[swinog] QNAME minimization (Was: Quad9 "does not collect", but .... it does....)
On 2018-11-01 21:53, Rainer Duffner wrote: Am 01.11.2018 um 21:26 schrieb Jeroen Massar : TLDR: On a related note: Does anyone run a resolver with QNAME-minimization enabled? Any problems, common or specific to certain domains? At least everybody running unbound is (as it is the default) and unbound is very often deployed in high-speed recursor situations. Do note that unbound has a not-default-on strict mode. That means in non-strict mode (default) it will retry when failures happen. (As such, a MITM/bad-authoritive could introduce a failure to learn more) The config option reads and explains reasonably well: -- qname-minimisation-strict: QNAME minimisation in strict mode. Do not fall-back to sending full QNAME to potentially broken nameservers. A lot of domains will not be resolvable when this option in enabled. Only use if you know what you are doing. This option only has effect when qname-minimisation is enabled. Default is off. Exact details are in the archives of the unbound mailing list... Greets, Jeroen ___ swinog mailing list swinog@lists.swinog.ch http://lists.swinog.ch/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/swinog
Re: [swinog] Quad9 "does not collect", but .... it does.... (Was: Google DNS on Salt Mobile)
> Am 01.11.2018 um 21:26 schrieb Jeroen Massar : > > TLDR: On a related note: Does anyone run a resolver with QNAME-minimization enabled? Any problems, common or specific to certain domains? ___ swinog mailing list swinog@lists.swinog.ch http://lists.swinog.ch/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/swinog
[swinog] Quad9 -- mostly constructive comments (Was: Google DNS on Salt Mobile)
On 2018-11-01 09:18, Bill Woodcock wrote: [..] No, that’s false. Please read RFCs 7816 and 7871. Quad9 implements the former and not the latter And because of the latter instead of going to the local ISP netflix cache one might go to the country-level cache or because it does not know better to the continental cache. GeoDNS goes rather bad when the source address is odd. Next to the problem of load-balancing or traffic engineering that the sending party is trying to fix by doing those tricks in the first place. Hence, supporting ENDS-Client-Subnet (stripping at minimum to BGP or /24 or /48 subnet) would be a good thing. If it is not considered a good thing, a little note on the site why not would go a long way. Again, if, after acquainting yourself with Quad9’s practices and the relevant RFCs, you see any way in which Quad9 could provide better privacy or security protections to users, they would VERY MUCH LIKE YOUR CONSTRUCTIVE INPUT, as that’s the entire point. It’s an open and transparent community project, to serve the community. - Please put on the quad9 website a _versioned_ "policy" and "privacy" page, thus that one can also see the previous editions. That would be good transparency. - align https://quad9.net/about/ with them, as "policy" does not mention "no other secondary revenue streams for personally-identifiable data" which is a 'good' sentence, but needs repeating there too. - Create a minimal version of those; 99% of the people do not bother reading them at all, let alone when too long. - Provide a /technical/ details page: - what software is used (e.g "we run bind4 custom patched by vix himself") and when possible point to Open Source to recognize their efforts (one does run multiple different resolver types to avoid any bugs I hope ;) - what actual RFCs/techniques are (not) used - why for instance RFC7871 is chosen not be to be supported - that DNSSEC is supported and that validation is active - list of providers of 'malicious domains' and who randomly samples/verifies that list (otherwise: who censors it) "Quad9 checks the site against a list of domains combined from 19 different threat intelligence partners." does one hit in a list block the domain, or do N lists (RPZ?) need to blacklist it? (RPZ does not have spamassassin-like scoring, asked for that option once though, but it is hard to do ;) Technical details (even though not verifiable as one does not have access to the infra) would be a great thing. Some other not-so-constructive comments (I snipped around those sections of the mail): - Remove refs to "not-for-profit" as that just means that all the money goes into the business instead of paying taxes... - "The three primary founding collaborators for the project have goals that are similar.", I can only assume that Big Blue is not a founding collaborator then... but the logos tell differently. in order to minimize the leakage of data from end-user to authoritative server. Moreover, that’s only an issue with zones for which PCH is not authoritative. For all those for which PCH is authoritative, no queries pass “through” to anywhere else. (I can only assume that you mean "9.9.9.9 recursor sits on the same net/vlan/switch as the PCH auth, thus it never leaks ;) Integrity is a bigger issue and there are many examples where it is actively being violated - this is at least partially addressed by DNSSEC. Which is why Quad9 was the first global anycast resolver to implement DNSSEC validation, and why PCH is the only DNSSEC operator besides ICANN to implement FIPS 140-2 Level 4 security. "global anycast resolver". That is a DNS recursor that is 'open for the world' right? :) Greets, Jeroen ___ swinog mailing list swinog@lists.swinog.ch http://lists.swinog.ch/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/swinog
[swinog] Quad9 "does not collect", but .... it does.... (Was: Google DNS on Salt Mobile)
TLDR: - https://quad9.net/policy/ and https://quad9.net/privacy/ are the multiple pages of legalese - it is a long text, not actually mentioning any actual technology - nobody using 9.9.9.9 will read it as they are using an IP, not a website with text - it can change whenever, there are no versions, there is no history of what changed (archive.org possibly) - for a variety of reasons IP (and thus PII) might be gathered anyway - IP prefixes are summarized, but unknown till which size (IPv6 /48?) - Undefined what happens with packets towards 9.9.9.9 (is somebody doing PDNS, or otherwise grabbing bits?) - Nothing mentioned about RFC7871 (EDNS Client Subnet) which is required for helping CDNs/Geo-DNS... more inline ;) Oh and for the record: Woody, you are not the "problem" here, the companies around Quad9 though, they have a commercial interest in the data... somebody has to pay for it, and that can mostly only be solved with the personal data collection nothing is for free in the end and bills (and woody's :) have to be paid. On 2018-11-01 06:24, Bill Woodcock wrote: On Oct 29, 2018, at 11:38 PM, Jeroen Massar wrote: [snip] How can something be "GDPR compliant" when no consent is given at all? By not collecting any PII. That is indeed a great start, what one does not have, one cannot abuse. Have you layered HTTP on top of DNS to provide a 20-pager of legalise that nobody can be bothered to read as it will change at a moment's notice? No. Stating "it doesn’t collect source IP addresses" means "but we collect everything else”. That’s an obviously false statement, and doesn’t usefully contribute to the conversation. Strange as https://quad9.net/privacy/ reads: "We share anonymized data on specific domains (such as domain, timestamp, geolocation, number of hits, first seen, last seen) with our threat intelligence partners." That says "Domains" and possibly labels. It also says "geolocation" which is derived from an IP, which can be wildly wrong but also extremely specific... It is not specified at all what is actually really collected. It would be great to have a list, or a log example or heck the tool (as it is likely open source...) of what is actually logged/collected/"shared with partners". But more importantly, for us 'geeky people' who run our own domains, that domain identifies an individual and thus a domain in effect points to PII. while 'gmail' is general, 'massar.ch' is not so general any more... Next to that labels can include IP addresses (e.g. 1.2.3.4.in-addr.arpa, but also the forward 4-3-2-1.dsl.isp.example) Noting that these are looked up by every SMTP server on the planet. Are you saying you are dropping these labels? As otherwise, you are collecting PII. https://quad9.net/policy/ reads: "This policy may be amended by Quad9, and the new version of the policy shall become effective upon its posting " so, as it is not versioned, and previous versions are not available, that 'policy' can be changed any time. Today it might look okay, tomorrow, it will not, and then 9.9.9.9 is hardcoded like 8.8.8.8 and nobody gave consent on the change in policy. Lets look a bit deeper: "When you use Quad9 DNS Services, the information we gather aides us to personalize, improve and operate our infrastructure. " Personalize? So, as in, P(ersonaliz)eII , how does one "personalize" when you claim to not collect Personal Information? "Our normal course of data management does not have any IP address information or other PII logged to disk or transmitted out of the location in which the query was received." What is the "not-normal course"? When is that applied? What happens then? Did you note the 20 pages of legalese I mentioned, indeed, there is about that amount on those pages. Would be cool to have a bullet list of what is collected... "We may aggregate certain counters to larger network block levels for statistical collection purposes" So, you keep addresses, but at "block" level. For IPv6, is that on /64, /56 or /48? And for IPv4 /31? ... would be great to specify otherwise that is a meaningless statement. "observed behaviors which we deem malicious or anomalous" Is "trying to resolve a malware URL" considered "malicious"? would be great to specify this. (I guess what I know what is written, but hey, it is a policy, thus legalese and thus, needs to be specific). "We do keep some generalized location information (at the city/metropolitan area level) so that we can conduct debugging and analyze abuse phenomena." Are you saying that certain "cities" have more abuse than others!? :) Look, just state that for debugging, IP addresses will be seen, nobody minds they are in the clear. But just do not log it and definitely do not automatically share with "3rd parties"... I'll skip commenting on the cookie section as that section just violates any form of
Re: [swinog] Google DNS on Salt Mobile
> On Nov 1, 2018, at 12:45 AM, Gregor Riepl wrote: > >> Quad9 collects: >> >> - Aggregate count of IPv4 queries per site > . >> - Aggregate count of queries matching each blocked domain per site, for >> queries which are directed to the malware-filtering addresses. >> >> In the future, Quad9 may also count aggregate number of queries matching >> blocked domains by origin AS, but there’s no active project to implement >> that. > > As any other centralised service, a DNS resolver will implicitly collect… The word “collect” is generally understood to mean “record” or “retain” and I’ve used it in that sense. By intention and design, neither of those are true for Quad9, with respect to any PII. No PII is recorded or retained, except in the sense that the source IP address of any query is used to address the reply. > …and pass on any traffic that goes through it. No, that’s false. Please read RFCs 7816 and 7871. Quad9 implements the former and not the latter, in order to minimize the leakage of data from end-user to authoritative server. Moreover, that’s only an issue with zones for which PCH is not authoritative. For all those for which PCH is authoritative, no queries pass “through” to anywhere else. Again, if, after acquainting yourself with Quad9’s practices and the relevant RFCs, you see any way in which Quad9 could provide better privacy or security protections to users, they would VERY MUCH LIKE YOUR CONSTRUCTIVE INPUT, as that’s the entire point. It’s an open and transparent community project, to serve the community. > Integrity is a bigger issue and there are many examples where it is actively > being violated - this is at least partially addressed by DNSSEC. Which is why Quad9 was the first global anycast resolver to implement DNSSEC validation, and why PCH is the only DNSSEC operator besides ICANN to implement FIPS 140-2 Level 4 security. > The question is what happens with the data. Only if “the data” is collected in the first place, and I regard doing so as a failure. If data is collected, it will inevitably be breached or disclosed. The only defense against this is to not collect data in the first place. Which, again, is the entire point of Quad9. >> While you’re right, that has no bearing, since the labels aren’t being >> collected. > > In the end, this is a question of who you trust and who you don’t. Exactly. The reasonable thing to do is to operate your own RFC 7816-compliant caching resolver at your border, and use a recursive resolver with policies that match your self-interest. And that’s what ~95% of Quad9’s users do, to the best of their understanding. Which is admittedly/purposely/by-design a limited understanding, since there’s no institutionalized concept of a “user.” However, since it’s a community, there’s a lot of discussion and mutual support and exchange of anecdotal information. And during the pilot (November 2016-November 2017) there was active interaction with the pilot users. > My initial complaint was more directed at the fact that an ISP is > delivering data about a customer's habits to the one of the biggest service > providers on the planet on a silver platter, and without their customer's > consent to boot. > That's not ok. Completely agreed. Unfortunately, nearly all large ISPs and many small ones are doing this, though usually not in as obvious a fashion as you observed. Most outsource operation of “their” resolvers to companies which monetize on the back end, without changing the IP address. -Bill signature.asc Description: Message signed with OpenPGP ___ swinog mailing list swinog@lists.swinog.ch http://lists.swinog.ch/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/swinog
