Re: [systemd-devel] [PATCH] refactored Re: [PATCH] nspawn: Map all seccomp filters to matching capabilities

2015-03-03 Thread Jay Faulkner

On Mar 3, 2015, at 8:55 AM, Topi Miettinen 
mailto:toiwo...@gmail.com>> wrote:

On 03/03/15 01:28, Jay Faulkner wrote:
Hey,

Lennart reviewed this in IRC and suggested I refactor the change in this
manner. Now, we have an array of capability:sys call pairs, and iterate
through that and then only add the seccomp filter if the capability
doesn’t exist.

The new patch is attached, and available
here: https://github.com/jayofdoom/systemd/pull/5.patch.

+typedef struct CapSeccompPair {
+uint64_t capability;
+int scmp_syscall_num;
+} CapSeccompPair;
...
+static const CapSeccompPair blacklist[] = {
+{ SCMP_SYS(iopl), CAP_SYS_RAWIO },

The fields are swapped.

-Topi


Thanks for the review! I’ve corrected the issue, and have the new patch 
attached and available here: https://github.com/jayofdoom/systemd/pull/5.patch.

-Jay Faulkner



nspawn-capabilty-seccomp.patch
Description: nspawn-capabilty-seccomp.patch
___
systemd-devel mailing list
systemd-devel@lists.freedesktop.org
http://lists.freedesktop.org/mailman/listinfo/systemd-devel


Re: [systemd-devel] [PATCH] refactored Re: [PATCH] nspawn: Map all seccomp filters to matching capabilities

2015-03-02 Thread Jay Faulkner
Hey,

Lennart reviewed this in IRC and suggested I refactor the change in this 
manner. Now, we have an array of capability:sys call pairs, and iterate through 
that and then only add the seccomp filter if the capability doesn’t exist.

The new patch is attached, and available here: 
https://github.com/jayofdoom/systemd/pull/5.patch.


nspawn-seccomp-capabilities.patch
Description: nspawn-seccomp-capabilities.patch
Thanks all,Jay FaulknerOn Feb 27, 2015, at 12:15 PM, Jay Faulkner <j...@jvf.cc> wrote:Hi all,My apologies if this is frowned upon, but this has been posted for a week and I haven’t gotten any feedback on it. I’d appreciate if this could get reviewed and if adequate, merged. I’m waiting on this change in order to be able to continue using systemd-nspawn containers, properly configured, to perform system tasks (such as firmware and bios flashing).Thanks,Jay FaulknerOn Feb 20, 2015, at 6:59 PM, Jay Faulkner <j...@jvf.cc> wrote:After some additional testing, I found a bug in this patch where it would not compile with seccomp disabled. I’ve updated the patch at https://github.com/jayofdoom/systemd/pull/4.patch — also I’ve attached the fixed patch.-JayOn Feb 20, 2015, at 4:18 PM, Jay Faulkner <j...@jvf.cc> wrote:Hi all,At the suggestion (and with the assistance of) a co-worker, we remade this patch to not have quite as much repeated code. The new version is attached and can be found here https://github.com/jayofdoom/systemd/pull/4.patch — thanks!Thanks,Jay FaulknerOn Feb 20, 2015, at 2:24 PM, Jay Faulkner <j...@jvf.cc> wrote:Hi all,Two weeks ago[1] I patched systemd-nspawn to respect CAP_SYS_MODULE with regards to setting seccomp filters. As I needed access to some of the other blocked syscalls as well, I have a patch to map all seccomp filters to various capabilities, and to only set those filters if the matching capability is dropped. The matching capabilities were taken from the man pages of the syscalls involved.I’d also suggest that in the future, additional filters use this same mapping as to avoid breaking use cases like mine in the future. :)The patch is attached, but in case it gets mangled in transport as the last one did, feel free to get it directly from github here:  https://github.com/jayofdoom/systemd/pull/3.patch.Thanks,Jay Faulkner___systemd-devel mailing listsystemd-devel@lists.freedesktop.orghttp://lists.freedesktop.org/mailman/listinfo/systemd-devel___systemd-devel mailing listsystemd-devel@lists.freedesktop.orghttp://lists.freedesktop.org/mailman/listinfo/systemd-devel___systemd-devel mailing listsystemd-devel@lists.freedesktop.orghttp://lists.freedesktop.org/mailman/listinfo/systemd-devel___systemd-devel mailing listsystemd-devel@lists.freedesktop.orghttp://lists.freedesktop.org/mailman/listinfo/systemd-devel___
systemd-devel mailing list
systemd-devel@lists.freedesktop.org
http://lists.freedesktop.org/mailman/listinfo/systemd-devel


Re: [systemd-devel] [PATCH] refactored Re: [PATCH] nspawn: Map all seccomp filters to matching capabilities

2015-02-27 Thread Jay Faulkner
Hi all,

My apologies if this is frowned upon, but this has been posted for a week and I 
haven’t gotten any feedback on it. I’d appreciate if this could get reviewed 
and if adequate, merged. I’m waiting on this change in order to be able to 
continue using systemd-nspawn containers, properly configured, to perform 
system tasks (such as firmware and bios flashing).

Thanks,
Jay Faulkner

On Feb 20, 2015, at 6:59 PM, Jay Faulkner mailto:j...@jvf.cc>> 
wrote:

After some additional testing, I found a bug in this patch where it would not 
compile with seccomp disabled. I’ve updated the patch at 
https://github.com/jayofdoom/systemd/pull/4.patch — also I’ve attached the 
fixed patch.

-Jay


On Feb 20, 2015, at 4:18 PM, Jay Faulkner mailto:j...@jvf.cc>> 
wrote:

Hi all,

At the suggestion (and with the assistance of) a co-worker, we remade this 
patch to not have quite as much repeated code. The new version is attached and 
can be found here https://github.com/jayofdoom/systemd/pull/4.patch — thanks!

Thanks,
Jay Faulkner
On Feb 20, 2015, at 2:24 PM, Jay Faulkner mailto:j...@jvf.cc>> 
wrote:

Hi all,

Two weeks ago[1] I patched systemd-nspawn to respect CAP_SYS_MODULE with 
regards to setting seccomp filters. As I needed access to some of the other 
blocked syscalls as well, I have a patch to map all seccomp filters to various 
capabilities, and to only set those filters if the matching capability is 
dropped. The matching capabilities were taken from the man pages of the 
syscalls involved.

I’d also suggest that in the future, additional filters use this same mapping 
as to avoid breaking use cases like mine in the future. :)

The patch is attached, but in case it gets mangled in transport as the last one 
did, feel free to get it directly from github here:  
https://github.com/jayofdoom/systemd/pull/3.patch.

Thanks,
Jay Faulkner

___
systemd-devel mailing list
systemd-devel@lists.freedesktop.org<mailto:systemd-devel@lists.freedesktop.org>
http://lists.freedesktop.org/mailman/listinfo/systemd-devel

___
systemd-devel mailing list
systemd-devel@lists.freedesktop.org<mailto:systemd-devel@lists.freedesktop.org>
http://lists.freedesktop.org/mailman/listinfo/systemd-devel

___
systemd-devel mailing list
systemd-devel@lists.freedesktop.org<mailto:systemd-devel@lists.freedesktop.org>
http://lists.freedesktop.org/mailman/listinfo/systemd-devel

___
systemd-devel mailing list
systemd-devel@lists.freedesktop.org
http://lists.freedesktop.org/mailman/listinfo/systemd-devel


Re: [systemd-devel] [PATCH] refactored Re: [PATCH] nspawn: Map all seccomp filters to matching capabilities

2015-02-20 Thread Jay Faulkner
After some additional testing, I found a bug in this patch where it would not 
compile with seccomp disabled. I’ve updated the patch at 
https://github.com/jayofdoom/systemd/pull/4.patch — also I’ve attached the 
fixed patch.

-Jay


refactor-nspawn-map-seccomp-to-capabilities.patch
Description: refactor-nspawn-map-seccomp-to-capabilities.patch
On Feb 20, 2015, at 4:18 PM, Jay Faulkner <j...@jvf.cc> wrote:



Hi all,


At the suggestion (and with the assistance of) a co-worker, we remade this patch to not have quite as much repeated code. The new version is attached and can be found here https://github.com/jayofdoom/systemd/pull/4.patch —
 thanks!



Thanks,Jay FaulknerOn Feb 20, 2015, at 2:24 PM, Jay Faulkner <j...@jvf.cc> wrote:



Hi all,


Two weeks ago[1] I patched systemd-nspawn to respect CAP_SYS_MODULE with regards to setting seccomp filters. As I needed access to some of the other blocked syscalls as well, I have a patch to map all seccomp filters to various capabilities, and
 to only set those filters if the matching capability is dropped. The matching capabilities were taken from the man pages of the syscalls involved.


I’d also suggest that in the future, additional filters use this same mapping as to avoid breaking use cases like mine in the future. :)


The patch is attached, but in case it gets mangled in transport as the last one did, feel free to get it directly from github here:  https://github.com/jayofdoom/systemd/pull/3.patch.


Thanks,
Jay Faulkner



___systemd-devel mailing listsystemd-devel@lists.freedesktop.orghttp://lists.freedesktop.org/mailman/listinfo/systemd-devel___systemd-devel mailing listsystemd-devel@lists.freedesktop.orghttp://lists.freedesktop.org/mailman/listinfo/systemd-devel___
systemd-devel mailing list
systemd-devel@lists.freedesktop.org
http://lists.freedesktop.org/mailman/listinfo/systemd-devel


[systemd-devel] [PATCH] refactored Re: [PATCH] nspawn: Map all seccomp filters to matching capabilities

2015-02-20 Thread Jay Faulkner
Hi all,

At the suggestion (and with the assistance of) a co-worker, we remade this 
patch to not have quite as much repeated code. The new version is attached and 
can be found here https://github.com/jayofdoom/systemd/pull/4.patch — thanks!


refactor-nspawn-map-seccomp-to-capabilities.patch
Description: refactor-nspawn-map-seccomp-to-capabilities.patch
Thanks,Jay FaulknerOn Feb 20, 2015, at 2:24 PM, Jay Faulkner <j...@jvf.cc> wrote:



Hi all,


Two weeks ago[1] I patched systemd-nspawn to respect CAP_SYS_MODULE with regards to setting seccomp filters. As I needed access to some of the other blocked syscalls as well, I have a patch to map all seccomp filters to various capabilities, and
 to only set those filters if the matching capability is dropped. The matching capabilities were taken from the man pages of the syscalls involved.


I’d also suggest that in the future, additional filters use this same mapping as to avoid breaking use cases like mine in the future. :)


The patch is attached, but in case it gets mangled in transport as the last one did, feel free to get it directly from github here:  https://github.com/jayofdoom/systemd/pull/3.patch.


Thanks,
Jay Faulkner



___systemd-devel mailing listsystemd-devel@lists.freedesktop.orghttp://lists.freedesktop.org/mailman/listinfo/systemd-devel___
systemd-devel mailing list
systemd-devel@lists.freedesktop.org
http://lists.freedesktop.org/mailman/listinfo/systemd-devel


[systemd-devel] [PATCH] nspawn: Map all seccomp filters to matching capabilities

2015-02-20 Thread Jay Faulkner
Hi all,

Two weeks ago[1] I patched systemd-nspawn to respect CAP_SYS_MODULE with 
regards to setting seccomp filters. As I needed access to some of the other 
blocked syscalls as well, I have a patch to map all seccomp filters to various 
capabilities, and to only set those filters if the matching capability is 
dropped. The matching capabilities were taken from the man pages of the 
syscalls involved.

I’d also suggest that in the future, additional filters use this same mapping 
as to avoid breaking use cases like mine in the future. :)

The patch is attached, but in case it gets mangled in transport as the last one 
did, feel free to get it directly from github here:  
https://github.com/jayofdoom/systemd/pull/3.patch.

Thanks,
Jay Faulkner


nspawn-map-seccomp-to-capabilities.patch
Description: nspawn-map-seccomp-to-capabilities.patch
___
systemd-devel mailing list
systemd-devel@lists.freedesktop.org
http://lists.freedesktop.org/mailman/listinfo/systemd-devel


Re: [systemd-devel] [PATCH] Make seccomp protections in systemd-nspawn optional

2015-02-03 Thread Jay Faulkner

> On Feb 3, 2015, at 3:52 PM, Lennart Poettering  wrote:
> 
> On Tue, 03.02.15 23:22, Jay Faulkner (j...@jvf.cc) wrote:
> 
>> Hi all,
>> 
>> As I posted last week, a change merged a while ago to systemd-nspawn
>> adding seccomp protections with no ability to enable/disable broke
>> the Ironic Python Agent ramdisk which utilizes CoreOS and
>> systemd. The attached patch makes the behavior optional, with it
>> defaulting to disabled. I did this for two reasons; the first being
>> that my (and other consumers of OpenStack Ironic) use case was
>> broken, as would anyone else using spawn in this
>> manner. Additionally, seccomp filters can be configured specifically
>> as desired in the unit file.
> 
> This was about allowing kernel module loading from inside nspawn
> containers?
> 

Yes, exactly.

> I completely missed that we actually really have seccomp filters to
> disallow that in place... We hence have two layers of security there
> to turn off kernel module loading: seccomp and the missing
> CAP_SYS_MODULE capability.
> 

As I discovered looking through the code; setting capability=all
prevents *any* capabilities from being dropped, which means I was covered
on this until the change was merged to add seccomp support.

> I am not particularly fond of the idea of adding a completely new
> command line option for this though. Maybe we can find another way for
> this.
> 
> For example, one option could be to split the seccomp syscall
> blacklist in two: split out the kernel kmod related syscalls, and
> only add them to the seccomp filter if arg_retain does not include
> CAP_SYS_MODULE. This would then leave the module seccomp filters in
> place by default, however, if you add the CAP_SYS_MODULE cap to the
> container with --capability= then the seccomp filter is changed to
> also allow the module loading sys calls.

I implemented this; the patch can be pulled directly from
https://github.com/jayofdoom/systemd/pull/2.patch to prevent me from
corrupting this along the way.

As a note; unlike what we discussed in IRC, someone passing capability=all
will be covered for module loading in this situation, because all sets the
bitmask to -1, effectively enabling all capabilities.

Thanks,
Jay Faulkner

> The patch is corrupted, it includes Windows new lines. 
> 
> If you rework the patch as suggested above, and send it as uncorrupted
> patch, I'd be happy to merge it.
> 
> Lennart
> 
> -- 
> Lennart Poettering, Red Hat

___
systemd-devel mailing list
systemd-devel@lists.freedesktop.org
http://lists.freedesktop.org/mailman/listinfo/systemd-devel


[systemd-devel] [PATCH] Make seccomp protections in systemd-nspawn optional

2015-02-03 Thread Jay Faulkner
Hi all,

As I posted last week, a change merged a while ago to systemd-nspawn adding 
seccomp protections with no ability to enable/disable broke the Ironic Python 
Agent ramdisk which utilizes CoreOS and systemd. The attached patch makes the 
behavior optional, with it defaulting to disabled. I did this for two reasons; 
the first being that my (and other consumers of OpenStack Ironic) use case was 
broken, as would anyone else using spawn in this manner. Additionally, seccomp 
filters can be configured specifically as desired in the unit file. 

I appreciate your time and effort in getting this patch merged, so I’ll be able 
to upgrade and consume a newer systemd.

Thanks,
Jay Faulkner





systemd-nspawn-seccomp-default-disable.patch
Description: systemd-nspawn-seccomp-default-disable.patch
___
systemd-devel mailing list
systemd-devel@lists.freedesktop.org
http://lists.freedesktop.org/mailman/listinfo/systemd-devel


[systemd-devel] systemd-nspawn support for loading kernel modules / custom seccomp rules

2015-01-29 Thread Jay Faulkner
Hi all,

I’m a big fan of systemd, and currently use IPA[1] running inside 
systemd-nspawn containers to provision and maintain systems as part of 
OpenStack Ironic. This includes, at times, doing things like flashing firmwares 
which may require a kernel module to be loaded.

Currently, we’re using CoreOS 367.0.0 with 3.15.2 kernel and systemd 212. 
Recently, I attempted an upgrade to CoreOS 575.0.0 with kernel 3.18.2 and 
systemd 218 and found I could no longer load kernel modules from inside an 
nspawn container. This appears to be related to some seccomp filters 
added/enabled in systemd 215.

Is it possible to have a switch added to systemd-nspawn to allow me to specify 
custom seccomp filters, or to disable them entirely? The only alternative to 
this for my use case is to not use containers at all or to preload all modules 
needed before launching my container. The 1st option doesn’t work well because 
CoreOS doesn’t ship with sufficient OS resources to run IPA inside it, and the 
second is not reasonable because the same IPA ramdisk is used across many nodes 
on a fleet, which may have different hardware and therefore different modules 
are required to perform things like BIOS flashing.


Thanks in advance,
Jay Faulkner

[1] https://github.com/openstack/ironic-python-agent; relevent nspawn flags 
here: 
https://github.com/openstack/ironic-python-agent/blob/master/imagebuild/coreos/oem/cloud-config.yml#L40

___
systemd-devel mailing list
systemd-devel@lists.freedesktop.org
http://lists.freedesktop.org/mailman/listinfo/systemd-devel