>>
>> And I do not. And that is the big driver why it should be OP  
>> instead of
>> IdP.
>
> I think what you're trying to say is that OpenID won't depend on  
> static
> trust relationships (like business contracts) between RPs and IdP/ 
> OPs -
> is that right? In which case, sure, I get that.
>
> But I do think OpenID will depend on there emerging a way of some RP
> trusting (or not) some IdP (and vice-versa). Whitelists and blacklists
> seem like a scalable and dynamic way of doing that, and would seem  
> to be
> a reasonable way of minimizing the presence of rogue IdPs. Don't  
> take my
> word for it though - look at the discussion on [EMAIL PROTECTED]

I don't think there should be an OP reputation. I will wade into the  
security@ list to discuss.


>> asserted data.
>> The OP is not verifying the accuracy of any of the attributes in
>> attribute exchange.
>
> A claim by my IdP/OP /might/ be a claim by a third-party, no? And  
> if the
> IdP/OP makes such a claim on my behalf (and is not under my direct
> control), won't it at least want to verify that the subject of the  
> claim
> is also the user whose identifier it asserted in OpenID  
> Authentication?

If the OP is making a separate claim about you, then it is not being  
an OP at that time.
Perhaps I am missing your point here though.

>
>>
>>>

 In OpenID Authentication, there is no trust relationship  
 requirement
 between the IdP and RP., and the only thing the IdP asserts is a
 binding between the user and an identifier (OpenID URL or i-name).
>>>
>>> And on what basis does the OP "assert" this binding to an RP?  
>>> Doesn't
>>> the OP typically "authenticate" that binding, or does it simply  
>>> take the
>>> users identifier on blind faith, and assert away?
>>
>> The OP authenticates the user (how the OP authenticates the user  
>> is out
>> of scope of the spec).
>
> OK - so the user probably maintains an "account" with the OP, very  
> much
> like a user would with an IdP? Unless the user runs her own OP.

The OP has a mechanism to determine which user it is interacting with.
If the user is running her own OP, then there is still an  
authentication process of some kind such as access to the machine.

-- Dick
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Re: "Editors" Conference Call

[John Kemp]

Dick Hardt wrote:

>> It would be nice to see a clear definition of an OP in order to
>> determine the exact differences between such an entity and an IdP, but,
>> in the absence of such, some questions:
>>
>> Dick Hardt wrote:
>>> Thanks David! ;-)
>>>
>>> Patrick, as you point out, Identity Provider is a well understood
>>> term in SAML and WS-*. Here is the definition from SAML 2.0 [1]
>>>
>>> Identity Provider: A kind of service provider that creates,
>>> maintains, and manages
>>> identity information for principals and provides principal
>>> authentication to other service providers within a federation, such
>>> as with web browser profiles.
>>>
>>> Per the definition, Identity Provider implies a federation or trust
>>> relationship between the IdP and RP.
>>
>> And I guess there is no similar concept in OpenID? Like perhaps an RP
>> adds a particular (I hate to use the word) "trusted" IdP to a whitelist
>> of IdPs from whom it accepts assertions? Or vice-versa?
> 
> Is it technically possible?

OK. Just checking. So an IdP/OP can choose whether or not to trust a
particular RP, based on some out-of-ban criteria. And an RP can choose
whether or not to trust the assertions of a particular IdP/OP? OK good.

>  Yes. Just like it is technically possible
> for SAML to be user-centric. :-)
> 
>>
>> Admittedly, such "federations" might not be as linked to static business
>> agreements perhaps as in a typical SAML deployment, but it seems they
>> would be necessary unless you base "trust" on public key-based
>> mechanisms, or decide that you'll accept assertions from
>> "no-password.com" (to quote from a discussion on [EMAIL PROTECTED])
>> and anyone else.
> 
> I have not had a chance to wade into that discussion.

I'd highly recommend it when you get the chance.

> 
>> I suspect the latter case will be unlikely, if OpenID
>> is to be successful.
> 
> And I do not. And that is the big driver why it should be OP instead of
> IdP.

I think what you're trying to say is that OpenID won't depend on static
trust relationships (like business contracts) between RPs and IdP/OPs -
is that right? In which case, sure, I get that.

But I do think OpenID will depend on there emerging a way of some RP
trusting (or not) some IdP (and vice-versa). Whitelists and blacklists
seem like a scalable and dynamic way of doing that, and would seem to be
a reasonable way of minimizing the presence of rogue IdPs. Don't take my
word for it though - look at the discussion on [EMAIL PROTECTED]

> 
> 
>>
>>> Additionally, IdPs often provide
>>> other assertions about the user.
>>
>> This is sometimes called "attribute exchange". In OpenID, is it then not
>> possible for an OP to exchange attributes related to a particular OpenID
>> with an RP? There seems to be an "attribute exchange" specification
>> (http://openid.net/specs/openid-attribute-exchange-1_0-02.html) where it
>> says (for example, in section 2) "Fetch retrieves attribute information
>> from an Identity Provider, while store saves or updates attribute
>> information on the Identity Provider.".
> 
> When I talk about assertions, I mean third party claims, not self
> asserted data.
> The OP is not verifying the accuracy of any of the attributes in
> attribute exchange.

A claim by my IdP/OP /might/ be a claim by a third-party, no? And if the
IdP/OP makes such a claim on my behalf (and is not under my direct
control), won't it at least want to verify that the subject of the claim
is also the user whose identifier it asserted in OpenID Authentication?

> 
>>
>>>
>>> In OpenID Authentication, there is no trust relationship requirement
>>> between the IdP and RP., and the only thing the IdP asserts is a
>>> binding between the user and an identifier (OpenID URL or i-name).
>>
>> And on what basis does the OP "assert" this binding to an RP? Doesn't
>> the OP typically "authenticate" that binding, or does it simply take the
>> users identifier on blind faith, and assert away?
> 
> The OP authenticates the user (how the OP authenticates the user is out
> of scope of the spec).

OK - so the user probably maintains an "account" with the OP, very much
like a user would with an IdP? Unless the user runs her own OP.

> 
> 
>>
>>>
>>> As people familiar with SAML / WS-* review the OpenID Authentication
>>> specification, there has been some confusion on exactly what the IdP
>>> does in OpenID. To make it clear that an IdP in OpenID is not the
>>> same as typical deployments in SAML, we decided to call it the OpenID
>>> Provider, which is more precise, and reduces ambiguity.
>>
>> I guess until we see this precise definition, we won't be able to see
>> the precise differences.
> 
> How about:
> 
> An OpenID Provider acts on behalf of the user in responding to
> OpenID Authentication requests from a Relying Party.
> 
> What more do we need in the spec then that?

What about:

"An OpenID Identity Provider acts on behalf of the user in responding to
OpenID Authentication requests from a Relyi

Re: "Editors" Conference Call

[Dick Hardt]

On 1-Nov-06, at 11:33 AM, John Kemp wrote:

> Hi Dick,

Hi John!

>
> It would be nice to see a clear definition of an OP in order to
> determine the exact differences between such an entity and an IdP,  
> but,
> in the absence of such, some questions:
>
> Dick Hardt wrote:
>> Thanks David! ;-)
>>
>> Patrick, as you point out, Identity Provider is a well understood
>> term in SAML and WS-*. Here is the definition from SAML 2.0 [1]
>>
>> Identity Provider: A kind of service provider that creates,
>> maintains, and manages
>> identity information for principals and provides principal
>> authentication to other service providers within a federation, such
>> as with web browser profiles.
>>
>> Per the definition, Identity Provider implies a federation or trust
>> relationship between the IdP and RP.
>
> And I guess there is no similar concept in OpenID? Like perhaps an RP
> adds a particular (I hate to use the word) "trusted" IdP to a  
> whitelist
> of IdPs from whom it accepts assertions? Or vice-versa?

Is it technically possible?  Yes. Just like it is technically  
possible for SAML to be user-centric. :-)

>
> Admittedly, such "federations" might not be as linked to static  
> business
> agreements perhaps as in a typical SAML deployment, but it seems they
> would be necessary unless you base "trust" on public key-based
> mechanisms, or decide that you'll accept assertions from
> "no-password.com" (to quote from a discussion on [EMAIL PROTECTED])
> and anyone else.

I have not had a chance to wade into that discussion.

> I suspect the latter case will be unlikely, if OpenID
> is to be successful.

And I do not. And that is the big driver why it should be OP instead  
of IdP.


>
>> Additionally, IdPs often provide
>> other assertions about the user.
>
> This is sometimes called "attribute exchange". In OpenID, is it  
> then not
> possible for an OP to exchange attributes related to a particular  
> OpenID
> with an RP? There seems to be an "attribute exchange" specification
> (http://openid.net/specs/openid-attribute-exchange-1_0-02.html)  
> where it
> says (for example, in section 2) "Fetch retrieves attribute  
> information
> from an Identity Provider, while store saves or updates attribute
> information on the Identity Provider.".

When I talk about assertions, I mean third party claims, not self  
asserted data.
The OP is not verifying the accuracy of any of the attributes in  
attribute exchange.

>
>>
>> In OpenID Authentication, there is no trust relationship requirement
>> between the IdP and RP., and the only thing the IdP asserts is a
>> binding between the user and an identifier (OpenID URL or i-name).
>
> And on what basis does the OP "assert" this binding to an RP? Doesn't
> the OP typically "authenticate" that binding, or does it simply  
> take the
> users identifier on blind faith, and assert away?

The OP authenticates the user (how the OP authenticates the user is  
out of scope of the spec).


>
>>
>> As people familiar with SAML / WS-* review the OpenID Authentication
>> specification, there has been some confusion on exactly what the IdP
>> does in OpenID. To make it clear that an IdP in OpenID is not the
>> same as typical deployments in SAML, we decided to call it the OpenID
>> Provider, which is more precise, and reduces ambiguity.
>
> I guess until we see this precise definition, we won't be able to see
> the precise differences.

How about:

An OpenID Provider acts on behalf of the user in responding to  
OpenID Authentication requests from a Relying Party.

What more do we need in the spec then that?


>
> From what I can tell so far, it seems to me that the differences  
> between
> an OP and an IdP are not significant.

See above wrt. "trust".

-- Dick

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Re: "Editors" Conference Call

[John Kemp]

Hi Dick,

It would be nice to see a clear definition of an OP in order to
determine the exact differences between such an entity and an IdP, but,
in the absence of such, some questions:

Dick Hardt wrote:
> Thanks David! ;-)
> 
> Patrick, as you point out, Identity Provider is a well understood  
> term in SAML and WS-*. Here is the definition from SAML 2.0 [1]
> 
> Identity Provider: A kind of service provider that creates,  
> maintains, and manages
> identity information for principals and provides principal
> authentication to other service providers within a federation, such
> as with web browser profiles.
> 
> Per the definition, Identity Provider implies a federation or trust  
> relationship between the IdP and RP.

And I guess there is no similar concept in OpenID? Like perhaps an RP
adds a particular (I hate to use the word) "trusted" IdP to a whitelist
of IdPs from whom it accepts assertions? Or vice-versa?

Admittedly, such "federations" might not be as linked to static business
agreements perhaps as in a typical SAML deployment, but it seems they
would be necessary unless you base "trust" on public key-based
mechanisms, or decide that you'll accept assertions from
"no-password.com" (to quote from a discussion on [EMAIL PROTECTED])
and anyone else. I suspect the latter case will be unlikely, if OpenID
is to be successful.

> Additionally, IdPs often provide  
> other assertions about the user.

This is sometimes called "attribute exchange". In OpenID, is it then not
possible for an OP to exchange attributes related to a particular OpenID
with an RP? There seems to be an "attribute exchange" specification
(http://openid.net/specs/openid-attribute-exchange-1_0-02.html) where it
says (for example, in section 2) "Fetch retrieves attribute information
from an Identity Provider, while store saves or updates attribute
information on the Identity Provider.".

> 
> In OpenID Authentication, there is no trust relationship requirement  
> between the IdP and RP., and the only thing the IdP asserts is a  
> binding between the user and an identifier (OpenID URL or i-name).

And on what basis does the OP "assert" this binding to an RP? Doesn't
the OP typically "authenticate" that binding, or does it simply take the
users identifier on blind faith, and assert away?

> 
> As people familiar with SAML / WS-* review the OpenID Authentication  
> specification, there has been some confusion on exactly what the IdP  
> does in OpenID. To make it clear that an IdP in OpenID is not the  
> same as typical deployments in SAML, we decided to call it the OpenID  
> Provider, which is more precise, and reduces ambiguity.

I guess until we see this precise definition, we won't be able to see
the precise differences.

>From what I can tell so far, it seems to me that the differences between
an OP and an IdP are not significant.

- John
> 
> -- Dick
> 
> [1] http://www.oasis-open.org/committees/download.php/11886/saml- 
> glossary-2.0-os.pdf
> 
> On 30-Oct-06, at 10:27 PM, Recordon, David wrote:
> 
>> I'll let Dick explain since it was his proposal and I didn't really  
>> care about if we changed the name or not. ;)
>>
>> --David
>>
>> From: Patrick Harding [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]
>> Sent: Monday, October 30, 2006 7:47 PM
>> To: Recordon, David; specs@openid.net
>> Subject: RE: "Editors" Conference Call
>>
>> Dave,
>> Can you please clarify how an OpenID Provider is 'very' different  
>> from the role of Identity Provider as defined in SAML or WS-*.
>> Thanks
>> - Patrick
>>
>>> Rename "Identity Provider" to "OpenID Provider" (IdP -> OP) to add
>> clarity to the term since IdP has a very different meaning in the SAML
>> and WS-* worlds
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> -Original Message-
>> From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] on behalf of Recordon, David
>> Sent: Mon 10/30/2006 7:51 PM
>> To: specs@openid.net
>> Subject: "Editors" Conference Call
>>
>> This morning Dick, Josh, and I got on Skype for 2.5 hours to try and
>> hash through all the remaining proposals.  Unfortunately Brad couldn't
>> join us, though I did talk to him about some of this stuff as well
>> beforehand.
>>
>>  - Authentication Age will be developed as an extension due to  
>> questions
>> around what is the best way for it to work, what features does it  
>> need,
>> etc
>>
>>  - The field "setup_url" will be removed from a checkid_immediate
>> response, rather the RP should fallback to a checkid_setup request to
>> complete the transaction.  It has been found that in the, albeit few,
>> implementations of checkid_immediate this is the behavior for the
>> setup_url anyway.
>>
>>  - Support bare requests by having the field "openid.return_to" as
>> optional in checkid_* requests.  There is a worry of user's not  
>> knowing
>> when they'll be redirected back and when they won't, though that will
>> only be worked out by allowing this functionality.
>>
>>  - Clarify that the openid.realm parameter should be used to uniquely
>> identifier relying parties
>>
>>  - There ar

RE: Making identities persistent?

[Hallam-Baker, Phillip]

I'm afraid I still don't get it.

As far as I am concerned the authenticated identifier is the tuple:

   (Identity-provider-Id,  Identifier)

If we want to have a single identifier there has to be a mechanism for 
establishing the scope of authority for each IdP over a specific subset of 
identifiers.

There are only two potential mechanisms I can see for achieving this:

  1) A lexigraphical convention
  2) A signalling registry


> -Original Message-
> From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] 
> [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] On Behalf Of Pete Rowley
> Sent: Wednesday, November 01, 2006 1:53 PM
> To: Rowan Kerr
> Cc: specs@openid.net
> Subject: Re: Making identities persistent?
> 
> Rowan Kerr wrote:
> > On Wed, 2006-11-01 at 11:33 -0500, John Kemp wrote:
> >   
> >> I think you need the ability for a user to change his 
> identifier at 
> >> the RP (as George notes below) and also at the IdP.
> >> 
> >
> > Isn't this was already covered in the spec? You accomplish this by 
> > creating an HTML page on some website you control with a http-equiv 
> > meta tag in it that points to your IdP. Then you use your 
> own url as 
> > your Identity, even though ultimately the data is pulled 
> from the IdP.
> >
> > So if you ever want to change IdP's you simply update your 
> html page 
> > with the new server. And your Identifier never needs to change.
> >
> >
> >   
> Except that the spec specifies that it is the derived 
> identifier of the IdP that is used at the RP - which means a 
> delegated identifier actually isn't used as an identifier. 
> That is not quite the same thing.
> 
> --
> Pete
> 
> 
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Re: Making identities persistent?

[Pete Rowley]

Rowan Kerr wrote:

On Wed, 2006-11-01 at 11:33 -0500, John Kemp wrote:
  

I think you need the ability for a user to change his identifier at the
RP (as George notes below) and also at the IdP. 



Isn't this was already covered in the spec? You accomplish this by
creating an HTML page on some website you control with a http-equiv meta
tag in it that points to your IdP. Then you use your own url as your
Identity, even though ultimately the data is pulled from the IdP.

So if you ever want to change IdP's you simply update your html page
with the new server. And your Identifier never needs to change.


  
Except that the spec specifies that it is the derived identifier of the 
IdP that is used at the RP - which means a delegated identifier actually 
isn't used as an identifier. That is not quite the same thing.


--
Pete



smime.p7s
Description: S/MIME Cryptographic Signature
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Re: "Editors" Conference Call

[Dick Hardt]

Thanks David! ;-)

Patrick, as you point out, Identity Provider is a well understood  
term in SAML and WS-*. Here is the definition from SAML 2.0 [1]

Identity Provider: A kind of service provider that creates,  
maintains, and manages
identity information for principals and provides principal
authentication to other service providers within a federation, such
as with web browser profiles.

Per the definition, Identity Provider implies a federation or trust  
relationship between the IdP and RP. Additionally, IdPs often provide  
other assertions about the user.

In OpenID Authentication, there is no trust relationship requirement  
between the IdP and RP, and the only thing the IdP asserts is a  
binding between the user and an identifier (OpenID URL or i-name).

As people familiar with SAML / WS-* review the OpenID Authentication  
specification, there has been some confusion on exactly what the IdP  
does in OpenID. To make it clear that an IdP in OpenID is not the  
same as typical deployments in SAML, we decided to call it the OpenID  
Provider, which is more precise, and reduces ambiguity.

-- Dick

[1] http://www.oasis-open.org/committees/download.php/11886/saml- 
glossary-2.0-os.pdf

On 30-Oct-06, at 10:27 PM, Recordon, David wrote:

> I'll let Dick explain since it was his proposal and I didn't really  
> care about if we changed the name or not. ;)
>
> --David
>
> From: Patrick Harding [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]
> Sent: Monday, October 30, 2006 7:47 PM
> To: Recordon, David; specs@openid.net
> Subject: RE: "Editors" Conference Call
>
> Dave,
> Can you please clarify how an OpenID Provider is 'very' different  
> from the role of Identity Provider as defined in SAML or WS-*.
> Thanks
> - Patrick
>
> > Rename "Identity Provider" to "OpenID Provider" (IdP -> OP) to add
> clarity to the term since IdP has a very different meaning in the SAML
> and WS-* worlds
>
>
>
>
> -Original Message-
> From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] on behalf of Recordon, David
> Sent: Mon 10/30/2006 7:51 PM
> To: specs@openid.net
> Subject: "Editors" Conference Call
>
> This morning Dick, Josh, and I got on Skype for 2.5 hours to try and
> hash through all the remaining proposals.  Unfortunately Brad couldn't
> join us, though I did talk to him about some of this stuff as well
> beforehand.
>
>  - Authentication Age will be developed as an extension due to  
> questions
> around what is the best way for it to work, what features does it  
> need,
> etc
>
>  - The field "setup_url" will be removed from a checkid_immediate
> response, rather the RP should fallback to a checkid_setup request to
> complete the transaction.  It has been found that in the, albeit few,
> implementations of checkid_immediate this is the behavior for the
> setup_url anyway.
>
>  - Support bare requests by having the field "openid.return_to" as
> optional in checkid_* requests.  There is a worry of user's not  
> knowing
> when they'll be redirected back and when they won't, though that will
> only be worked out by allowing this functionality.
>
>  - Clarify that the openid.realm parameter should be used to uniquely
> identifier relying parties
>
>  - There are some places where it could be clear in step-by-step
> instructions of what an IdP needs to do in various parts of the
> protocol, like is done in section 12 for rp's.  Sxip will provide
> pointers to where this clarity can be added.
>
>  - Rename "Identity Provider" to "OpenID Provider" (IdP -> OP) to add
> clarity to the term since IdP has a very different meaning in the SAML
> and WS-* worlds
>
>  - The spec won't speak to what a RP should do if it has an identifier
> like "[EMAIL PROTECTED]", worried about setting a confusing  
> precedent of
> allowing this form of identifier for discovery.  Users are used to
> entering, "example.com" in their URL bar to goto the site, so entering
> the same to login doesn't seem like to far of a stretch.  All of  
> OpenID
> has a user education challenge and this doesn't seem very different.
>
>  - Spec will say in essence, "RP's SHOULD give the text field a user
> enters their OpenID Identifier a name attribute with a value of
> 'openid_identifier', though if a RP wishes to support rich clients it
> MUST do so".
>
>  - Dick will be writing a separate document discussing how RPs can
> advertise services, logos, etc
>
>  - There cannot be parameters with the same name, make sure spec says
> this, we think it does.
>
>  - Josh will be updating his delegation proposal patch to specify two
> identifiers for all transactions.  This will create a consistent
> paradigm when dealing with delegation or when not.
>
> Goal is to have all of these changes made by end of day Wednesday.  I
> doubt I've added enough detail in all places, so feel free to ask for
> clarifications or wait to comment on the next draft.
>
> --David
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>

RE: Making identities persistent?

[Hallam-Baker, Phillip]

Don't forget that the a more important constraint here is to prevent 
impersonation.

I don't see how one can switch between genuinely autonamous IdPs in the way 
suggested without allowing a rogue IdP to impersonate anyone they chose.

At what point do the synchronization mechanisms you build in exceed the 
complexity of PKI?

> -Original Message-
> From: John Kemp [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] 
> Sent: Wednesday, November 01, 2006 11:33 AM
> To: Hallam-Baker, Phillip
> Cc: Stefan Görling; Shutra Zhou; specs@openid.net
> Subject: Re: Making identities persistent?
> 
> Hello,
> 
> I think you need the ability for a user to change his 
> identifier at the RP (as George notes below) and also at the 
> IdP. In addition, it should be possible for the IdP to 
> providing OpenID "forwarding" if the user leaves for another 
> IdP (perhaps the user will even pay for a forwarding
> service?)
> 
> We're not talking about persistence as such (a particular 
> users OpenID can surely change over time?), but more the 
> ability for the user to update her OpenID when she switches 
> from one IdP to another. At the IdP, this would I guess be 
> kind of like leaving a forwarding address, as the user is 
> "leaving" one IdP and moving to another. At the RP, the user 
> is telling the RP that he is using a new IdP.
> 
> So, I think George's (1) is a necessity, and agree that (2) 
> is a business decision, but certainly offers the ability for 
> an IdP to be "community-friendly" if it so wishes, and may 
> even be a good business decision.
> 
> Isn't this all about the likely /lack/ of persistence in a 
> particular OpenID though?
> 
> Regards,
> 
> - John
> 
> Hallam-Baker, Phillip wrote:
> > If we want identities to be persistent then we are going to need to 
> > introduce a layer of indirection.
> > 
> > This normally gets me worried about patents and such. Fortunately 
> > Multics did this, so did UNIX and VMS. Plenty of prior art.
> > 
> > If we are serious about decentralization then map the user 
> identifier 
> > onto a randomly assigned machine readable GUID.
> > 
> >> -Original Message- From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] 
> >> [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] On Behalf Of Stefan Görling Sent:
> >> Wednesday, November 01, 2006 10:52 AM To: Shutra Zhou Cc:
> >> specs@openid.net Subject: Re: Making identities persistent?
> >> 
> >> 
> >> The reasons for raising this question was partly that I've 
> been doing 
> >> some research on how people use e-mail addresses and sad 
> to say, you 
> >> can not expect the user to make wise choices. And even so, 
> companies 
> >> go broke even the best ones. Services comes and disappear. In my 
> >> research over half of the population use non-portable e-mail 
> >> addresses tied to an employer, university, etc.
> >> and is likely to only live a few years.
> >> 
> >> E-mail is not a stable address/identity identifier. We 
> must not rely 
> >> on it as such.
> >> 
> >> If we want an identity to be persistent, it must contain a 
> migration 
> >> feature, so that I can move all their trust relations from 
> one place 
> >> to another. This of course creates a number of other 
> issues such as 
> >> security and complexibility, but it is my sincere belief that the 
> >> issue should be addressed by the system and not only 
> delegated to be 
> >> dependent on wise user decisions.
> >> 
> >> Therefore, my +1 is on (1) below. I will try to read back 
> on what has 
> >> been said in the past on a 'change identifier' extension 
> and see if 
> >> there is anything I can do to help.
> >> 
> >> /Stefan
> >> 
> >>> Yes, this is important thing I thought. We should privide a
> >> spec for
> >>> the consumer to change their end user's OpenID URL,
> >> optionally the end
> >>> user can use multiple OpenIDs in this consuemr. And this
> >> case can be
> >>> expended as this, the IdP（OpenID Server） is closed down.
> >>> 
> >>> 2006/10/31, George Fletcher <[EMAIL PROTECTED]
> >> >:
> >>> This is a good use case and I think important for both users and 
> >>> IdPs (now OPs [OpenID Provider] per the latest "editor's
> >>> conference") to consider.
> >>> 
> >>> I see a number of options...
> >>> 
> >>> 1. There has been some discussion regarding a "change
> >> identifier"
> >>> extension that would allow you to change your identifier at the 
> >>> relying party.  This would solve the use case and is necessary 
> >>> regardless of the other options.
> >>> 
> >>> 2. The OP (in this case AOL.com) could continue to provide an 
> >>> "identifier management" page that would allow the user
> >> to specify
> >>> the OP of choice.  This requires the OP to continue to serve the 
> >>> XRDS doc or at least the indirection to a XRDS doc with 
> the new OP.  
> >>> This is not that much extra overhead for the OP,
> >> but it will
> >>> likely be a business decision as to whether to support
> >> such a feature.
> >>> 3. The user gets to choose their OP so they can ensure that they 
> >>> don'

Re: Making identities persistent?

[Rowan Kerr]

On Wed, 2006-11-01 at 11:33 -0500, John Kemp wrote:
> I think you need the ability for a user to change his identifier at the
> RP (as George notes below) and also at the IdP. 

Isn't this was already covered in the spec? You accomplish this by
creating an HTML page on some website you control with a http-equiv meta
tag in it that points to your IdP. Then you use your own url as your
Identity, even though ultimately the data is pulled from the IdP.

So if you ever want to change IdP's you simply update your html page
with the new server. And your Identifier never needs to change.


> In addition, it should
> be possible for the IdP to providing OpenID "forwarding" if the user
> leaves for another IdP (perhaps the user will even pay for a forwarding
> service?)

Is there anything against an IdP implementing the "delegate" feature to
forward to a different server?


-Rowan



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Re: Making identities persistent?

[John Kemp]

Hello,

I think you need the ability for a user to change his identifier at the
RP (as George notes below) and also at the IdP. In addition, it should
be possible for the IdP to providing OpenID "forwarding" if the user
leaves for another IdP (perhaps the user will even pay for a forwarding
service?)

We're not talking about persistence as such (a particular users OpenID
can surely change over time?), but more the ability for the user to
update her OpenID when she switches from one IdP to another. At the IdP,
this would I guess be kind of like leaving a forwarding address, as the
user is "leaving" one IdP and moving to another. At the RP, the user is
telling the RP that he is using a new IdP.

So, I think George's (1) is a necessity, and agree that (2) is a
business decision, but certainly offers the ability for an IdP to be
"community-friendly" if it so wishes, and may even be a good business
decision.

Isn't this all about the likely /lack/ of persistence in a particular
OpenID though?

Regards,

- John

Hallam-Baker, Phillip wrote:
> If we want identities to be persistent then we are going to need to
> introduce a layer of indirection.
> 
> This normally gets me worried about patents and such. Fortunately
> Multics did this, so did UNIX and VMS. Plenty of prior art.
> 
> If we are serious about decentralization then map the user identifier
> onto a randomly assigned machine readable GUID.
> 
>> -Original Message- From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] 
>> [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] On Behalf Of Stefan Görling Sent:
>> Wednesday, November 01, 2006 10:52 AM To: Shutra Zhou Cc:
>> specs@openid.net Subject: Re: Making identities persistent?
>> 
>> 
>> The reasons for raising this question was partly that I've been
>> doing some research on how people use e-mail addresses and sad to
>> say, you can not expect the user to make wise choices. And even so,
>> companies go broke even the best ones. Services comes and
>> disappear. In my research over half of the population use
>> non-portable e-mail addresses tied to an employer, university, etc.
>> and is likely to only live a few years.
>> 
>> E-mail is not a stable address/identity identifier. We must not
>> rely on it as such.
>> 
>> If we want an identity to be persistent, it must contain a 
>> migration feature, so that I can move all their trust relations
>> from one place to another. This of course creates a number of other
>> issues such as security and complexibility, but it is my sincere
>> belief that the issue should be addressed by the system and not
>> only delegated to be dependent on wise user decisions.
>> 
>> Therefore, my +1 is on (1) below. I will try to read back on what
>> has been said in the past on a 'change identifier' extension and
>> see if there is anything I can do to help.
>> 
>> /Stefan
>> 
>>> Yes, this is important thing I thought. We should privide a
>> spec for
>>> the consumer to change their end user's OpenID URL,
>> optionally the end
>>> user can use multiple OpenIDs in this consuemr. And this
>> case can be
>>> expended as this, the IdP（OpenID Server） is closed down.
>>> 
>>> 2006/10/31, George Fletcher <[EMAIL PROTECTED]
>> >:
>>> This is a good use case and I think important for both users and 
>>> IdPs (now OPs [OpenID Provider] per the latest "editor's 
>>> conference") to consider.
>>> 
>>> I see a number of options...
>>> 
>>> 1. There has been some discussion regarding a "change
>> identifier"
>>> extension that would allow you to change your identifier at the 
>>> relying party.  This would solve the use case and is necessary 
>>> regardless of the other options.
>>> 
>>> 2. The OP (in this case AOL.com) could continue to provide an 
>>> "identifier management" page that would allow the user
>> to specify
>>> the OP of choice.  This requires the OP to continue to serve the 
>>> XRDS doc or at least the indirection to a XRDS doc with the new 
>>> OP.  This is not that much extra overhead for the OP,
>> but it will
>>> likely be a business decision as to whether to support
>> such a feature.
>>> 3. The user gets to choose their OP so they can ensure that they 
>>> don't get "locked in".  This is the ideal behind user-centric. 
>>> However, in practice, it will take good education and time for 
>>> users to understand the ramifications of their decisions.
>>> 
>>> Thanks, George
>>> 
>>> Stefan Görling wrote:
>>> 
 Hi everybody,
 
 I'm trying to get a grip around your great work and have one
 issue that I'm not quite clear on, relevant to the discussion
 of using
 
 [EMAIL PROTECTED] 
>> identifiers, but also in a more general context.
 Please let me know if I've simply missunderstood my own
 question.
 
 
 http://openid.net/specs/openid-authentication-2_0-09.html#an
> chor48 says:
 "OpenID is decentralized. No central authority must approve or
  register Relying Parties or Identity Providers. An End User
>> can freely

RE: Making identities persistent?

[Hallam-Baker, Phillip]

If we want identities to be persistent then we are going to need to introduce a 
layer of indirection. 

This normally gets me worried about patents and such. Fortunately Multics did 
this, so did UNIX and VMS. Plenty of prior art. 

If we are serious about decentralization then map the user identifier onto a 
randomly assigned machine readable GUID.

> -Original Message-
> From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] 
> [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] On Behalf Of Stefan Görling
> Sent: Wednesday, November 01, 2006 10:52 AM
> To: Shutra Zhou
> Cc: specs@openid.net
> Subject: Re: Making identities persistent?
> 
> 
> The reasons for raising this question was partly that I've 
> been doing some research on how people use e-mail addresses 
> and sad to say, you can not expect the user to make wise 
> choices. And even so, companies go broke even the best ones. 
> Services comes and disappear. In my research over half of the 
> population use non-portable e-mail addresses tied to an 
> employer, university, etc. and is likely to only live a few years.
> 
> E-mail is not a stable address/identity identifier. We must 
> not rely on it as such.
> 
> If we want an identity to be persistent, it must contain a 
> migration feature, so that I can move all their trust 
> relations from one place to another. This of course creates a 
> number of other issues such as security and complexibility, 
> but it is my sincere belief that the issue should be 
> addressed by the system and not only delegated to be 
> dependent on wise user decisions.
> 
> Therefore, my +1 is on (1) below. I will try to read back on 
> what has been said in the past on a 'change identifier' 
> extension and see if there is anything I can do to help.
> 
> /Stefan
> 
> > Yes, this is important thing I thought. We should privide a 
> spec for 
> > the consumer to change their end user's OpenID URL, 
> optionally the end 
> > user can use multiple OpenIDs in this consuemr. And this 
> case can be 
> > expended as this, the IdP（OpenID Server） is closed down.
> >
> > 2006/10/31, George Fletcher <[EMAIL PROTECTED] 
> >:
> >
> > This is a good use case and I think important for both users and
> > IdPs (now OPs [OpenID Provider] per the latest "editor's
> > conference") to consider.
> >
> > I see a number of options...
> >
> > 1. There has been some discussion regarding a "change 
> identifier"
> > extension that would allow you to change your identifier at the
> > relying party.  This would solve the use case and is necessary
> > regardless of the other options.
> >
> > 2. The OP (in this case AOL.com) could continue to provide an
> > "identifier management" page that would allow the user 
> to specify
> > the OP of choice.  This requires the OP to continue to serve the
> > XRDS doc or at least the indirection to a XRDS doc with the new
> > OP.  This is not that much extra overhead for the OP, 
> but it will
> > likely be a business decision as to whether to support 
> such a feature.
> >
> > 3. The user gets to choose their OP so they can ensure that they
> > don't get "locked in".  This is the ideal behind user-centric. 
> > However, in practice, it will take good education and time for
> > users to understand the ramifications of their decisions.
> >
> > Thanks,
> > George
> >
> > Stefan Görling wrote:
> >
> >>Hi everybody,
> >>
> >>I'm trying to get a grip around your great work and have one issue 
> >>that I'm not quite clear on, relevant to the discussion of using
> >>
> >>[EMAIL PROTECTED]  
> identifiers, but also in a more general context. 
> >>Please let me know if I've simply missunderstood my own question.
> >>
> >>
> >>http://openid.net/specs/openid-authentication-2_0-09.html#an
chor48 says:
> >>"OpenID is decentralized. No central authority must approve or 
> >>register Relying Parties or Identity Providers. An End User 
> can freely 
> >>choose
> >>
> >>which Identity Provider to use. They can preserve their 
> Identifier if 
> >>they switch Identity Providers."
> >>
> >>Let us consider the case that I'm an AOL.com customer, and 
> they act as 
> >>an IdP providing we with an identifier. I use this identifier for 3
> >>
> >>years for identity management on most of the services I use, due to 
> >>the huge success of the standard... However, I'm starting 
> to get fed 
> >>up with AOL and terminates my agreement with them. Is there any 
> >>procedure for me
> >>
> >>to switch to another IdP? How is this done?
> >>
> >>Best Regards,
> >>
> >>Stefan Görling
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >>___
> >>specs mailing list
> >>
> >>specs@openid.net  
> >>http://openid.net/mailman/listinfo/specs
> >>
> >>  
> >>
> >
> > ___
> > specs mailing list
> > specs@openid.net 
> > http://openid.net/mailman/

Re: Making identities persistent?

[Stefan Görling]

The reasons for raising this question was partly that I've been doing 
some research on how people use e-mail addresses and sad to say, you can 
not expect the user to make wise choices. And even so, companies go 
broke even the best ones. Services comes and disappear. In my research 
over half of the population use non-portable e-mail addresses tied to an 
employer, university, etc. and is likely to only live a few years.

E-mail is not a stable address/identity identifier. We must not rely on 
it as such.

If we want an identity to be persistent, it must contain a migration 
feature, so that I can move all their trust relations from one place to 
another. This of course creates a number of other issues such as 
security and complexibility, but it is my sincere belief that the issue 
should be addressed by the system and not only delegated to be dependent 
on wise user decisions.

Therefore, my +1 is on (1) below. I will try to read back on what has 
been said in the past on a 'change identifier' extension and see if 
there is anything I can do to help.

/Stefan

> Yes, this is important thing I thought. We should privide a spec for 
> the consumer to change their end user's OpenID URL, optionally the end 
> user can use multiple OpenIDs in this consuemr. And this case can be 
> expended as this, the IdP（OpenID Server） is closed down.
>
> 2006/10/31, George Fletcher <[EMAIL PROTECTED] >:
>
> This is a good use case and I think important for both users and
> IdPs (now OPs [OpenID Provider] per the latest "editor's
> conference") to consider.
>
> I see a number of options...
>
> 1. There has been some discussion regarding a "change identifier"
> extension that would allow you to change your identifier at the
> relying party.  This would solve the use case and is necessary
> regardless of the other options.
>
> 2. The OP (in this case AOL.com) could continue to provide an
> "identifier management" page that would allow the user to specify
> the OP of choice.  This requires the OP to continue to serve the
> XRDS doc or at least the indirection to a XRDS doc with the new
> OP.  This is not that much extra overhead for the OP, but it will
> likely be a business decision as to whether to support such a feature.
>
> 3. The user gets to choose their OP so they can ensure that they
> don't get "locked in".  This is the ideal behind user-centric. 
> However, in practice, it will take good education and time for
> users to understand the ramifications of their decisions.
>
> Thanks,
> George
>
> Stefan Görling wrote:
>
>>Hi everybody,
>>
>>I'm trying to get a grip around your great work and have one issue that 
>>I'm not quite clear on, relevant to the discussion of using 
>>
>>[EMAIL PROTECTED]  identifiers, but also in a more 
>>general context. 
>>Please let me know if I've simply missunderstood my own question.
>>
>>
>>http://openid.net/specs/openid-authentication-2_0-09.html#anchor48 says:
>>"OpenID is decentralized. No central authority must approve or register 
>>Relying Parties or Identity Providers. An End User can freely choose 
>>
>>which Identity Provider to use. They can preserve their Identifier if 
>>they switch Identity Providers."
>>
>>Let us consider the case that I'm an AOL.com customer, and they act as 
>>an IdP providing we with an identifier. I use this identifier for 3 
>>
>>years for identity management on most of the services I use, due to the 
>>huge success of the standard... However, I'm starting to get fed up with 
>>AOL and terminates my agreement with them. Is there any procedure for me 
>>
>>to switch to another IdP? How is this done?
>>
>>Best Regards,
>>
>>Stefan Görling
>>
>>
>>
>>___
>>specs mailing list
>>
>>specs@openid.net 
>>http://openid.net/mailman/listinfo/specs
>>
>>  
>>
>
> ___
> specs mailing list
> specs@openid.net 
> http://openid.net/mailman/listinfo/specs
>
>
>

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RE: Making identities persistent?

[Hallam-Baker, Phillip]

Bad statement of the principle. Centralized direction is 
inevitable if there are to be unique, mnemonic 
identifiers.
 
The questions are whether the centralized control is 
accountable, whether the system has checks and balances and the confidence that 
users can place in the registry continuing to be supported after the startup 
money has run out.
 
 


  
  
  From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] 
  [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] On Behalf Of Drummond 
  ReedSent: Tuesday, October 31, 2006 10:31 PMTo: 'George 
  Fletcher'; 'Stefan Görling'Cc: specs@openid.netSubject: 
  RE: Making identities persistent?
  
  
  Good answer, George. 
  The question applies mainly to delegated identifiers (e.g., email addresses 
  delegated under a specific DNS domain like [EMAIL PROTECTED], third-or-lower level 
  domain names like user.aol.com, or community i-names such as @aol*user), since 
  they are by definition assigned within the context of (and thus under the 
  ultimate control of) as specific identifier community (such as aol.com). 
  
   
  For identifiers 
  registered directly with a global registry (e.g., joesmith.com in DNS or 
  =joe.smith in XRI), the identifiers themselves are portable across registrars 
  and the registrant has direct control of the identifier and what it resolves 
  to (e.g., the XRDS document).This portability is established by ICANN for DNS 
  registries and XDI.org for XRI global registries.
   
  So the section of the 
  spec you cite should probably be clarified with regard to these points, i.e., 
  something like: 
   "OpenID is decentralized. No central authority must approve or register Relying Parties or OpenID Providers. An End User can freely choose which OpenID Provider to use. OpenID design also enables an End User to continue to use an OpenID Identifier if they switch OpenID Providers. Note that the portability and persistence of an OpenID identifier itself (URL or XRI) is a capability of the identifier and the registry authority and is out of scope for OpenID. End Users who wish to maintain persistent control of an OpenID Identifier SHOULD select an identifier and registry authority that offers these capabilities.”
   
  Thoughts?
   
  =Drummond 
  
  
  
  
  
  From: 
  [EMAIL PROTECTED] [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] On Behalf Of George FletcherSent: Tuesday, October 31, 2006 7:36 
  AMTo: Stefan 
  GörlingCc: 
  specs@openid.netSubject: Re: 
  Making identities persistent?
   
  This is a good use case and I 
  think important for both users and IdPs (now OPs [OpenID Provider] per the 
  latest "editor's conference") to consider.I see a number of 
  options...1. There has been some discussion regarding a "change 
  identifier" extension that would allow you to change your identifier at the 
  relying party.  This would solve the use case and is necessary regardless 
  of the other options.2. The OP (in this case AOL.com) could continue 
  to provide an "identifier management" page that would allow the user to 
  specify the OP of choice.  This requires the OP to continue to serve the 
  XRDS doc or at least the indirection to a XRDS doc with the new OP.  This 
  is not that much extra overhead for the OP, but it will likely be a business 
  decision as to whether to support such a feature.3. The user gets to 
  choose their OP so they can ensure that they don't get "locked in".  This 
  is the ideal behind user-centric.  However, in practice, it will take 
  good education and time for users to understand the ramifications of their 
  decisions.Thanks,GeorgeStefan Görling wrote: 
  Hi everybody, I'm trying to get a grip around your great work and have one issue that I'm not quite clear on, relevant to the discussion of using [EMAIL PROTECTED] identifiers, but also in a more general context. Please let me know if I've simply missunderstood my own question. http://openid.net/specs/openid-authentication-2_0-09.html#anchor48 says:"OpenID is decentralized. No central authority must approve or register Relying Parties or Identity Providers. An End User can freely choose which Identity Provider to use. They can preserve their Identifier if they switch Identity Providers." Let us consider the case that I'm an AOL.com customer, and they act as an IdP providing we with an identifier. I use this identifier for 3 years for identity management on most of the services I use, due to the huge success of the standard... However, I'm starting to get fed up with AOL and terminates my agreement with them. Is there any procedure for me to switch to another IdP? How is this done? Best Regards, Stefan Görling   ___specs mailing listspecs@openid.nethttp://openid.net/mailman/listinfo/specs   
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