Re: [Tails-dev] Fwd: [tor-qa] Reminder about html5demos.com
sajol...@pimienta.org wrote (27 Mar 2014 15:00:45 GMT) : > I'm not sure to understand what you mean. I couldn't find any reference > to html5demos.com in our Git repo... Sorry, I was clearly too scarse. I meant that we could use the same HTML5 tests as the TBB folks, instead of maintaining a different list on our own. Cheers, -- intrigeri | GnuPG key @ https://gaffer.ptitcanardnoir.org/intrigeri/intrigeri.asc | OTR fingerprint @ https://gaffer.ptitcanardnoir.org/intrigeri/otr.asc ___ Tails-dev mailing list Tails-dev@boum.org https://mailman.boum.org/listinfo/tails-dev To unsubscribe from this list, send an empty email to tails-dev-unsubscr...@boum.org.
Re: [Tails-dev] Fwd: [tor-qa] Reminder about html5demos.com
intrigeri: > This probably impacts our test suite. I'm not sure to understand what you mean. I couldn't find any reference to html5demos.com in our Git repo... -- sajolida signature.asc Description: OpenPGP digital signature ___ Tails-dev mailing list Tails-dev@boum.org https://mailman.boum.org/listinfo/tails-dev To unsubscribe from this list, send an empty email to tails-dev-unsubscr...@boum.org.
Re: [Tails-dev] Please review'n'merge doc/6182-contribute-how-sysadmin
intrigeri: > intrigeri wrote (15 Mar 2014 13:47:57 GMT) : >> branch: doc/6182-contribute-how-sysadmin >> ticket: https://labs.riseup.net/code/issues/6182 > >> Should I go ahead and publish it, or does someone want to have >> a look first? > > A week later, I've merged it. Comments and improvements are still > welcome :) I'm sorry I didn't find the time to review that earlier. I just had a look and it looks great. I pushed a few minor with commit 096daf3. Can't push it no because I can't reach webmasters.boum.org (no ping). -- sajolida signature.asc Description: OpenPGP digital signature ___ Tails-dev mailing list Tails-dev@boum.org https://mailman.boum.org/listinfo/tails-dev To unsubscribe from this list, send an empty email to tails-dev-unsubscr...@boum.org.
Re: [Tails-dev] Testing EHLO messages: simplification proposal
Alan: > Hi everybody, > > During Tails release process we test various aspects the candidate ISO: > https://tails.boum.org/contribute/release_process/test/ > > For claws mail, one of these tests is: > > * Check that the profile works and is torified (specifically the > EHLO/HELO SMTP messages it sends): > > 1. Send an email using Claws and a non-anonymizing SMTP relay. > 2. Then check that email's headers once received, especially the > Received: and Message-ID: ones. > > But the next one is: > > * Also check that the EHLO/HELO SMTP message is not leaking anything > with a packet sniffer: > 1. start Claws using the panel icon. > 1. Disable SSL/TLS for SMTP in Claws (so take precautions for not > leaking your password in plaintext by either changing it > temporarily or using a disposable account). > 2. Run `sudo tcpdump -n -i lo -w dump` to capture the packets > before Tor encrypts it, then close tcpdump, and check the dump > for the HELO/EHLO message and verify that it only contains > `localhost`. > > I don't see what the first of these tests would check that is not also > checked by the second. In addition, it's not easy to access a > "non-anonymizing SMTP relay" through Tor. > > I suggest we remove the 1st of these tests. What do you think? I agree with your proposal. Furthermore, "non-anonymizing SMTP relay" is badly defined. -- sajolida signature.asc Description: OpenPGP digital signature ___ Tails-dev mailing list Tails-dev@boum.org https://mailman.boum.org/listinfo/tails-dev To unsubscribe from this list, send an empty email to tails-dev-unsubscr...@boum.org.
Re: [Tails-dev] Feedback wanted on planned implementation of Feature #5301 - Clone or Backup Persistent Volume
CustaiCo: > I am interested in working on getting https://labs.riseup.net/code/issues/5301 > "Clone or Backup Persistent Volume" implemented. Thanks a lot for starting that discussion and sorry for the delay. This would definitely be a nice feature to have but the people in the core team, we won't have time to work on that ourselves. So it would be amazing if you could help. > My current process is to just > make an encrypted tarball as root while offline, but that's a real pain > because there are lots of times I want to get a backup of something important > (like a new key) as quick as possible as to prevent loss, and I don't want to > be enabling root all the time just to make backups. We also documented a manual procedure here: https://tails.boum.org/doc/first_steps/persistence/copy/ But yes, that's quite painful. > I'm wondering if my plan would be considered insecure under the current threat > model, however. I was thinking about adding new steps into > tails-persistence-setup for backing up the tails persistence partition into an > encrypted tarball, and then another one for restoring persistence from a prior > backup. > > The backup step would ensure that persistence has been enabled and mounted, > and then go into /live/persistence/TailsData_unlocked/ then run something that > would be the equivalent of something like this > > tar cjf - . | gpg --cipher-algo AES -c - > > /home/amnesia/-MM-DD-backup.tbz2.gpg Here the user should be prompted about where to save the backup. Because there might not be enough RAM on the computer to handle that, so they might prefer to write that file directly in some other place, like an external hard drive or USB stick. > then test it with something that does something like this > > cat /home/amnesia/-MM-DD-backup.tbz2.gpg | gpg - | tar djf - > > If that gives outputs anything, we give some sort of abort/retry/fail message > to the user. If all goes well, then the user has a file they can back up > with a secure method. I'm also wondering whether it would be worth to ask the user which folders of the persistence setup to backup. But maybe that's not needed for a first prototype, as we might assume that the info in persistence is kept to the minimum. And also, do you think we should treat differently the data in persistence that is not so personal, like APT lists and APT packages. Those might compress pretty badly and occupy space for nothing in the backups. > The restore step would do the current delete partition steps (if there was > already a persistence partition found), then most of the current steps to > create a partition, but instead of asking the user what they want to use > their > new partition for, it would instead ask the user to pick an encrypted backup > file and would untar it into the directory that the partition was mounted > for initialization. Ack. > Does anything look bad with this plan? And what are your plans regarding the menus entries proposed to the user? For the moment we have: └── Applications └── Tails ├── Configure persistent volume └── Delete persistent volume Maybe that could go all together in another entry, say "Backup and restore persistent volume"? -- sajolida signature.asc Description: OpenPGP digital signature ___ Tails-dev mailing list Tails-dev@boum.org https://mailman.boum.org/listinfo/tails-dev To unsubscribe from this list, send an empty email to tails-dev-unsubscr...@boum.org.
[Tails-dev] Tails logo contest
Hello, I recently sent you an email via MailTor, but the service does not work now, so not sure if you got it, so sent again here to be sure. I have been discovering your Tails logo contest a few days ago only, so I did not have much time to come with something more elaborated, but here are samples so that you get the idea. Took into account your tips: coming with something original yet reminding its origin: swirl of Debian in cat's body, cat's body also reminds onion's shape as well as his 3 tails..., etc. There are 55 logos and banners, like this : http://pixs.ru/showimage/Tails042jp_1856699_11398699.jpg no time to upload them one by one, you can get them safely (even through Tor, no javascript, etc.) here http://upfile.mobi/422737 I could possibly rework on that, but don't have much free time for the moment (and not often online, so be patient if ever you need a reply, thanks). Cheers ! ___ Tails-dev mailing list Tails-dev@boum.org https://mailman.boum.org/listinfo/tails-dev To unsubscribe from this list, send an empty email to tails-dev-unsubscr...@boum.org.
