09/10/13 22:01, irregula...@riseup.net wrote:
> On 10/09/2013 07:32 PM, anonym wrote:
>>
>> ## Using Tails at home
>>
>> First, note that the user's relation (owner, family member's,
>> friend's, work's, borrowed, etc.) to the computer running Tails
>> doesn't matter; the location is already directly related to the user's
>> identity. Similarly, because of this, MAC spoofing is of very limited
>> value for both AvoidTracking and AvoidIdTails value.
>>
>> MAC spoofing could hinder AvoidSuspicion if detected by the ISP's
>> hardware (i.e. no trusted router in the way). Similarly, ISP-provided
>> hardware may employ some sort of MAC address white-listing (e.g. only
>> X unique ones are allowed) that can prevent AvoidConnectionProbs.
>>
>> Summary: MAC spoofing should be avoided but isn't terribly dangerous
>> if enabled.
>>
>
> That's a very thorough and interesting analysis on changing mac address,
> thanks.
>
> I want to argue on "MAC spoofing should be avoided but isn't terribly
> dangerous if enabled." when using Tails at home. I wouldn't say that
> AvoidIdTails is negligible.
The real solution for AvoidIdTails would be to hide the use of Tor
completely, e.g. by using obfsproxy. Also, see the "No mention of
AvoidIdTails as motivation?" section. Despite us having this user goal,
the real motivation for MAC spoofing is AvoidTracking.
However, I don't think AvoidIdTails is what you're really talking about
below.
> As you correctly write spoofing MAC could raise suspicion. On the other
> hand, if user is under surveillance for whatever reason, and an
> adversary's goal is to link the user to a certain internet persona, for
> example a nickname in an IRC room. Adversary is monitoring user's local
> router and correlates the following :
>
> - a MAC address connects to the router
> - that PC starts using Tor
> - a certain nickname shows up in the IRC room
>
> After a period of time that the adversary monitors the above events and
> seeks for correlation, is able to be certain that user is the one using
> that nickname.
This isn't really what AdvGoalIdTails and the corresponding Tails user
mitigation goal, AvoidIdTails, is about. It's more akin to
AdvGoalTracking, with a twist of traffic-confirmation, which is outside
of Tor's threat model, and hence Tails'. The adversary has used
traffic-confirmation to establish that the traffic of interest
originates from some known location, and what remains is to either prove
that a suspect user is at that location at the time, and also to
identify the user in case s/he is unknown. However, since the "known
location" is the users *home*, we lose.
> All the adversary has to do now, is prove that the MAC address is owned
> from that user.
>
> Of course if adversary is constantly monitoring user's connections and
> router, will be alarmed when a random MAC will appear. Nevertheless that
> MAC does not provably belong to the user.
This seems like wishful thinking to me (I certainly wish it to be true!
:)). Isn't the connection between a home Internet connection and the
residents of that home too strong to yield that kind of plausible
deniability?
> Interestingly a similar case is described in Hammond Jeremy's complaint,
> page 29 [1], when FBI agents used wireless traffic sniffing, MAC address
> logging to correlate Hammond to a certain persona.
I had a quick look, and I suspect the MAC address stuff was what they
used to single out Hammond's traffic from any other they happen to sniff
over wireless. Could it also have been necessary for their pen/trap
court order? Even if so I imagine there are several other ways they
could have gotten one even if Hammond employed MAC spoofing.
I think we have to assume that no matter what we do, we're screwed if
we're victims of targeted surveillance. What Tails can help with is the
*technical side* of not getting there in the first place. Hammond seems
to have put himself there through due to a weak security culture.
Cheers!
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