[time-nuts] Lady Heather 5.00 doesn't keep time
Looking at the log file, it looks like the receiver is sending garbage data. I have some USB dongles with a (supposedly) Prolific PL23xx chip in them. After, typically a day or two, they start sending corrupted data. I think the problem showed up after installing some program that updated the driver. ___ time-nuts mailing list -- time-nuts@febo.com To unsubscribe, go to https://www.febo.com/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/time-nuts and follow the instructions there.
Re: [time-nuts] Lady Heather 5.00 doesn't keep time
On Mon, Aug 14, 2017 at 12:58:53AM +, JULIAN TOPOLSKI wrote: > Checking with WWV on the radio, the WSJTX clock is right on but LH > is off by some 20 seconds. Is there a bug in LH5.00? Is there an > option I didn't set? The 3.1 version worked without any special > options other than full screen and digital clock selected. "some 20 seconds" sounds a lot like the 18 second difference between the GPS timescale and UTC. Check and ensure your receiver is set to produce UTC if that's what you expect. --msa ___ time-nuts mailing list -- time-nuts@febo.com To unsubscribe, go to https://www.febo.com/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/time-nuts and follow the instructions there.
[time-nuts] Lady Heather 5.00 doesn't keep time
I installed version 5.00 of Lady Heather as the 3.1 version was affected by the GPS Rollover. It stopped displaying the digital clock which I used as a station clock for my ham radio logging. So I installed and ran version 5.00, specifying the digital clock. It worked for a while with correct time as I compared it to the digital clock display in the WSJTX software GUI. I haven't determined how long it takes but it is in the range of 5 or 10 minutes and then I notice a difference between the clocks. Checking with WWV on the radio, the WSJTX clock is right on but LH is off by some 20 seconds. Is there a bug in LH5.00? Is there an option I didn't set? The 3.1 version worked without any special options other than full screen and digital clock selected. Julian KR5J ___ time-nuts mailing list -- time-nuts@febo.com To unsubscribe, go to https://www.febo.com/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/time-nuts and follow the instructions there.
Re: [time-nuts] How well does GPS work in the Arcitic?
On Mon, 14 Aug 2017 18:19:56 -0700, jimlux wrote: >On 8/14/17 5:58 PM, Bill Beam wrote: >> GPS orbit inclination is 50-60deg. >55 degrees Current TLE show I= low of 51.7 to I= high of 56.6. >> At my latitude of 65N satellites are about 15deg above the horizon to the >> north. >That would be for satellites that are "over the pole" with respect to you? yes >___ >time-nuts mailing list -- time-nuts@febo.com >To unsubscribe, go to https://www.febo.com/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/time-nuts >and follow the instructions there. Bill Beam NL7F ___ time-nuts mailing list -- time-nuts@febo.com To unsubscribe, go to https://www.febo.com/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/time-nuts and follow the instructions there.
Re: [time-nuts] How well does GPS work in the Arcitic?
On 8/14/17 6:15 PM, Bob kb8tq wrote: Hi If you are at ICBM mid course altitudes, there are a *lot* of sat’s visible …. (at least compared to being on the ground). But do you get good VDOP? I don't know how high the typical ICBM trajectory goes, I assumed it's fairly low (why burn to get higher and take longer), say, 1000 km. So in polar regions, there's still nothing above you if you're at 80 degrees latitude. The highest latitude the satellite gets is 55 degrees. Maybe you can pick up VDOP from satellites that are "below" you (grazing the earth?) ___ time-nuts mailing list -- time-nuts@febo.com To unsubscribe, go to https://www.febo.com/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/time-nuts and follow the instructions there.
Re: [time-nuts] How well does GPS work in the Arcitic?
On 8/14/17 5:58 PM, Bill Beam wrote: GPS orbit inclination is 50-60deg. 55 degrees At my latitude of 65N satellites are about 15deg above the horizon to the north. That would be for satellites that are "over the pole" with respect to you? ___ time-nuts mailing list -- time-nuts@febo.com To unsubscribe, go to https://www.febo.com/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/time-nuts and follow the instructions there.
Re: [time-nuts] How well does GPS work in the Arcitic?
Hi If you are at ICBM mid course altitudes, there are a *lot* of sat’s visible …. (at least compared to being on the ground). Bob > On Aug 14, 2017, at 9:04 PM, jimlux wrote: > > On 8/14/17 5:12 PM, Bob kb8tq wrote: >> Hi >> >> At the time all this was figured out, the idea of the military needing nav >> at the poles >> was pretty far fetched. They accepted a bit of degradation in those regions >> as a result >> of this thinking. >> > > I don't know about that - I think it was more that it was "good enough" > everywhere, all the time. > > And polar nav, pre-GPS, was really tough - Omega had the same ionosphere > problems that GPS has, etc. > > I recall reading somewhere that one of the justifications for GPS was more > accurate midcourse guidance for ICBMs and those trajectories tend to be > polar. OTOH, in that application you also have IMU and (potentially) star > tracker data. > > ___ > time-nuts mailing list -- time-nuts@febo.com > To unsubscribe, go to https://www.febo.com/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/time-nuts > and follow the instructions there. ___ time-nuts mailing list -- time-nuts@febo.com To unsubscribe, go to https://www.febo.com/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/time-nuts and follow the instructions there.
Re: [time-nuts] PLL book 3rd edition
Ulrich - Did anyone ever agree to help update this? Regards Dave On Fri, Mar 11, 2016 at 3:13 PM, KA2WEU--- via time-nuts wrote: > > Why don't you look at the outline to determine what might be needed or > missing . > > Ulrich > > > > > In a message dated 3/11/2016 11:09:51 A.M. Eastern Standard Time, > att...@kinali.ch writes: > > Hoi Ulrich, > > On Mon, 7 Mar 2016 19:52:58 -0500 > KA2WEU--- via time-nuts wrote: > > > I have published the following book > > > > " Microwave and Wireless Synthesizers: Theory and Design, Ulrich L. > Rohde, > > John Wiley & Sons, August 1997, ISBN 0-471-52019-5." > [...] > > As I am more or less now in microwave technology and less in PLL IC's, > I > > hate to see this standard textbook disappear Who can help or want > to > > take over? > > Da ich sowieso für mich was grösseres über Zeit/Frequenzmessung > amzusammenstellen bin, und da PLL's grundsätzlich auch dazu gehören, > wäre ich interessiert. Mein Problem dabei ist, dass ich von der > praktischen Seite aber kaum eine Erfahrung habe und für mich alleine > die Arbeit mit ziemlicher Sicherheit zuviel wäre. Aber es wäre möglich, > dass ich zum Beispiel mit Magnus zusammen und vielleicht der Hilfe von > ein paar anderen time-nuts und/oder Enrico etwas auf die Beine stellen > könnte. > > Was wären denn die Dinge, welche für dich, in ein Update rein müssten? > > Gruess aus Saarbrücken > > Attila Kinali > > -- > It is upon moral qualities that a society is ultimately founded. All > the prosperity and technological sophistication in the world is of no > use without that foundation. > -- Miss Matheson, The Diamond Age, Neil Stephenson > ___ > time-nuts mailing list -- time-nuts@febo.com > To unsubscribe, go to https://www.febo.com/cgi-bin/ > mailman/listinfo/time-nuts > and follow the instructions there. > ___ time-nuts mailing list -- time-nuts@febo.com To unsubscribe, go to https://www.febo.com/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/time-nuts and follow the instructions there.
Re: [time-nuts] How well does GPS work in the Arcitic?
On 8/14/17 5:12 PM, Bob kb8tq wrote: Hi At the time all this was figured out, the idea of the military needing nav at the poles was pretty far fetched. They accepted a bit of degradation in those regions as a result of this thinking. I don't know about that - I think it was more that it was "good enough" everywhere, all the time. And polar nav, pre-GPS, was really tough - Omega had the same ionosphere problems that GPS has, etc. I recall reading somewhere that one of the justifications for GPS was more accurate midcourse guidance for ICBMs and those trajectories tend to be polar. OTOH, in that application you also have IMU and (potentially) star tracker data. ___ time-nuts mailing list -- time-nuts@febo.com To unsubscribe, go to https://www.febo.com/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/time-nuts and follow the instructions there.
Re: [time-nuts] How well does GPS work in the Arcitic?
GPS orbit inclination is 50-60deg. At my latitude of 65N satellites are about 15deg above the horizon to the north. Regards. On Mon, 14 Aug 2017 16:45:22 -0700, Hal Murray wrote: >The satellite orbits only go so far north? If you are far enough north for >that to be a problem, can you pick up the satellites across the pole? >I have several days of NMEA log files from 68 N. I think it will be simple >after I have done it, but it may be a while before I get time to plot them. >Does anybody have (non-Windows) code to that? >-- >These are my opinions. I hate spam. >___ >time-nuts mailing list -- time-nuts@febo.com >To unsubscribe, go to https://www.febo.com/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/time-nuts >and follow the instructions there. Bill Beam NL7F ___ time-nuts mailing list -- time-nuts@febo.com To unsubscribe, go to https://www.febo.com/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/time-nuts and follow the instructions there.
Re: [time-nuts] How well does GPS work in the Arcitic?
Hi At the time all this was figured out, the idea of the military needing nav at the poles was pretty far fetched. They accepted a bit of degradation in those regions as a result of this thinking. Bob > On Aug 14, 2017, at 7:45 PM, Hal Murray wrote: > > > The satellite orbits only go so far north? If you are far enough north for > that to be a problem, can you pick up the satellites across the pole? > > I have several days of NMEA log files from 68 N. I think it will be simple > after I have done it, but it may be a while before I get time to plot them. > Does anybody have (non-Windows) code to that? > > > > -- > These are my opinions. I hate spam. > > > > ___ > time-nuts mailing list -- time-nuts@febo.com > To unsubscribe, go to https://www.febo.com/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/time-nuts > and follow the instructions there. ___ time-nuts mailing list -- time-nuts@febo.com To unsubscribe, go to https://www.febo.com/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/time-nuts and follow the instructions there.
Re: [time-nuts] How well does GPS work in the Arcitic?
On 8/14/17 4:45 PM, Hal Murray wrote: The satellite orbits only go so far north? If you are far enough north for that to be a problem, can you pick up the satellites across the pole? I have several days of NMEA log files from 68 N. I think it will be simple after I have done it, but it may be a while before I get time to plot them. Does anybody have (non-Windows) code to that? http://mycoordinates.org/challenges-for-positioning-and-navigation-in-the-arctic/ lack of SBAS (WAAS) is an issue. HDOP is better, VDOP poorer because of orbit inclination (no satellites overhead) ionospheric effects worse (TEC varies a lot more in polar regions) ___ time-nuts mailing list -- time-nuts@febo.com To unsubscribe, go to https://www.febo.com/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/time-nuts and follow the instructions there.
[time-nuts] How well does GPS work in the Arcitic?
The satellite orbits only go so far north? If you are far enough north for that to be a problem, can you pick up the satellites across the pole? I have several days of NMEA log files from 68 N. I think it will be simple after I have done it, but it may be a while before I get time to plot them. Does anybody have (non-Windows) code to that? -- These are my opinions. I hate spam. ___ time-nuts mailing list -- time-nuts@febo.com To unsubscribe, go to https://www.febo.com/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/time-nuts and follow the instructions there.
Re: [time-nuts] Ships fooled in GPS spoofing attack suggest Russian cyberweapon
>In a car it is even easier. The car nav system KNOWS it must be on a >roadway. The car's ground track (positional history) must be on a road. That's assuming the GPS company keeps their maps up to date (it doesn't matter how often you update the maps in the device if the company's maps don't keep up with reality). New roads appear, old ones occasionally get moved. ___ time-nuts mailing list -- time-nuts@febo.com To unsubscribe, go to https://www.febo.com/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/time-nuts and follow the instructions there.
Re: [time-nuts] Ships fooled in GPS spoofing attack suggest Russian cyberweapon
Detecting a spoof is not really so hard. What you need to redundancy. When the two navigation methods diverge then you know one of them is acting up. (that is broken or being spoofed or just buggy) On a ship you have magnetic compass and knot log and almost certainly gyros and all these are typically NMEA connected. Then of course there is a paper based backup. But just using the available electronics you could detect divergence. A large ship that is long enough could use two GPS receivers one at each end. The ship knows it's magnetic heading and the distance between the two GPS receivers. When the GPS solution is wrong the ship knows to ignore GPS.An attacker would have to spoof so that both receivers are moved the exact same direction and distance. I'mhaving some trouble seeing how that could be done. (not that it can't be done) But in any case the first method (divergence from expected location) would work eventually and not requires any extra hardware. In a car it is even easier. The car nav system KNOWS it must be on a roadway. The car's ground track (positional history) must be on a road. When this is no longer true the navigator can turn the screen red and say "invalid gps signal". I more sophisticated car such as a Tesla with autopilot sensors can do a more sophisticated form of visual navigation and compare the observed road type (multilane divided highway or residential) and it can notice when it crosses intersections. It should notice divergence from GPS more quickly can could fail back to dead reckoning with visual updates. Yes an expensive to develop software system but not science fiction either. In a way cars have it good because they know they can't drive though building. Commercial aircraft have even better data available that could be used to compare with GPS, Ground based radar being one but many on-board systems as well. In short it is REALLY HARD to spoof information a person can know from other sources. On Mon, Aug 14, 2017 at 11:29 AM, Bob kb8tq wrote: > HI > > Since multi path is a real issue in a mobile environment, defining what an > “abnormal” > change is could be quite tricky. A reasonable “spoof” would start with > feeding the correct > data and then slowly capture the target (still with correct data). Once he > is are “in charge” > signal wise, start doing whatever …. If you are talking about a ship, you > have *lots* of time. > > Bob > > > On Aug 14, 2017, at 1:40 PM, ken Schwieker > wrote: > > > > Wouldn't monitoring the received signal strength and noting any > non-normal increase (or decrease) level change indicate possible spoofing? > The spoofing station would have no way to know what the target's > > received signal strength would be. > > > > Ken S > > > > > > --- > > This email has been checked for viruses by AVG. > > http://www.avg.com > > > > ___ > > time-nuts mailing list -- time-nuts@febo.com > > To unsubscribe, go to https://www.febo.com/cgi-bin/ > mailman/listinfo/time-nuts > > and follow the instructions there. > > ___ > time-nuts mailing list -- time-nuts@febo.com > To unsubscribe, go to https://www.febo.com/cgi-bin/ > mailman/listinfo/time-nuts > and follow the instructions there. > -- Chris Albertson Redondo Beach, California ___ time-nuts mailing list -- time-nuts@febo.com To unsubscribe, go to https://www.febo.com/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/time-nuts and follow the instructions there.
Re: [time-nuts] Sharing a GPS Antenna
Clay Antennas can be shared through splitters. I have an 8 port satellite TV splitter. Auto sense DC and DC blocking. Inexpensive and on ebay and amazon. Interestingly 8 ports is never enough when your a time-nut. So you can do the same simply come off of one of your new ports from the splitter. I added an amplifier to correct for the 16 db of loss in the 8 port splitter. Most modern antennas have quite a bit of gain so with good feed line (I use 1/2" hardline) You may not need the amplifier. I am quite interested in your blitzertung perhaps we could correspond directly. Regards Paul WB8TSL On Mon, Aug 14, 2017 at 1:41 PM, Clay Autery wrote: > Thank you one and all for all the help and suggestions. > > I've got an HP 58516A w/external DC input option on the way. Now to > find a proper N-male terminator for the unused port, and start gathering > up cable and connectors to hook it all up. > > __ > Clay Autery, KY5G > MONTAC Enterprises > (318) 518-1389 > > On 8/14/2017 9:22 AM, Clay Autery wrote: > > I'm toying with the idea of trying to share a single PCTEL GPS antenna > > three-ways. > > > > > > ___ > time-nuts mailing list -- time-nuts@febo.com > To unsubscribe, go to https://www.febo.com/cgi-bin/ > mailman/listinfo/time-nuts > and follow the instructions there. > ___ time-nuts mailing list -- time-nuts@febo.com To unsubscribe, go to https://www.febo.com/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/time-nuts and follow the instructions there.
Re: [time-nuts] Ships fooled in GPS spoofing attack suggest Russian cyberweapon
Hi Setting up the signals for any time / location on earth is simply matter of a few mouse clicks with any of a number of packages. No need to do anything more than that to get the data. Bob > On Aug 14, 2017, at 3:02 PM, Graham / KE9H wrote: > > Remember the military drone that the Iranians tricked into landing in Iran > a few years ago? > > The best explanation I heard of how they did it was that they knew that if > it lost its command channel, that it would return to the airport where it > took off. > > So, what they did was spoof the GPS with a signal that said it was 150 > miles further east than it actually was, then jam the control channel, and > it set down nicely on the airport it came from, except that it was the > desert in IRAN with a few rocks that ripped up its landing gear, and not > its home runway. > > Would this spoof be as easy as recording the real signal and playing it > back (louder) delayed by about 120 seconds? (Assuming you want to shift > things to the East.) (Also assume you have a relatively unsophisticated GPS > nav receiver.) > > --- Graham > > == > > On Mon, Aug 14, 2017 at 1:41 PM, Bob kb8tq wrote: > >> Hi >> >>> On Aug 14, 2017, at 2:13 PM, Chris Albertson >> wrote: >>> >>> The trouble with spoofing location is that in theory every ship is using >>> more than one method of navigation. They would notice their GPS is >> acting >>> up and turn it off. >> >> In most cases the “other method” is dead reckoning. That’s actually being >> generous. There are a *lot* of cases every year where the answer is that >> the vessel is on GPS autopilot with nobody at all on watch. Yes the >> results of >> breaking the law are fairly predictable. Actually having a competent >> navigator >> on duty all the time running “alternate” data, that costs money ….. >> >> Bob >> >>> >>> I'm far from a professional but I've taken the six week class and I'm >>> reasonably certain I could find a place on the other side of the pacific >>> ocean with no GPS. The GPS is far easier to use and more accurate but >> no >>> one uses just GPS alone, they alway compare several methods. >>> >>> On Mon, Aug 14, 2017 at 10:12 AM, Clint Jay wrote: >>> I guess it would depend on the level of infrastructure available to the attacker, clock distribution is a reasonably well solved problem isn't >> it? There would, I suppose also be the issue of receiver swamping, you could monitor received signal levels as it's my understanding that the signals from the satellites are weak enough that they're indiscernible from >> noise floor without some rather complex processing? Authentication via signing could be another feasible way to prevent spoofing except we are potentially talking about interference from state actors who may even be the very people who run one of the satellite networks On 14 Aug 2017 5:51 pm, "Attila Kinali" wrote: > On Mon, 14 Aug 2017 12:09:43 -0400 > Tim Shoppa wrote: > >> I think if you are only trying to spoof a single receiver it would be >> possible to walk a spoofed time/space code in a way that time moved > without >> so obvious of a discontinuity. I'm sure there would be effects a time-nut >> could notice still. > > Not really. Unless you have a multi-antenna setup (see jim's email), > you have nothing to compare the signal to. Even an ideal reference > clock in your GPS receiver does not help, as the attacker could be > tracking you in such a way that you will never see a discontinuity > in time or position and that all the other sanity checks you do > still don't show anything. > > With a two antenna setup, you can already check whether the phases > add up to what you expect them to be, given your position relative > to the satellites position. You do not need 3 antennas as a potential > attacker can spoof the phase of some satellites correctly, but not > of all at the same time. This at least gives you a spoof/no-spoof >> signal. > > With an antenna array you can do some masking of spoofers (ie placing > a null where the spoofer comes from). But this increases the cost and > complexity of the system super-linear with the number of antennas. > Maybe one way to do it, would be to use a single receiver with a stable > reference clock and switch between antennas in short succession. Ie similar > to how the early single channel GPS receivers worked, but for antennas > instead of SVs. But I have no idea how easy/difficult this would be > to do and how well it would work against spoofers. > > Attila Kinali > -- > It is upon moral qualities that a society is ultimately founded. All > the prosperity and technological sophistication in the world is of no > use without that foundation. >-- Miss
Re: [time-nuts] Ships fooled in GPS spoofing attack suggest Russian cyberweapon
Remember the military drone that the Iranians tricked into landing in Iran a few years ago? The best explanation I heard of how they did it was that they knew that if it lost its command channel, that it would return to the airport where it took off. So, what they did was spoof the GPS with a signal that said it was 150 miles further east than it actually was, then jam the control channel, and it set down nicely on the airport it came from, except that it was the desert in IRAN with a few rocks that ripped up its landing gear, and not its home runway. Would this spoof be as easy as recording the real signal and playing it back (louder) delayed by about 120 seconds? (Assuming you want to shift things to the East.) (Also assume you have a relatively unsophisticated GPS nav receiver.) --- Graham == On Mon, Aug 14, 2017 at 1:41 PM, Bob kb8tq wrote: > Hi > > > On Aug 14, 2017, at 2:13 PM, Chris Albertson > wrote: > > > > The trouble with spoofing location is that in theory every ship is using > > more than one method of navigation. They would notice their GPS is > acting > > up and turn it off. > > In most cases the “other method” is dead reckoning. That’s actually being > generous. There are a *lot* of cases every year where the answer is that > the vessel is on GPS autopilot with nobody at all on watch. Yes the > results of > breaking the law are fairly predictable. Actually having a competent > navigator > on duty all the time running “alternate” data, that costs money ….. > > Bob > > > > > I'm far from a professional but I've taken the six week class and I'm > > reasonably certain I could find a place on the other side of the pacific > > ocean with no GPS. The GPS is far easier to use and more accurate but > no > > one uses just GPS alone, they alway compare several methods. > > > > On Mon, Aug 14, 2017 at 10:12 AM, Clint Jay wrote: > > > >> I guess it would depend on the level of infrastructure available to the > >> attacker, clock distribution is a reasonably well solved problem isn't > it? > >> > >> There would, I suppose also be the issue of receiver swamping, you could > >> monitor received signal levels as it's my understanding that the signals > >> from the satellites are weak enough that they're indiscernible from > noise > >> floor without some rather complex processing? > >> > >> Authentication via signing could be another feasible way to prevent > >> spoofing except we are potentially talking about interference from state > >> actors who may even be the very people who run one of the satellite > >> networks > >> > >> On 14 Aug 2017 5:51 pm, "Attila Kinali" wrote: > >> > >>> On Mon, 14 Aug 2017 12:09:43 -0400 > >>> Tim Shoppa wrote: > >>> > I think if you are only trying to spoof a single receiver it would be > possible to walk a spoofed time/space code in a way that time moved > >>> without > so obvious of a discontinuity. I'm sure there would be effects a > >> time-nut > could notice still. > >>> > >>> Not really. Unless you have a multi-antenna setup (see jim's email), > >>> you have nothing to compare the signal to. Even an ideal reference > >>> clock in your GPS receiver does not help, as the attacker could be > >>> tracking you in such a way that you will never see a discontinuity > >>> in time or position and that all the other sanity checks you do > >>> still don't show anything. > >>> > >>> With a two antenna setup, you can already check whether the phases > >>> add up to what you expect them to be, given your position relative > >>> to the satellites position. You do not need 3 antennas as a potential > >>> attacker can spoof the phase of some satellites correctly, but not > >>> of all at the same time. This at least gives you a spoof/no-spoof > signal. > >>> > >>> With an antenna array you can do some masking of spoofers (ie placing > >>> a null where the spoofer comes from). But this increases the cost and > >>> complexity of the system super-linear with the number of antennas. > >>> Maybe one way to do it, would be to use a single receiver with a stable > >>> reference clock and switch between antennas in short succession. Ie > >> similar > >>> to how the early single channel GPS receivers worked, but for antennas > >>> instead of SVs. But I have no idea how easy/difficult this would be > >>> to do and how well it would work against spoofers. > >>> > >>>Attila Kinali > >>> -- > >>> It is upon moral qualities that a society is ultimately founded. All > >>> the prosperity and technological sophistication in the world is of no > >>> use without that foundation. > >>> -- Miss Matheson, The Diamond Age, Neil Stephenson > >>> ___ > >>> time-nuts mailing list -- time-nuts@febo.com > >>> To unsubscribe, go to https://www.febo.com/cgi-bin/ > >>> mailman/listinfo/time-nuts > >>> and follow the instructions there. > >>> > >>
Re: [time-nuts] Ships fooled in GPS spoofing attack suggest Russian cyberweapon
albertson.ch...@gmail.com said: > I'm far from a professional but I've taken the six week class and I'm > reasonably certain I could find a place on the other side of the pacific > ocean with no GPS. The GPS is far easier to use and more accurate but no > one uses just GPS alone, they alway compare several methods. What's magic about the other side of the Pacific? GPS is based on satellites that don't care if there is land or water underneath. Do you have examples for "several methods"? LORAN was turned off within the USA. Few people know how to use a sextant. -- These are my opinions. I hate spam. ___ time-nuts mailing list -- time-nuts@febo.com To unsubscribe, go to https://www.febo.com/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/time-nuts and follow the instructions there.
Re: [time-nuts] Ships fooled in GPS spoofing attack suggest Russian cyberweapon
On 8/14/17 10:24 AM, Magnus Danielson wrote: Hi Jim, On 08/14/2017 06:03 PM, jimlux wrote: And GPS users who care about spoofing tend to use antenna systems that will reject signals coming from the "wrong" direction. It's pretty easy to set up 3 antenna separated by 30 cm or so and tell what direction the signal from each S/V is coming from. I would expect that as spoofing/jamming becomes more of a problem (e.g. all those Amazon delivery drones operating in a RF dense environment) this will become sort of standard practice. So now your spoofing becomes much more complex, because the sources have to appear to come from the right place in the sky. (fleets of UAVs?) You gain maybe 10 to 20 dB, but not much more. A real protection scheme needs much more tolerance to handle severe problems. I think it is more about are looking for "spoof detection" or "spoof immunity".. Spoof detection is a easier bar. There is an overbeliefe in such approaches, rather than trying to look at the system analysis, since when you loose the GPS signal, what do you do. I get blank stares all too often when I ask that trick question. Most successful schemes rely on "side information" of one sort or another - whether from an IMU or from other sources. Acquisition is always more vulnerable than track. I don't do much, if any, of this stuff these days - that was more my thing in the mid-80s when I would killed to have the cheap processing power and fast data converters available today. ___ time-nuts mailing list -- time-nuts@febo.com To unsubscribe, go to https://www.febo.com/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/time-nuts and follow the instructions there.
Re: [time-nuts] Ships fooled in GPS spoofing attack suggest Russian cyberweapon
Hi, Sure, some have started to work on it, but far from it. Traditional navigation helps a lot. While you have signal you can trim continously. Cheers, Magnus On 08/14/2017 07:43 PM, paul swed wrote: Sextent, compass, and clock. Amazingly as posted on time nuts some time ago the Navy and Coast Guard have re-introduced that training. On Mon, Aug 14, 2017 at 1:24 PM, Magnus Danielson < mag...@rubidium.dyndns.org> wrote: Hi Jim, On 08/14/2017 06:03 PM, jimlux wrote: And GPS users who care about spoofing tend to use antenna systems that will reject signals coming from the "wrong" direction. It's pretty easy to set up 3 antenna separated by 30 cm or so and tell what direction the signal from each S/V is coming from. I would expect that as spoofing/jamming becomes more of a problem (e.g. all those Amazon delivery drones operating in a RF dense environment) this will become sort of standard practice. So now your spoofing becomes much more complex, because the sources have to appear to come from the right place in the sky. (fleets of UAVs?) You gain maybe 10 to 20 dB, but not much more. A real protection scheme needs much more tolerance to handle severe problems. There is an overbeliefe in such approaches, rather than trying to look at the system analysis, since when you loose the GPS signal, what do you do. I get blank stares all too often when I ask that trick question. Cheers, Magnus ___ time-nuts mailing list -- time-nuts@febo.com To unsubscribe, go to https://www.febo.com/cgi-bin/m ailman/listinfo/time-nuts and follow the instructions there. ___ time-nuts mailing list -- time-nuts@febo.com To unsubscribe, go to https://www.febo.com/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/time-nuts and follow the instructions there. ___ time-nuts mailing list -- time-nuts@febo.com To unsubscribe, go to https://www.febo.com/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/time-nuts and follow the instructions there.
Re: [time-nuts] Ships fooled in GPS spoofing attack suggest Russian cyberweapon
Hi > On Aug 14, 2017, at 2:13 PM, Chris Albertson > wrote: > > The trouble with spoofing location is that in theory every ship is using > more than one method of navigation. They would notice their GPS is acting > up and turn it off. In most cases the “other method” is dead reckoning. That’s actually being generous. There are a *lot* of cases every year where the answer is that the vessel is on GPS autopilot with nobody at all on watch. Yes the results of breaking the law are fairly predictable. Actually having a competent navigator on duty all the time running “alternate” data, that costs money ….. Bob > > I'm far from a professional but I've taken the six week class and I'm > reasonably certain I could find a place on the other side of the pacific > ocean with no GPS. The GPS is far easier to use and more accurate but no > one uses just GPS alone, they alway compare several methods. > > On Mon, Aug 14, 2017 at 10:12 AM, Clint Jay wrote: > >> I guess it would depend on the level of infrastructure available to the >> attacker, clock distribution is a reasonably well solved problem isn't it? >> >> There would, I suppose also be the issue of receiver swamping, you could >> monitor received signal levels as it's my understanding that the signals >> from the satellites are weak enough that they're indiscernible from noise >> floor without some rather complex processing? >> >> Authentication via signing could be another feasible way to prevent >> spoofing except we are potentially talking about interference from state >> actors who may even be the very people who run one of the satellite >> networks >> >> On 14 Aug 2017 5:51 pm, "Attila Kinali" wrote: >> >>> On Mon, 14 Aug 2017 12:09:43 -0400 >>> Tim Shoppa wrote: >>> I think if you are only trying to spoof a single receiver it would be possible to walk a spoofed time/space code in a way that time moved >>> without so obvious of a discontinuity. I'm sure there would be effects a >> time-nut could notice still. >>> >>> Not really. Unless you have a multi-antenna setup (see jim's email), >>> you have nothing to compare the signal to. Even an ideal reference >>> clock in your GPS receiver does not help, as the attacker could be >>> tracking you in such a way that you will never see a discontinuity >>> in time or position and that all the other sanity checks you do >>> still don't show anything. >>> >>> With a two antenna setup, you can already check whether the phases >>> add up to what you expect them to be, given your position relative >>> to the satellites position. You do not need 3 antennas as a potential >>> attacker can spoof the phase of some satellites correctly, but not >>> of all at the same time. This at least gives you a spoof/no-spoof signal. >>> >>> With an antenna array you can do some masking of spoofers (ie placing >>> a null where the spoofer comes from). But this increases the cost and >>> complexity of the system super-linear with the number of antennas. >>> Maybe one way to do it, would be to use a single receiver with a stable >>> reference clock and switch between antennas in short succession. Ie >> similar >>> to how the early single channel GPS receivers worked, but for antennas >>> instead of SVs. But I have no idea how easy/difficult this would be >>> to do and how well it would work against spoofers. >>> >>>Attila Kinali >>> -- >>> It is upon moral qualities that a society is ultimately founded. All >>> the prosperity and technological sophistication in the world is of no >>> use without that foundation. >>> -- Miss Matheson, The Diamond Age, Neil Stephenson >>> ___ >>> time-nuts mailing list -- time-nuts@febo.com >>> To unsubscribe, go to https://www.febo.com/cgi-bin/ >>> mailman/listinfo/time-nuts >>> and follow the instructions there. >>> >> ___ >> time-nuts mailing list -- time-nuts@febo.com >> To unsubscribe, go to https://www.febo.com/cgi-bin/ >> mailman/listinfo/time-nuts >> and follow the instructions there. >> > > > > -- > > Chris Albertson > Redondo Beach, California > ___ > time-nuts mailing list -- time-nuts@febo.com > To unsubscribe, go to https://www.febo.com/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/time-nuts > and follow the instructions there. ___ time-nuts mailing list -- time-nuts@febo.com To unsubscribe, go to https://www.febo.com/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/time-nuts and follow the instructions there.
Re: [time-nuts] Ships fooled in GPS spoofing attack suggest Russian cyberweapon
Hi Consider what your automotive GPS receiver does coming out of a tunnel or out from under a bunch of trees. It still needs to work correctly in that situation. Same thing with a big rain cloud “over there”. I don’t think you would want a receiver that went nuts in those cases. I don’t think the military would want one either. Bob > On Aug 14, 2017, at 1:49 PM, Tim Shoppa wrote: > > Civilian receivers generally do not measure absolute strength but instead > report S/N. The spoofer could fake up a reasonable amount of noise to get a > wimpy S/N with a much stronger signal. > > Tim. > > On Mon, Aug 14, 2017 at 1:40 PM, ken Schwieker > wrote: > >> Wouldn't monitoring the received signal strength and noting any non-normal >> increase (or decrease) level change indicate possible spoofing? The >> spoofing station would have no way to know what the target's >> received signal strength would be. >> >> Ken S >> >> >> --- >> This email has been checked for viruses by AVG. >> http://www.avg.com >> >> >> ___ >> time-nuts mailing list -- time-nuts@febo.com >> To unsubscribe, go to https://www.febo.com/cgi-bin/m >> ailman/listinfo/time-nuts >> and follow the instructions there. >> > ___ > time-nuts mailing list -- time-nuts@febo.com > To unsubscribe, go to https://www.febo.com/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/time-nuts > and follow the instructions there. ___ time-nuts mailing list -- time-nuts@febo.com To unsubscribe, go to https://www.febo.com/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/time-nuts and follow the instructions there.
Re: [time-nuts] Ships fooled in GPS spoofing attack suggest Russian cyberweapon
The trouble with spoofing location is that in theory every ship is using more than one method of navigation. They would notice their GPS is acting up and turn it off. I'm far from a professional but I've taken the six week class and I'm reasonably certain I could find a place on the other side of the pacific ocean with no GPS. The GPS is far easier to use and more accurate but no one uses just GPS alone, they alway compare several methods. On Mon, Aug 14, 2017 at 10:12 AM, Clint Jay wrote: > I guess it would depend on the level of infrastructure available to the > attacker, clock distribution is a reasonably well solved problem isn't it? > > There would, I suppose also be the issue of receiver swamping, you could > monitor received signal levels as it's my understanding that the signals > from the satellites are weak enough that they're indiscernible from noise > floor without some rather complex processing? > > Authentication via signing could be another feasible way to prevent > spoofing except we are potentially talking about interference from state > actors who may even be the very people who run one of the satellite > networks > > On 14 Aug 2017 5:51 pm, "Attila Kinali" wrote: > > > On Mon, 14 Aug 2017 12:09:43 -0400 > > Tim Shoppa wrote: > > > > > I think if you are only trying to spoof a single receiver it would be > > > possible to walk a spoofed time/space code in a way that time moved > > without > > > so obvious of a discontinuity. I'm sure there would be effects a > time-nut > > > could notice still. > > > > Not really. Unless you have a multi-antenna setup (see jim's email), > > you have nothing to compare the signal to. Even an ideal reference > > clock in your GPS receiver does not help, as the attacker could be > > tracking you in such a way that you will never see a discontinuity > > in time or position and that all the other sanity checks you do > > still don't show anything. > > > > With a two antenna setup, you can already check whether the phases > > add up to what you expect them to be, given your position relative > > to the satellites position. You do not need 3 antennas as a potential > > attacker can spoof the phase of some satellites correctly, but not > > of all at the same time. This at least gives you a spoof/no-spoof signal. > > > > With an antenna array you can do some masking of spoofers (ie placing > > a null where the spoofer comes from). But this increases the cost and > > complexity of the system super-linear with the number of antennas. > > Maybe one way to do it, would be to use a single receiver with a stable > > reference clock and switch between antennas in short succession. Ie > similar > > to how the early single channel GPS receivers worked, but for antennas > > instead of SVs. But I have no idea how easy/difficult this would be > > to do and how well it would work against spoofers. > > > > Attila Kinali > > -- > > It is upon moral qualities that a society is ultimately founded. All > > the prosperity and technological sophistication in the world is of no > > use without that foundation. > > -- Miss Matheson, The Diamond Age, Neil Stephenson > > ___ > > time-nuts mailing list -- time-nuts@febo.com > > To unsubscribe, go to https://www.febo.com/cgi-bin/ > > mailman/listinfo/time-nuts > > and follow the instructions there. > > > ___ > time-nuts mailing list -- time-nuts@febo.com > To unsubscribe, go to https://www.febo.com/cgi-bin/ > mailman/listinfo/time-nuts > and follow the instructions there. > -- Chris Albertson Redondo Beach, California ___ time-nuts mailing list -- time-nuts@febo.com To unsubscribe, go to https://www.febo.com/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/time-nuts and follow the instructions there.
Re: [time-nuts] Ships fooled in GPS spoofing attack suggest Russian cyberweapon
HI Since multi path is a real issue in a mobile environment, defining what an “abnormal” change is could be quite tricky. A reasonable “spoof” would start with feeding the correct data and then slowly capture the target (still with correct data). Once he is are “in charge” signal wise, start doing whatever …. If you are talking about a ship, you have *lots* of time. Bob > On Aug 14, 2017, at 1:40 PM, ken Schwieker wrote: > > Wouldn't monitoring the received signal strength and noting any non-normal > increase (or decrease) level change indicate possible spoofing? The spoofing > station would have no way to know what the target's > received signal strength would be. > > Ken S > > > --- > This email has been checked for viruses by AVG. > http://www.avg.com > > ___ > time-nuts mailing list -- time-nuts@febo.com > To unsubscribe, go to https://www.febo.com/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/time-nuts > and follow the instructions there. ___ time-nuts mailing list -- time-nuts@febo.com To unsubscribe, go to https://www.febo.com/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/time-nuts and follow the instructions there.
Re: [time-nuts] Ships fooled in GPS spoofing attack suggest Russian cyberweapon
Civilian receivers generally do not measure absolute strength but instead report S/N. The spoofer could fake up a reasonable amount of noise to get a wimpy S/N with a much stronger signal. Tim. On Mon, Aug 14, 2017 at 1:40 PM, ken Schwieker wrote: > Wouldn't monitoring the received signal strength and noting any non-normal > increase (or decrease) level change indicate possible spoofing? The > spoofing station would have no way to know what the target's > received signal strength would be. > > Ken S > > > --- > This email has been checked for viruses by AVG. > http://www.avg.com > > > ___ > time-nuts mailing list -- time-nuts@febo.com > To unsubscribe, go to https://www.febo.com/cgi-bin/m > ailman/listinfo/time-nuts > and follow the instructions there. > ___ time-nuts mailing list -- time-nuts@febo.com To unsubscribe, go to https://www.febo.com/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/time-nuts and follow the instructions there.
Re: [time-nuts] Ships fooled in GPS spoofing attack suggest Russian cyberweapon
In some sense the "jump everyone to the airport 32km away" is a too-simplistic case because it's too easy to detect. Let's just arbitrarily place 100nanoseconds as the threshold for detectable time jump indicating that you're being spoofed. Yes modern timing receivers do better than that all the time but navigation receivers are not timing receivers. The spoofing transmitter would need to know the single target's 3-dimensional location to 100 feet, to avoid detection of a spoofing attempt, then. This seems possible or even likely, especially in the case of a spoofing demonstration with slow seagoing vessels, or maybe even road vehicles known to be traveling on a given highway combined with other roadside sensors. After the spoofer had acquired the spoofing target that way, giving it a false (but not inconceivable) course to the wrong location seems possible. If you know something about the craft's ability for inertial guidance you would keep your fake course within those parameters. So it all gets much easier ifyou can set up the local detection net at key locations that a spoofing target is likely to travel through. A narrow strait or a highway intersection. It all gets much harder when you have multiple targets in your field of view that you want to spoof especially if you can't follow them closely. But maybe as long as all the GPS manufacturers are focusing on low time-to-first-fix, the target GPS will always be too willing to believe a completely arbitrary location. Us time-nuts don't mind surveying for days. Real GPS positioining users want the answer much more quickly! Tim N3QE On Mon, Aug 14, 2017 at 12:51 PM, Attila Kinali wrote: > On Mon, 14 Aug 2017 12:09:43 -0400 > Tim Shoppa wrote: > > > I think if you are only trying to spoof a single receiver it would be > > possible to walk a spoofed time/space code in a way that time moved > without > > so obvious of a discontinuity. I'm sure there would be effects a time-nut > > could notice still. > > Not really. Unless you have a multi-antenna setup (see jim's email), > you have nothing to compare the signal to. Even an ideal reference > clock in your GPS receiver does not help, as the attacker could be > tracking you in such a way that you will never see a discontinuity > in time or position and that all the other sanity checks you do > still don't show anything. > > With a two antenna setup, you can already check whether the phases > add up to what you expect them to be, given your position relative > to the satellites position. You do not need 3 antennas as a potential > attacker can spoof the phase of some satellites correctly, but not > of all at the same time. This at least gives you a spoof/no-spoof signal. > > With an antenna array you can do some masking of spoofers (ie placing > a null where the spoofer comes from). But this increases the cost and > complexity of the system super-linear with the number of antennas. > Maybe one way to do it, would be to use a single receiver with a stable > reference clock and switch between antennas in short succession. Ie similar > to how the early single channel GPS receivers worked, but for antennas > instead of SVs. But I have no idea how easy/difficult this would be > to do and how well it would work against spoofers. > > Attila Kinali > -- > It is upon moral qualities that a society is ultimately founded. All > the prosperity and technological sophistication in the world is of no > use without that foundation. > -- Miss Matheson, The Diamond Age, Neil Stephenson > ___ > time-nuts mailing list -- time-nuts@febo.com > To unsubscribe, go to https://www.febo.com/cgi-bin/ > mailman/listinfo/time-nuts > and follow the instructions there. > ___ time-nuts mailing list -- time-nuts@febo.com To unsubscribe, go to https://www.febo.com/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/time-nuts and follow the instructions there.
Re: [time-nuts] Sharing a GPS Antenna
Thank you one and all for all the help and suggestions. I've got an HP 58516A w/external DC input option on the way. Now to find a proper N-male terminator for the unused port, and start gathering up cable and connectors to hook it all up. __ Clay Autery, KY5G MONTAC Enterprises (318) 518-1389 On 8/14/2017 9:22 AM, Clay Autery wrote: > I'm toying with the idea of trying to share a single PCTEL GPS antenna > three-ways. > > ___ time-nuts mailing list -- time-nuts@febo.com To unsubscribe, go to https://www.febo.com/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/time-nuts and follow the instructions there.
Re: [time-nuts] Ships fooled in GPS spoofing attack suggest Russian cyberweapon
Wouldn't monitoring the received signal strength and noting any non-normal increase (or decrease) level change indicate possible spoofing? The spoofing station would have no way to know what the target's received signal strength would be. Ken S --- This email has been checked for viruses by AVG. http://www.avg.com ___ time-nuts mailing list -- time-nuts@febo.com To unsubscribe, go to https://www.febo.com/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/time-nuts and follow the instructions there.
Re: [time-nuts] Ships fooled in GPS spoofing attack suggest Russian cyberweapon
Sextent, compass, and clock. Amazingly as posted on time nuts some time ago the Navy and Coast Guard have re-introduced that training. On Mon, Aug 14, 2017 at 1:24 PM, Magnus Danielson < mag...@rubidium.dyndns.org> wrote: > Hi Jim, > > On 08/14/2017 06:03 PM, jimlux wrote: > >> And GPS users who care about spoofing tend to use antenna systems that >> will reject signals coming from the "wrong" direction. It's pretty easy to >> set up 3 antenna separated by 30 cm or so and tell what direction the >> signal from each S/V is coming from. >> >> I would expect that as spoofing/jamming becomes more of a problem (e.g. >> all those Amazon delivery drones operating in a RF dense environment) this >> will become sort of standard practice. >> >> So now your spoofing becomes much more complex, because the sources have >> to appear to come from the right place in the sky. (fleets of UAVs?) >> > > You gain maybe 10 to 20 dB, but not much more. > A real protection scheme needs much more tolerance to handle severe > problems. > > There is an overbeliefe in such approaches, rather than trying to look at > the system analysis, since when you loose the GPS signal, what do you do. I > get blank stares all too often when I ask that trick question. > > Cheers, > Magnus > ___ > time-nuts mailing list -- time-nuts@febo.com > To unsubscribe, go to https://www.febo.com/cgi-bin/m > ailman/listinfo/time-nuts > and follow the instructions there. > ___ time-nuts mailing list -- time-nuts@febo.com To unsubscribe, go to https://www.febo.com/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/time-nuts and follow the instructions there.
Re: [time-nuts] Ships fooled in GPS spoofing attack suggest Russian cyberweapon
Hi > On Aug 14, 2017, at 11:38 AM, Clint Jay wrote: > > All very true and yes, for a capable programmer and hardware tech it's not > going to be an impossible task. > > I would still expect a turnkey solution to exist though as I can see many > applications for not just state actors. There have been multiple “turn key” solutions out there for at least 10 years now. It’s a bit like buying a couple hundred pounds of heroin. You just need to know where to shop …. Bob > > On 14 Aug 2017 4:32 pm, "Attila Kinali" wrote: > >> On Mon, 14 Aug 2017 10:26:13 +0100 >> Clint Jay wrote: >> >>> That it can "so easily" be spoofed (it's not a trivial hack to spoof and >>> would, as far as I can see, take good knowledge of how GPS works and >> skill >>> to implement) is worrying and it could have disastrous consequences if >>> anyone decided to use it for malicious means but I'd be surprised if >> there >>> wasn't a turnkey solution available to anyone who has the funds. >> >> You don't need a turnkey solution. If you start from zero and are working >> alone, it probably will take you a month or two to write the code to spoof >> GPS L1 C/A. If you start from one of the GnuRadio based GPS simulators, >> you can do it in a weekend. >> >> If you want to spoof L2C and L5 as well and also Galileo OS E1/E5, >> it will take a bit longer, but not that much, as 90% of the code shared. >> >> Not only is this very simple. All the documentation you need is readily >> available and packaged such, that you don't need to know anything about >> GNSS systems before you start and it will not slow you down significantly. >> (e.g. Pick up the book from Hegarty and Kaplan and you can just write >> the code as you read it). >> >> The most difficult part of this is not creating the signals, but figuring >> out a way what PRN's and fake position to choose, such that the tracking >> loop of the target doesn't go completely bonkers and needs to do a >> re-aquisition on all signals. But even that is not that difficult, if >> you have some estimate of the target's location. Or you can simply not >> care about it, if you have a slow moving target, like a car or a ship, >> as the re-aquisition will take less than a minute. >> >> >> There have been discussions on adding authentication to GNSS services >> for quite some time (at least 10 years, probably longer). And it >> culminated in the CS and PRS services of Galileo. I.e. they are a >> restricted and/or paid-for service. I am pretty sure that this will >> change at some point and the OS serivces (including the free services >> of GPS) will provide some basic authentication system as well. >> >> In the meantime, people who rely on GNSS heavily have monitoring >> facilites that check the on air signals for degradation or spoofing. >> As this requires multiple monitoring stations over the whole area >> covered, to ensure that no spoofing or jamming attempt goes unnoticed, >> this is rather expensive. The only use of this kind of system, that I >> am aware of, are airports. And yes, this is not fool-proof. A narrow >> beam spoofer pointed at some airplane will go unoticed, as all the >> monitoring stations are on the ground. >> >> >>Attila Kinali >> >> -- >> It is upon moral qualities that a society is ultimately founded. All >> the prosperity and technological sophistication in the world is of no >> use without that foundation. >> -- Miss Matheson, The Diamond Age, Neil Stephenson >> ___ >> time-nuts mailing list -- time-nuts@febo.com >> To unsubscribe, go to https://www.febo.com/cgi-bin/ >> mailman/listinfo/time-nuts >> and follow the instructions there. >> > ___ > time-nuts mailing list -- time-nuts@febo.com > To unsubscribe, go to https://www.febo.com/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/time-nuts > and follow the instructions there. ___ time-nuts mailing list -- time-nuts@febo.com To unsubscribe, go to https://www.febo.com/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/time-nuts and follow the instructions there.
[time-nuts] Sharing a GPS Antenna
I'm toying with the idea of trying to share a single PCTEL GPS antenna three-ways. I would prefer to NOT have to put up three different GPS antennas, have three different feed lines coming into the shack, et al. Need to feed: 1) GPSDO (currently a re-purposed Nortel unit) 5VDC spec antenna 2) NTP Stratum 1 server (Raspberry Pi-based) Pretty sure a 3.3VDC antenna 3) Blitzortung System BLUE lightning detection/reporting station. 3.3VDC antenna PCTEL GPS-TMG-HR-26N antenna is a 5VDC nominal (40mA @ 5VDC) HOWEVER the spec sheet shows it functions from 3.3VDC to 12 VDC using a regulated supply, and a "survival voltage" of 24 VDC. Now, I have heard of folks running antennas that function on 12VDC on a straight splitter with no DC blocking, but that doesn't "sit right" with the OCD over-engineer part of me. Here are the 3 options: 1) 3-way split, no DC blocking 2) 3-way split with DC blocking on 3.3VDC devices. 3) 3-way split with DC blocking on all three devices AND DC injection after the split with a chosen regulated DC voltage based on best gain vs. minimized noise. Leaning toward Option #3 because I don't intend to use the old NORTEL unit forever... and it's replacement may well NOT be a 5VDC device... And I suspect that efficiency drops rapidly below 5VDC. That way, nothing changes from splitter to antenna regardless of what device I put in place for GPSDO, NTP server, et al... Cable run will be approximately 53 feet from devices to top of 38 foot mast right outside the shack (top of pole used at one corner of 80m loop; loop is suspended 10 foot laterally away from mast). I know splitting the signal is likely NOT "time Nuts approved" approach, but I'd like to try it anyway... and putting the antenna up high in an all but unobstructed 360 degree view, and using a low-loss feed-line should allow sufficient signal for all devices. (I hope) Any suggestions for a 3 port DC blocked splitter, or other part(s) and some part to use for DC injection? I can handle the linear regulated supply. Thanks! -- __ Clay Autery, KY5G (318) 518-1389 ___ time-nuts mailing list -- time-nuts@febo.com To unsubscribe, go to https://www.febo.com/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/time-nuts and follow the instructions there.
Re: [time-nuts] Ships fooled in GPS spoofing attack suggest Russian cyberweapon
Hi Jim, On 08/14/2017 06:03 PM, jimlux wrote: And GPS users who care about spoofing tend to use antenna systems that will reject signals coming from the "wrong" direction. It's pretty easy to set up 3 antenna separated by 30 cm or so and tell what direction the signal from each S/V is coming from. I would expect that as spoofing/jamming becomes more of a problem (e.g. all those Amazon delivery drones operating in a RF dense environment) this will become sort of standard practice. So now your spoofing becomes much more complex, because the sources have to appear to come from the right place in the sky. (fleets of UAVs?) You gain maybe 10 to 20 dB, but not much more. A real protection scheme needs much more tolerance to handle severe problems. There is an overbeliefe in such approaches, rather than trying to look at the system analysis, since when you loose the GPS signal, what do you do. I get blank stares all too often when I ask that trick question. Cheers, Magnus ___ time-nuts mailing list -- time-nuts@febo.com To unsubscribe, go to https://www.febo.com/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/time-nuts and follow the instructions there.
Re: [time-nuts] Ships fooled in GPS spoofing attack suggest Russian cyberweapon
All very true and yes, for a capable programmer and hardware tech it's not going to be an impossible task. I would still expect a turnkey solution to exist though as I can see many applications for not just state actors. On 14 Aug 2017 4:32 pm, "Attila Kinali" wrote: > On Mon, 14 Aug 2017 10:26:13 +0100 > Clint Jay wrote: > > > That it can "so easily" be spoofed (it's not a trivial hack to spoof and > > would, as far as I can see, take good knowledge of how GPS works and > skill > > to implement) is worrying and it could have disastrous consequences if > > anyone decided to use it for malicious means but I'd be surprised if > there > > wasn't a turnkey solution available to anyone who has the funds. > > You don't need a turnkey solution. If you start from zero and are working > alone, it probably will take you a month or two to write the code to spoof > GPS L1 C/A. If you start from one of the GnuRadio based GPS simulators, > you can do it in a weekend. > > If you want to spoof L2C and L5 as well and also Galileo OS E1/E5, > it will take a bit longer, but not that much, as 90% of the code shared. > > Not only is this very simple. All the documentation you need is readily > available and packaged such, that you don't need to know anything about > GNSS systems before you start and it will not slow you down significantly. > (e.g. Pick up the book from Hegarty and Kaplan and you can just write > the code as you read it). > > The most difficult part of this is not creating the signals, but figuring > out a way what PRN's and fake position to choose, such that the tracking > loop of the target doesn't go completely bonkers and needs to do a > re-aquisition on all signals. But even that is not that difficult, if > you have some estimate of the target's location. Or you can simply not > care about it, if you have a slow moving target, like a car or a ship, > as the re-aquisition will take less than a minute. > > > There have been discussions on adding authentication to GNSS services > for quite some time (at least 10 years, probably longer). And it > culminated in the CS and PRS services of Galileo. I.e. they are a > restricted and/or paid-for service. I am pretty sure that this will > change at some point and the OS serivces (including the free services > of GPS) will provide some basic authentication system as well. > > In the meantime, people who rely on GNSS heavily have monitoring > facilites that check the on air signals for degradation or spoofing. > As this requires multiple monitoring stations over the whole area > covered, to ensure that no spoofing or jamming attempt goes unnoticed, > this is rather expensive. The only use of this kind of system, that I > am aware of, are airports. And yes, this is not fool-proof. A narrow > beam spoofer pointed at some airplane will go unoticed, as all the > monitoring stations are on the ground. > > > Attila Kinali > > -- > It is upon moral qualities that a society is ultimately founded. All > the prosperity and technological sophistication in the world is of no > use without that foundation. > -- Miss Matheson, The Diamond Age, Neil Stephenson > ___ > time-nuts mailing list -- time-nuts@febo.com > To unsubscribe, go to https://www.febo.com/cgi-bin/ > mailman/listinfo/time-nuts > and follow the instructions there. > ___ time-nuts mailing list -- time-nuts@febo.com To unsubscribe, go to https://www.febo.com/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/time-nuts and follow the instructions there.
Re: [time-nuts] Ships fooled in GPS spoofing attack suggest Russian cyberweapon
I guess it would depend on the level of infrastructure available to the attacker, clock distribution is a reasonably well solved problem isn't it? There would, I suppose also be the issue of receiver swamping, you could monitor received signal levels as it's my understanding that the signals from the satellites are weak enough that they're indiscernible from noise floor without some rather complex processing? Authentication via signing could be another feasible way to prevent spoofing except we are potentially talking about interference from state actors who may even be the very people who run one of the satellite networks On 14 Aug 2017 5:51 pm, "Attila Kinali" wrote: > On Mon, 14 Aug 2017 12:09:43 -0400 > Tim Shoppa wrote: > > > I think if you are only trying to spoof a single receiver it would be > > possible to walk a spoofed time/space code in a way that time moved > without > > so obvious of a discontinuity. I'm sure there would be effects a time-nut > > could notice still. > > Not really. Unless you have a multi-antenna setup (see jim's email), > you have nothing to compare the signal to. Even an ideal reference > clock in your GPS receiver does not help, as the attacker could be > tracking you in such a way that you will never see a discontinuity > in time or position and that all the other sanity checks you do > still don't show anything. > > With a two antenna setup, you can already check whether the phases > add up to what you expect them to be, given your position relative > to the satellites position. You do not need 3 antennas as a potential > attacker can spoof the phase of some satellites correctly, but not > of all at the same time. This at least gives you a spoof/no-spoof signal. > > With an antenna array you can do some masking of spoofers (ie placing > a null where the spoofer comes from). But this increases the cost and > complexity of the system super-linear with the number of antennas. > Maybe one way to do it, would be to use a single receiver with a stable > reference clock and switch between antennas in short succession. Ie similar > to how the early single channel GPS receivers worked, but for antennas > instead of SVs. But I have no idea how easy/difficult this would be > to do and how well it would work against spoofers. > > Attila Kinali > -- > It is upon moral qualities that a society is ultimately founded. All > the prosperity and technological sophistication in the world is of no > use without that foundation. > -- Miss Matheson, The Diamond Age, Neil Stephenson > ___ > time-nuts mailing list -- time-nuts@febo.com > To unsubscribe, go to https://www.febo.com/cgi-bin/ > mailman/listinfo/time-nuts > and follow the instructions there. > ___ time-nuts mailing list -- time-nuts@febo.com To unsubscribe, go to https://www.febo.com/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/time-nuts and follow the instructions there.
Re: [time-nuts] Ships fooled in GPS spoofing attack suggest Russian cyberweapon
On Mon, 14 Aug 2017 12:09:43 -0400 Tim Shoppa wrote: > I think if you are only trying to spoof a single receiver it would be > possible to walk a spoofed time/space code in a way that time moved without > so obvious of a discontinuity. I'm sure there would be effects a time-nut > could notice still. Not really. Unless you have a multi-antenna setup (see jim's email), you have nothing to compare the signal to. Even an ideal reference clock in your GPS receiver does not help, as the attacker could be tracking you in such a way that you will never see a discontinuity in time or position and that all the other sanity checks you do still don't show anything. With a two antenna setup, you can already check whether the phases add up to what you expect them to be, given your position relative to the satellites position. You do not need 3 antennas as a potential attacker can spoof the phase of some satellites correctly, but not of all at the same time. This at least gives you a spoof/no-spoof signal. With an antenna array you can do some masking of spoofers (ie placing a null where the spoofer comes from). But this increases the cost and complexity of the system super-linear with the number of antennas. Maybe one way to do it, would be to use a single receiver with a stable reference clock and switch between antennas in short succession. Ie similar to how the early single channel GPS receivers worked, but for antennas instead of SVs. But I have no idea how easy/difficult this would be to do and how well it would work against spoofers. Attila Kinali -- It is upon moral qualities that a society is ultimately founded. All the prosperity and technological sophistication in the world is of no use without that foundation. -- Miss Matheson, The Diamond Age, Neil Stephenson ___ time-nuts mailing list -- time-nuts@febo.com To unsubscribe, go to https://www.febo.com/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/time-nuts and follow the instructions there.
Re: [time-nuts] Ships fooled in GPS spoofing attack suggest Russian cyberweapon
Hi Time is one more thing the spoofer needs to consider. It does not eliminate the ability to spoof, it just adds one more factor to his setup. If he’s got a “clear” GPS signal to base his spoof on, that gives him a timebase to use. Bob > On Aug 14, 2017, at 12:09 PM, Tim Shoppa wrote: > > Bringing this back around to time-nuts - wouldn't the timescale > discontinuity at the receiver, be a powerful clue that spoofing was going > on? But these being navigation receivers they aren't looking so critically > at the time. > > Presumably this was a single-transmitter jammer that pretended it was a > whole GPS constellation. > > A 32 kilometer jump in position would've been a 10 to 100 microsecond time > jump for at least some of the receivers in that section of the Black Sea. > And 10 microseconds sticks out like a sore thumb to a time nut. > > I think if you are only trying to spoof a single receiver it would be > possible to walk a spoofed time/space code in a way that time moved without > so obvious of a discontinuity. I'm sure there would be effects a time-nut > could notice still. > > Tim N3QE > > > On Sat, Aug 12, 2017 at 5:23 PM, John Allen > wrote: > >> FYI, John K1AE >> >> -Original Message- >> From: YCCC [mailto:yccc-boun...@contesting.com] On Behalf Of ROBERT >> DOHERTY >> Sent: Saturday, August 12, 2017 9:26 AM >> To: YCCC Reflector >> Subject: [YCCC] Fwd: Re: [Radio Officers, &c] Ships fooled in GPS spoofing >> attack suggest Russian cyberweapon >> >> As if there were not enough problems in the world . >> >> Whitey K1VV >> >>>Date: August 12, 2017 at 7:37 AM >>>Subject: Re: [Radio Officers, &c] Ships fooled in GPS spoofing >> attack suggest Russian cyberweapon >>> >>>Ships fooled in GPS spoofing attack suggest Russian cyberweapon >>> >>>News from: New Scientis (article reported by R/O Luca Milone – >> IZ7GEG) >>> >>>https://www.newscientist.com/article/2143499-ships-fooled- >> in-gps-spoofing-attack-suggest-russian-cyberweapon/#. >> WY6zNfZq1VA.google_plusone_share https://www.newscientist.com/ >> article/2143499-ships-fooled-in-gps-spoofing-attack- >> suggest-russian-cyberweapon/#.WY6zNfZq1VA.google_plusone_share >>> >>> >>>On date: 10 August 2017 >>> >>>By David Hambling >>> >>> >>>Reports of satellite navigation problems in the Black Sea suggest >> that Russia may be testing a new system for spoofing GPS, New Scientist has >> learned. This could be the first hint of a new form of electronic warfare >> available to everyone from rogue nation states to petty criminals. >>> >>> >>>On 22 June, the US Maritime Administration filed a seemingly bland >> incident report. The master of a ship off the Russian port of Novorossiysk >> had discovered his GPS put him in the wrong spot – more than 32 kilometres >> inland, at Gelendzhik Airport. >>> >>> >>>After checking the navigation equipment was working properly, the >> captain contacted other nearby ships. Their AIS traces – signals from the >> automatic identification system used to track vessels – placed them all at >> the same airport. At least 20 ships were affected >> http://maritime-executive.com/editorials/mass-gps-spoofing- >> attack-in-black-sea . >>> >>> >>>While the incident is not yet confirmed, experts think this is the >> first documented use of GPS misdirection – https://www.marad.dot.gov/ >> msci/alert/2017/2017-005a-gps-interference-black-sea/ a spoofing attack >> that has long been warned of but never been seen in the wild. >>> >>> >>>Until now, the biggest worry for GPS has been it can be jammed >> https://www.newscientist.com/article/dn20202-gps-chaos-how- >> a-30-box-can-jam-your-life/ by masking the GPS satellite signal with >> noise. While this can cause chaos, it is also easy to detect. GPS receivers >> sound an alarm when they lose the signal due to jamming. Spoofing is more >> insidious: a false signal from a ground station simply confuses a satellite >> receiver. “Jamming just causes the receiver to die, spoofing causes the >> receiver to lie,” says consultant David Last >> http://www.professordavidlast.co.uk/ , former president of the UK’s Royal >> Institute of Navigation. >>> >>> >>>Todd Humphreys http://www.ae.utexas.edu/faculty/faculty-directory/ >> humphreys , of the University of Texas at Austin, has been warning of the >> coming danger of GPS spoofing for many years. In 2013, he showed how a >> superyacht with state-of-the-art navigation could be lured off-course by >> GPS spoofing. “The receiver’s behaviour in the Black Sea incident was much >> like during the controlled attacks http://onlinelibrary.wiley. >> com/doi/10.1002/navi.183/full my team conducted,” says Humphreys. >>> >>> >>>Humphreys thinks this is Russia experimenting with a new form of >> electronic warfare. Over the past year, GPS spoofing has been causing chaos >> for the receivers on phone apps in central Moscow to misbehave >> https://themoscowtim
Re: [time-nuts] Ships fooled in GPS spoofing attack suggest Russian cyberweapon
Hi The big(er) deal with some systems is that they offer encrypted services. If you happen to have access to the crypto version, that’s going to help you. As long as you are using “public” (and thus fully documented) modes … not a lot of difference. The same info that lets anybody design a receiver lets people design a spoofing system. Bob > On Aug 14, 2017, at 11:54 AM, John Hawkinson wrote: > > So, what I wonder: to what extent (if any) are GPS, GLONASS, and Galileo > sufficiently different that it is challenging to spoof all three in the same > way? Is there any reason why it is more than 3 times the work to spoof all 3? > > Is there something clever receivers can do, with awareness of all three > services, that makes them harder to spoof (beyond checking the services > against each other)? > > --jh...@mit.edu > John Hawkinson > ___ > time-nuts mailing list -- time-nuts@febo.com > To unsubscribe, go to https://www.febo.com/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/time-nuts > and follow the instructions there. ___ time-nuts mailing list -- time-nuts@febo.com To unsubscribe, go to https://www.febo.com/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/time-nuts and follow the instructions there.
Re: [time-nuts] Ships fooled in GPS spoofing attack suggest Russian cyberweapon
Bringing this back around to time-nuts - wouldn't the timescale discontinuity at the receiver, be a powerful clue that spoofing was going on? But these being navigation receivers they aren't looking so critically at the time. Presumably this was a single-transmitter jammer that pretended it was a whole GPS constellation. A 32 kilometer jump in position would've been a 10 to 100 microsecond time jump for at least some of the receivers in that section of the Black Sea. And 10 microseconds sticks out like a sore thumb to a time nut. I think if you are only trying to spoof a single receiver it would be possible to walk a spoofed time/space code in a way that time moved without so obvious of a discontinuity. I'm sure there would be effects a time-nut could notice still. Tim N3QE On Sat, Aug 12, 2017 at 5:23 PM, John Allen wrote: > FYI, John K1AE > > -Original Message- > From: YCCC [mailto:yccc-boun...@contesting.com] On Behalf Of ROBERT > DOHERTY > Sent: Saturday, August 12, 2017 9:26 AM > To: YCCC Reflector > Subject: [YCCC] Fwd: Re: [Radio Officers, &c] Ships fooled in GPS spoofing > attack suggest Russian cyberweapon > > As if there were not enough problems in the world . > > Whitey K1VV > > > Date: August 12, 2017 at 7:37 AM > > Subject: Re: [Radio Officers, &c] Ships fooled in GPS spoofing > attack suggest Russian cyberweapon > > > > Ships fooled in GPS spoofing attack suggest Russian cyberweapon > > > > News from: New Scientis (article reported by R/O Luca Milone – > IZ7GEG) > > > > https://www.newscientist.com/article/2143499-ships-fooled- > in-gps-spoofing-attack-suggest-russian-cyberweapon/#. > WY6zNfZq1VA.google_plusone_share https://www.newscientist.com/ > article/2143499-ships-fooled-in-gps-spoofing-attack- > suggest-russian-cyberweapon/#.WY6zNfZq1VA.google_plusone_share > > > > > > On date: 10 August 2017 > > > > By David Hambling > > > > > > Reports of satellite navigation problems in the Black Sea suggest > that Russia may be testing a new system for spoofing GPS, New Scientist has > learned. This could be the first hint of a new form of electronic warfare > available to everyone from rogue nation states to petty criminals. > > > > > > On 22 June, the US Maritime Administration filed a seemingly bland > incident report. The master of a ship off the Russian port of Novorossiysk > had discovered his GPS put him in the wrong spot – more than 32 kilometres > inland, at Gelendzhik Airport. > > > > > > After checking the navigation equipment was working properly, the > captain contacted other nearby ships. Their AIS traces – signals from the > automatic identification system used to track vessels – placed them all at > the same airport. At least 20 ships were affected > http://maritime-executive.com/editorials/mass-gps-spoofing- > attack-in-black-sea . > > > > > > While the incident is not yet confirmed, experts think this is the > first documented use of GPS misdirection – https://www.marad.dot.gov/ > msci/alert/2017/2017-005a-gps-interference-black-sea/ a spoofing attack > that has long been warned of but never been seen in the wild. > > > > > > Until now, the biggest worry for GPS has been it can be jammed > https://www.newscientist.com/article/dn20202-gps-chaos-how- > a-30-box-can-jam-your-life/ by masking the GPS satellite signal with > noise. While this can cause chaos, it is also easy to detect. GPS receivers > sound an alarm when they lose the signal due to jamming. Spoofing is more > insidious: a false signal from a ground station simply confuses a satellite > receiver. “Jamming just causes the receiver to die, spoofing causes the > receiver to lie,” says consultant David Last > http://www.professordavidlast.co.uk/ , former president of the UK’s Royal > Institute of Navigation. > > > > > > Todd Humphreys http://www.ae.utexas.edu/faculty/faculty-directory/ > humphreys , of the University of Texas at Austin, has been warning of the > coming danger of GPS spoofing for many years. In 2013, he showed how a > superyacht with state-of-the-art navigation could be lured off-course by > GPS spoofing. “The receiver’s behaviour in the Black Sea incident was much > like during the controlled attacks http://onlinelibrary.wiley. > com/doi/10.1002/navi.183/full my team conducted,” says Humphreys. > > > > > > Humphreys thinks this is Russia experimenting with a new form of > electronic warfare. Over the past year, GPS spoofing has been causing chaos > for the receivers on phone apps in central Moscow to misbehave > https://themoscowtimes.com/articles/the-kremlin-eats-gps- > for-breakfast-55823 . The scale of the problem did not become apparent > until people began trying to play Pokemon Go. The fake signal, which seems > to centre on the Kremlin, relocates anyone nearby to Vnukovo Airport > http://www.thetruthaboutcars.com/2017/01/bizarre-gps- > spoofing-means-drivers-near-kremlin-always-airport/ , 32 km away. This is > probably fo
Re: [time-nuts] Ships fooled in GPS spoofing attack suggest Russian cyberweapon
On 8/14/17 8:24 AM, Attila Kinali wrote: On Mon, 14 Aug 2017 10:26:13 +0100 Clint Jay wrote: That it can "so easily" be spoofed (it's not a trivial hack to spoof and would, as far as I can see, take good knowledge of how GPS works and skill to implement) is worrying and it could have disastrous consequences if anyone decided to use it for malicious means but I'd be surprised if there wasn't a turnkey solution available to anyone who has the funds. You don't need a turnkey solution. If you start from zero and are working alone, it probably will take you a month or two to write the code to spoof GPS L1 C/A. If you start from one of the GnuRadio based GPS simulators, you can do it in a weekend. If you want to spoof L2C and L5 as well and also Galileo OS E1/E5, it will take a bit longer, but not that much, as 90% of the code shared. Not only is this very simple. All the documentation you need is readily available and packaged such, that you don't need to know anything about GNSS systems before you start and it will not slow you down significantly. (e.g. Pick up the book from Hegarty and Kaplan and you can just write the code as you read it). The most difficult part of this is not creating the signals, but figuring out a way what PRN's and fake position to choose, such that the tracking loop of the target doesn't go completely bonkers and needs to do a re-aquisition on all signals. But even that is not that difficult, if you have some estimate of the target's location. Or you can simply not care about it, if you have a slow moving target, like a car or a ship, as the re-aquisition will take less than a minute. There have been discussions on adding authentication to GNSS services for quite some time (at least 10 years, probably longer). And it culminated in the CS and PRS services of Galileo. I.e. they are a restricted and/or paid-for service. I am pretty sure that this will change at some point and the OS serivces (including the free services of GPS) will provide some basic authentication system as well. In the meantime, people who rely on GNSS heavily have monitoring facilites that check the on air signals for degradation or spoofing. As this requires multiple monitoring stations over the whole area covered, to ensure that no spoofing or jamming attempt goes unnoticed, this is rather expensive. The only use of this kind of system, that I am aware of, are airports. And yes, this is not fool-proof. A narrow beam spoofer pointed at some airplane will go unoticed, as all the monitoring stations are on the ground. And GPS users who care about spoofing tend to use antenna systems that will reject signals coming from the "wrong" direction. It's pretty easy to set up 3 antenna separated by 30 cm or so and tell what direction the signal from each S/V is coming from. I would expect that as spoofing/jamming becomes more of a problem (e.g. all those Amazon delivery drones operating in a RF dense environment) this will become sort of standard practice. So now your spoofing becomes much more complex, because the sources have to appear to come from the right place in the sky. (fleets of UAVs?) Attila Kinali ___ time-nuts mailing list -- time-nuts@febo.com To unsubscribe, go to https://www.febo.com/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/time-nuts and follow the instructions there.
Re: [time-nuts] Ships fooled in GPS spoofing attack suggest Russian cyberweapon
So, what I wonder: to what extent (if any) are GPS, GLONASS, and Galileo sufficiently different that it is challenging to spoof all three in the same way? Is there any reason why it is more than 3 times the work to spoof all 3? Is there something clever receivers can do, with awareness of all three services, that makes them harder to spoof (beyond checking the services against each other)? --jh...@mit.edu John Hawkinson ___ time-nuts mailing list -- time-nuts@febo.com To unsubscribe, go to https://www.febo.com/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/time-nuts and follow the instructions there.
[time-nuts] Lady Heather Crashing with Skipped Time Stamps and Changing Receiver Modes
I have LH installed on a fast Intel i5 Dual Core processor, no background programs, 8G RAM and it crashes after about 2 hours. Attached is the log and it seems that the end near the crash begins with skipped time stamps and changes in receiver mode. I hope someone can offer some advice or further diagnostics? Jerry, NY2W tbolt.log Description: Binary data ___ time-nuts mailing list -- time-nuts@febo.com To unsubscribe, go to https://www.febo.com/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/time-nuts and follow the instructions there.
Re: [time-nuts] Ships fooled in GPS spoofing attack suggest Russian cyberweapon
On Mon, 14 Aug 2017 10:26:13 +0100 Clint Jay wrote: > That it can "so easily" be spoofed (it's not a trivial hack to spoof and > would, as far as I can see, take good knowledge of how GPS works and skill > to implement) is worrying and it could have disastrous consequences if > anyone decided to use it for malicious means but I'd be surprised if there > wasn't a turnkey solution available to anyone who has the funds. You don't need a turnkey solution. If you start from zero and are working alone, it probably will take you a month or two to write the code to spoof GPS L1 C/A. If you start from one of the GnuRadio based GPS simulators, you can do it in a weekend. If you want to spoof L2C and L5 as well and also Galileo OS E1/E5, it will take a bit longer, but not that much, as 90% of the code shared. Not only is this very simple. All the documentation you need is readily available and packaged such, that you don't need to know anything about GNSS systems before you start and it will not slow you down significantly. (e.g. Pick up the book from Hegarty and Kaplan and you can just write the code as you read it). The most difficult part of this is not creating the signals, but figuring out a way what PRN's and fake position to choose, such that the tracking loop of the target doesn't go completely bonkers and needs to do a re-aquisition on all signals. But even that is not that difficult, if you have some estimate of the target's location. Or you can simply not care about it, if you have a slow moving target, like a car or a ship, as the re-aquisition will take less than a minute. There have been discussions on adding authentication to GNSS services for quite some time (at least 10 years, probably longer). And it culminated in the CS and PRS services of Galileo. I.e. they are a restricted and/or paid-for service. I am pretty sure that this will change at some point and the OS serivces (including the free services of GPS) will provide some basic authentication system as well. In the meantime, people who rely on GNSS heavily have monitoring facilites that check the on air signals for degradation or spoofing. As this requires multiple monitoring stations over the whole area covered, to ensure that no spoofing or jamming attempt goes unnoticed, this is rather expensive. The only use of this kind of system, that I am aware of, are airports. And yes, this is not fool-proof. A narrow beam spoofer pointed at some airplane will go unoticed, as all the monitoring stations are on the ground. Attila Kinali -- It is upon moral qualities that a society is ultimately founded. All the prosperity and technological sophistication in the world is of no use without that foundation. -- Miss Matheson, The Diamond Age, Neil Stephenson ___ time-nuts mailing list -- time-nuts@febo.com To unsubscribe, go to https://www.febo.com/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/time-nuts and follow the instructions there.
Re: [time-nuts] Ships fooled in GPS spoofing attack suggest Russian cyberweapon
Hi Björn, bg wrote: > Hi Martin, > No there was also a SDR hack to spoof. > http://www.rtl-sdr.com/cheating-at-pokemon-go-with-a-hackrf-and-gps-spoofing/ This sounds indeed like a nice way to test if a real spoofing approach is working properly, so it could also be used to do really evil things. But of course it's a nice way to demonstrate how easy it's possible. Thanks for the pointer. Martin ___ time-nuts mailing list -- time-nuts@febo.com To unsubscribe, go to https://www.febo.com/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/time-nuts and follow the instructions there.
Re: [time-nuts] Ships fooled in GPS spoofing attack suggest Russian cyberweapon
Oh definitely and if I was going to cheat at Pokémon then that'd be the most cost effective method (yes, I play, my 9 year old son insists) but I'd rather have the "fun" of actually catching them the proper way On 14 Aug 2017 12:08 pm, "Martin Burnicki" wrote: > Clint Jay wrote: > > No, this was not the software hack, it was done with some rather nice > > Rohde&Schwarz test equipment. > > Ah, OK, of course that's also possible. > > However, what I found was much simpler: > https://devs-lab.com/how-to-play-pokemon-go-without- > moving-no-root-required.html > > ___ > time-nuts mailing list -- time-nuts@febo.com > To unsubscribe, go to https://www.febo.com/cgi-bin/ > mailman/listinfo/time-nuts > and follow the instructions there. > ___ time-nuts mailing list -- time-nuts@febo.com To unsubscribe, go to https://www.febo.com/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/time-nuts and follow the instructions there.
Re: [time-nuts] Ships fooled in GPS spoofing attack suggest Russian cyberweapon
Clint Jay wrote: > No, this was not the software hack, it was done with some rather nice > Rohde&Schwarz test equipment. Ah, OK, of course that's also possible. However, what I found was much simpler: https://devs-lab.com/how-to-play-pokemon-go-without-moving-no-root-required.html ___ time-nuts mailing list -- time-nuts@febo.com To unsubscribe, go to https://www.febo.com/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/time-nuts and follow the instructions there.
Re: [time-nuts] Ships fooled in GPS spoofing attack suggest Russian cyberweapon
No, this was not the software hack, it was done with some rather nice Rohde&Schwarz test equipment. On 14 Aug 2017 10:42 am, "Martin Burnicki" wrote: > Clint Jay wrote: > > Absolutely, their use of it was for something trivial and my reason for > > using that example was to show how 'simple' and available the technology > is > > if a couple of students could do it with lab equipment that anyone can > buy > > (obviously you'd need deep pockets). > > I just searched for "Pokémon GO GPS spoofing" on the 'net. > > Looks like this was just a hack in Android where apps were provided with > a spoofed position from the hack instead of the true position determined > by the GPS/GNSS receiver. > > So this is quite a different thing than spoofing the real GPS signals, > and it only affects the devices which have that hack installed. > > ___ > time-nuts mailing list -- time-nuts@febo.com > To unsubscribe, go to https://www.febo.com/cgi-bin/ > mailman/listinfo/time-nuts > and follow the instructions there. > ___ time-nuts mailing list -- time-nuts@febo.com To unsubscribe, go to https://www.febo.com/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/time-nuts and follow the instructions there.
Re: [time-nuts] Ships fooled in GPS spoofing attack suggest Russian cyberweapon
Hi Martin, No there was also a SDR hack to spoof. http://www.rtl-sdr.com/cheating-at-pokemon-go-with-a-hackrf-and-gps-spoofing/ -- Björn Sent from my smartphone. Original message From: Martin Burnicki Date: 14/08/2017 11:42 (GMT+01:00) To: Discussion of precise time and frequency measurement Subject: Re: [time-nuts] Ships fooled in GPS spoofing attack suggest Russian cyberweapon Clint Jay wrote: > Absolutely, their use of it was for something trivial and my reason for > using that example was to show how 'simple' and available the technology is > if a couple of students could do it with lab equipment that anyone can buy > (obviously you'd need deep pockets). I just searched for "Pokémon GO GPS spoofing" on the 'net. Looks like this was just a hack in Android where apps were provided with a spoofed position from the hack instead of the true position determined by the GPS/GNSS receiver. So this is quite a different thing than spoofing the real GPS signals, and it only affects the devices which have that hack installed. ___ time-nuts mailing list -- time-nuts@febo.com To unsubscribe, go to https://www.febo.com/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/time-nuts and follow the instructions there. ___ time-nuts mailing list -- time-nuts@febo.com To unsubscribe, go to https://www.febo.com/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/time-nuts and follow the instructions there.
Re: [time-nuts] Ships fooled in GPS spoofing attack suggest Russian cyberweapon
Clint Jay wrote: > Absolutely, their use of it was for something trivial and my reason for > using that example was to show how 'simple' and available the technology is > if a couple of students could do it with lab equipment that anyone can buy > (obviously you'd need deep pockets). I just searched for "Pokémon GO GPS spoofing" on the 'net. Looks like this was just a hack in Android where apps were provided with a spoofed position from the hack instead of the true position determined by the GPS/GNSS receiver. So this is quite a different thing than spoofing the real GPS signals, and it only affects the devices which have that hack installed. ___ time-nuts mailing list -- time-nuts@febo.com To unsubscribe, go to https://www.febo.com/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/time-nuts and follow the instructions there.
Re: [time-nuts] Ships fooled in GPS spoofing attack suggest Russian cyberweapon
Clint Jay wrote: > Absolutely, their use of it was for something trivial and my reason for > using that example was to show how 'simple' and available the technology is > if a couple of students could do it with lab equipment that anyone can buy > (obviously you'd need deep pockets). > > That it can "so easily" be spoofed (it's not a trivial hack to spoof and > would, as far as I can see, take good knowledge of how GPS works and skill > to implement) is worrying and it could have disastrous consequences if > anyone decided to use it for malicious means but I'd be surprised if there > wasn't a turnkey solution available to anyone who has the funds. I absolutely agree. ___ time-nuts mailing list -- time-nuts@febo.com To unsubscribe, go to https://www.febo.com/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/time-nuts and follow the instructions there.
Re: [time-nuts] Ships fooled in GPS spoofing attack suggest Russian cyberweapon
Absolutely, their use of it was for something trivial and my reason for using that example was to show how 'simple' and available the technology is if a couple of students could do it with lab equipment that anyone can buy (obviously you'd need deep pockets). That it can "so easily" be spoofed (it's not a trivial hack to spoof and would, as far as I can see, take good knowledge of how GPS works and skill to implement) is worrying and it could have disastrous consequences if anyone decided to use it for malicious means but I'd be surprised if there wasn't a turnkey solution available to anyone who has the funds. On 14 Aug 2017 10:04 am, "Martin Burnicki" wrote: > Clint Jay wrote: > > It might have been a hoax but I'm sure I saw it demonstrated by a couple > of > > students who used it to fool Pokémon go... > > Yes, I read about that, too. However, related to Pokémon go it's just > fun, but related to serious application it can cause quite some damage. > > ___ > time-nuts mailing list -- time-nuts@febo.com > To unsubscribe, go to https://www.febo.com/cgi-bin/ > mailman/listinfo/time-nuts > and follow the instructions there. > ___ time-nuts mailing list -- time-nuts@febo.com To unsubscribe, go to https://www.febo.com/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/time-nuts and follow the instructions there.
Re: [time-nuts] Ships fooled in GPS spoofing attack suggest Russian cyberweapon
Clint Jay wrote: > It might have been a hoax but I'm sure I saw it demonstrated by a couple of > students who used it to fool Pokémon go... Yes, I read about that, too. However, related to Pokémon go it's just fun, but related to serious application it can cause quite some damage. ___ time-nuts mailing list -- time-nuts@febo.com To unsubscribe, go to https://www.febo.com/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/time-nuts and follow the instructions there.
Re: [time-nuts] Ships fooled in GPS spoofing attack suggest Russian cyberweapon
It might have been a hoax but I'm sure I saw it demonstrated by a couple of students who used it to fool Pokémon go... On 14 Aug 2017 8:27 am, "Martin Burnicki" wrote: > Clint Jay wrote: > > Didn't someone demonstrate this using some rather expensive but 'off the > > shelf' Rohde & Schwarz lab gear a year or so ago? > > https://news.utexas.edu/2013/07/29/ut-austin-researchers- > successfully-spoof-an-80-million-yacht-at-sea > > https://sofrep.com/46818/gps-spoofing-how-iran-tricked-us- > patrol-boats-into-capture/ > > Martin > > ___ > time-nuts mailing list -- time-nuts@febo.com > To unsubscribe, go to https://www.febo.com/cgi-bin/ > mailman/listinfo/time-nuts > and follow the instructions there. > ___ time-nuts mailing list -- time-nuts@febo.com To unsubscribe, go to https://www.febo.com/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/time-nuts and follow the instructions there.
Re: [time-nuts] Ships fooled in GPS spoofing attack suggest Russian cyberweapon
Clint Jay wrote: > Didn't someone demonstrate this using some rather expensive but 'off the > shelf' Rohde & Schwarz lab gear a year or so ago? https://news.utexas.edu/2013/07/29/ut-austin-researchers-successfully-spoof-an-80-million-yacht-at-sea https://sofrep.com/46818/gps-spoofing-how-iran-tricked-us-patrol-boats-into-capture/ Martin ___ time-nuts mailing list -- time-nuts@febo.com To unsubscribe, go to https://www.febo.com/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/time-nuts and follow the instructions there.
