Re: [swinog] Lawful interception - what's new?

2009-07-28 Diskussionsfäden Norbert Bollow
Andreas Fink af...@list.fink.org wrote:

 The technical document does not specify which information to be
 stored. That's the point. The law says Verbindungs und
 Abrechungsdaten.
 However what is connection data?

In my opinion, based on carefully reading the relevant definitions
in the law on telecommunication (Fernmeldegesetz, FMG), connection
data in the context of ADSL should be understood as referring to
the connection between the ADSL modem and the DSLAM, and *not* as
referring to anything done by means of TCP connections or anything
else at such high layers in the OSI reference model.

From their letter, I expect that ISC-EJPD PFÜ probably disagrees with
me regarding this point, and in fact I believe that they're currently
engaged in reinterpreting the law with the goal of pretending that it
says what they want it to say, even if it actually doesn't.

SIUG has initiated correspondence with ISC-EJPD PFÜ aimed at getting
them to formulate a clear position about what in their opinion is the
precise meaning of the term Fernmeldedienst to which these
Verbindungs und Abrechungsdaten are supposed to refer.

I'll post here as soon as we have results from this (either a clear
answer or enough failed attempts to get them to answer that it's
clear that they're dodging the issue).  At that stage it will be time
to discuss how to best get the parliament involved.

Greetings,
Norbert

P.S. Is someone here interested in joining SIUG's core group and
actively contributing in SIUG's work on this issue?

-- 
siug.ch -- Swiss Internet User Group, an initiative of /ch/open
adaptux.com -- Empowering adaptation of IT to your business processes

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[swinog] Lawful interception - what's new?

2009-07-27 Diskussionsfäden Manuel Wenger
Hi everyone,
as the discussion about the new lawful interception proposal is going  
on, an issue always comes up with people saying that saving real time  
data of all customers takes up a lot of hard disk space.

Now, as far as I understand this proposal, only information about  
logins and mailbox accesses has to be stored pro-actively. Real-time  
data intercepted from the DSL connection is only to be sent to the ÜPF  
in case of an interception order, in real-time, from that moment on  
(and no historical information).

This means that nothing changes from the present situation for what  
the storage of historic data is concerned. This new proposal only  
brings the following changes:
- new real-time interception of data transmitted through a broadband  
connection (no historical storage)
- new interfaces to communicate with ÜPF

Is this correct?

Now, do you think it would be possible to talk to ÜPF in order to find  
ad-hoc solutions in the rare cases these real-time interceptions  
should become necessary? Otherwise it's definitely overkill. What  
would be the best way to approach this?

I think some lawyers wrote this proposal without having the slightest  
idea of what they were doing, and I'm sure the techies working at ÜPF  
are smart people who would be willing to negotiate a more efficient  
implementation. What do you think?

-Manuel


Ticinocom SA - Via Stazione 5 - 6600 Muralto
Tel. 091 220 00 00 - http://www.ticinocom.com


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Re: [swinog] Lawful interception - what's new?

2009-07-27 Diskussionsfäden Andreas Fink


On 27.07.2009, at 14:29, Manuel Wenger wrote:


Hi everyone,
as the discussion about the new lawful interception proposal is going
on, an issue always comes up with people saying that saving real time
data of all customers takes up a lot of hard disk space.

Now, as far as I understand this proposal, only information about
logins and mailbox accesses has to be stored pro-actively. Real-time
data intercepted from the DSL connection is only to be sent to the ÜPF
in case of an interception order, in real-time, from that moment on
(and no historical information).


The technical document does not specify which information to be  
stored. That's the point. The law says Verbindungs und  
Abrechungsdaten.
However what is connection data? connection to the mailserver?  
connection to website XYZ. This is all communication. So they could  
say every tcp connection from A to B is connection data. Of course  
storing all data is ridiculous and is for sure not happening but today  
they want email, tomorrow they want instant messaging, then they want  
skype etc. etc. It will go on and on.


So far we have never stored historical data because there was  
absolutely no need to. Thats where ISP's differ from Telco's because  
you dont need to know whom has sent whom an e-mail to collect the  
bill. Furthermore if you compare it to non electronic world, does the  
Post Office take a photocopy of every envelope they deliver ? no! eve  
though there every single envelope is being paid for. So why are we  
under stricter rules than the non electronic world? Because its  
technically possible. Thats the key. And just because its technically  
possible is not the right reason to ask for it.




This means that nothing changes from the present situation for what
the storage of historic data is concerned. This new proposal only
brings the following changes:
- new real-time interception of data transmitted through a broadband
connection (no historical storage)
- new interfaces to communicate with ÜPF

Is this correct?



The new interface basically brings the problem of authenticity. We can  
not control if this order is legal or not. It brings SEVERE costs.



Now, do you think it would be possible to talk to ÜPF in order to find
ad-hoc solutions in the rare cases these real-time interceptions
should become necessary? Otherwise it's definitely overkill. What
would be the best way to approach this?


This was the solution of the past as far as I have heard. I would have  
absolutely no problem if the police would show up with a judge's order  
to wiretap my customer XYZ with a laptop in their hand and active  
connecting to an ethernet. This would work very well for most ISP's I  
would imagine. But this administrative jumbo interface will basically  
kill 50% of the ISP's who have less than 10'000 customers as they can  
not afford it.



I think some lawyers wrote this proposal without having the slightest
idea of what they were doing, and I'm sure the techies working at ÜPF
are smart people who would be willing to negotiate a more efficient
implementation. What do you think?


ÜPF is the author. They are greedy for information. They want  
everything they can get. I don't think they will move. Their opinion  
will be its the law so do what we ask. The only thing is to move  
this a few levels up to the Bundesrat (namely Evelyne Widmer Schlumpf)  
and make it clear what kind of nonsense they produce.


The german Twittosphere (the guys who have invented Zensursula)  
already has a word for it... Ueberwachungsschlumpf (Surveillance  
smurf).







Andreas Fink

Fink Consulting GmbH
Global Networks Schweiz AG
BebbiCell AG
IceCell ehf

---
Tel: +41-61-330 Fax: +41-61-331  Mobile: +41-79-2457333
Address: Clarastrasse 3, 4058 Basel, Switzerland
E-Mail:  andr...@fink.org
www.finkconsulting.com www.global-networks.ch www.bebbicell.ch
---
ICQ: 8239353 MSN: m...@gni.ch AIM: smsrelay Skype: andreasfink
Yahoo: finkconsulting SMS: +41792457333

http://a-fink.blogspot.com/




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Re: [swinog] Lawful interception - what's new?

2009-07-27 Diskussionsfäden Andreas Fink
PS: what also changed is that they now ask for certification of this  
whole nonsense.



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Re: [swinog] Lawful interception - what's new?

2009-07-27 Diskussionsfäden Reza Kordi
Hi Guys

I tried to clarify some questions with EJPD regarding when does SP need to 
Archive connection information and when is a REAL time Data interception 
required.

Answer was only when you receive and interception order you should be able to 
provide real time data (I think nobody though how this technically should work 
for all differant services, etc.)

I thought a plan would be to cover this in AGB and stop the connection as soon 
as the order for real time intercept is received.

Any ideas if this could work.

Cheers,
Reza


On 7/27/09 2:42 PM, Andreas Fink af...@list.fink.org wrote:


On 27.07.2009, at 14:29, Manuel Wenger wrote:

Hi everyone,
as the discussion about the new lawful interception proposal is going
on, an issue always comes up with people saying that saving real time
data of all customers takes up a lot of hard disk space.

Now, as far as I understand this proposal, only information about
logins and mailbox accesses has to be stored pro-actively. Real-time
data intercepted from the DSL connection is only to be sent to the ÜPF
in case of an interception order, in real-time, from that moment on
(and no historical information).

The technical document does not specify which information to be stored. That's 
the point. The law says Verbindungs und Abrechungsdaten.
However what is connection data? connection to the mailserver? connection to 
website XYZ. This is all communication. So they could say every tcp connection 
from A to B is connection data. Of course storing all data is ridiculous and is 
for sure not happening but today they want email, tomorrow they want instant 
messaging, then they want skype etc. etc. It will go on and on.

So far we have never stored historical data because there was absolutely no 
need to. Thats where ISP's differ from Telco's because you dont need to know 
whom has sent whom an e-mail to collect the bill. Furthermore if you compare it 
to non electronic world, does the Post Office take a photocopy of every 
envelope they deliver ? no! eve though there every single envelope is being 
paid for. So why are we under stricter rules than the non electronic world? 
Because its technically possible. Thats the key. And just because its 
technically possible is not the right reason to ask for it.


This means that nothing changes from the present situation for what
the storage of historic data is concerned. This new proposal only
brings the following changes:
- new real-time interception of data transmitted through a broadband
connection (no historical storage)
- new interfaces to communicate with ÜPF

Is this correct?


The new interface basically brings the problem of authenticity. We can not 
control if this order is legal or not. It brings SEVERE costs.

Now, do you think it would be possible to talk to ÜPF in order to find
ad-hoc solutions in the rare cases these real-time interceptions
should become necessary? Otherwise it's definitely overkill. What
would be the best way to approach this?

This was the solution of the past as far as I have heard. I would have 
absolutely no problem if the police would show up with a judge's order to 
wiretap my customer XYZ with a laptop in their hand and active connecting to an 
ethernet. This would work very well for most ISP's I would imagine. But this 
administrative jumbo interface will basically kill 50% of the ISP's who have 
less than 10'000 customers as they can not afford it.

I think some lawyers wrote this proposal without having the slightest
idea of what they were doing, and I'm sure the techies working at ÜPF
are smart people who would be willing to negotiate a more efficient
implementation. What do you think?

ÜPF is the author. They are greedy for information. They want everything they 
can get. I don't think they will move. Their opinion will be its the law so 
do what we ask. The only thing is to move this a few levels up to the Bundesrat 
(namely Evelyne Widmer Schlumpf) and make it clear what kind of nonsense they 
produce.

The german Twittosphere (the guys who have invented Zensursula) already has a 
word for it... Ueberwachungsschlumpf (Surveillance smurf).







Andreas Fink

Fink Consulting GmbH
Global Networks Schweiz AG
BebbiCell AG
IceCell ehf

---
Tel: +41-61-330 Fax: +41-61-331  Mobile: +41-79-2457333
Address: Clarastrasse 3, 4058 Basel, Switzerland
E-Mail:  andr...@fink.org
www.finkconsulting.com http://www.finkconsulting.com  www.global-networks.ch 
www.bebbicell.ch
---
ICQ: 8239353 MSN: m...@gni.ch AIM: smsrelay Skype: andreasfink
Yahoo: finkconsulting SMS: +41792457333

http://a-fink.blogspot.com/






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