Re: [tor-bugs] #19791 [Metrics/metrics-lib]: Use CollecTor's index.json for download; adapt current download to use new date format

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#19791: Use CollecTor's index.json for download; adapt current download to use 
new
date format
-+---
 Reporter:  karsten  |  Owner:  iwakeh
 Type:  defect   | Status:  merge_ready
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:  metrics-lib 1.4.0
Component:  Metrics/metrics-lib  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+---

Comment (by iwakeh):

 Wednesdays are a good release days, imo.
 [https://gitweb.torproject.org/user/iwakeh/metrics-lib.git/commit/?h=task-
 release-1.4.0&id=cc4df8911f19a5e61877bcb467395893de8cf1eb here] are the
 suggestions for readme and changelog.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #20031 [Applications/Tor Browser]: web.whatsapp.com

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20031: web.whatsapp.com
--+--
 Reporter:  cosimobarlume |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-usability-website |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by gk):

 * keywords:   => tbb-usability-website


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Re: [tor-bugs] #19932 [Applications/Tor Browser]: 30MB of duplicated data in profile directory, httpseverywhere gone wild

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#19932: 30MB of duplicated data in profile directory, httpseverywhere gone wild
--+---
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  not a bug
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---
Changes (by teor):

 * status:  reopened => closed
 * resolution:   => not a bug


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Re: [tor-bugs] #20033 [HTTPS Everywhere/EFF-HTTPS Everywhere]: httpseverywhere too many files very slow to make usb stick

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20033: httpseverywhere too many files very slow to make usb stick
-+-
 Reporter:  keb  |  Owner:  jsha
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  HTTPS Everywhere/EFF-HTTPS   |Version:  HTTPS-E
  Everywhere |  3.4.3
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb l10n https-e usb ux  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by teor):

 * owner:   => jsha
 * component:  HTTPS Everywhere => HTTPS Everywhere/EFF-HTTPS Everywhere


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Re: [tor-bugs] #19905 [Core Tor/Tor]: make-test-network-all has never detected IPv6 on linux

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#19905: make-test-network-all has never detected IPv6 on linux
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  teor
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.0.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.2.7.3-rc
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  029-proposed, easy, intro,   |  Actual Points:  0.1
  TorCoreTeam201609  |
Parent ID:   | Points:  0.2
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by teor):

 * keywords:  029-proposed, easy, intro => 029-proposed, easy, intro,
 TorCoreTeam201609
 * status:  new => needs_review
 * actualpoints:   => 0.1


Comment:

 See my branch bug19905 on https://github.com/teor2345/tor.git

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Re: [tor-bugs] #20012 [Core Tor/Tor]: Stop upgrading client to intro connections to ntor

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20012: Stop upgrading client to intro connections to ntor
---+---
 Reporter:  teor   |  Owner:  teor
 Type:  defect | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  Tor:
   |  0.2.9.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-hs, TorCoreTeam201608  |  Actual Points:  0.2
Parent ID: | Points:  1
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+---
Changes (by teor):

 * keywords:  tor-hs => tor-hs, TorCoreTeam201608
 * status:  new => needs_review
 * actualpoints:   => 0.2


Comment:

 Please see my branch bug20012 on https://github.com/teor2345/tor.git

 It mainly deletes code, but it does two things:
 * delete intro points that don't have a TAP key in the HS descriptor
 * stop logging intro point details into the client log on this error

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Re: [tor-bugs] #17178 [Core Tor/Tor]: Rendezvous Single Onion Services: One-Hop Intro Point and Rendezvous

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#17178: Rendezvous Single Onion Services: One-Hop Intro Point and Rendezvous
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  teor
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  merge_ready
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.2.9.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  rsos, tor-hs, TorCoreTeam201608, |  Actual Points:  11.5
  TorCoreTeam201609, review-group-5, review- |
  group-7|
Parent ID:   | Points:  6.5
 Reviewer:  dgoulet  |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by teor):

 * keywords:  rsos, tor-hs, TorCoreTeam201608, review-group-5, review-
 group-7 =>
 rsos, tor-hs, TorCoreTeam201608, TorCoreTeam201609, review-group-5,
 review-group-7
 * status:  needs_revision => merge_ready
 * actualpoints:  11 => 11.5


Comment:

 I have revised and rebased this into my branch feature-17178-v7 on
 https://github.com/teor2345/tor.git

 It can be tested using chutney branch feature-17178-v3 on
 https://github.com/teor2345/chutney.git with:
 {{{
 chutney/tools/test-network.sh --flavour single-onion
 }}}

 There haven't been any code changes from feature-17178-v6.
 Here's what I did do:
 * rebased onto master
 * resolved some rebase merge conflicts
 * added an entry to the changes file
 * squashed some commits
 * reworded two commit messages

 I'm putting this into merge_ready for nickm to look at, because asn and
 dgoulet seem happy with it to go there. If I have that wrong, please feel
 free to put it back, with suggestions.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #17622 [Core Tor/Chutney]: chutney rendezvous single onion services templates & network

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#17622: chutney rendezvous single onion services templates & network
--+-
 Reporter:  teor  |  Owner:  teor
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Chutney  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  rsos  |  Actual Points:  1
Parent ID:| Points:  0.5
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+-
Changes (by teor):

 * status:  needs_review => merge_ready
 * actualpoints:  0.5 => 1


Old description:

> Please merge the feature-17178-rsos branch in
> https://github.com/teor2345/chutney.git

New description:

 ~~Please merge the feature-17178-rsos branch in
 https://github.com/teor2345/chutney.git~~
 I'll make this happen when #17178 closes.

--

Comment:

 The latest branch is now feature-17178-v3.

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[tor-bugs] #20035 [Core Tor/Tor]: Identify client-specific options that work with hidden services

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20035: Identify client-specific options that work with hidden services
--+-
 Reporter:  teor  |  Owner:
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.2.???
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:  easy doc tor-hs
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:  1 |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+-
 Many of the "client-specific" options in the tor manual page work with
 Hidden Services.

 Others, such as Socks/Trans/NATD/DNSPort, do not.

 It would be great to split up the client-only section into those options
 that truly only work for clients, and those that also affect the behaviour
 of hidden services (and bridge relays, and relays, and authorities).

 For example, when a bridge relay builds an anonymous 3-hop path to submit
 its descriptor, it is likely affected by all the client options that
 affect node selection. (Unless we specifically disable them for servers.)

 And a hidden service's paths are affected by these same options.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #19678 [Core Tor/Tor]: Don't allow hidden services in Tor2web mode

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#19678: Don't allow hidden services in Tor2web mode
--+
 Reporter:  teor  |  Owner:
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.2.9.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  isaremoved|  Actual Points:  0.1
Parent ID:  #17178| Points:  0.1
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by teor):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed
 * milestone:  Tor: 0.2.??? => Tor: 0.2.9.x-final


Comment:

 Part of #17178

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Re: [tor-bugs] #20034 [Core Tor/Tor]: Make Tor2web work with ReachableAddresses

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20034: Make Tor2web work with ReachableAddresses
--+
 Reporter:  teor  |  Owner:
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.2.9.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:  Tor: 0.2.8.7
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  tor2web   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #17178| Points:  0.1
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by teor):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 Part of #17178

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Re: [tor-bugs] #19677 [Core Tor/Tor]: Count unix sockets when counting client listeners

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#19677: Count unix sockets when counting client listeners
--+--
 Reporter:  teor  |  Owner:
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Low   |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.2.???
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Trivial   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  isaremoved|  Actual Points:  0.1
Parent ID:  #17178| Points:  0.1
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by teor):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 Part of #17178

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Re: [tor-bugs] #19663 [Core Tor/Tor]: On rend failure, Single Onions should build a 3-hop path

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#19663: On rend failure, Single Onions should build a 3-hop path
---+--
 Reporter:  teor   |  Owner:
 Type:  defect | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.2.???
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  rsos, sos, tor-hs, isaremoved  |  Actual Points:  0.1
Parent ID:  #17178 | Points:  1
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+--
Changes (by teor):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 Part of #17178

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[tor-bugs] #20034 [Core Tor/Tor]: Make Tor2web work with ReachableAddresses

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20034: Make Tor2web work with ReachableAddresses
--+
 Reporter:  teor  |  Owner:
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.2.9.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:  Tor: 0.2.8.7
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:  tor2web
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:  #17178
   Points:  0.1   |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+
 This feature was inadvertently enabled in 0.2.8.6, then broken again in
 0.2.8.7 by #19973. It was always intended to be part of #17178.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #19539 [Metrics/Atlas]: Add red/green circles to indicate uptime/downtime

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#19539: Add red/green circles to indicate uptime/downtime
---+-
 Reporter:  twim   |  Owner:  phw
 Type:  enhancement| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Atlas  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:  wontfix
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #19538 | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+-
Changes (by twim):

 * status:  needs_review => closed
 * resolution:   => wontfix


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Re: [tor-bugs] #15951 [Core Tor/Tor]: FairPretender: Pretend as any hidden service in passive mode

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#15951: FairPretender: Pretend as any hidden service in passive mode
-+--
 Reporter:  twim |  Owner:  twim
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.2.???
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Blocker  | Resolution:  wontfix
 Keywords:  tor, hs, descriptor, tor-hs  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+--
Changes (by twim):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => wontfix
 * severity:   => Blocker


Comment:

 Resolving this as wontfix due to upcoming prop224 which solves this issue
 by introducing "IP-enc-key"<->"descriptor-signing-key" cross-
 certifications. I see no reason for implementing effectively the same
 structure on top of legacy TOS (pre-prop224 era). Until prop224 got
 implemented this should not cause any problems.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #19932 [Applications/Tor Browser]: 30MB of duplicated data in profile directory, httpseverywhere gone wild

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#19932: 30MB of duplicated data in profile directory, httpseverywhere gone wild
--+--
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  reopened
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by keb):

 done see ticket:20033

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[tor-bugs] #20033 [HTTPS Everywhere]: httpseverywhere too many files very slow to make usb stick

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20033: httpseverywhere too many files very slow to make usb stick
--+-
 Reporter:  keb   |  Owner:
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  HTTPS Everywhere  |Version:  HTTPS-E 3.4.3
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:  tbb l10n https-e usb ux
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+-
 The oodles of (what look like) l10n files in HTTPSeverywhere make it
 impractical to install TBB to a USB stick. It took more than an hour to
 copy a finished installation folder to a fat32 formatted USB 2.0 stick
 (dont know how long, i gave up after an hour) on an i7 Windows 7 computer.
 Installing directly to USB stick fails with timeouts.

 Suggestion: Could the installation be modified to omit files for locales
 the user doesnt need?

 This is more than an enhancement request, it is a usability bug. I dont
 know if it can be pushed upstream to EFF since TBB is responsible for
 final installation of the add-on.

 related to ticket:19932

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[tor-bugs] #20032 [Applications/Tor Messenger]: Remove link when update fails

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20032: Remove link when update fails
+-
 Reporter:  sukhbir |  Owner:
 Type:  defect  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Messenger  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal  |   Keywords:
Actual Points:  |  Parent ID:
   Points:  |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:  |
+-
 In the (rare) case an update fails, remove the link from the update
 window.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #18828 [Core Tor/Tor]: Regenerate fallback list for 0.2.9

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#18828: Regenerate fallback list for 0.2.9
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  teor
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.2.9.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  TorCoreTeam201609, 029-accepted  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:  3
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:  SponsorU-
 |  can
-+-
Changes (by teor):

 * keywords:  TorCoreTeam201608, 029-accepted => TorCoreTeam201609,
 029-accepted


Comment:

 We have extended the 0.2.9 release deadline, and so I can afford to do
 some of this in September.

 I also want to:
 * make a wiki page so someone else can update fallbacks if needed (and so
 I don't forget)
 * change the fallback script so it has an "exclude existing" mode (exclude
 both the whitelist and blacklist), to make finding new potential fallbacks
 easier

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Re: [tor-bugs] #20010 [Core Tor/Tor]: modifications of relay(s) on fallback whitelist

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20010: modifications of relay(s) on fallback whitelist
-+
 Reporter:  niij |  Owner:  teor
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Very Low |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.2.9.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Minor| Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  fallback, whitelist  |  Actual Points:  0.2
Parent ID:  #18828   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+
Changes (by teor):

 * status:  needs_revision => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed
 * actualpoints:   => 0.2


Comment:

 Fixed in my branch fallbacks-201607 on https://github.com/teor2345/tor.git
 [fallbacks-201607 0d8acd3] fixup! Update fallback addresses based on
 operator emails and tickets

 It will get merged to master when we redo the fallbacks for 0.2.9.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #20022 [Core Tor/Tor]: Tor should deprecate insecure cookie auth

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20022: Tor should deprecate insecure cookie auth
--+-
 Reporter:  dkg   |  Owner:
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+-

Comment (by yawning):

 Replying to [comment:6 teor]:
 > It's also worth noting that there are situations where security is
 somewhat irrelevant - such as control sockets on tor test networks. Best
 we keep some auth methods for that use case.

 "some auth methods" like `NULL`, `HASHEDPASSWORD`, and `SAFECOOKIE`?  If
 your test network tooling only supports `COOKIE` auth, that's a problem
 with the tooling.

 `SAFECOOKIE` was introduced in 0.2.3.13-alpha.  I don't see a compelling
 argument to keep `COOKIE` around.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #19932 [Applications/Tor Browser]: 30MB of duplicated data in profile directory, httpseverywhere gone wild

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#19932: 30MB of duplicated data in profile directory, httpseverywhere gone wild
--+--
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  reopened
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by teor):

 * status:  closed => reopened
 * resolution:  not a bug =>


Comment:

 Reopening this ticket - keb, I'd suggest you log your last ticket as a
 separate bug, it's more likely to get noticed.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #19964 [Core Tor/Tor]: warns on startup that it cannot remove bw_accounting

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#19964: warns on startup that it cannot remove bw_accounting
--+
 Reporter:  weasel|  Owner:
 Type:  defect| Status:  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.2.9.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:  Tor: 0.2.9.1-alpha
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  easy  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by teor):

 * status:  needs_review => merge_ready


Comment:

 Looks good to me.

 As an alternative, we could use file_status() to check the file exists
 before unlinking it. But that seems like more complexity than we need
 here.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #20007 [Core Tor/Tor]: Sandbox causing crash when setting HidServAuth when there is a hidden service running

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20007: Sandbox causing crash when setting HidServAuth when there is a hidden
service running
--+
 Reporter:  segfault  |  Owner:
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:  Tor: 0.2.9.2-alpha
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by teor):

 * status:  new => needs_information


Comment:

 What happens when you turn sandbox off and hidden service auth on?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #20019 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Proposal for TOR Browser extension

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20019: Proposal for TOR Browser extension
--+---
 Reporter:  SECUSO_Kristoffer |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---
Changes (by teor):

 * status:  new => needs_information


Comment:

 This extension requires extended validation SSL certificates to show the
 green status.
 Otherwise it shows a yellow status. For HTTP, it shows a red status. This
 is not an accurate representation of the security of Tor onion sites
 (hidden services) - even if they use HTTP, they're secure (as long as the
 address is correct).

 SECUSO_Kristoffer, do you have plans to add a check for onion sites to
 your extension?

 Also, it chooses one of ten random images per-user. This could be a
 fingerprinting vector:
 * is it loaded from a remote site?
 * what happens when a Tor Browser user selects "new identity" (or quits
 and reopens the browser)?
   * do we choose a new image at random, destroying the utility of this
 feature?
   * or do we preserve the image, providing a fingerprinting vector?
   * or do we just use one symbol for Tor Browser users? Then it would be
 easy to fake based on the user agent.

 What would you do about this issue?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #20022 [Core Tor/Tor]: Tor should deprecate insecure cookie auth

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20022: Tor should deprecate insecure cookie auth
--+-
 Reporter:  dkg   |  Owner:
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+-

Comment (by atagar):

 As I understand it auth isn't necessary if using a control socket. By
 using cookie authentication you're proving you have permission to read the
 cookie file from disk. File-based sockets have similar access controls
 making cookie auth redundant.

 Happy to be corrected if I'm wrong. :)

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Re: [tor-bugs] #20022 [Core Tor/Tor]: Tor should deprecate insecure cookie auth

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20022: Tor should deprecate insecure cookie auth
--+-
 Reporter:  dkg   |  Owner:
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+-

Comment (by teor):

 It's also worth noting that there are situations where security is
 somewhat irrelevant - such as control sockets on tor test networks. Best
 we keep some auth methods for that use case.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #2129 [Core Tor/Tor]: Allow Tor client functionality even when we hibernate

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#2129: Allow Tor client functionality even when we hibernate
--+
 Reporter:  arma  |  Owner:
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.2.???
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-relay |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+

Comment (by teor):

 Replying to [comment:23 ioneyes]:
 > Hello NickM, Arma, Sebastian,
 >
 > Was this ever merged ?
 >
 > I may have some time to spend on taking NickM's comments into account.
 > What really scares me with this is I don't know the Tor code base well
 enough to accommodate all of NickM's suggestions. On the plus side, all of
 his comments made sense to me.
 >
 > With that in mind, I may have enough to do the research and become more
 adept with the code base.
 >
 > That aside, I just wanted to give you folks a big thumbs up. I have been
 tracking Tor for some time now and you folks humble me. Keep up the good
 work.

 Hi ioneyes,

 Thanks for being willing to help out!

 We no longer recommend that people run their Tor relay as a client. It
 makes it too easy for them to be de-anonymised. Much better if they run a
 separate Tor instance for the client and relay.

 It might be best to focus on another patch to start with - try the ones
 tagged "easy" or "intro".

 
https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/query?status=accepted&status=assigned&status=needs_review&status=new&status=reopened&order=priority&keywords=~easy&col=id&col=summary&col=component&col=status&col=type&col=priority&col=milestone&report=30

 Tim

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Re: [tor-bugs] #20031 [Applications/Tor Browser]: web.whatsapp.com

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20031: web.whatsapp.com
--+--
 Reporter:  cosimobarlume |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by dcf):

 * owner:   => tbb-team
 * component:  - Select a component => Applications/Tor Browser


Comment:

 This is because of the
 [https://www.torproject.org/projects/torbrowser/design/#fingerprinting-
 linkability defense against canvas fingerprinting] in Tor Browser. What
 you need to do, is click "Allow in the future" when you see this dialog on
 https://web.whatsapp.com/:
 
[[Image(https://people.torproject.org/~dcf/graphs/blogfiles/tbb-6.0a2-canvas.png)]]

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[tor-bugs] #20031 [- Select a component]: web.whatsapp.com

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20031: web.whatsapp.com
--+-
 Reporter:  cosimobarlume |  Owner:
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  - Select a component  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+-
 Connecting to web.whatsapp.com the square barcode gets displayed for less
 than 1 second and then overridden by the whatsapp icon.
 Consequently using the iphone to sync the session to the web becomes
 impossible.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #16220 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Torbutton/Torlauncher flips out if TOR_SKIP_LAUCH is set without TOR_SOCKS_PORT

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#16220: Torbutton/Torlauncher flips out if TOR_SKIP_LAUCH is set without
TOR_SOCKS_PORT
--+--
 Reporter:  yawning   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by mcs):

 * severity:   => Normal


Comment:

 Now that #15852 has been fixed, I took another look at this ticket. But it
 is not fixed because we kept the code in Torbutton that sets
 network.proxy.socks_port to 9050 when the browser is started with
 TOR_SOCKS_PORT=9050. So the control port check is correct: the proxy is
 misconfigured if you are really running it on 9150.

 I do not know how to fix this without making the effect of the env vars
 temporary, which would be difficult to do in a way that is "bulletproof"
 (or crash-proof at least).

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Re: [tor-bugs] #19001 [Obfuscation/Snowflake]: Tor Browser with Snowflake

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#19001: Tor Browser with Snowflake
---+-
 Reporter:  dcf|  Owner:
 Type:  project| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Obfuscation/Snowflake  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+-

Comment (by dcf):

 Replying to [comment:17 dcf]:
 > Then I want to merge Serene's go-webrtc updates (comment:11), Arlo's
 datachannel patch (comment:1:ticket:19569), then merge with master to pick
 up the patch for #19737.

 I pushed:
   [https://gitweb.torproject.org/user/dcf/tor-browser-
 bundle.git/commit/?h=snowflake&id=a2d13e6f42ad45bdcf8c2b78ef192dd15431d431
 a2d13e6f42] Bump SNOWFLAKE_TAG to
 !6cecd31fd896eb26e64ad8bab8a9ea510ec3b21d.
   [https://gitweb.torproject.org/user/dcf/tor-browser-
 bundle.git/commit/?h=snowflake&id=f811240035c3ac01818f44eb606d08c532cb1e61
 f811240035] Merge tag 'tbb-6.5a2-build2' into snowflake
 I didn't do the datachannel patch (#19659) because I wasn't sure it was
 going to work in the mac descriptor (it probably will, with some work, but
 I didn't have time for it yet).

 Bundle are here:
   https://people.torproject.org/~dcf/pt-
 bundle/snowflake/20160830-6.5a2-f811240035c3/
 I tested the linux64 and mac bundles and they work.

 This was my first time running the mac bundle. I got a firewall dialog the
 first time running it:
   [[Image(snowflake-client-mac-fw.png)]]
 I let the dialog remain for a few seconds and the connection failed. This
 is what was at the end of snowflake.log:
 {{{
 2016/08/30 13:32:35 SOCKS accepted:  {0.0.3.0:1  map[]}
 2016/08/30 13:32:35  Handler: snowflake assigned 
 2016/08/30 13:32:35 Buffered 235 bytes --> WebRTC
 2016/08/30 13:32:40 Traffic Bytes (in|out): 0 | 235 -- (0 OnMessages, 1
 Sends)
 2016/08/30 13:32:45 WebRTC: At capacity [1/1]  Retrying in 10 seconds...
 2016/08/30 13:32:55 WebRTC: At capacity [1/1]  Retrying in 10 seconds...
 2016/08/30 13:33:05 WebRTC: At capacity [1/1]  Retrying in 10 seconds...
 2016/08/30 13:33:05 WebRTC: No messages received for 30 seconds -- closing
 stale connection.
 2016/08/30 13:33:05 WebRTC: closing PeerConnection
 2016/08/30 13:33:05 WebRTC: DataChannel.OnClose [locally]
 2016/08/30 13:33:05 WebRTC: Closing
 2016/08/30 13:33:05 copy loop ended
 2016/08/30 13:33:05  Handler: closed ---
 2016/08/30 13:33:05 SOCKS listening...
 2016/08/30 13:33:05 WebRTC: melted all 0 snowflakes.
 2016/08/30 13:33:05 snowflake is done.
 }}}
 The snowflake proxy itself seemed to stall at this point, saying `Status:
 Serving 1 new client. (Polling in 0 seconds...)`. I had to refresh the
 page before I could try to connect again. After I allowed snowflake-client
 through the firewall, everything worked.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #19534 [Core Tor/Tor]: Не могу зайти в ТОР

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#19534: Не могу зайти в ТОР
-+-
 Reporter:  Lollypoper   |  Owner:  isis
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  user
 Keywords:  bridgedb-reportbug,  |  disappeared
  TorCoreTeam201608  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by arlolra):

 This might have to do with scramblesuit.  When I choose that pt, it tries
 to connect to 83.212.101.3

 Searching trac brings up a few more issues with that IP.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #19791 [Metrics/metrics-lib]: Use CollecTor's index.json for download; adapt current download to use new date format

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#19791: Use CollecTor's index.json for download; adapt current download to use 
new
date format
-+---
 Reporter:  karsten  |  Owner:  iwakeh
 Type:  defect   | Status:  merge_ready
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:  metrics-lib 1.4.0
Component:  Metrics/metrics-lib  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+---

Comment (by karsten):

 Thanks for looking!

 And those are good ideas.  Would you want to submit a patch for that?  But
 regardless of who writes this text, I shouldn't do the release dance today
 but rather tomorrow morning with a fresh brain.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #19791 [Metrics/metrics-lib]: Use CollecTor's index.json for download; adapt current download to use new date format

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#19791: Use CollecTor's index.json for download; adapt current download to use 
new
date format
-+---
 Reporter:  karsten  |  Owner:  iwakeh
 Type:  defect   | Status:  merge_ready
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:  metrics-lib 1.4.0
Component:  Metrics/metrics-lib  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+---

Comment (by iwakeh):

 Looks fine.
 Maybe add the minor change that the jars can now be found in
 `generated/dist` and a hint about where to find the jars to the README.md?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #18055 [HTTPS Everywhere/EFF-HTTPS Everywhere]: Exception needed for http://www.lenovo.com/lenovorecovery

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#18055: Exception needed for http://www.lenovo.com/lenovorecovery
---+--
 Reporter:  cypherpunks|  Owner:  jsha
 Type:  defect | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  HTTPS Everywhere/EFF-HTTPS Everywhere  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  httpse-ruleset-bug |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+--

Comment (by fuglede):

 Added a fixing PR in https://github.com/EFForg/https-everywhere/pull/6684.

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[tor-bugs] #20030 [Obfuscation/meek]: meek-http-helper doesn't shutdown cleanly on OS X

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20030: meek-http-helper doesn't shutdown cleanly on OS X
--+-
 Reporter:  arlolra   |  Owner:  dcf
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Obfuscation/meek  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+-
 I've got this process hanging around after I close TB 6.5a2,

 {{{
 /Applications/TorBrowser.app/Contents/MacOS/firefox --invisible -no-remote
 -profile /Applications/TorBrowser-Data/Tor/PluggableTransports/profile
 .meek-http-helper
 }}}

 Seems reproducible enough on this day.

 Using meek-amazon.  meek-azure no longer seems reachable.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #16345 [HTTPS Everywhere/EFF-HTTPS Everywhere]: bad redirect for hr.buffalo.edu

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#16345: bad redirect for hr.buffalo.edu
---+--
 Reporter:  cypherpunks|  Owner:  jsha
 Type:  defect | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  HTTPS Everywhere/EFF-HTTPS Everywhere  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+--
Changes (by fuglede):

 * severity:   => Normal


Comment:

 Looks like this one was fixed with https://github.com/EFForg/https-
 everywhere/commit/cf4b2bad03d753d5911c4239c4691daaf88eb7ca. However, since
 then, other issues have come up. Those are addressed in
 https://github.com/EFForg/https-everywhere/pull/6682.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #19938 [Metrics/CollecTor]: stats on versions of Tor that bridges are running

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#19938: stats on versions of Tor that bridges are running
---+-
 Reporter:  isabela|  Owner:
 Type:  defect | Status:  new
 Priority:  High   |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/CollecTor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #19728 | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+-

Comment (by karsten):

 weasel was confused by the bridge numbers above and how they don't match
 the absolute number of bridges in the network.  The numbers above are just
 a distribution of versions, computed by looking at all bridge server
 descriptors that happened to be published in a given hour.  This was just
 a shortcut to get to the overall distribution, but I can see how it
 confuses people.

 Here's a more precise view on bridge versions, this time with more
 accurate absolute bridge numbers.  These numbers are based on two recent
 bridge network statuses, one by Bifroest (1D8F...) and one by Tonga
 (4A0C...), and the platform lines of referenced bridge server descriptors.

 {{{
  866 20160830-184232-1D8F3A91C37C5D1C4C19B1AD1D0CFBE8BF72D8E1,Tor 0.2.8.7
 on Linux
  711 20160830-184232-1D8F3A91C37C5D1C4C19B1AD1D0CFBE8BF72D8E1,Tor
 0.2.9.2-alpha on Linux
  428 20160830-180625-4A0CCD2DDC7995083D73F5D667100C8A5831F16D,Tor 0.2.7.6
 on Linux
  200 20160830-180625-4A0CCD2DDC7995083D73F5D667100C8A5831F16D,Tor 0.2.8.6
 on Linux
  152 20160830-180625-4A0CCD2DDC7995083D73F5D667100C8A5831F16D,Tor 0.2.5.12
 on Linux
  112 20160830-180625-4A0CCD2DDC7995083D73F5D667100C8A5831F16D,Tor 0.2.4.23
 on Windows 8
  109 20160830-180625-4A0CCD2DDC7995083D73F5D667100C8A5831F16D,Tor 0.2.4.23
 on Windows 7
   81 20160830-180625-4A0CCD2DDC7995083D73F5D667100C8A5831F16D,Tor 0.2.4.27
 on Linux
   62 20160830-180625-4A0CCD2DDC7995083D73F5D667100C8A5831F16D,Tor 0.2.6.10
 on Linux
   44 20160830-180625-4A0CCD2DDC7995083D73F5D667100C8A5831F16D,Tor
 0.2.8.2-alpha on Linux
   41 20160830-180625-4A0CCD2DDC7995083D73F5D667100C8A5831F16D,Tor 0.2.5.10
 on Linux
   24 20160830-180625-4A0CCD2DDC7995083D73F5D667100C8A5831F16D,Tor 0.2.4.22
 on Windows 7
   22 20160830-180625-4A0CCD2DDC7995083D73F5D667100C8A5831F16D,Tor 0.2.4.22
 on Windows 8
   19 20160830-180625-4A0CCD2DDC7995083D73F5D667100C8A5831F16D,Tor 0.2.7.6
 on FreeBSD
   14 20160830-180625-4A0CCD2DDC7995083D73F5D667100C8A5831F16D,Tor 0.2.4.23
 on Linux
   13 20160830-180625-4A0CCD2DDC7995083D73F5D667100C8A5831F16D,Tor 0.2.4.23
 on Windows XP
   13 20160830-180625-4A0CCD2DDC7995083D73F5D667100C8A5831F16D,Tor 0.2.4.20
 on Windows 7
   11 20160830-184232-1D8F3A91C37C5D1C4C19B1AD1D0CFBE8BF72D8E1,Tor 0.2.9.2
 -alpha-dev on Linux
   10 20160830-180625-4A0CCD2DDC7995083D73F5D667100C8A5831F16D,Tor 0.2.7.6
 on Windows 8
9 20160830-180625-4A0CCD2DDC7995083D73F5D667100C8A5831F16D,Tor 0.2.4.22
 on Linux
 }}}

 This output means that there have been 866 bridges on "Tor 0.2.8.7 on
 Linux" in Bifroest's 18:42 network status.  Hope this is less confusing.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #15852 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Remove/synchronize Torbutton SOCKS pref logic

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#15852: Remove/synchronize Torbutton SOCKS pref logic
-+-
 Reporter:  mikeperry|  Owner:  brade
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  tbb-4.5-regression, tbb-torbutton-   |  Actual Points:
  conversion, TorBrowserTeam201608R  |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  SponsorU
-+-
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  needs_review => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 Merged (commit 1648da8461dfed9975ac83fdb03aa745b6c8d49b on master),
 thanks.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #15852 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Remove/synchronize Torbutton SOCKS pref logic

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#15852: Remove/synchronize Torbutton SOCKS pref logic
-+-
 Reporter:  mikeperry|  Owner:  brade
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-4.5-regression, tbb-torbutton-   |  Actual Points:
  conversion, TorBrowserTeam201608R  |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  SponsorU
-+-
Changes (by mcs):

 * status:  reopened => needs_review


Comment:

 While testing some other things, Kathy and I noticed a change in behavior
 compared to older versions of Torbutton: prior to the commit that fixed
 this ticket, the network.proxy.socks and network.proxy.socks_port prefs
 were not reset in the absence of env vars. We should probably restore the
 old behavior.

 Here is a fixup patch:
 
https://gitweb.torproject.org/user/brade/torbutton.git/commit/?h=bug15852-03&id=1648da8461dfed9975ac83fdb03aa745b6c8d49b

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Re: [tor-bugs] #15852 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Remove/synchronize Torbutton SOCKS pref logic

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#15852: Remove/synchronize Torbutton SOCKS pref logic
-+-
 Reporter:  mikeperry|  Owner:  brade
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  reopened
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-4.5-regression, tbb-torbutton-   |  Actual Points:
  conversion, TorBrowserTeam201608R  |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  SponsorU
-+-
Changes (by mcs):

 * status:  closed => reopened
 * resolution:  fixed =>


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[tor-bugs] #20029 [Core Tor/Tor]: prop224: Implementation of INTRODUCE1 and INTRODUCE_ACK cells

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20029: prop224: Implementation of INTRODUCE1 and INTRODUCE_ACK cells
--+
 Reporter:  dgoulet   |  Owner:  dgoulet
 Type:| Status:  new
  enhancement |
 Priority:  High  |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.0.x-final
Component:  Core  |Version:
  Tor/Tor |
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:  tor-hs, prop224, TorCoreTeam201609
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:  #17241
   Points:  6 |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
  SponsorR-must   |
--+
 Main ticket for the implementation of section 3.2 of proposal 224. This
 section specifies the format and how to handle `INTRODUCE1` and
 `INTRODUCE_ACK` cells.

 Note: this depends on #20004 for which we hope to get merged upstream
 _before_ this is completed.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #19043 [Core Tor/Tor]: prop224: Implementation of ESTABLISH_INTRO cell

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#19043: prop224: Implementation of ESTABLISH_INTRO cell
-+-
 Reporter:  alec.heif|  Owner:
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.0.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-hs, prop224, 6.s194, |  Actual Points:
  TorCoreTeam201609  |
Parent ID:  #17241   | Points:  3
 Reviewer:  asn, dgoulet |Sponsor:
 |  SponsorR-must
-+-
Changes (by dgoulet):

 * keywords:  tor-hs, prop224, 6.s194, 0210-proposed, TorCoreTeam201608 =>
 tor-hs, prop224, 6.s194, TorCoreTeam201609


Comment:

 Moving this to 030 and part of the September core team work.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #19043 [Core Tor/Tor]: prop224: Implementation of ESTABLISH_INTRO cell (was: Implementation of prop224 ESTABLISH_INTRO cell)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#19043: prop224: Implementation of ESTABLISH_INTRO cell
-+-
 Reporter:  alec.heif|  Owner:
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.0.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-hs, prop224, 6.s194, |  Actual Points:
  0210-proposed, TorCoreTeam201608   |
Parent ID:  #17241   | Points:  3
 Reviewer:  asn, dgoulet |Sponsor:
 |  SponsorR-must
-+-
Changes (by dgoulet):

 * milestone:  Tor: 0.2.??? => Tor: 0.3.0.x-final


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Re: [tor-bugs] #20004 [Core Tor/Tor]: prop224: Add a trunnel subdirectory specifically for HS

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20004: prop224: Add a trunnel subdirectory specifically for HS
-+
 Reporter:  dgoulet  |  Owner:  dgoulet
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.2.9.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-hs, prop224  |  Actual Points:  0.5
Parent ID:  #17241   | Points:  1
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:  SponsorR-must
-+
Changes (by dgoulet):

 * status:  new => needs_review
 * actualpoints:   => 0.5


Comment:

 Ok I ended up adding all cells from 224 which is 4 of them:

 * ESTABLISH_INTRO
 * INTRO_ESTABLISHED
 * INTRODUCE1 (also INTRODUCE2)
 * INTRODUCE_ACK

 Reminder that this branch _only_ adds trunnel definition for those cells.

 Still branch: `ticket20004_029_01`

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Re: [tor-bugs] #19932 [Applications/Tor Browser]: 30MB of duplicated data in profile directory, httpseverywhere gone wild

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#19932: 30MB of duplicated data in profile directory, httpseverywhere gone wild
--+---
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  not a bug
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---

Comment (by keb):

 The hundreds of l10n files in HTTPSeverywhere make it impractical to
 install TBB to a USB stick.  It takes more than an hour to copy a finished
 installation to a fat32 formatted USB 2.0 stick (dont know how long, i
 gave up after an hour).  Installing directly to USB stick fails with
 timeouts.

 Could the installation be modified to omit files for locales the user
 doesnt need?

 This is more than an enhancement request, it is a usability bug, somewhat
 related to the original complaint.  Unlikely it can be pushed upstream to
 EFF since TBB is responsible for final installation of the add-on.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #20015 [Internal Services/Service - dist]: Vidalia relay bundles being run accidentally by Tor users

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20015: Vidalia relay bundles being run accidentally by Tor users
--+-
 Reporter:  donncha   |  Owner:
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Service - dist  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+-
Changes (by micah):

 * cc: micah (added)


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Re: [tor-bugs] #19791 [Metrics/metrics-lib]: Use CollecTor's index.json for download; adapt current download to use new date format

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#19791: Use CollecTor's index.json for download; adapt current download to use 
new
date format
-+---
 Reporter:  karsten  |  Owner:  iwakeh
 Type:  defect   | Status:  merge_ready
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:  metrics-lib 1.4.0
Component:  Metrics/metrics-lib  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+---
Changes (by karsten):

 * status:  needs_review => merge_ready


Comment:

 Alright, pushed to master and uploaded
 [https://people.torproject.org/~karsten/volatile/descriptor-1.4.0.tar.gz a
 yet unsigned 1.4.0 pre-release tarball].  Mind taking a final look before
 I upload the signature file, push the signed Git tag, and announce the new
 release?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #15056 [Core Tor/Tor]: Support ed25519 identities for circuit extension

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#15056: Support ed25519 identities for circuit extension
-+-
 Reporter:  nickm|  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  assigned
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.2.9.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.2.7
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-relay, ed25519, prop-220,|  Actual Points:
  027-triaged-1-in, 028-triaged, |
  201511-deferred, tor-crypto-identity, tor- |
  ed25519-proto TorCoreTeam201609|
Parent ID:  #15054   | Points:  parent
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  SponsorU-must
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * keywords:
 tor-relay, ed25519, prop-220, 027-triaged-1-in, 028-triaged,
 201511-deferred, tor-crypto-identity, tor-ed25519-proto
 =>
 tor-relay, ed25519, prop-220, 027-triaged-1-in, 028-triaged,
 201511-deferred, tor-crypto-identity, tor-ed25519-proto
 TorCoreTeam201609


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Re: [tor-bugs] #15055 [Core Tor/Tor]: Implement ed25519 link handshake

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#15055: Implement ed25519 link handshake
-+-
 Reporter:  nickm|  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  assigned
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.2.9.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.2.7
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-relay, prop-220, |  Actual Points:
  027-triaged-1-in, 028-triaged, |
  201511-deferred, 201512-deferred, tor-crypto-  |
  identity, tor-ed25519-proto|
Parent ID:  #15054   | Points:  parent
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  SponsorU-must
-+-

Comment (by nickm):

 Status: I believe I will finish the core implementation today or tomorrow.
 The testing and debugging and reviewing will take a bit longer.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #17779 [Core Tor/Tor]: Memory leak in routerkeys.c

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#17779: Memory leak in routerkeys.c
-+
 Reporter:  cypherpunks  |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect   | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.2.9.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor: 0.2.7.2-alpha
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  easy, TorCoreTeam201608  |  Actual Points:  0
Parent ID:  #15055   | Points:  .5
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+
Changes (by nickm):

 * actualpoints:   => 0


Comment:

 Done as part of my WIP 15055 branch.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #19160 [Core Tor/Tor]: [prop220] Advertise support for Ed25519 link authentication

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#19160: [prop220] Advertise support for Ed25519 link authentication
---+
 Reporter:  nickm  |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  enhancement| Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.2.9.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  TorCoreTeam201608  |  Actual Points:  0
Parent ID:  #15055 | Points:  0.1
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:  SponsorU-must
---+
Changes (by nickm):

 * actualpoints:   => 0


Comment:

 This is done in my 15055_wip branch.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #13752 [Core Tor/Tor]: Extend TLS RSA link keys to 2048-bit

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#13752: Extend TLS RSA link keys to 2048-bit
-+-
 Reporter:  nickm|  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  assigned
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.2.9.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.2.7
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-relay, prop-220, |  Actual Points:  0
  027-triaged-1-in, 028-triaged, |
  TorCoreTeam201608  |
Parent ID:  #15055   | Points:  .1
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  SponsorU-must
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * actualpoints:   => 0


Comment:

 Done as part of 15055_wip

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Re: [tor-bugs] #19158 [Core Tor/Tor]: [prop220] Understand and validate ed25519-signed AUTH0002 cells

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#19158: [prop220] Understand and validate ed25519-signed AUTH0002 cells
---+
 Reporter:  nickm  |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  enhancement| Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.2.9.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  TorCoreTeam201608  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #15055 | Points:  1
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:  SponsorU-must
---+

Comment (by nickm):

 1) That would be AUTH0003, actually.

 Now implemented, I believe, in my 15055_wip branch.  Needs tests though.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #19158 [Core Tor/Tor]: [prop220] Understand and validate ed25519-signed AUTH0002 cells

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#19158: [prop220] Understand and validate ed25519-signed AUTH0002 cells
---+
 Reporter:  nickm  |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  enhancement| Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.2.9.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  TorCoreTeam201608  |  Actual Points:  2
Parent ID:  #15055 | Points:  1
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:  SponsorU-must
---+
Changes (by nickm):

 * actualpoints:   => 2


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Re: [tor-bugs] #20028 [Core Tor/Tor]: Fix typos in tor-spec.txt [circID -> CircID]

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20028: Fix typos in tor-spec.txt [circID -> CircID]
--+--
 Reporter:  twim  |  Owner:
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by twim):

 * status:  new => needs_review


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[tor-bugs] #20028 [Core Tor/Tor]: Fix typos in tor-spec.txt [circID -> CircID]

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20028: Fix typos in tor-spec.txt [circID -> CircID]
--+-
 Reporter:  twim  |  Owner:
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+-


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Re: [tor-bugs] #19157 [Core Tor/Tor]: [prop220] Check all new certificate types (incl cross-cert and ed25519)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#19157: [prop220] Check all new certificate types (incl cross-cert and ed25519)
+--
 Reporter:  nickm   |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  enhancement | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:  Tor:
|  0.2.9.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  prop220, TorCoreTeam201608  |  Actual Points:  2
Parent ID:  #15055  | Points:  1
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:  SponsorU-must
+--
Changes (by nickm):

 * actualpoints:   => 2


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Re: [tor-bugs] #19157 [Core Tor/Tor]: [prop220] Check all new certificate types (incl cross-cert and ed25519)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#19157: [prop220] Check all new certificate types (incl cross-cert and ed25519)
+--
 Reporter:  nickm   |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  enhancement | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:  Tor:
|  0.2.9.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  prop220, TorCoreTeam201608  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #15055  | Points:  1
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:  SponsorU-must
+--

Comment (by nickm):

 Done in my 15055_wip branch.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #20026 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Support SAFECOOKIE authentication in Tor Browser

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20026: Support SAFECOOKIE authentication in Tor Browser
--+--
 Reporter:  gk|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by mcs):

 Related: #16017 (use PROTOCOLINFO to discover which authentication method
 to use, location of cookie, and so on).

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Re: [tor-bugs] #20027 [Core Tor/Tor]: Ed25519 certificate parsing does badly with expirations after 2038

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20027: Ed25519 certificate parsing does badly with expirations after 2038
---+
 Reporter:  nickm  |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect | Status:  accepted
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.2.9.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  TorCoreTeam201608  |  Actual Points:  0
Parent ID:  #15055 | Points:  0
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+
Changes (by nickm):

 * actualpoints:   => 0


Comment:

 Done as part of my branch for #15055.  This was one of those where the
 changes file plus the ticket plus the commit message took way longer than
 the actual bugfix.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #20027 [Core Tor/Tor]: Ed25519 certificate parsing does badly with expirations after 2038

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20027: Ed25519 certificate parsing does badly with expirations after 2038
---+
 Reporter:  nickm  |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect | Status:  accepted
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.2.9.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  TorCoreTeam201608  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #15055 | Points:  0
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+
Changes (by nickm):

 * owner:   => nickm
 * status:  new => accepted


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[tor-bugs] #20027 [Core Tor/Tor]: Ed25519 certificate parsing does badly with expirations after 2038

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20027: Ed25519 certificate parsing does badly with expirations after 2038
--+
 Reporter:  nickm |  Owner:
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.2.9.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:  TorCoreTeam201608
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:  #15055
   Points:  0 |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+
 We deliberately chose an hour-based expiration counter for ed certs,
 because of 32-bit issues.  But when we parse them, we just multiply the
 32-bit field by 3600.  That results in an overflow if the time is greater
 than UINT32_MAX.

 The impact here isn't too bad.  First, it only affects certs that expire
 after 32-bit signed time overflows in Y2038.  Second, it can only make it
 seem that a non-expired cert is expired: it can never make it seem that an
 expired cert is still live.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #15087 [Core Tor/Tor]: Move timeliness check out of tor_cert_checksig, or into tor_cert_get_checkable_sig

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#15087: Move timeliness check out of tor_cert_checksig, or into
tor_cert_get_checkable_sig
-+-
 Reporter:  nickm|  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  assigned
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.2.9.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.2.7
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  027-triaged-1-in, 028-triaged tor-   |  Actual Points:
  ed25519-proto TorCoreTeam201608|
Parent ID:  #15054   | Points:  1
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  SponsorU-can
-+-

Comment (by nickm):

 Done as part of my 15055_wip branch

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Re: [tor-bugs] #15087 [Core Tor/Tor]: Move timeliness check out of tor_cert_checksig, or into tor_cert_get_checkable_sig

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#15087: Move timeliness check out of tor_cert_checksig, or into
tor_cert_get_checkable_sig
-+-
 Reporter:  nickm|  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  assigned
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.2.9.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.2.7
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  027-triaged-1-in, 028-triaged tor-   |  Actual Points:
  ed25519-proto TorCoreTeam201608|
Parent ID:  #15054   | Points:  1
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  SponsorU-can
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * keywords:  027-triaged-1-in, 028-triaged tor-ed25519-proto =>
 027-triaged-1-in, 028-triaged tor-ed25519-proto TorCoreTeam201608


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Re: [tor-bugs] #19490 [Core Tor/Tor]: dir-spec.txt: Make a "may" be more defined

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#19490: dir-spec.txt: Make a "may" be more defined
--+--
 Reporter:  twim  |  Owner:
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.2.???
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  spec  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  needs_review => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 merged!

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Re: [tor-bugs] #20021 [Core Tor/Tor]: Require ntor-onion-key in microdescriptors, descriptors

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20021: Require ntor-onion-key in microdescriptors, descriptors
--+
 Reporter:  nickm |  Owner:
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.0.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:  .1
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+

Comment (by nickm):

 That's all true, and thanks for the note!  What I was thinking of was
 making all of the code in routerparse which treats ntor-onion-key as an
 optional token instead treat it as a mandatory token.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #19968 [Core Tor/Tor]: Test fails on Debian experimental reproducible builds

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#19968: Test fails on Debian experimental reproducible builds
--+
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.2.8.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:  Tor: 0.2.9.1-alpha
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  easy  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by nickm):

 * keywords:   => easy
 * milestone:   => Tor: 0.2.8.x-final


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Re: [tor-bugs] #20020 [Core Tor/Tor]: Strange Warning: "Couldn't add re-parsed router: Some certs on this router are expired."

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20020: Strange Warning: "Couldn't add re-parsed router: Some certs on this 
router
are expired."
--+--
 Reporter:  torland   |  Owner:
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:  Tor: 0.2.8.7
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by nickm):

 That's nothing to worry about, although it probably means that one of you
 (either you or the router) has a clock that is mis-set... or that the code
 has a bug.  We should investigate.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #20024 [Core Tor/Tor]: Typo in rend-spec.txt

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20024: Typo in rend-spec.txt
--+
 Reporter:  twim  |  Owner:
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  needs_review => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 Merged!

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Re: [tor-bugs] #19964 [Core Tor/Tor]: warns on startup that it cannot remove bw_accounting

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#19964: warns on startup that it cannot remove bw_accounting
--+
 Reporter:  weasel|  Owner:
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.2.9.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:  Tor: 0.2.9.1-alpha
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  easy  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  new => needs_review


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Re: [tor-bugs] #19791 [Metrics/metrics-lib]: Use CollecTor's index.json for download; adapt current download to use new date format

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#19791: Use CollecTor's index.json for download; adapt current download to use 
new
date format
-+---
 Reporter:  karsten  |  Owner:  iwakeh
 Type:  defect   | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:  metrics-lib 1.4.0
Component:  Metrics/metrics-lib  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+---

Comment (by iwakeh):

 The other tests ran without trouble b/c they tested a different behavior:
 * a file that is too old shouldn't be fetched (z2)
 * a file with wrong size shouldn't be fetched (w2)

 I added some more inline comments and also added another correct file
 'a/b/c/u2' for demonstrating what is tested in
 `testNormalCollectingWithDeletion`, i.e. why your suggested 'correction'
 is not correct.

 Please see [https://gitweb.torproject.org/user/iwakeh/metrics-
 lib.git/commit/?h=task-19791-2b&id=0986ae1755be478145b191d235efee12608a3c80
 this branch] based on your latest branch above.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #19690 [Core Tor/DirAuth]: Tonga (Bridge Authority) Permanent Shutdown Notice

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#19690: Tonga (Bridge Authority) Permanent Shutdown Notice
---+
 Reporter:  shamrock   |  Owner:  isis
 Type:  task   | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Very High  |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.2.8.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/DirAuth   |Version:  Tor: 0.2.8.5-rc
 Severity:  Critical   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  TorCoreTeam201608  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+

Comment (by karsten):

 And here's [https://people.torproject.org/~karsten/volatile/running-
 bridges-2016-08-30.png an updated graph].

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Re: [tor-bugs] #19848 [Internal Services/Service - git]: Grant arlo and serene access to /user/dcf/tor-browser-bundle.git

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#19848: Grant arlo and serene access to /user/dcf/tor-browser-bundle.git
-+
 Reporter:  dcf  |  Owner:  tor-gitadm
 Type:  task | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Service - git  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+
Changes (by weasel):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 Done.  I do wonder, however, if this should be a repo in a different
 namespace now that it's shared.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #14273 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Investigate missing Tor Browser patches to make Unix Domain Socket option work

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#14273: Investigate missing Tor Browser patches to make Unix Domain Socket 
option
work
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:
 |  mikeperry
 Type:  task | Status:  closed
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  tbb-security, TorBrowserTeam201608R  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #14270   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  SponsorU
-+-
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  needs_review => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 Replying to [comment:12 mcs]:
 > Thinking about this some more, for the alpha I assume we want to use
 Unix domain sockets by default on Linux and OSX. That means we should
 change torrc-defaults to use a path for SocksPort and ControlPort. And
 then we will need to change the browser's network.proxy.socks pref value
 to match the SocksPort value. The pref value needs to be a file: URL and
 of course the SocksPort and ControlPort directives need to look like
 unix:/path/to/socket.
 >
 > Do you want Kathy and me to create appropriate patches for tor-browser
 and builders/tor-browser-bundle?

 That would be neat. You could use #14270 for that or create a new child
 ticket of it for this task I guess.

 FWIW the rebased Mozilla patch looks good to me. It is applied on tor-
 browser-45.3.0esr-6.5-1 (commit cde73b2295b75898ca435ed9f78541eccf6c34cb).

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Re: [tor-bugs] #20026 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Support SAFECOOKIE authentication in Tor Browser

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20026: Support SAFECOOKIE authentication in Tor Browser
--+--
 Reporter:  gk|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Description changed by gk:

Old description:

> We should support SAFECOOKIE authentication in Tor Browser, that is adapt
> the code in Torbutton and Tor Launcher accordingly.

New description:

 We should support `SAFECOOKIE` authentication in Tor Browser, that is
 adapt the code in Torbutton and Tor Launcher accordingly.

--

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Re: [tor-bugs] #20022 [Core Tor/Tor]: Tor should deprecate insecure cookie auth

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20022: Tor should deprecate insecure cookie auth
--+-
 Reporter:  dkg   |  Owner:
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+-

Comment (by gk):

 Replying to [comment:3 mcs]:
 > Tor Launcher and Torbutton do not support SAFECOOKIE. It sounds like
 something we should fix

 Yes, #20026 is the ticket for that.

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[tor-bugs] #20026 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Support SAFECOOKIE authentication in Tor Browser

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20026: Support SAFECOOKIE authentication in Tor Browser
--+--
 Reporter:  gk|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+--
 We should support SAFECOOKIE authentication in Tor Browser, that is adapt
 the code in Torbutton and Tor Launcher accordingly.

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