Tom,
You are in the best case right, but I think that the crises is less
than one generation (20 years) away. The statement you make
have no support in known facts, especially since the usage growth
rate seems to be grossly underestimated. The reserves from the
Oil companies has already been proven to be over estimated,
with almost a third for Shell only.
Hakan
At 09:59 PM 3/29/2005, you wrote:
Hi All,
I am an environmental scientist by education and my latest research is on
sustainable development. As near as I can tell there is no shortage of oil.
There may be shortages of production, shortages of distribution but for at
least another generation there will be no shortage of oil due to lack of
material. Here is the key reasoning. We still have not tapped all the
available reserves on land. All the Gulf war stuff is about underdeveloped
Iraqi oil and the as yet untouched and shallow (read highly profitable) oil
in the Azerbijan region. Oil is produced under oceans. Although we have
found most of the terrestrial based oil, it represents only 1/8 the planets
surface area. That leaves 7/8 of the planet where we have hardly begun the
search for new sources. A recent National Geographic article displayed new
technology that was enabling drilling off the continental shelf in water
1500 feet deep. Now oil from that depth won't be cheap but it still will be
available. With prices at $57/ barrel it becomes economically feasable to
look even deeper.
The point and the problem is that there will be no lack of oil. The problem
will be from the climate change that is already here and will only worsen as
we convert fossilized carbon from solid and liquid from into gaseous carbon
dioxide. I recently rewrote a global warming headline, " Hemingway turns in
his grave as the Snows of Kilamanjaro dissappear from the Earth forever.
That's the problem folks.
Sincerely,
Tom Irwin
-Original Message-
From: Keith Addison
To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Sent: 3/29/05 2:28 PM
Subject: [Biofuel] Mapping The Oil Motive
http://www.tompaine.com/articles/mapping_the_oil_motive.php
Mapping The Oil Motive
Michael T. Klare
March 18, 2005
The Bush administration has publicly advanced a number of reasons for
going to war in Iraq, from WMDs to the Iraqi people's need for
liberation. Michael Klare reviews the evidence that securing
America's source of oil was a decisive factor in the White House's
decision to invade-and looks at whether the administration succeeded.
Michael T. Klare is a professor of peace and world security studies
at Hampshire College and the author, most recently, of Blood and Oil:
The Dangers and Consequences of America's Growing Petroleum
Dependency (Metropolitan Books)
What role did oil play in the U.S. decision to invade Iraq? If oil
did play a significant role, what, exactly, did President Bush and
his associates hope to accomplish in this regard? To what degree did
they succeed? These are questions that will no doubt occupy analysts
for many years to come, but that can and should be answered now-as
the American people debate the validity of the invasion and Bush
administration gears up for a possible war against Iran under
circumstances very similar to those prevailing in Iraq in early 2003.
In addressing these questions, it should be noted that the U.S.
invasion of Iraq was a matter of choice, not of necessity. The United
States did not act in response to an aggressive move by a hostile
power directed against this country or one of its allies, but rather
employed force on its own volition to advance (what the
administration viewed as) U.S. national interests. This means that we
cannot identify a precipitating action for war, but instead must
examine the calculus of costs and benefits that persuaded President
Bush to invade Iraq at that particular moment. On one side of this
ledger were the disincentives to war: the loss of American lives, the
expenditure of vast sums of money and the alienation of America's
allies. To outweigh these negatives, and opt for war, would require
powerful incentives. But what were they? This is the question that
has so bedeviled pundits and analysts since the onset of combat.
It is highly doubtful that any one factor tipped the balance toward
invasion. A war of choice is rarely precipitated by a single
objective, but rather stems from a combination of contributing
factors. In this case, many come to mind: legitimate concern over
Saddam Hussein's weapons of mass destruction; an inclination to
demonstrate the effectiveness of the administration's "pre-emptive"
war doctrine; increased security for Israel; the promotion of
democracy in the Middle East; U.S. domination of the Persian Gulf
region; and a thirst for Iraqi oil. All of these, and possibly
others, are likely to have figured to some degree in the president's
decision to invade. What is difficult is to ascertain is how these
factors were ranked in the administration's calculus; what we can do,
however, is to pu
