Re: [T(A)ILS-dev] 0.6~rc3

[tim smy]

Hi

Boot from CD is ok usb also -- slight improvement in security as mentioned 
already

Slight off-topic note in recent road map notes posted on 18-10-2010

"users can also fuck up the firewall configuration"

A possible alternative might be "mess up"?

tim 
 Original-Nachricht 
> Datum: Wed, 20 Oct 2010 19:40:38 +0200
> Von: intrigeri 
> An: "The T\\(A\\)ILS public development discussion list" 
> Betreff: Re: [T(A)ILS-dev] 0.6~rc3

> Hi,
> 
> I've done some testing on my latest builds (unreleased rc4).
> 
> anonym wrote (17 Oct 2010 22:57:41 GMT) :
> > W.r.t. our test suite [0], these are the things I've _NOT_ tested:
> 
> > * tor enforcement: ipv6 (my isp do not support it...)
> 
> mine does, but I won't set it up before releasing 0.6.
> we'll only check the ip6tables rules are applied correctly, it seems.
> 
> > * use of untrusted partitions
> 
> done.
> 
> > * whisperback (but someone seems to have been testing it lately)
> 
> exactly.
> 
> > * monkeysphere
> 
> well, hmm, there is still some work needed for this to be functional,
> so I think we can ignore it for the time being.
> 
> > * boot from CD (but I tried from USB successfully)
> 
> > Every other item has been tested with a satisfactory result.
> 
> :)
> 
> Bye,
> -- 
>   intrigeri 
>   | GnuPG key @ https://gaffer.ptitcanardnoir.org/intrigeri/intrigeri.asc
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[T(A)ILS-dev] some problems

[tim smy]

Hello

no reply from anonym despite many emails, -so what to do--hwew iwe go

trying amnesia 0.6

get the error message everytime on startup in desktop


"ERROR starting Gnome settings daemon  will try to restart next time log on 

also my isp supports IPV6
so in netstat -a I get

tcp6   0  0 localhost:ipp   [::]:*  LISTEN 

also please tell me a simple way to get 0.6 on a usb stick cannot find the 
correct info as k does not exist

tim  
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Re: [T(A)ILS-dev] some problems

[tim smy]

Thankyou for your email

The Gnome settings appears to have stopped.

thanks for the IPv6 info

I was wondering how I might check to see which sda or sda1 the usb is monuted 
on. I tried to install unetbootin from the command line but its not available.

Would it be woth formatting the usb first?

thanks

tim
 Original-Nachricht 
> Datum: Mon, 22 Nov 2010 11:13:23 +0100
> Von: anonym 
> An: "The T(A)ILS public development discussion list" 
> Betreff: Re: [T(A)ILS-dev] some problems

> 22/11/10 09:09, tim smy:
> > Hello
> > 
> > no reply from anonym despite many emails, -so what to do--hwew iwe
> > go
> 
> I haven't received anything, but you shouldn't send questions about
> T(A)ILS to me only. Use this list directly instead.
> 
> > trying amnesia 0.6
> > 
> > get the error message everytime on startup in desktop
> > 
> > 
> > "ERROR starting Gnome settings daemon  will try to restart next time
> > log on
> 
> Could you please reproduce this and use the "Report a Bug" feature found
> on the desktop? This will provide us with more data. Also include the
> following information:
> 
> 1. Does it happen on every computer you've tried it on?
> 2. Are there any other problems seemingly related to this error?
> 
> > also my isp supports IPV6 so in netstat -a I get
> > 
> > tcp6   0  0 localhost:ipp   [::]:*  LISTEN
> 
> I'm not sure what the issue is here. As you can see, ipp is only
> listening on localhost, so the printing service is not open for attack
> through the network. Any way, initiating ipv6 connections is completely
> blocked [1] since Tor doesn't support it.
> 
> [1] https://amnesia.boum.org/contribute/design/Tor_enforcement/#index3h1
> 
> > also please tell me a simple way to get 0.6 on a usb stick cannot
> > find the correct info as k does not exist
> 
> At the moment there's no GUI for this, so you'll have to do it through
> the command line (what you probably have read in the walkthrough isn't
> correct -- that's some leftovers from the Incognito LiveCD).
> 
> What you need to figure out is the device for the CD-ROM drive that
> T(A)ILS runs from, and the USB drive you want to install it on. Let us
> say that they are /dev/cdrom and /dev/sda, respectively. Then you do a
> 
>   sudo su
>   cat /dev/cdrom > /dev/sda
> 
> In fact you may do this from any running linux system using the iso
> image file instead of /dev/cdrom, i.e.
> 
>   sudo su
>   cat /path/to/tails/image.iso > /dev/sda
> 
> Warning: be _very_ sure about that you get the usb drive device
> (/dev/sda in the example) right, otherwise you might overwrite one of
> your harddrives.
> 
> Note to other devs: we really should remove the
> incorrect/not-yet-implemented parts from the walkthrough.
> 
> Cheers!
> 

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Re: [T(A)ILS-dev] some problems

[tim smy]

Anonym

tried to send bug report but connection timed out as gnome settings 
as per email before.

re dmesg that was ok but would not copy I did in fact stop the process myself 
as i noticed there was nothing in the usb stick here is the output the usb 
mounts by default when placed in the usb slot.
maybe i could try another usb stick




dmesg output
--

[ 1742.516354] usb-storage: device scan complete
[ 1742.516843] scsi 9:0:0:0: Direct-Access SanDisk  U3 Cruzer Micro  3.27 
PQ: 0 ANSI: 2
[ 1742.517212] scsi 9:0:0:1: CD-ROMSanDisk  U3 Cruzer Micro  3.27 
PQ: 0 ANSI: 2
[ 1742.520038] sd 9:0:0:0: Attached scsi generic sg6 type 0
[ 1742.523331] sd 9:0:0:0: [sdf] 8015502 512-byte logical blocks: (4.10 GB/3.82 
GiB)
[ 1742.524830] sd 9:0:0:0: [sdf] Write Protect is off
[ 1742.524833] sd 9:0:0:0: [sdf] Mode Sense: 03 00 00 00
[ 1742.524836] sd 9:0:0:0: [sdf] Assuming drive cache: write through
[ 1742.525329] sr1: scsi3-mmc drive: 8x/40x writer xa/form2 cdda tray
[ 1742.525408] sr 9:0:0:1: Attached scsi CD-ROM sr1
[ 1742.525468] sr 9:0:0:1: Attached scsi generic sg7 type 5
[ 1742.529944] sd 9:0:0:0: [sdf] Assuming drive cache: write through
[ 1742.529949]  sdf: sdf1
[ 1742.532325] sd 9:0:0:0: [sdf] Assuming drive cache: write through
[ 1742.532328] sd 9:0:0:0: [sdf] Attached SCSI removable disk
[ 1742.800708] FAT: utf8 is not a recommended IO charset for FAT filesystems, 
filesystem will be case sensitive!
[ 1981.688450] sg_write: data in/out 2080423089/4050 bytes for SCSI command 
0xf3--guessing data in;
[ 1981.688452]program cat not setting count and/or reply_len properly
[ 2288.916667] sr 7:0:0:0: [sr0] Result: hostbyte=DID_OK driverbyte=DRIVER_SENSE
[ 2288.916672] sr 7:0:0:0: [sr0] Sense Key : Illegal Request [current] 
[ 2288.916676] Info fld=0x46a96, ILI
[ 2288.916678] sr 7:0:0:0: [sr0] Add. Sense: Illegal mode for this track
[ 2288.916684] sr 7:0:0:0: [sr0] CDB: Read(10): 28 00 00 04 6a 78 00 00 20 00
[ 2288.916692] end_request: I/O error, dev sr0, sector 1157600
[ 2288.916696] Buffer I/O error on device sr0, logical block 289400
[ 2288.916700] Buffer I/O error on device sr0, logical block 289401
[ 2288.916704] Buffer I/O error on device sr0, logical block 289402
[ 2288.916707] Buffer I/O error on device sr0, logical block 289403
[ 2288.916709] Buffer I/O error on device sr0, logical block 289404
[ 2288.916712] Buffer I/O error on device sr0, logical block 289405
[ 2288.916714] Buffer I/O error on device sr0, logical block 289406
[ 2288.916717] Buffer I/O error on device sr0, logical block 289407
[ 2288.916719] Buffer I/O error on device sr0, logical block 289408
[ 2288.974928] sr 7:0:0:0: [sr0] Result: hostbyte=DID_OK driverbyte=DRIVER_SENSE
[ 2288.974932] sr 7:0:0:0: [sr0] Sense Key : Illegal Request [current] 
[ 2288.974936] Info fld=0x46a96, ILI
[ 2288.974938] sr 7:0:0:0: [sr0] Add. Sense: Illegal mode for this track
[ 2288.974942] sr 7:0:0:0: [sr0] CDB: Read(10): 28 00 00 04 6a 96 00 00 02 00
[ 2288.974950] end_request: I/O error, dev sr0, sector 1157720
amnesia:~# 

 Original-Nachricht 
> Datum: Tue, 23 Nov 2010 00:12:22 +0100
> Von: anonym 
> An: "The T(A)ILS public development discussion list" 
> Betreff: Re: [T(A)ILS-dev] some problems

> 22/11/10 22:23, tim smy:
> > I was wondering how I might check to see which sda or sda1 the usb is
> > monuted on. I tried to install unetbootin from the command line but
> > its not available.
> 
> Well, what I usually do is: insert the usb drive (but don't mount it)
> during a T(A)ILS session, then issue the command
> 
>   dmesg
> 
> in a terminal. The device name appears at numerious times in the end of
> the output, within [square brackets]. For instance, I see something like
> the following:
> 
> ...
> [1078315.361139] sd 19:0:0:0: Attached scsi generic sg4 type 0
> [1078315.362050] sd 19:0:0:0: [sdd] 3940479 512-byte logical blocks:
> (2.01 GB/1.87 GiB)
> [1078315.368128] sd 19:0:0:0: [sdd] Write Protect is off
> [1078315.368333] sd 19:0:0:0: [sdd] Mode Sense: 45 00 00 08
> [1078315.368338] sd 19:0:0:0: [sdd] Assuming drive cache: write through
> [1078315.371700] sd 19:0:0:0: [sdd] Assuming drive cache: write through
> [1078315.371710]  sdd: sdd1
> [1078315.376917] sd 19:0:0:0: [sdd] Assuming drive cache: write through
> [1078315.376924] sd 19:0:0:0: [sdd] Attached SCSI removable disk
> 
> which means that /dev/sdd is the device the usb drive was assigned. Then
> I simply do a
> 
>   cat /dev/cdrom > /dev/sdd
> 
> which installs T(A)ILS to the usb drive.
> 
> > Would it be woth formatting the usb first?
> 
> No.
> 
> Cheers!
> 

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[T(A)ILS-dev] is this walk through correct

[tim smy]

Thanks for your email


Would be nice if someone could update the support
walkthrough as it is says:


Persistent home directory
At a certain point when booting T(A)ILS from USB you will be prompted with the 
question if you want a persistent home directory or not. As mentioned elsewhere 
in this document, that will allow you to save files and keep application 
settings between shutdowns, which is not normally the case. Naturally, saving 
sensitive stuff could be dangerious if it got into the wrong hands, so the use 
of encryption is highly recommended.
As you progress through the guided setup of the persistent home directory you 
will be asked as few questions and given some simple instructions, and some of 
these might need to be commented a bit:

tim

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Re: [T(A)ILS-dev] Specification and security design document

[tim smy]

Please say somewhere in the doc that each cd /version only lasts a few months. 
As for security reasons tor and other sotware is constanly being updated and 
made more secure.

tim
 Original-Nachricht 
> Datum: Tue, 14 Dec 2010 19:28:04 +0100
> Von: intrigeri 
> An: tails-dev@boum.org
> Betreff: [T(A)ILS-dev] Specification and security design document

> Hi,
> 
> I've starting working on our specification and security design
> document, based on good old Incognito's one:
> 
> https://amnesia.boum.org/contribute/design/draft/
> 
> Help, critics and comments are of course welcome.
> 
> Bye,
> -- 
>   intrigeri 
>   | GnuPG key @ https://gaffer.ptitcanardnoir.org/intrigeri/intrigeri.asc
>   | OTR fingerprint @
> https://gaffer.ptitcanardnoir.org/intrigeri/otr-fingerprint.asc
>   | Do not be trapped by the need to achieve anything.
>   | This way, you achieve everything.
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> https://boum.org/mailman/listinfo/tails-dev

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Re: [T(A)ILS-dev] Specification and security design document

[tim smy]

Perhaps consolidated into a single sentence would suffice

tim
 Original-Nachricht 
> Datum: Sun, 19 Dec 2010 10:45:57 +0100
> Von: intrigeri 
> An: "The T\\(A\\)ILS public development discussion list" 
> Betreff: Re: [T(A)ILS-dev] Specification and security design document

> Hi,
> 
> tim smy wrote (15 Dec 2010 14:29:44 GMT) :
> > Please say somewhere in the doc that each cd /version only lasts a
> > few months. As for security reasons tor and other sotware is
> > constanly being updated and made more secure.
> 
> Thank you for this suggestion that indicates we agree on the
> background idea. On the other hand, since 0.4 T(A)ILS has been
> notifying the user in case the running version is affected by security
> flaws announced on our website.
> 
> Knowing so, do you still think we should make it explicit in the
> end-user documentation? This might help reinforcing / explaining the
> notification system.
> 
> No strong objection from my part, but I always try to avoid increasing
> the end-user documentation size unless really needed, based on the
> "the longer it is, the fewer people will read it" assumption.
> 
> Bye,
> -- 
>   intrigeri 
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> https://gaffer.ptitcanardnoir.org/intrigeri/otr-fingerprint.asc
>   | Who wants a world in which the guarantee that we shall not
>   | die of starvation would entail the risk of dying of boredom ?
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Re: [T(A)ILS-dev] Specification and security design document

[tim smy]

Hello

>2. In 3.2.3, there is :
> 
> - [cryptsetup](http://code.google.com/p/cryptsetup/) ensures storage
>   encryption using [LUKS](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/LUKS)

please consider loop-aes its far more secure that the others mentioned.

tim 



 Original-Nachricht 
> Datum: Mon, 20 Dec 2010 14:10:24 -0800
> Von: a...@boum.org
> An: tails-dev@boum.org
> Betreff: Re: [T(A)ILS-dev] Specification and security design document

> 
> El Tue, 14 Dec 2010 10:28:44 -0800
> a...@boum.org escribió:
> > From: intrigeri 
> > To: tails-dev@boum.org
> > Date: Tue, 14 Dec 2010 10:28:04 -0800
> > Enc: unencrypted
> > Sig: No signature
> > 
> > Hi,
> > 
> > I've starting working on our specification and security design
> > document, based on good old Incognito's one:
> > 
> > https://amnesia.boum.org/contribute/design/draft/
> > 
> > Help, critics and comments are of course welcome.
> > 
> > Bye,
> 
> Hi,
> 
> I just read the draft and it's great. Just a few comments, even thought
> I don't know everything about Tails' internals.
> 
> 1. First, about what you call the « post-mortem analysis ». I like the
> term but I want to know whether it is a canonical term for security
> experts or something that might need a bit more explanation.
> 
> Then, apart from the threat model, the document is not very explicit
> about this issue. There might not be much to say but I think that it
> should at least be mentioned in the requirements, part 2 :
>   - What is required for a PELD to prevent from post-mortem analysis?
>   - How do we think this should be provided?
> 
> Again in part 3, while presenting the implementation we should explain
> more about what Tails does to achieve that. There is a paragraph on
> host system RAM but I guess we can find more to explain, like :
>   - I could imagine that some LiveDistros detect the swap areas and use
> them.  Do we ? ;)
>   - I could imagine that some LiveDistros read the disks and possibly
> mount the available partitions automatically. Same thing.
>   - I wonder how Tails addresses the requirements in 2.1.2, for example
> this one : « The usage of encrypted removable storage devices (such
> as USB sticks) should be encouraged. »
> 
> I think this whole post-mortem analysis thingie is the real difference
> to put forward while talking to the Tor people ; bringing their privacy
> concerns further than just the Internet connection. You can be a Tor
> freak and get the same Tor configuration as Tails on your own system
> but you won't get the same post-mortem analysis protection.
> 
> 2. In 3.2.3, there is :
> 
> - [cryptsetup](http://code.google.com/p/cryptsetup/) ensures storage
>   encryption using [LUKS](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/LUKS)
> 
> Should we rather say 'offers' instead of 'ensures'. Is Tails using LUKS
> if not asked to do so ?
> 
> 3. You'll find attached to this mail a very small amount of aesthetics
> and language fixes. I'm not sure whether there is a native English
> speaker in the team but, well, we would a review at some point.
> 
> Cheers,
> 
> -- 
> sajolida
> 
> 
> 
> 
> -- 

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[T(A)ILS-dev] search engine

[tim smy]

I would to suggest duckduckgo.com as the default search engine it has a tor 
page and has good privacy panel

Privacy
Google tracks you. We don't.
SSL version w/ HTTPS everywhere.
HTML & Lite (non-JS) versions.
Tor hidden service (about).
POST/Refcontrol settings.


Privacy Settings
For more info on these privacy settings, check out the Privacy Policy.
Redirect:

If On it prevents sharing of your search with sites you click on.
Address bar:
If On, searches will appear in your address bar (GET vs POST requests).
HTTPS:  
If On, searches on the site will always go to the encrypted version.

they are on by default.

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Re: [T(A)ILS-dev] search engine

[tim smy]

I put your comments forward to the duckduckgo.com forum and received this 
reply. While I am sure duckduckgo.com is a good search engine , and says
that logs are erased nightly , is this enough?  why keep logs at all?

Thx!  Anything in particular you want me to comment on?


> SSL version w/ HTTPS everywhere.

Scroogle also has a SSL version, which is used in T(A)ILS.


HTTPS everywhere means that for major sites the organic links are automatically 
changed tho their https versions. 


 

> Tor hidden service (about).

What would be the advantage in T(A)ILS?


Not sure how T(A)ILS works, but the advantage is speed if you're on Tor. The 
end point is our server.


 

> POST/Refcontrol settings.

> Privacy Settings
> For more info on these privacy settings, check out the Privacy Policy.
> Redirect:

>  If On it prevents sharing of your search with sites you click
>  on.

This hides to the clicked websites:

 - the fact the user is coming from DuckDuckGo
 - the search that was performed, in case GET is used -> see the
   second "privacy" setting

On the other hand, I wonder how this is implemented without telling
DuckDuckGo what site the user is going to visit... which would be
pretty bad privacy-wise.


The referer says duckduckgo.com, but the search terms are not there. We do not 
store ips or user agent so we have no idea what you in particular are clicking 
on. And right now we do nothing with this information anyway, and it is erased 
nightly.

 

> Address bar:
>  If On, searches will appear in your address bar (GET vs POST
>  requests).

I fail to understand the privacy enhancement this brings. Could
someone explain? I can clearly see the privacy downside in case
referrers are not disabled.


This is a) an over-the-shoulder privacy enhancement and b) makes it harder for 
someone to looking through your browsing history on your computer.

 

> HTTPS:
>  If On, searches on the site will always go to the encrypted
>  version.

This would be a great thing to have.

> they are on by default.

According to the settings page I just visited the HTTPS setting is Off
by default.


This just means if you land on our homepage with that setting on, it will 
submit searches to the https version. If you start on the https version always, 
it isn't needed.

 

Worried about how the default settings could be changed, I have had a
quick look to their website and it seems this can be done using [URL
parameters](https://duckduckgo.com/params.html) rather than cookies,
which is probably desirable in T(A)ILS context. We should be careful
about this though: using a non-default set of URL parameters would
help DuckDuckGo fingerprint T(A)ILS users.


We don't store user agents. I'd also be fine with scrubbing these parameters 
from the logs nightly. 

 Original-Nachricht 
> Datum: Sat, 15 Jan 2011 21:14:39 +0100
> Von: intrigeri 
> An: "The T\\(A\\)ILS public development discussion list" 
> Betreff: Re: [T(A)ILS-dev] search engine

> Hi,
> 
> tim smy wrote (15 Jan 2011 18:35:50 GMT) :
> > I would to suggest duckduckgo.com as the default search engine it
> > has a tor page and has good privacy panel
> 
> We already had a TODO item about this[0] in the todo/discuss state.
> Thanks for the heads up!
> 
>   [0] https://amnesia.boum.org/todo/DuckDuckGo/
> 
> > Privacy
> > Google tracks you. We don't.
> 
> T(A)ILS shall not rely on such good-willing promises
> => T(A)ILS shall protect users from DuckDuckGo as much as from
>Scroogle or anyone else.
> 
> > SSL version w/ HTTPS everywhere.
> 
> Scroogle also has a SSL version, which is used in T(A)ILS.
> 
> > HTML & Lite (non-JS) versions.
> 
> Scroogle has no JS or non-Lite versions :)
> 
> > Tor hidden service (about).
> 
> What would be the advantage in T(A)ILS?
> 
> > POST/Refcontrol settings.
> 
> > Privacy Settings
> > For more info on these privacy settings, check out the Privacy Policy.
> > Redirect:
> 
> > If On it prevents sharing of your search with sites you click
> > on.
> 
> This hides to the clicked websites:
> 
>   - the fact the user is coming from DuckDuckGo
>   - the search that was performed, in case GET is used -> see the
> second "privacy" setting
> 
> On the other hand, I wonder how this is implemented without telling
> DuckDuckGo what site the user is going to visit... which would be
> pretty bad privacy-wise.
> 
> > Address bar:
> > If On, searches will appear in your address bar (GET vs POST
> > requests).
> 
> I

[T(A)ILS-dev] truecrypt-whats the alternative

[tim smy]

I was reading under Truecrypt in amnesia.boum.org

"In the future, we would like to provide proper alternatives and stop 
distributing TrueCrypt. This means that you should not create new TrueCrypt 
media if you intend to stay with T(A)ILS in the long run"

What are the alternatives? It would be nice to give some

tim
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Re: [T(A)ILS-dev] truecrypt-whats the alternative

[tim smy]

My view is that you cannot say:

"This means that you should not create
new TrueCrypt media if you intend to stay with T(A)ILS"

with giving some alternative.

tim
 Original-Nachricht 
> Datum: Wed, 26 Jan 2011 22:28:43 +0100
> Von: intrigeri 
> An: "The T\\(A\\)ILS public development discussion list" 
> Betreff: Re: [T(A)ILS-dev] truecrypt-whats the alternative

> Hi,
> 
> tim smy wrote (26 Jan 2011 18:59:42 GMT) :
> > "In the future, we would like to provide proper alternatives and
> > stop distributing TrueCrypt. This means that you should not create
> > new TrueCrypt media if you intend to stay with T(A)ILS in the long
> > run"
> 
> > What are the alternatives? It would be nice to give some
> 
> It depends on what part of the TrueCrypt feature set we want to
> provide alternatives for. I am not sure we want to, and can, provide
> alternatives for the whole TrueCrypt feature set.
> 
> E.g.:
> 
>   - multi-platform encrypted volumes: IIRC dm-crypt / LUKS volumes are
> usable on Windows thanks to FreeOTFE; OSX?
>   - hidden volumes: doable using plain dm-crypt / cryptsetup (no
> LUKS), but
> * multi-platform?
> * no proper GUI
>   - other features?
> 
> Bye,
> -- 
>   intrigeri 
>   | GnuPG key @ https://gaffer.ptitcanardnoir.org/intrigeri/intrigeri.asc
>   | OTR fingerprint @ https://gaffer.ptitcanardnoir.org/intrigeri/otr.asc
>   | Who wants a world in which the guarantee that we shall not
>   | die of starvation would entail the risk of dying of boredom ?
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Re: [T(A)ILS-dev] Freeze ->0.7?

[tim smy]

Lets not also forget something thats been thought about for a while and that
is a persistent Home directory.

tim
 Original-Nachricht 
> Datum: Mon, 07 Feb 2011 21:15:27 +0100
> Von: anonym 
> An: "The T(A)ILS public development discussion list" 
> Betreff: Re: [T(A)ILS-dev] Freeze ->0.7?

> 07/02/11 18:53, intrigeri:
> > Hi,
> > 
> > Now that all serious Squeeze-related regressions I know of have been
> > fixed in our devel branch, I'd like to start stabilizing a 0.7 release
> > based on Debian Squeeze.
> > 
> > The main issue I have with this process is that work has been started
> > not very long ago on two pretty interesting features (wipe memory on
> > media removal, minimal bridges support); big parts of this work are
> > done, but it seems these features still need some more care before we
> > can dare announcing and supporting any of those. I would be delighted
> > if these features could make it into 0.7, but I would prefer not to
> > treat it as release blockers. Also, it seems to me both are somehow
> > optional, i.e. users who don't actively do anything to use one of
> > these will not suffer from it being not perfect
> > 
> > => I think we should release 0.7 with these features in half-done
> >state in case their implementation / documentation lags behind the
> >rest of the stabilization and testing work.
> > 
> > I therefore propose merging the current devel branch into the testing
> > branch and partially freeze the testing branch; changes that may enter
> > testing during the freeze period would be:
> > 
> >   A. fixes for grave bugs
> >   B. fixes for not-so-grave bugs when we are sure the fixes won't break
> >  anything else
> >   C. non-invasive enhancements of the two features I was talking of,
> >  i.e. they must not touch areas that can break other stuff
> > 
> > I propose this merging + freeze to happen at the end of the current
> > week in order to leave a bit more time to work on the two
> > aforementioned features.
> 
> This sounds like a pretty good approach to me. I'm in favour.
> 
> > Depending on the state of these features at the time of the release,
> > we might or might not mention it in the announcement, or announce it
> > as experimental and unsupported, or whatever we feel like is
> > appropriate.
> 
> I'd say we don't mention anything about them before we're positive they
> work properly (I don't think we want to risk getting a reputation of
> shipping half-baked solutions). We'll see if time allows for that to
> happen before the 0.7 release.
> 
> Cheers!
> 

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Re: [T(A)ILS-dev] Freeze ->0.7?

[tim smy]

Thanks for the url, its like a toothache, in the hope it might go away.

tim
 Original-Nachricht 
> Datum: Tue, 08 Feb 2011 00:06:04 +0100
> Von: intrigeri 
> An: "The T\\(A\\)ILS public development discussion list" 
> Betreff: Re: [T(A)ILS-dev] Freeze ->0.7?

> tim smy wrote (07 Feb 2011 21:28:32 GMT) :
> > Lets not also forget something thats been thought about for a while
> > and that is a persistent Home directory.
> 
> https://amnesia.boum.org/contribute/roadmap/
> 
> -- 
>   intrigeri 
>   | GnuPG key @ https://gaffer.ptitcanardnoir.org/intrigeri/intrigeri.asc
>   | OTR fingerprint @ https://gaffer.ptitcanardnoir.org/intrigeri/otr.asc
>   | Who wants a world in which the guarantee that we shall not
>   | die of starvation would entail the risk of dying of boredom ?
> ___
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Re: [T(A)ILS-dev] about Tails doc

[tim smy]

I hope this idea might help if not tell what I could sothat it might come to
fruition.

Ask the main tor people Rodger Dingledine etc to promote tails in there web 
site and tell more people about it.

tim
 Original-Nachricht 
> Datum: Thu, 17 Feb 2011 10:19:56 +0100
> Von: sajolida 
> An: tails-dev@boum.org
> Betreff: [T(A)ILS-dev] about Tails doc

> 
> Hello people,
> 
> Here are couple of notes from a discussion we had about the Tails
> documentation. The discussion arose when someone proposed to write an
> FAQ for Tails and we felt the need to think more globally about the
> documentation.
> 
> FAQ
> ---
> 
> Someone proposed to write a FAQ for Tails. Here are a couple of comments
> on that.
> 
> - The FAQ could be a list of common questions but the answers should
>   point to more complete answers in the real doc.
> - It could be possible to give several answers to the same question.
> - Some questions will surely go beyond the scope of Tails so in this
>   case we should rather point to other references (eg. Wikipedia) than
>   rewrite things that are already existing.
> - We need to write a big warning to the FAQ to say that people need to
>   face the truth:
>   - It is not possible to give a simple answer to a complex question
>   - It is not possible to protect from bad uses of Tails
> - To summer up: the FAQ should be see as another entry point to the doc,
>   another format to explore the same content without simplifying or
>   duplicating what's in the real doc.
> 
> Content
> ---
> 
> Here are a couple of comments about the documentation in general.
> 
> - The most important would be to be clear about what Tails doesn't
>   protect you against :
>   - Doesn't protect you from a targeted attack against a specific person
> for example in the case of confirmation attacks, if the two ends of
> a connection are analysed, if your connection is being monitored or
> analysed.
>   - Doesn't protect you against MitM with fake certificates or if you
> don't pay enough attention.
>   - It makes it clear that you are using Tor and probably Tails. It
> doesn't make you look like any random Internet user.
>   - Doesn't clear the metadata of your images for you (eg. the serial
> number of your digital camera).
>   - Doesn't makes your crappy passwords stronger.
>   - Doesn't magically separte your different virtual identities if used
> in parallel in the same session.
>   - Doesn't protect you from a global adversary.
> - We should reuse as much as possible the Tor documentation.
> - We should base our work on the walktrough: correct it, split it,
>   complete it.
> 
> Miscellaneous
> -
> 
> - When writing doc on software included in Tails we could try to push it
>   upstream, just as we're doing for code.
> - When should also try to push upstream the translation of docs that we
>   produce.
> - For screenshots it looks alright to use a 800×600 screen resolution
>   and reduce it afterwards by 75% (like done in the new doc on USB
>   install). JPG should be lighter that PNG.
> 
> Structure of the doc
> 
> 
> **Getting started…**, a page that would present a possible path to using
> Tails a bit like the beginning of the overview of Tor's documentation,
> see http://www.torproject.org/docs/documentation.html.en
>   - Overview
>   - Warning…
>   - Install + Check your Tails' integrity + Stay tuned
>   - Doc, FAQ, Reference manual
>   - Found a bug?
>   - Talk
> 
> **Support**, with pointers to :
>   - Documentation
>   - FAQ
>   - Found a bug?
>   - Talk
> 
> **Documentation**
>   - Introduction → Overview
>   - Warnings!
>   - Installing Tails
> - Downloading (link)
> - Verify the image integrity
> - Installing onto a USB stick
> - Virtualization
> - Stay up to date
> 
> Found a problem? → suppressed!
> 
> Possible first steps forward
> 
> 
> - Integrate in the walkthough the doc about installing
> - Write something for the Getting started…
> - Write something for the Warning part
> 
> Hi everybody,
> 
> Here are couple of notes from a discussion we had about the Tails
> documentation. The discussion arose when someone proposed to write an
> FAQ for Tails and we felt the need to think more globally about the
> documentation.
> 
> FAQ
> ---
> 
> Someone proposed to write a FAQ for Tails. Here are a couple of comments
> on that.
> 
> - The FAQ could be a list of common questions but the answers should
>   point to more complete answers in the real doc.
> - It could be possible to give several answers to the same question.
> - Some questions will surely go beyond the scope of Tails so in this
>   case we should rather point to other references (eg. Wikipedia) than
>   rewrite things that are already existing.
> - We need to write a big warning to the FAQ to say that people need to
>   face the truth:
>   - It is not possible to give a simple answer to a complex question
>   - It is not p

Re: [Tails-dev] Jenkins build is back to normal : build_Tails_ISO_experimental #1690

[tim smy]

Is  . password protected

 

tim

 

Gesendet: Freitag, 23. Januar 2015 um 23:49 Uhr
Von: intrigeri 
An: "The Tails public development discussion list" 
Betreff: Re: [Tails-dev] Jenkins build is back to normal : build_Tails_ISO_experimental #1690

The branch merges post-reset of the experimental branch introduced
duplicated code that broke the experimental build. Now fixed.

anonym, next time you reset experimental, please follow the next step
of the release process:

Make sure Jenkins manages to build all updated major branches fine:
.

Thanks!
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Re: [Tails-dev] Jenkins build is back to normal : build_Tails_ISO_feature-jessie #309

[tim smy]

PASSWORD REQUIRED?

 

tim

 

Gesendet: Donnerstag, 29. Januar 2015 um 16:50 Uhr
Von: tails-sysadm...@boum.org
An: tails-dev@boum.org
Betreff: [Tails-dev] Jenkins build is back to normal : build_Tails_ISO_feature-jessie #309

See 

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[Tails-dev] problems crsting usb stick for tails 1.7

[tim smy]

I followed the set up of tails on a usb drive as per the tails web site ,

however since I have a UFEI BIOS-(windows 10) then the universal usb installer will not work

 

The alternative it seems is to use a software called Rufus 2.5.799

Here are the options that I think may be  correct. please find log at foot of this email.

 

Divce:

maas 8gb

 

Partition scheme and target system type:

MBR partition scheme for BIOS or UFEI

 

File system:

FAT32(default)

 

Cluster size:

4096 bytes (default)

 

new volume label

tails 1.7

 

create a bootable disk using:

ISO image

 

there are other options to choose from which I did not take advantage of just yet

 

Here is the log which stops at the last entry for some reason:

 


Found USB 2.0 device 'Lexar USB Flash Drive USB Device' (05DC:A81D)
1 device found
Disk type: Removable, Sector Size: 512 bytes
Cylinders: 974, TracksPerCylinder: 255, SectorsPerTrack: 63
Partition type: MBR, NB Partitions: 1
Disk ID: 0x001D5769
Drive has a Syslinux Master Boot Record
Partition 1:
  Type: FAT32 LBA (0x0c)
  Size: 7.5 GB (8015314944 bytes)
  Start Sector: 2048, Boot: Yes, Recognized: Yes
Found USB 2.0 device 'Lexar USB Flash Drive USB Device' (05DC:A81D)
1 device found
Disk type: Removable, Sector Size: 512 bytes
Cylinders: 974, TracksPerCylinder: 255, SectorsPerTrack: 63
Partition type: MBR, NB Partitions: 1
Disk ID: 0x001D5769
Drive has a Syslinux Master Boot Record
Partition 1:
  Type: FAT32 LBA (0x0c)
  Size: 7.5 GB (8015314944 bytes)
  Start Sector: 2048, Boot: Yes, Recognized: Yes
Found USB 2.0 device 'Lexar USB Flash Drive USB Device' (05DC:A81D)
1 device found
Disk type: Removable, Sector Size: 512 bytes
Cylinders: 974, TracksPerCylinder: 255, SectorsPerTrack: 63
Partition type: MBR, NB Partitions: 1
Disk ID: 0x001D5769
Drive has a Syslinux Master Boot Record
Partition 1:
  Type: FAT32 LBA (0x0c)
  Size: 7.5 GB (8015314944 bytes)
  Start Sector: 2048, Boot: Yes, Recognized: Yes
Scanning image...
ISO analysis:
  Image is an ISO9660 image
  Will use '/isolinux/isolinux.cfg' for Syslinux
  Detected Syslinux version: 6.03/20150326 (from '/EFI/BOOT/isolinux.bin')
Disk image analysis:
  Image has an unknown Master Boot Record
  Image is a bootable disk image
ISO label: 'TAILS 1.7 - 20151103'
  Size: 1052835840 bytes
  Has a >64 chars filename: No
  Has Symlinks: No
  Has a >4GB file: No
  Uses Bootmgr: No
  Uses EFI: Yes
  Uses Grub 2: No
  Uses Grub4DOS: No
  Uses isolinux: Yes (6.03)
  Uses KolibriOS: No
  Uses ReactOS: No
  Uses WinPE: No
Using image: tails-i386-1.7.iso
Found USB 2.0 device 'Lexar USB Flash Drive USB Device' (05DC:A81D)
1 device found
Disk type: Removable, Sector Size: 512 bytes
Cylinders: 974, TracksPerCylinder: 255, SectorsPerTrack: 63
Partition type: MBR, NB Partitions: 1
Disk ID: 0x001D5769
Drive has a Syslinux Master Boot Record
Partition 1:
  Type: FAT32 LBA (0x0c)
  Size: 7.5 GB (8015314944 bytes)
  Start Sector: 2048, Boot: Yes, Recognized: Yes
Downloading 'ldlinux.sys' from http://rufus.akeo.ie/files/syslinux-6.03/20150326/ldlinux.sys
Network is unavailable: Internet has not be initialized.
Could not download the file - cancelling
Found USB 2.0 device 'Lexar USB Flash Drive USB Device' (05DC:A81D)
1 device found
Disk type: Removable, Sector Size: 512 bytes
Cylinders: 974, TracksPerCylinder: 255, SectorsPerTrack: 63
Partition type: MBR, NB Partitions: 1
Disk ID: 0x001D5769
Drive has a Syslinux Master Boot Record
Partition 1:
  Type: FAT32 LBA (0x0c)
  Size: 7.5 GB (8015314944 bytes)
  Start Sector: 2048, Boot: Yes, Recognized: Yes
Found USB 2.0 device 'Lexar USB Flash Drive USB Device' (05DC:A81D)
1 device found
Disk type: Removable, Sector Size: 512 bytes
Cylinders: 974, TracksPerCylinder: 255, SectorsPerTrack: 63
Partition type: MBR, NB Partitions: 1
Disk ID: 0x001D5769
Drive has a Syslinux Master Boot Record
Partition 1:
  Type: FAT32 LBA (0x0c)
  Size: 7.5 GB (8015314944 bytes)
  Start Sector: 2048, Boot: Yes, Recognized: Yes
Found USB 2.0 device 'Lexar USB Flash Drive USB Device' (05DC:A81D)
1 device found
Disk type: Removable, Sector Size: 512 bytes
Cylinders: 974, TracksPerCylinder: 255, SectorsPerTrack: 63
Partition type: MBR, NB Partitions: 1
Disk ID: 0x001D5769
Drive has a Syslinux Master Boot Record
Partition 1:
  Type: FAT32 LBA (0x0c)
  Size: 7.5 GB (8015314944 bytes)
  Start Sector: 2048, Boot: Yes, Recognized: Yes
Found USB 2.0 device 'Lexar USB Flash Drive USB Device' (05DC:A81D)
1 device found
Disk type: Removable, Sector Size: 512 bytes
Cylinders: 974, TracksPerCylinder: 255, SectorsPerTrack: 63
Partition type: MBR, NB Partitions: 1
Disk ID: 0x001D5769
Drive has a Syslinux Master Boot Record
Partition 1:
  Type: FAT32 LBA (0x0c)
  Size: 7.5 GB (8015314944 bytes)
  Start Sector: 2048, Boot: Yes, Recognized: Yes
Found USB 2.0 device 'Lexar USB Flash Drive USB Device' (05DC:A81D)
1 device found
Disk type: Removable, Sector Size: 512 bytes
Cylinders: 974, TracksPerCylinder: 255, SectorsPerTrack: 63
Partition type: MBR,

Re: [Tails-dev] problems creating usb stick for tails 1.7

[tim smy]

Here is a update log to my previous post showing more deatils.
 
I followed the set up of tails on a usb drive as per the tails web site ,
however since I have a UFEI BIOS-(windows 10) then the universal usb installer 
will not work
 
The alternative it seems is to use a software called Rufus 2.5.799
Here are the options that I think may be  correct. please find log at foot of 
this email.
 
Divce:
maas 8gb
 
Partition scheme and target system type:
MBR partition scheme for BIOS or UFEI
 
File system:
FAT32(default)
 
Cluster size:
4096 bytes (default)
 
new volume label
tails 1.7
 
create a bootable disk using:
ISO image
 
there are other options to choose from which I did not take advantage of just 
yet
 
Here is the log which stops at the last entry for some reason:

Found USB 2.0 device 'Lexar USB Flash Drive USB Device' (05DC:A81D)
1 device found
Disk type: Removable, Sector Size: 512 bytes
Cylinders: 974, TracksPerCylinder: 255, SectorsPerTrack: 63
Partition type: MBR, NB Partitions: 1
Disk ID: 0x0031A317
Drive has a Syslinux Master Boot Record
Partition 1:
  Type: FAT32 (0x0b)
  Size: 7.5 GB (8015314944 bytes)
  Start Sector: 2048, Boot: No, Recognized: Yes
Scanning image...
ISO analysis:
  Image is an ISO9660 image
  Will use '/isolinux/isolinux.cfg' for Syslinux
  Detected Syslinux version: 6.03/20150326 (from '/EFI/BOOT/isolinux.bin')
Disk image analysis:
  Image has an unknown Master Boot Record
  Image is a bootable disk image
ISO label: 'TAILS 1.7 - 20151103'
  Size: 1052835840 bytes
  Has a >64 chars filename: No
  Has Symlinks: No
  Has a >4GB file: No
  Uses Bootmgr: No
  Uses EFI: Yes
  Uses Grub 2: No
  Uses Grub4DOS: No
  Uses isolinux: Yes (6.03)
  Uses KolibriOS: No
  Uses ReactOS: No
  Uses WinPE: No
Using image: tails-i386-1.7.iso

Computing checksum for 'C:\Users\akincana\Downloads\tails-i386-1.7.iso'...
  MD5:   dfbc1337a118a2fc87e7bfeaf8e8870e
  SHA1:  b53fb15773da339a16595c047b71ffd9a88255da
  SHA256: 372ba423c46ce76393f5e8cd64136e5e9c4a806def993951fe8dbf7d93be2546
Downloading 'ldlinux.sys' from 
http://rufus.akeo.ie/files/syslinux-6.03/20150326/ldlinux.sys
Unable to access file: 404
Extended version was not found, trying main version
Downloading 'ldlinux.sys' from 
http://rufus.akeo.ie/files/syslinux-6.03/ldlinux.sys
File length: 68599 bytes
Successfully downloaded 'ldlinux.sys'
Downloading 'ldlinux.bss' from 
http://rufus.akeo.ie/files/syslinux-6.03/20150326/ldlinux.bss
Unable to access file: 404
Extended version was not found, trying main version
Downloading 'ldlinux.bss' from 
http://rufus.akeo.ie/files/syslinux-6.03/ldlinux.bss
File length: 512 bytes
Successfully downloaded 'ldlinux.bss'

Format operation started
Requesting disk access...
Opened drive \\.\PHYSICALDRIVE1 for write access
Will use 'G:' as volume mountpoint
I/O boundary checks disabled
Analyzing existing boot records...
Drive has a Syslinux Master Boot Record
Volume has an unknown Partition Boot Record
Deleting partitions...
Clearing MBR/PBR/GPT structures...
Erasing 128 sectors
Partitioning (MBR)...
Closing existing volume...
Waiting for logical drive to reappear...
Formatting (FAT32)...
Using cluster size: 4096 bytes
Slow format was selected
Creating file system...
Format completed.
Writing master boot record...
Drive has a Zeroed Master Boot Record
Set bootable USB partition as 0x80
Using Syslinux MBR
Found volume GUID \\?\Volume{ac77ce43-9b11-11e5-9bef-0c5b8f279a64}\
Installing Syslinux 6.03...
Using existing './rufus_files/syslinux-6.03/20150326/ldlinux.sys'
Using existing './rufus_files/syslinux-6.03/20150326/ldlinux.bss'
Successfully wrote 'ldlinux.sys'
Opened drive \\?\Volume{ac77ce43-9b11-11e5-9bef-0c5b8f279a64} for write access
Successfully wrote Syslinux boot record
Successfully remounted Volume{ac77ce43-9b11-11e5-9bef-0c5b8f279a64}\ on G:\
Copying ISO files...
Extracting files...
libcdio: Found Extension: Joliet Level 3
Image is an ISO9660 image
This image will be extracted using Joliet extensions (if present)
Extracting: G:\.disk\archive_trace (1 bytes)
Extracting: G:\.disk\info (80 bytes)
Extracting: G:\EFI\BOOT\bootia32.efi (294.5 KB)
Extracting: G:\EFI\BOOT\bootx64.efi (175.1 KB)
Extracting: G:\EFI\BOOT\bootx64.png (7.1 KB)
Extracting: G:\EFI\BOOT\cat.c32 (2.3 KB)
Extracting: G:\EFI\BOOT\chain.c32 (27.7 KB)
Extracting: G:\EFI\BOOT\cmd.c32 (1.8 KB)
Extracting: G:\EFI\BOOT\cmenu.c32 (5 KB)
Extracting: G:\EFI\BOOT\config.c32 (2.1 KB)
Extracting: G:\EFI\BOOT\cptime.c32 (5.2 KB)
Extracting: G:\EFI\BOOT\cpu.c32 (5.5 KB)
Extracting: G:\EFI\BOOT\cpuid.c32 (2.4 KB)
Extracting: G:\EFI\BOOT\cpuidtest.c32 (3.5 KB)
Extracting: G:\EFI\BOOT\debug.c32 (2.2 KB)
Extracting: G:\EFI\BOOT\dhcp.c32 (5.2 KB)
Extracting: G:\EFI\BOOT\disk.c32 (2.7 KB)
Extracting: G:\EFI\BOOT\dmi.c32 (10 KB)
Extracting: G:\EFI\BOOT\dmitest.c32 (14.1 KB)
Extracting: G:\EFI\BOOT\elf.c32 (4.2 KB)
Extracting: G:\EFI\BOOT\ethersel.c32 (3.7 KB)
Extracting: G:\EFI\BOOT\f1.txt (841 bytes)
Extracting: G:\EFI\BOOT\f10.txt (728 bytes)
Extracting:

[Tails-dev] trying to set up non pubilc address in tails

[tim smy]

english is not strong trying to set up non piublic tor address in tails

 

 

Untitled Document 1
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[Tails-dev] english not stong -trying to set up non pubilc tor adress in tails-se pastebin

[tim smy]

2 time attcheent does not show here is pastebin

trying to set up tnon public tor address in tails

https://paste.debian.net/1087288

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