[Standards] XEP-0198 and SASL-Anonymous

2013-01-25 Thread Winfried Tilanus
Hi,

And now we are talking about XEP-0198, I think the security
considerations should take some more situations in account for the
session hijacking protection. When properly and securely authenticated,
the authentication is enough protection against sesion hijacking. But
when using SASL-Anonymous, the session id MUST be unpredictable AND the
session MUST be encrypted, otherwise the session can be hijacked. Think
it would be better to add that to the spec.

Winfried


Re: [Standards] XEP-0198 and SASL-Anonymous

2013-01-25 Thread Matt Miller

On Jan 25, 2013, at 7:08 AM, Winfried Tilanus winfr...@tilanus.com wrote:

 Hi,
 
 And now we are talking about XEP-0198, I think the security
 considerations should take some more situations in account for the
 session hijacking protection. When properly and securely authenticated,
 the authentication is enough protection against sesion hijacking. But
 when using SASL-Anonymous, the session id MUST be unpredictable AND the
 session MUST be encrypted, otherwise the session can be hijacked. Think
 it would be better to add that to the spec.
 

Those are good points, although transport encryption is only as trusted as the 
certificate in use (think of all the times we have clicked I understand the 
risks...).

I think it should also be valid for the server to prohibit stream management 
resumption if using SASL ANONYMOUS.


- mm

Matthew A. Miller
 http://goo.gl/LK55L 



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