Re: [Tails-dev] [review'n'merge:1.2.2] liveusb-creator:bugfix/8353-update-status-when-device-appears
On 01/12/14 20:05, intrigeri wrote: Hi, I've had this usability issue on my personal todo list for (at least) months, along with a tentative patch. Now properly tested (by live-patching the code in a running Tails 1.2), so here we go = candidate for 1.2.2. I've described the steps to reproduce on the ticket. Merged! Part of liveusb-creator 3.11.6+tails1-14. Cheers! ___ Tails-dev mailing list Tails-dev@boum.org https://mailman.boum.org/listinfo/tails-dev To unsubscribe from this list, send an empty email to tails-dev-unsubscr...@boum.org.
[Tails-dev] Build failed in Jenkins: build_Tails_ISO_experimental #1574
See https://jenkins.tails.boum.org/job/build_Tails_ISO_experimental/1574/ -- Started by an SCM change Started by an SCM change Building remotely on isobuilder2 in workspace https://jenkins.tails.boum.org/job/build_Tails_ISO_experimental/ws/ Deleting project workspace... done [build_Tails_ISO_experimental] $ /bin/sh -xe /tmp/hudson9107276634886435147.sh + TAILS_RAM_BUILD=yes TAILS_CLEAN_BUILD=yes TAILS_BOOTSTRAP_CACHE= http_proxy=http://apt-proxy.lizard:3142 sh -x ./vagrant/provision/assets/build-tails sh: 0: Can't open ./vagrant/provision/assets/build-tails Build step 'Execute shell' marked build as failure ___ Tails-dev mailing list Tails-dev@boum.org https://mailman.boum.org/listinfo/tails-dev To unsubscribe from this list, send an empty email to tails-dev-unsubscr...@boum.org.
Re: [Tails-dev] [review'n'merge:1.2.3] #8404 -- bugfix/handle-website-CA-change
On 06/01/15 11:13, intrigeri wrote: hi, * bugfix/handle-website-CA-change branch in main Git repo now creates the CA bundle without the CA that signed the old certificate, and names the bundle file in a more generic way * bugfix/handle-website-CA-change in the IUK Git repo has the changes needed to adjust to the above change * bugfix/handle-website-CA-change branch in main Git repo updates the security check script to use the new CA bundle (which actually isn't very useful, see #8536, but still) For testing purposes, the changes from the IUK repo were imported into the main one as a chroot_local-patch, which needs to be removed once a new version of tails-iuk is released and uploaded. Merged in both Tails' main Git, and in tails-iuk's. Part of tails-iuk 1.18. Cheers! ___ Tails-dev mailing list Tails-dev@boum.org https://mailman.boum.org/listinfo/tails-dev To unsubscribe from this list, send an empty email to tails-dev-unsubscr...@boum.org.
[Tails-dev] test question
Dear tails-dev: I am fine with not knowing who you are. . .stay anonymous. I am here if you feel that I can somehow contribute to developing the windows appearance. I have used early versions (iceweasel browser) as well as the current (which I feel does not have as good of a windows appearance). Sincerely, -- Joe Spicha, B.Sc. P.O. Box 7823 msla, mt 59807-7823 ___ Tails-dev mailing list Tails-dev@boum.org https://mailman.boum.org/listinfo/tails-dev To unsubscribe from this list, send an empty email to tails-dev-unsubscr...@boum.org.
[Tails-dev] New mail address
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- Hash: SHA1 Hi to all, this is my new mail address (moved from t...@dominik-pilatzki.de). I am also able to speak GPG now. My public key can be found on the regular keyservers, my fingerprint is: 179E 23A5 4D25 CF05 FC5F A67A C914 7FC5 687A 380F. Cheers, spriver -BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE- Version: GnuPG v1.4.12 (GNU/Linux) iQIcBAEBAgAGBQJUtXpwAAoJEMkUf8VoejgPmtcP/05/ONjdeGf2ucSJtDcovxQg W13VK6ldfhPVml6W1txK4N1dZ/rmeWiIxbVbT7P84hKTT8X8xOf9KqnymXdEF34D 6gV8g0iLfYRr8vGe5KWmk7LE3ggLM9tGpzZm0UDseN7CcO+ChiuXj3j97wx3DT38 DDww9zZDMQi0EkSaMX52Zn361YCCvGCY1XucZkYeavuyfAJ+OdDFLKdKlMCX5g5u sKcHJGHBXScVw0euT47cFfIX+qwb/vQ/jYq0Mh9dwfvu7KntLMM7n4G0Iw2ecO4F 8wUCOX3FY1TxjEGoC3l/2B0g/SpRtVe8Nn5FO0VbO0iHlg6Phv0powqkvMeSP5y/ hDuGq5dZekJi7/Eeo0v7VUggsddjFp9pf7KsCXXdIEmaqMLOc6fMsOrIdM4SAkfB YrUpRCua/ejXwspJzjEx7/HxCYwnBOzTm+swgO27OnYh5Z6cQzdEEMAIFl9WxxEl ZDKcVlaGdUZRmg3YcU77JlmJGWcHBJt+trMnWwzhkJAIm1okYNzfmNGKtbieEd/D ivOOzE92UNqp/l+FlbN5J2gez5MSDDUajCYGQR4437IUe4OI+XgLop8ziNa3gS03 DcUbntEX3dIqhQvn9IF/em3j+w6wGS/4BVK608RbJyPhhHjzLM1/pC6JEy+8fFzs eGEtvbqEyL3W3A9kNTyt =79Gl -END PGP SIGNATURE- ___ Tails-dev mailing list Tails-dev@boum.org https://mailman.boum.org/listinfo/tails-dev To unsubscribe from this list, send an empty email to tails-dev-unsubscr...@boum.org.
[Tails-dev] Question for administrator... WHAT process keeps FBI/CIA/NSA/others from volunteering and getting inside the organization?
OR, worse scenario, they already are and are the owners of the TAILS process, and have total ability to capture all data? Just a concern that all participants need to be informed of THANK YOU ! *-Ernie* * (864) 610-8021Greenville, SC USA* ___ Tails-dev mailing list Tails-dev@boum.org https://mailman.boum.org/listinfo/tails-dev To unsubscribe from this list, send an empty email to tails-dev-unsubscr...@boum.org.
Re: [Tails-dev] [review'n'merge: 1.2.3] bugfix/8571-fix-mac-spoof-panic-mode
anonym wrote (11 Jan 2015 12:58:57 GMT) :
With commit 8156352 the notification was shown 10 out of 10 times, which
seems like an improvement. :)
I've seen it fail to show up, but indeed it seems better.
Merged, tested the 4 combinations of:
* macchanger = /bin/{true,false}
* Tails 1.2.2, stable + your branch
... and got the expected results in all cases. Congrats!
Before testing, I've added commit
23ac1e0367514b7b81bb971069c4a0647c1e86dc on top, that anonym
has ACK'ed.
Cheers!
--
intrigeri
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[Tails-dev] Build failed in Jenkins: build_Tails_ISO_stable #169
See https://jenkins.tails.boum.org/job/build_Tails_ISO_stable/169/changes Changes: [amnesia] Do not exit upon macchanger error. [amnesia] Fail safe by entering panic mode if macchanger exits with an error. [amnesia] Wait for notification-daemon to run before showing notifications. [amnesia] Log that we're going to step NM before trying to do it. -- [...truncated 11611 lines...] Adding debian:NetLock_Qualified_=Class_QA=_Root.pem Adding debian:NetLock_Notary_=Class_A=_Root.pem Adding debian:NetLock_Express_=Class_C=_Root.pem Adding debian:NetLock_Business_=Class_B=_Root.pem Adding debian:NetLock_Arany_=Class_Gold=_Főtanúsítvány.pem Adding debian:Microsec_e-Szigno_Root_CA_2009.pem Adding debian:Microsec_e-Szigno_Root_CA.pem Adding debian:Juur-SK.pem Adding debian:Izenpe.com.pem Adding debian:IGC_A.pem Adding debian:Hongkong_Post_Root_CA_1.pem Adding debian:Hellenic_Academic_and_Research_Institutions_RootCA_2011.pem Adding debian:Go_Daddy_Root_Certificate_Authority_-_G2.pem Adding debian:Go_Daddy_Class_2_CA.pem Adding debian:Global_Chambersign_Root_-_2008.pem Adding debian:GlobalSign_Root_CA_-_R3.pem Adding debian:GlobalSign_Root_CA_-_R2.pem Adding debian:GlobalSign_Root_CA.pem Adding debian:GeoTrust_Universal_CA_2.pem Adding debian:GeoTrust_Universal_CA.pem Adding debian:GeoTrust_Primary_Certification_Authority_-_G3.pem Adding debian:GeoTrust_Primary_Certification_Authority_-_G2.pem Adding debian:GeoTrust_Primary_Certification_Authority.pem Adding debian:GeoTrust_Global_CA_2.pem Adding debian:GeoTrust_Global_CA.pem Adding debian:GTE_CyberTrust_Global_Root.pem Adding debian:Equifax_Secure_eBusiness_CA_1.pem Adding debian:Equifax_Secure_Global_eBusiness_CA.pem Adding debian:Equifax_Secure_CA.pem Adding debian:Entrust_Root_Certification_Authority.pem Adding debian:Entrust.net_Secure_Server_CA.pem Adding debian:Entrust.net_Premium_2048_Secure_Server_CA.pem Adding debian:EE_Certification_Centre_Root_CA.pem Adding debian:EC-ACC.pem Adding debian:EBG_Elektronik_Sertifika_Hizmet_Sağlayıcısı.pem Adding debian:E-Tugra_Certification_Authority.pem Adding debian:E-Guven_Kok_Elektronik_Sertifika_Hizmet_Saglayicisi.pem Adding debian:Digital_Signature_Trust_Co._Global_CA_3.pem Adding debian:Digital_Signature_Trust_Co._Global_CA_1.pem Adding debian:DigiCert_High_Assurance_EV_Root_CA.pem Adding debian:DigiCert_Global_Root_CA.pem Adding debian:DigiCert_Assured_ID_Root_CA.pem Adding debian:Deutsche_Telekom_Root_CA_2.pem Adding debian:DST_Root_CA_X3.pem Adding debian:DST_ACES_CA_X6.pem Adding debian:D-TRUST_Root_Class_3_CA_2_EV_2009.pem Adding debian:D-TRUST_Root_Class_3_CA_2_2009.pem Adding debian:Cybertrust_Global_Root.pem Adding debian:Comodo_Trusted_Services_root.pem Adding debian:Comodo_Secure_Services_root.pem Adding debian:Comodo_AAA_Services_root.pem Adding debian:ComSign_Secured_CA.pem Adding debian:ComSign_CA.pem Adding debian:China_Internet_Network_Information_Center_EV_Certificates_Root.pem Adding debian:Chambers_of_Commerce_Root_-_2008.pem Adding debian:Certum_Trusted_Network_CA.pem Adding debian:Certum_Root_CA.pem Adding debian:Certplus_Class_2_Primary_CA.pem Adding debian:Certinomis_-_Autorité_Racine.pem Adding debian:Certigna.pem Adding debian:Camerfirma_Global_Chambersign_Root.pem Adding debian:Camerfirma_Chambers_of_Commerce_Root.pem Adding debian:COMODO_ECC_Certification_Authority.pem Adding debian:COMODO_Certification_Authority.pem Adding debian:CNNIC_ROOT.pem Adding debian:CA_Disig_Root_R2.pem Adding debian:CA_Disig_Root_R1.pem Adding debian:CA_Disig.pem Adding debian:Buypass_Class_3_Root_CA.pem Adding debian:Buypass_Class_3_CA_1.pem Adding debian:Buypass_Class_2_Root_CA.pem Adding debian:Buypass_Class_2_CA_1.pem Adding debian:Baltimore_CyberTrust_Root.pem Adding debian:Autoridad_de_Certificacion_Firmaprofesional_CIF_A62634068.pem Adding debian:Atos_TrustedRoot_2011.pem Adding debian:ApplicationCA_-_Japanese_Government.pem Adding debian:America_Online_Root_Certification_Authority_2.pem Adding debian:America_Online_Root_Certification_Authority_1.pem Adding debian:AffirmTrust_Premium_ECC.pem Adding debian:AffirmTrust_Premium.pem Adding debian:AffirmTrust_Networking.pem Adding debian:AffirmTrust_Commercial.pem Adding debian:AddTrust_Qualified_Certificates_Root.pem Adding debian:AddTrust_Public_Services_Root.pem Adding debian:AddTrust_Low-Value_Services_Root.pem Adding debian:AddTrust_External_Root.pem Adding debian:Actalis_Authentication_Root_CA.pem Adding debian:AC_Raíz_Certicámara_S.A..pem Adding debian:ACEDICOM_Root.pem Adding debian:ACCVRAIZ1.pem Adding debian:A-Trust-nQual-03.pem Adding debian:ca.pem Adding debian:cacert.org.pem done. Setting up libreoffice-base-core (1:3.5.4+dfsg2-0+deb7u2) ... Setting up libreoffice-calc (1:3.5.4+dfsg2-0+deb7u2) ... Setting up libreoffice-draw (1:3.5.4+dfsg2-0+deb7u2) ... Setting up libreoffice-gtk (1:3.5.4+dfsg2-0+deb7u2) ... Setting up libreoffice-gnome (1:3.5.4+dfsg2-0+deb7u2) ... Setting up libreoffice-impress
Re: [Tails-dev] Question for administrator... WHAT process keeps FBI/CIA/NSA/others from volunteering and getting inside the organization?
Mike Rising wrote (13 Jan 2015 14:44:25 GMT) : OR, worse scenario, they already are and are the owners of the TAILS process, and have total ability to capture all data? Just a concern that all participants need to be informed of THANK YOU ! Nothing prevents adversaries to contribute to Tails. Let's not assume that all Tails contributors have the same goals and adversaries anyway. However: the review and QA processes we have, that are primarily meant to catch human errors, should work just as fine to catch problems that someone would try to introduce intentionally. Cheers, -- intrigeri ___ Tails-dev mailing list Tails-dev@boum.org https://mailman.boum.org/listinfo/tails-dev To unsubscribe from this list, send an empty email to tails-dev-unsubscr...@boum.org.
Re: [Tails-dev] [review'n'merge:1.2.2] bugfix/6538-Tails-Installer-tries-to-install-to-too-small-devices
Alan wrote (12 Jan 2015 12:10:35 GMT) : I reviewed the new patch but had a few concerns with it. Please have a look at https://labs.riseup.net/code/issues/6538 Ok I have made the required changes. Thanks! I'm not sure to have time to take care of that in the next few days thought. If someone else feels like it, don't hesitate. Done, review posted on Redmine = postponed to 1.3. Cheers, -- intrigeri ___ Tails-dev mailing list Tails-dev@boum.org https://mailman.boum.org/listinfo/tails-dev To unsubscribe from this list, send an empty email to tails-dev-unsubscr...@boum.org.
[Tails-dev] Jenkins build is back to normal : build_Tails_ISO_stable #170
See https://jenkins.tails.boum.org/job/build_Tails_ISO_stable/170/changes ___ Tails-dev mailing list Tails-dev@boum.org https://mailman.boum.org/listinfo/tails-dev To unsubscribe from this list, send an empty email to tails-dev-unsubscr...@boum.org.
Re: [Tails-dev] [review'n'merge:1.2.1] bugfix/7678-Tails-Installer-crashes-on-upgrade
Hi, this branch was obviously not tested in its proposed form, as it breaks at least the Clone and upgrade feature that it's supposed to improve = postponed to Tails 1.3. See details on Redmine. Cheers, -- intrigeri ___ Tails-dev mailing list Tails-dev@boum.org https://mailman.boum.org/listinfo/tails-dev To unsubscribe from this list, send an empty email to tails-dev-unsubscr...@boum.org.
Re: [Tails-dev] Shared screen locking solution for live distributions in Debian
On 01/12/2015 03:58 PM, Klaus Knopper wrote: Also, screen locking makes only sense if there is the apparent possibility that someone else has physical access to the computer while the user is not paying attention. Why would I lock the screen if I'm the only one using the computer in a safe environment, and shut it down and remove the live medium when I'm done with my work. I outlined some reasons for it here [1], but TL;DR is so you can step out of your office for a minute to refill your cup of coffee without having to close all your work, tell everyone you're chatting with that you'll brb, shut down your computer, and then boot it up again to get back to work. [1] https://labs.riseup.net/code/issues/5684#note-11 -- Micah Lee ___ Tails-dev mailing list Tails-dev@boum.org https://mailman.boum.org/listinfo/tails-dev To unsubscribe from this list, send an empty email to tails-dev-unsubscr...@boum.org.
Re: [Tails-dev] Shared screen locking solution for live distributions in Debian
Hello Sajolida, On Wed, Dec 31, 2014 at 02:03:15PM +, sajolida wrote: Hi, I'm part of the people working on Tails, a live distribution that aims at preserving privacy and anonymity: https://tails.boum.org/. Tails is currently lacking a screen locker and this has been a frequent feature request. See https://labs.riseup.net/code/issues/5684. For example, as Tails is been adopted more and more by journalists, they want to be able to leave their computer unattended in their office to go to the toilets for a minute and have their screen locked. I'm writing this emails to various Live distributions based on Debian (Knoppix, Grml, Jondo, Kali, Debian Live, and Tanglu). I'm also putting Micah Lee in copy as he has shown particular interest in this feature. I've been investigating the screen locking mechanism of those various Debian based live distributions, and I found out that none of them had a real mechanism to do so. They either: - Do not provide any screen locking mechanism (Knoppix, Grml, Jondo Live). Actually, Knoppix disables/circumvents the standard Debian screen locking mechanism because there is no unlocking possible once the screenlock is active. All passwords are invalid and locked. - Either rely on their default password to unlock the screen (Kali, Tanglu, Debian Live). The purpose of this email is to know whether you would be interested in working on a common Debian package to provide a generic screen locking solution for Debian based live distributions. The core usability issue that we are facing here is the one of the unlocking password. As we are live distributions, there either is no password or a default one. no password in the sense of there is no valid authentication password, i.e. no backdoor. Sometimes, people mean ANY password if they say no password, which is not the case for Knoppix. Again, all passwords are invalid and locked. Still, screen locking only make sense if the user is able to use a custom password. Also, screen locking makes only sense if there is the apparent possibility that someone else has physical access to the computer while the user is not paying attention. Why would I lock the screen if I'm the only one using the computer in a safe environment, and shut it down and remove the live medium when I'm done with my work. As an interesting exception, note that in Jondo Live, the user is prompted for a user password on boot. Knoppix design is not to ask anything from the boot screen till the running graphical desktop, with the possible exception of an encrypted personal overlay. In Tails the user can set up an administration password but this is disabled by default for security reasons so we cannot rely on this for screen locking. During our last monthly meeting we came up with the idea of asking for a custom password *in the process of locking the screen* for the first time. So, when is the right time to lock the screen? Debian does this by default when the computer goes to standby or the notebook lid is closed. In this case, the user will hardly pay attention to a dialog asking for a password. For example, in GNOME, when doing Meta+L for the first time, the user would be prompted to enter a screen locking password, then only the screen would get locked. If she locks the screen again, the same password would be reused. A voluntary screenlock button, asking for a new screenlock (not necessarily a login) password could be worth a try. Regards -Klaus ___ Tails-dev mailing list Tails-dev@boum.org https://mailman.boum.org/listinfo/tails-dev To unsubscribe from this list, send an empty email to tails-dev-unsubscr...@boum.org.
Re: [Tails-dev] [review'n'merge:1.2.2] test/8359-check-po
On 05/12/14 23:32, intrigeri wrote: Hi, in the same vein as #8360, here's now PO checking in our automated test suite, so that we check PO files in other branches than master too. One small commit, only adds stuff to the test suite = candidate for 1.2.2. Merged! Cheers! ___ Tails-dev mailing list Tails-dev@boum.org https://mailman.boum.org/listinfo/tails-dev To unsubscribe from this list, send an empty email to tails-dev-unsubscr...@boum.org.
[Tails-dev] Jenkins build is back to normal : build_Tails_ISO_experimental #1575
See https://jenkins.tails.boum.org/job/build_Tails_ISO_experimental/1575/changes ___ Tails-dev mailing list Tails-dev@boum.org https://mailman.boum.org/listinfo/tails-dev To unsubscribe from this list, send an empty email to tails-dev-unsubscr...@boum.org.
Re: [Tails-dev] [review'n'merge:1.2.1] bugfix/7678-Tails-Installer-crashes-on-upgrade
Hi, this branch was obviously not tested in its proposed form, as it breaks at least the Clone and upgrade feature that it's supposed to improve = postponed to Tails 1.3. See details on Redmine. Sorry for the very dummy error, I tested and it works now. Cheers, Kurono ___ Tails-dev mailing list Tails-dev@boum.org https://mailman.boum.org/listinfo/tails-dev To unsubscribe from this list, send an empty email to tails-dev-unsubscr...@boum.org.
